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TWO INDIAN APPROACHES TO THE SUBJECT-PREDICATE DISTINCTION

The topic of categories has occupied a central place in both Western and Indian Philosophy. That this is really so and not an exaggerated impression of common philosophical concern created by the fact that the same term is used to designate doctrines which, at least in the Western context, do not always have much more than the nomenclature in common is an objection not without force. After all, what is the common reference of "category" as it is used by, say, Aristotle and Kant, and by Ryle in our time? Nevertheless this difficulty can be overcome by characterising the common topic so as to make it both more specific and less far-ranging, its centrality being retained by its still remaining a point of division in philosophy as fundamental as any other that might be named. Thus even a cursory reading of Aristotle's *Categories* ought to convince a student of Indian Philosophy that the Stagira's preoccupation with substance has a strong parallel in the Nyāya and Jaina doctrines of substance; their respective lists of categories have marked resemblances. Similarly the protracted differences between the champions of substance like the Nyāya and Jaina philosophers on one side and the Buddhists on the other has unmistakeable parallels in Western philosophy in the debates between nominalists and realists in medieval philosophy and in 20th century philosophy, and those between empiricists and rationalists in the "Classical" period of modern philosophy.

Though this parallel is in my opinion extremely important, I do not wish to suggest that we should make a comparative study of Indian and Western Philosophies from this point of view. We have had enough of comparative studies for a long time to come, and I have no wish to make another addition to this list. For the present at least it will pay to be unhistorical and to worry in the main about problems only, to study philosophical problems in their Indian setting as obsessively as we do when we are doing philosophy and not concerning ourselves with obscure issues of somewhat antiquarian interest which tend to become charged with excessive emotion for reasons which are largely extra-philosophical.

The connexion between the subject predicate distinction and the categories may of course be seen in a variety of ways. I shall

begin at any rate with the form in which it comes down to us in Western philosophy from Aristotle and through the scholastics. In the *Categories* Aristotle assigns to first substance the primary place in his list of ten categories. This primacy consists in primary substance being characterizable in ways unique to it. He defines first substance as that which is neither present in a subject nor predicable of a subject. There are difficulties connected with the first part of this definition; but the second part of the definition is intended to provide an adequate criterion in itself. Even among philosophers who have not wanted to uphold substance there are many who argue that there are individuals which cannot occupy the predicate place without a radical change of sense.¹ Thus there is a well-established tradition in Western Philosophy which by linking together the subject predicate distinction and the particular universal distinction marks a fundamental difference which is both logical as well as ontological. Of course there have always been philosophers who have challenged or at least departed fundamentally from this approach. Thus Hobbes who held that a proposition was a concatenation of names in an extreme example of the opposite approach. This issue is too fundamental for one to talk about even in a related context without making commitments whose soundness will not appear unquestionable to others involved therein. I hope I shall be able to develop in this paper a fruitful theme without an undue measure of such commitments.

In modern philosophy the criterion of substance which has been most prominent has been that of independent existence. This does not receive explicit acknowledgement from Aristotle except in the dark saying, in the *Categories* and repeated elsewhere, that if substance did not exist nothing would exist. In fact, independent existence is for him a consequence of substantiality but is not a sufficient condition of it; thus a heap of stones has independent existence but is hardly a substance (what gives a substance independent existence is a union of form and matter; now a heap of stones, or an area in space is merely homogeneous and hardly articulated into a form.) The rationalists seem to have employed independent existence as the primary test of substance (though it has been claimed that this might not be true for Descartes).

Now it is obvious that this second criterion is not as precise as the first, for even if we can give "independent existence" a

workable application, there will be plenty of cases where it will be disputable whether or not something qualifies under the requirements which it is supposed to meet. But there is a much greater difficulty. Any worthwhile attempt to define substance must throw light on the nature of particulars, but the definition in term of independent existence puts particulars in very strange company without providing any means of making any interesting distinctions among them. (This shows itself in even time and space being included among substances in both Nyāya and Jaina logic.) Now someone might argue that this should not matter, for the aim of using independent existence is to pick out what prediacates or attributes are or may be predicated of. But this won't do, for there is not much we can say of space and time; in fact even what is sayable finds application only *via* reference to other things (intervals of time or areas of space are quantitatively large only in terms of criteria which we impose on them). And when we say that something occurs at time t_1 , or in space p_1 , we are not predicating anything of t_1 or p_1 . To give the locus (to use a term Ingalls uses to mark certain Navyanyāya ideas) of something is, if anything to make a spatial predication of that thing.

So to offer independent existence as the test of individuality defeats its own ultimate purpose, for it cannot place the notion of attribution or saying something of a subject on any solid foundation. No wonder then that the notion of substance has been under heavy fire in modern philosophy, for what has independent existence need not be a substance. If we translate Aristotle's main problem into the terms of existence, then for him the main problem was not what has independent existence, nor even what kinds of things must exist if anything is to exist at all, but "what is the primary sense of existence"? Aristotle answers the last question in two ways. The more successful, and complete, answer Aristotle gives it is in terms of his theory of form and matter; the other answer is in terms of a theory of predication which is not only incomplete but is also full of obscurity even where his recorded reflections on it are available to us.

Among Aristotle's failures in the latter regard has been listed² the penultimate in gravity—namely, that he went over to the two-term view of a proposition, which was surpassed only by Hobbes' view of the proposition as coupling of names. Whether or not

Geach is right in this conclusion about a philosopher whom he on the whole is very much in sympathy with. I think a matter for debate, but he is not dramatising when he refers to a mistake of this magnitude on the part of the most influential philosopher of the Western and Islamic worlds as a disaster comparable only to the Fall.

I want now to state categorically that I do not hold that the problem of substance, and more generally that of particulars, can be viewed mainly in these terms only. But it does seem to me that in Western philosophy even philosophers who are opposed to substance as a basic category see particularity as a kind of a symmetry in predication or in judgements, or as in recent philosophy in propositions. No doubt there are radical nominalists like Ramsay who put subject and predicate categorically on the same footing. But even for them facts, and so propositions, are autonomous. This no doubt amounts to a dark saying, whose purport I must now proceed to explain. And I shall do this by listing some of the different possibilities that are to be found in Indian philosophy.

If we consider the three main schools of logic in Indian philosophy—the Nyāya, the Buddhist and the Jaina—we find, at first sight at least, that though substance is an issue of primary importance to each of them, the topic of the proposition or judgement plays hardly a part at least in the first two of them. Subject and predicate are terms which in these two schools figure primarily as subject-term and predicate-term, i.e., as the terms of premises that can occur in a process of inference.³ There are two fairly straight forward points that may be noticed about treating subject and predicate as subject-term and predicate-term respectively. A premise is not something that is believed to be true or false, for in that respect it is indistinguishable from a proposition, but something from the assertion or admission of which some other proposition follows. That is a sufficient condition for something to be employable as a premise is that it is intelligible, and it does not have to represent even a possibility.

The second point that draws our attention is this in a premise though the subject-term may be singular by occurring in an inference the premise with such a term in fact functions as a universal. Thus in Barbara the minor premise "Socrates is a man" with the

singular term "Socrates" as subject is treated in the traditional "Aristotelian" doctrine of the syllogism as "All Socrates are men". This is correct because the validity of the syllogism depends on the subject-term being an instance of a universal of the right kind. So the reasoning is not about Socrates, except accidentally, but rather about any body who is like Socrates in the relevant respect. We might say that in the proposition "Socrates is a man", "a man" is only unimportantly predicated of Socrates because in figuring in the minor premise of a syllogism humanity belongs to no special individual except in so far as a general term is instantiated.

Let us now look at each of these closely, starting with the first. The former seems to be in the spirit of the Nyāya belief that everything that exists is knowable, for what is thinkable is presumably knowable in principle, and the thinkable is something wider in scope than the actual and the possible. Now it appears from the literature of Indian logic that inference is sharply distinguished from implication or the purely formal relations obtaining between propositions, and the former is viewed as an activity with its own purposes. But despite its purposiveness inference is still an activity and as such not any particular individual's prerogative. This means that however intensional Indian logic might be, it does not involve the impossible position of requiring in the inferential process itself a reference to the reasoner's own act of reasoning. We are now in a position to make a distinction between the *telos* of reasoning as an activity, or the *telos* of various kinds of reasoning and the reasoner's own end in reasoning in a certain manner. We assume that in the standard case an activity's own proper end and the performer's end must coincide but this assumption cannot be made in the present case. Why should I employ a form of reasoning, even if the activity does achieve a goal when successfully performed? Perhaps this question answers itself when the end of the reasoning is my good, and the question "Can I not desire my own good"? cannot be raised. But this could only be the case in the sphere of practical reasoning. We are thus forced to the conclusion that, for there to be a reasoner employing a form of reasoning there has to be concern on his part with particulars, for human purposes could only be expressed or realised by operations on particulars.

This means that we need a theory of reference as well as a theory of inference. But a theory of reference should not be confused with a theory of meaning. No doubt we are here operating in a very difficult and still largely uncharted area, but we are able to make certain valid points without a systematic study of the interrelatedness of these two topics. Thus while it is true that someone who says "A cat ran across the garden" will not have made a significant utterance unless he has satisfied certain referential conditions, nevertheless while the cat so referred to must be the cat he meant it will nevertheless not be the same cat included in the explication of the meaning of what was said on this occasion. But what about proper names, and uniquely referring expressions like, "the President of India"? Here again the conclusion is similar. We must not rush to embrace the position that because a proper name is not an unmeaning mark therefore this expression *means* the present holder of this office. It is only in a communicative situation or in an actual judgement or at least in entertaining thought expressible in a judgement that such a reference is at this juncture necessary. That the present President of India is Mr. N. Sanjiva Reddy does not belong to the meaning of any utterance which might include "the present President of India" as a constituent. In other words the principle that what might be a necessary condition of a successful employment of a form of speech need not belong to its meaning finds an illustration in this case.

Our second point is an analogous one—just as the particular which I refer to on a particular occasion when I use a referring expression is not to be included in an account of the meaning of the utterance which takes place on that occasion, but at best in what I then meant, the Socrates I refer to in the process of inference when using the stock-example of a syllogism in Barbara can figure only in an account of what I then did, and not in the inferential process employed, where this particular individual has no place whatever.

Thus, the successful reference to a particular by the use of a referential expression does not imply that the inferential process in which a term of this nature is introduced must at some point contain a reference to this same particular, or in fact, some particular rather than another. In other words, that inference is not particular

referring is clearly not some kind of result achieved through some of kind procedure of selecting a suitable device or set of devices. But particulars can and have been kept out of discourse by employing a suitable mode of quantification (Quine) or, at least purportedly, by what Strawson calls "feature-placing" language. It is this latter which is of some interest to us, for it bears obvious resemblance to certain (allegedly?) Navya-Nyāya doctrines. Thus Ingalls says: "It is worth noting that Navya-Nyāya does not confuse, as Aristotle does, the predicates of members of a class with the predicate of the class itself. Aristotle would hold that in the statement:

(1) 'All men are mortal'

mortality is predicated of the class of all men, just as in

(2) 'Socrates is wise'

wisdom is predicated of Socrates.

But in Navya-Nyāya (2) would be represented by:

'Socrates is a locus of wisdom by inherence', whereas

(1) would be represented by: 'mortality pervades humanity', i.e., 'every locus of man-ness by H is a locus of death-ness by P'.

(pp. 75-76)

I shall leave aside the question whether Aristotle is guilty of the error in question (the charge itself is framed in an unsatisfactory manner) but it is not difficult to see that Ingalls makes a rather elementary mistake in describing the Navya-Nyāya position. As we have already seen, location does not necessarily mark predication; in locating something at a particular location we do not make a predication, though a contextual implication to this effect might be present (which is not of any relevance here). So the nature of the Navya-Nyāya distinction is not all clear from Ingalls' own remarks. Nor am I myself in a position to offer a better answer. But, since the Navya-Nyāya writers were preoccupied with vyāpti (pervasion) we could perhaps say that they were employing a notion which was neutral between the two kinds of language distinguished by Strawson.

We are now in a position to see that since what is said in respect of something is not necessarily, when so said, predicated of it we are faced with a whole host of problems in philosophical logic

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of a most difficult nature. Aristotle was well aware of these problems, and there is plenty of evidence in his logical writings of how much he must have battled in grappling with them. But the results are not recorded in a satisfactory manner; in good part this is simply because very often he was far from being wholly successful in his efforts. Frege, in my opinion, was too good in his philosophical instincts not to have been aware of these problems, and in fact, this can be seen even from the volume of selected writings edited by Black and Geach. But the more formal of his interests seem as a rule to prevail in his work, so that not much help can be derived from him. Among contemporary writers, Grice clearly shows awareness of the need to investigate the notion of predication itself. I am surprised to find that a writer of the acumen of Geach (in *Reference and Generality*, for instance) is almost obstinate in refusing to see unsolved problems in this part of philosophical logic. He rightly hails Frege's discovery of the predicate calculus, but does not take note of the basic distinction which generates the bafflements. A proposition, he says, is divisible into two components, viz. subject and predicate; in this respect all propositions are alike. But, as Geach recognises, predicating is a propounding of a proposition (at least minimally of what may be believed to be true or false or placed in a certain relation to other propositions); this means that in a proposition not only are a subject and a predicate held together but also that something is predicated of the subject. Now the completeness belongs only to the subject and the predicate taken together but not to the subject and what is predicated of it. Thus "Socrates" and "is wise" are the two constituents of the proposition "Socrates is wise" but "wisdom" which is predicated of Socrates, does not complete this proposition as "is wise" does. There are different modes of predication in this sense (Aristotle's list of categories may be taken to be an attempt to classify these modes). The point I am trying to make is a valid one since the distinction between the substantive "predicate" and the verb "to predicate" is more than the distinction between a noun and its corresponding verb form.

I cannot of course hope to give a fully satisfactory or even an adequate account of this distinction. What I propose to do is to adopt the following course in the remaining part of the paper. I shall make a few further remarks very briefly with the purpose of

Justifying the need to make the kind of distinction I have suggested, and then comment on the *Syād-vāda-manjari* (F.W. Thomas's translation : Motilal Banarsidass) in order to make a partial characterisation of what it is to predicate of a subject by trying to place this activity within its proper context.

As Geach points out⁴, while subject and predicate are linguistic items, so that the predicate is a linguistic item "attached to" another linguistic item namely the subject, but what that linguistic item stands for. Thus "is wise" is attached to "Socrates", but is not predicated of the name "Socrates", for it is Socrates who is wise and not his name. So it seems perfectly reasonable to assume that the activity of predicating must at least aim at attributing something of a subject that is taken to have reality. Furthermore, before there can be an act of predication there must be a subject already picked out, even if it is not the one intended. This means that what is already necessarily known in picking out a subject-term must place limits on the scope of what is predicatable of this subject-term; for predicating could not be an entirely pointless activity.

As against predicating we have what might be called "saying" or "thinking something" of a subject. We have already seen that what is said in respect of a term is not necessarily thereby predicated of it. But the notion I am now trying to explain, though analagous, is of the utmost generality; it is much more extensive in scope than the notion I want to contract it with. That saying or thinking extends so widely arises from there being a number of dimensions in which it can find scope. Thus I can be said to be not whatever is other than myself. There is so much that can become accidentally true of an individual; and there are no logical limits to what something with a distinct nature can be distinguished from. But these two descriptions do not designate an identical group. Only an unthinking dogmatism could lead someone to hold that all that can be said or thought in this way is to be described as one species or another of predication. Again that things take time to say or that our thought processes are time-bound provides another dimension in which what is said or thought can range almost without limit. Thus what I say admits not only of contradiction but even of incoherence in a way in which what is ascribed or attributed

cannot. The principal reason why this is so lies of course in predication not being itself in any way temporal.

Let us now take a look at *Syād-vāda-mañjari*, the celebrated Jaina work in logic. Jainism is often described as "relativist" in approach, and more recently some would suggest that its logic is many-valued. I do not know whether these suggestions are based on sound reflection or whether they arise from a measure of thoughtlessness; in the absence of close study of works such as the above mentioned, we are in no position to assess such claims or even to give them any precise sense. I shall comment on just two crucial chapters in the *Mañjari*, namely chapters 23 and 28, which are on the 'seven-nuances view' and the *nayas* respectively. Even these I cannot do justice to, for they call for the kind of study which chapters in, say Plato's *Republic* or Descartes's *Meditations* have received. I shall confine myself to a few of the broadest remarks. The two doctrines, of the seven-nuance view and of the *nayas* are said to be in harmony. I suggest that they are in fact so, and by virtue of offering a doctrine covering both what I have called "saying" and "predicating" in a marvellous sweep of comprehensiveness. The seven-nuances arises, in Hemacandra's words, from "distinction of expression", and the seven nuances are made up from affirmation, negation and unutterability. (In the following chapter *Mallisena* says that "non-existence, existence, and unutterability" are "the chief, and the remaining nuances are, as due to combination, simply included in these", p. 142). They are made up into their list of seven by the introduction of tense. This schematism is a fairly formal one, for the operations performed are affirmation and negation or combinations formed from these by employing temporal distinctions. Nevertheless the whole theory is firmly tied to reality by giving statements giving "the own-form" and "substance-meaning" primacy. Thus the two doctrines are ultimately complementary, despite their radically different orientations.

Now let us look at the chapter on the *nayas*. It is said that though the methods are infinite, the number seven has the same primary application here too. Thus: "And to this effect the ancients, 'As many as are the ways of statement, just so many are the Method-statements'. Nevertheless, the ancients by working

out a purport of seven, as all-embracing formulated only seven : As follows : Naigama (market place), the comprehensive (sam-graha), the conventional (vyavahāra), the straightforward (rjusutra), the verbal (śabda), the etymological (samābhirudha) and the ' just so ' (evambhūta). (p. 154).

Let us note the following :

- (a) The " all-embracing " purports are said to be seven. This implies that the possibility of other purposes is recognised, and that to a certain extent looseness in the formulation of the doctrine of methods is implied. We might also say that the actual seven included in the list are in need of scrutiny. Here clearly there is much scope for disagreement and dispute.
- (b) We must disabuse our minds of any simple opposition such as realism vs. nominalism or conventionalism. All the seven methods are descriptive of reality; they are all partially valid, which means that they are partially revelatory of truth. It is only where they are misapplied that we are liable to error. When correctly applied they attain their ends fully and are in themselves complete. To say that they are partial is in effect to say that they are what they are and not another thing.
- (c) A division is made between the first four and the rest. In the former category, each successful application gives us what is " ultimately real ". We may want to grade things that are ultimately real, but this is not to derogate in any way from their ultimate reality. The point of attaching *quodammodo* (in a way) in each of the seven cases lies in directing attention to the errors perpetuated by other schools. If there was no liability to such errors everything said in these modes would be taken to be what it is.
- (d) Though the other three methods are less important as sources of knowledge, they are no less essential in so far as we are the kind of knowers that we are⁵ (This is extrapolation on my part). For that things are called by the names they are given is important to us, even when it is not to what is called by the name it has received. Even here both the verbal and etymological methods are

not seem as in any way arbitrary. Though names are given by us they are not just somehow given. That Indra has the names he has is perfectly intelligible. (When we call a sickly and moronic looking child "kind of lion" the institution of naming is being abused. And thus even the etymological method retains a measure of sanity. Here we have therefore a very important notion. Naming not being altogether arbitrary, calling has a descriptive role. That something is called by a certain name marks not merely a historical fact of naming and the pragmatic one of human convenience, but also something in the field of ontology. So if we can speak of predicating even in the vestigial area of etymology the whole doctrine of the *nayas* can be viewed as a doctrine of predication.

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NOTES

1. The asymmetry between subject and predicate is also stressed by Plato, e.g. in the *Sophist*.
2. By Geach in his inaugural lecture.
3. See Appendix notes a and b.
4. *Reference and Generality*, pp 22-23.
5. I have some doubts about the "just so". It suggests the notion of form (which is pretty basic) and also that of context or occasion which can be minor

ANALYSIS IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Considering the General nature of the topic proposed for discussion in this seminar, I do not feel sure if I would be justified in narrowing down the scope of the discussion by electing to make a few observations in this paper on 'Analysis'. The reason for my choice of this particular subject is that without some illustration it cannot be shown how modern western philosophising looks in the perspective of Indian philosophical speculations, and 'analysis' being the major trend in modern thought no better illustration could perhaps be chosen to expound my point of view on the subject. I may also refer to some other problems generally regarded as peculiar to Indian philosophy and therefore having no topical relevance today, to suggest the view that philosophical problems, whether Indian or western, never become outdated and lose significance.

The conveners of the Seminar have aptly pointed out, in their note, that in the philosophical fraternity of India there is prevalent the impression that the philosophical thought of the ancient Indian schools has very little to say that is relevant to the solution or even the proper understanding of problems hotly debated today. If this impression were correct and based on a first-hand intensive study of the schools, then the sooner we get rid of our concern with Indian Philosophy the better. But I am afraid, the modern Indian Philosopher's impression about the contemporary irrelevance of Indian schools of thinking is quite hasty and even distorted. He has no better access to these schools than through the histories of them which, to say the least, are no better than bird's-eye views of only the major doctrines expounded by some of them. Detailed first-hand studies of each of the schools or any of its major doctrines, like Scherbatsky's 'Buddhist Logic' are rarely attempted these days. Perhaps the neglect and indifference reflected in the prevalent attitude towards Indian philosophy is inspired by the over-weeningly conceited view of most modern Indian thinkers that the philosophical thought of an unscientific age could not possibly have any relevance to the philosophical problems of an out-and-out scientific era. I for one do not see eye to eye with this oft-repeated plea;

science for all its advance, does not seem to me to have changed much the nature of philosophical problems. But instead of arguing this point in an abstract manner, I would discuss briefly two problems apparently far removed from matters of current philosophical interest, to vindicate my point that almost all Indian philosophy of the schools has topical relevance today.

The first is the problem of the eternity of the Vedas. In view of the fact that the Vedas are vast literary compositions characterised by all the qualities that go along with human authorship, it would seem quite perverse to debate the question with a philosophical air whether these works are human creations or not. Most of the modern oriental scholars have been confused by this debate and have therefore tried somehow to explain it away. But if we take into consideration the technical meaning of 'imperative statements' assigned to the word 'Vēda' by Mīmāṃsā, and further interpret the above question as inquiring whether imperatives having to do with moral commandments derive their authority from that of any human speakers of them or they are self-authoritative, the contemporary relevance of the above question becomes evident at once. It is evidently the familiar question of the 'categoricity of imperatives' discussed in Kantian ethics.

The second problem is, on the face of it, no less anachronistic than the first. In his commentary on the fourth aphorism of the Brahma-sutras, Śaṅkara joins issue with the Mīmāṃsists on their theory that only statements laying down ritualistic injunctions can be admitted as significant (if they occur in the scriptures). The Upaniṣadic statements purporting to make simple reference to ultimate reality have therefore to be interpreted as suggesting the necessity of some kind of action, say that of prayer, etc., in regard to the ultimate reality. It is obvious that the controversy presented in this form is bound to strike a modern student of philosophy as futile and senseless. But a slight change of idiom would suddenly transform it into a burning issue of contemporary philosophy. Śaṅkara, as the advocate of a certain theory of meaning, is here attacking the Mīmāṃsists who advocate another theory—the Indian and more refined counterpart of the modern theory of sense-verification which like the latter, rules out as not nonsensical, but as having only a secondary sense (or Arthavāda) the Upaniṣadic statements purporting to make significant reference to the transcendental re-

lity of Brahman. The sallies and countersallies that take place between the Mīmāṃsists and Śaṅkara on this issue remind one vividly of similar polemics occurring between the positivists and their opponents in modern discussions. Again, if it were explained that Śaṅkara's elaborate explication of the meaning of the indeclinable 'Artha' in his commentary on the first aphorism is not mere exegesis but is a serious and rational attempt to justify the possibility, significance and feasibility of the realisation of Brahman, the discussion is at once thrown into a new perspective and it then assumes an extraordinary topical importance.

I have chosen only stray examples to just illustrate my point that even ancient Indian thinking can be a help in solving the philosophical problems of this scientific era. I now propose to discuss in some detail, one particular topic of modern philosophy, namely analysis, in the perspective of the speculations of Indian schools on the subject. In a short paper like this I cannot hope to present more than a bare outline of the discussion conducted on this subject in Sanskrit treatises. Analysis is the major trend of modern philosophising and it has emerged as such by way of a violent reaction against the sweeping generalisations and syntheses of the Hegelians and the Neo-Hegelians. This reaction in its earlier phases voiced by Moore and Russell, at the turn of the century, took the almost extreme course of equating philosophy with logic itself which, for Russell was the analytical discipline par excellence. Moore was however sober-minded enough not to identify philosophy with analysis but even he practised nothing but analysis all through his life.

An exactly similar trend we find raising its head for the first time in the sphere of Indian thought in the form of Buddhism which has been given the significant name 'Vibhajjavāda' in the Buddhist canonical literature. It must have been against the unsystematised, intuitive and sweeping generalisations of the Upaniṣads and the Upaniṣadic thinkers that Buddhism had to raise a strong voice of protest and this it did upholding the thesis that analysis is the essence of philosophy and that the real is the indivisible, self-contained and unique moment itself. Even in the avowedly analytical philosophy of atomism propounded by Russell and the subtle philosophical analysis of precepts in terms of sense-data proposed by Moore, we fail to find the depth of philosophical

insight which could enable them to proclaim boldly that reality is the ultimate spatio-temporal and qualitative unit itself and not that entity whose ultimacy is relative to a particular type of analysis. Compared to the vacillating attitude of the early analysts like Russell, Moore, Broad and others towards the problems of reality, the Buddhistic approach to it seems to be thoroughly honest, bold and confident. „

There is another remarkable thing about the Buddhist philosophy of analysis. Russell, Moore and other modern analysts borrowed ready-made the analytical point of view from the sciences. I have not come across any rigorous logical argument advanced by any of these thinkers to support the analytical thesis. But it is quite different with the Buddhists. They have first formulated in precise logical terms the commonsense criterion of reality which is to the effect that whatever is real must be effective in producing some perceptible result (Arthakriyākāritvam Sattvam). Literally taken, this implies that no real entity can remain ineffective even for a moment and that two different results cannot issue from the same entity, for, if an entity is capable of producing them either successively or simultaneously it should produce them all at once. It will not do to say against this that even a cause requires the help of auxiliary conditions to produce its own results. In that case it could be rejoined that a result which is not wholly dependent upon its so-called cause cannot reasonably be regarded as its effect and further that the auxiliaries being only the partial causes of the cumulative result, they and the main cause may, without difficulty, produce their separate results at the same time. By this line of argument, which is developed to its logical perfection, the Buddhists seek to deduce the analytical doctrine from the common notion of reality itself. Whole treatises in Sanskrit have been devoted to logical hairsplitting on this issue but the modern founders of the analytical movement do not seem to be aware of the need of any rigorous argument in this regard.

Further, it can also be said to the credit of the Buddhists that they have successfully applied the analytical thesis to every sphere of reality not excluding eschatology. Moore got so inextricably stuck up in the morass of the sense-data metaphysics that all through his philosophical career he remained preoccupied with the problem of the relation of sense data to perceptual objects and so he could

not even turn to the epistemological problem as to how sense-data can be sensed if they are fleeting entities. It was because of his lack of awareness of the epistemological problem that Moore could maintain the position in ethics that ethical properties are *suigeneris* and are intuitively apprehended, which is in flagrant contradiction with his metaphysical position. Russell, however, tried to construct a realist epistemology but even he remained blissfully unaware of the main epistemological difficulty that any sense-data metaphysics has to face, namely, that the momentary sense-data and their momentary cognitions can never be directly connected with each other. The early Buddhists' attempts to negotiate this hurdle without being precipitated into the idealistic position show how keen an eye they had for philosophical subtleties. In comparison, the modern analysts' performance in this sphere seems to be rather half-hearted and slipshod, not to say of their utter indifference to explain eschatological matters on analytical lines. The Buddhists have quite consistently with their metaphysics developed a system of transcendental ethics from which the very idea of soul is excluded.

Like the Buddhist, the Naiyāyika also expounds the analytical point of view but he cannot be said to have any definite ontological commitments with regard to the nature of reality. As the celebrated remark goes : 'Buddhyā Yadupannam Tannyāyamatam' the Nyāya would regard that to be real or true whose existence is justifiable by reason. This does not exclude commonsense but cautions us against an indiscriminate reliance in and use of it. As Moore would put it, it is one thing to say that one knows a thing but quite a different and a very serious thing to say that one knows the analysis of what one says one knows. Nyāya makes it one of its main business to provide the analysis of all important commonsensical notions.

All analysis in philosophy must be conceptual whether the concepts analysed are pure or are embodied in linguistic forms or structures. It is not actual entities or their attributes and properties which philosophy can legitimately claim to analyse, for these are in *rerum natura* either self-analysed or non-composite. In the former case the business of philosophy would be confined to merely revealing the analytical nature of things. If the latter alternative holds, philosophical analysis would entail the fallacy of metaphysi-

cal division. Concepts, however, are not identical with common objects but they are also not pure fictions or even mere logical constructions as Russell would say. Again, they are also not mere projections of the transcendental *Vāsanā* or *Vijñāna* as the *Yogācāra* idealists have maintained. They are epistemic structures grounded upon ontological realities which our various modes of cognition help build up when they come in contact with objects. To illustrate, a book is before me on the table. The book, the table and their mutual relation of conjunction are all realities in the world of nature. Now, since I perceive the book on the table and not the table on the book, each of these entities must figure in a certain way even in my simple cognition of the book on the table. The book figures as lying above the table, so we may call this mode of figuring as *Prakārata*. The table, on the other hand, figures as standing below the book, so we call its mode of figuring as '*Viśeṣata*'. Similarly the connection between these two figures only as a relation and not as a term; so we may call its mode of figuring as '*Saṃsargyā*'. Corresponding to each of these modes of figuring there has to be admitted the emergence of a mode in the cognition itself so that the latter would be endowed with a '*Prakāritā*' a '*Viśeṣitā*' and a '*Saṃsargitā*' respectively. If this is not admitted, then all differences of cognitions would fall on the side of objects and then the obvious difference between the perception of a book on the table and that of a table with the book under it cannot be easily explained.

So *Nyāya* has postulated a large number of conceptual entities like the above to fill the apparent gaps in our reason-pictures of commonplace facts. *Nyāya* is called '*Lakṣanaikacakṣuṣka*' in Indian philosophy for it does not rest satisfied with commonsense accounts of things but tries to give a compact and fool-proof account of these, for which purpose exact definitions based upon a rigorous analysis of common notions have to be formulated. This task involves some major difficulties, two of which may be referred to here in order to show how *Nyāya* has very ingeniously resolved them. One difficulty is about the status of the conceptual entities vis-a-vis the real entities with which they are supposed to be epistemically related. If these are regarded as real, as the commonplace objects, it would not only be overpopulating the real world but their non-recognition for what they are by unphilosophical people would be an enigma. If on the other hand these entities are treated as mere

logical constructs, as has been done by Russell, the necessity of their incorporation in the analytical account is left unexplained. Indian logicians hold different views on this matter but the majority of them are of the opinion that these entities are to be conceived as certain types of self relations '*svarūpa sambandha*'. This is a tricky notion of Nyāya which cannot be gone into here. It would suffice to say only this much about it that it is a way of conceiving a thing under a relational aspect. Adapting the terminology of modern logic, one can even say that a conceptual entity is the relational function of the entity whose structure is subjected to logical analysis.

Another difficulty which is likely to present itself in this account is one which every formal logician has to face at some stage or other in his analytical investigation of things. It is the difficulty of explaining the apparent discrepancy between the logical and the commonsensical descriptions of a thing. If the structure of an entity is as complex as the logician makes it out, why does it appear quite simple and homogeneous to the common man? It is not a satisfactory reply to this to say that the common man cannot be expected to know the analytical structure of a thing; for if the thing is really as complex as the logician makes it out to be even the common man must know this complexity. Nyāya's solution of this difficulty is that all the complexity that is discovered by analysis falls on the side of the relation which is supposed to hold together the different parts of the analytical structure of a thing. This relation as relation is unanalysable and therefore the question of its analytical presentation along with the presentation of its relata cannot be raised. If the relation were to present itself as a term it would cease to be a relation. But for the purpose of logical analysis, relation must be treated as a term and therefore each of its component elements must present itself separately. Many other difficulties, which cannot be mentioned here, are sought to be overcome by adopting this device by the Naiyāyikas.

Even this sketchy account of analysis as practised by Nyāya would, by comparison, bring home to a serious thinker the serious inadequacy that characterises almost all analyses of concepts propounded by modern analysts. This relates to the explication of the logical nexus of the various component elements into which a conceptual entity is analysed. To illustrate. The concept of negation of an entity may be analysed by a modern analyst into the two com-

ponents, the entity itself and its negation. But a good many things remain undisclosed in this simple analysis. The entity is involved in its negation as its counterpositive. The specific character of the entity would also be involved in the negation as the limiter of the counterpositiveness of the latter. The counterpositiveness again would have to be related to the negation as its converse. Only when all these things are explicitly stated complete analytical picture of the negation can be said to have emerged. As Johnson has very aptly pointed out in his *Logic*, analysis is not mere separation of a complex or whole into its parts; it is the complete explication of the mode under which the various component elements are determined so as to constitute the whole.


We have dwelt at great length on conceptual analysis; but what about the other forms of analysis like those of common usage and other usages which are the fashion in modern thought? Does Nyāya or any other Indian school deal with this type of analysis? The reply to this question is partly affirmative and partly negative. Nyāya is quite definite on the point that philosophical problems are not reducible to those of mere semantics. Discussion of usages becomes relevant only when words are to be precisely fixed in their meanings. We have abundant discussion of usages in that part of Nyāya which has to do with semantics. For instance, the precise determination of the meaning of ego-centric particulars like 'I' 'That' etc. has taken up a lot of space in Nyāya works like *Śaktivāda* In *Vyutpativāda* and *Sabdsaktiprakāśikā*. We have detailed discussion of the semantics of prefixes, suffixes, cases, verbs and so on in which thinkers of different schools take different positions. But such discussions are never mixed up with the philosophical explication of concepts. However near to common experience and usage Nyāya may be, its attitude to it is more prescriptive than descriptive. It has rarely allowed mere established usage or comparison of different usages to decide philosophical problems. Even in the west, as recent writings show, the interest in usage analysis seems to be on the wane.

I may wind up this account with some remarks on the Vedāntic approach to 'analysis'. Vedānta and Buddhism are poles apart and yet as opposite extremes they seem to converge on certain points. The Buddhistic real is the analytical ultimate while the Vedāntic real is the synthetic (or universal) ultimate. But as ultimates

both defy the imposition of any character or extraneous mark upon them. They are therefore *svayamprakāśa* or *svalakṣaṇa*; that is to say, not dependent upon anything outside themselves to manifest their identity. Though they may be described as tolerating *Upādhi* and *vikalpa*, yet these are, to adopt a modern terminology, only the dependent existential (in the case of Vedānta) and logical functions of the ultimate realities (in the case of Buddhism). For Vedānta as opposed to Nyāya analysis is the distorter of reality. Hence even on the empirical plane, where Vedānta shows its readiness to go the whole hog with Nyāya in its account of the means of knowledge (*Prāmāṇa*) it yet makes the reservation that even knowledge derived through *Prāmāṇa* is mediated through and through and is therefore indirect. The essence of reality is self-revelation and it must come out even in empirical knowledge. Hence while agreeing with other schools in their descriptions of the processes leading to perception, the Vedānta parts company with them in maintaining that the object of perception emerges in total definance of the subjective and the objective conditions by which it is usually obscured. Thus, analysis for Vedānta is a negative condition of knowledge while for Nyāya it is its positive condition. But even Nyāya, for all its analyticity, does not regard analysis as the final goal of philosophy. The distinctive apprehension of truths (leading to self-realisation as in other schools) is the goal which analysis is supposed to lead us to. If analysis were the end of philosophising it could never be reached for no analysis of a concept can be claimed as the final one. Yet if an ad hoc analysis of a concept adequately reveals its structure, it may be accepted as satisfactory for the purpose in hand.

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BRADLEY AND SANKARA

I

The present seminar is an essay in comparative philosophy. I believe its aim is to evolve a perspective in philosophy within which a deeper reconciliation and a more fruitful synthesis of divergent truths can be had. There is an essential unity characterizing systems of human philosophy which is not disturbed or marred by the "strife of systems". This is why the surviving "isms" merely suggest, as Perry put it, the battle-cries of a war that has ended in a peace without victory; this is why there is a "meeting of extremes", and an endeavour to move "beyond idealism and realism". Every philosophical problem has a many-sided richness about it. The problems also run into one another, so much so that every philosophical concept turns out to be an abbreviation of system. Every approach to the problem is legitimate and there can be no question of substituting one approach by another. This explains how A.N. Whitehead's 'philosophy of organism' which, according to the author himself, while it is "based upon a recurrence to that phase of philosophic thought which began with Descartes and ended with Hume", is, in its final outcome, "a transformation of some main doctrine of Absolute Idealism onto a realistic basis", "an approximation to Bradley"¹. This also explains how this very philosophy, with its concept of 'Creativity' and of 'God' as its primordial, non-temporal accident, "seems to approximate to some strains of Indian, or Chinese, thought, than to western Asiatic, or European thought"². If Descartes, Locke, Hume, and Bradley can be rolled into one, there is sufficient justification for a seminar on comparative philosophy with "mutual self-discovery and self-illumination" as its watch word. "Let both grow together until the harvest".

In a way the key-problems of philosophy have always been the same. They are the problems of Reality, of Value and Meaning, and of Knowledge. But the problems always grow on a particular psychological soil which has an antecedent past and which determines the future 'go' of the philosophic quest. The formulation of the problem may receive a peculiar slant. It may for example appear as the problem of 'Meaningful Life' of 'Intelligible

World' or of the 'Criterion of Intelligibility'. As the problems run into one another, we cannot say something about one problem without, at the same time having said something about the other ones. As every philosophical concept is an abbreviation of system from whatever point of view we may take up the question of philosophic interpretation, from the standpoint of fundamental distinctions within being, such as mind, matter, life, spirit, from the point of view of philosophic categories or concepts, such as origin and destiny, cause and purpose, development and progress; or finally, from the point of view of ultimate values, in every case the unity of philosophic thought and of the categories scheme is visible.³ There can be no question of substituting one approach by another, and Kant's claim to have introduced a Copernican change in philosophy by insisting that objects must conform to knowledge and not knowledge to objects seems to be an exceedingly exaggerated claim.

II

I propose to bring together one western and one Indian view concerning the problem of 'Reality' in order to see whether and how far these perspectives enrich each other and help the emergence of a unified picture as the result of mutual self-discovery and self-illumination. I believe the doctrines of Indian philosophy have sufficient vitality to influence the current of modern philosophy in the west.

Some modern, newfangled, perspectives in philosophy dispen-
 pence with the notion of "*ens realissimum*" because they find that there is an element of 'prejudice' in the varried and contrasting definitions of the real. We may identify the real with the actual, or with the non-existent or the subsistent, with the permanent or the changing, with that which is related or which is independent of relations; but we cannot do away with the concept. It is the very *a priori* of intelligible thought and intelligible discourse. What is it, then, *to be real*? And what is that in human experience *which answers to the notion of reality*? These two questions are crucial questions for philosophy.

In recent times we find singularly bold and strikingly original attempt being made by Bradley to reconstruct the notion of Reality⁴ which he offers as the essential message of Hegel.⁵ It is an idealistic view of Reality. The nerve of this Idealism is that "Reality is

spiritual"⁶. Outside of spirit there is not and there cannot be, any reality, and the more that anything is spiritual, so much the more is it veritably real.⁷ The question we have to put to ourselves is : What is it to be spiritual and in what sense can one thing be more spiritual than another according to Bradley ? What is the notion of "spirit" outside of which there cannot be any reality ? In what sense are 'Reality' and 'Spirit' synonymous ? Is the conception of 'Spirit' identical with the conception of 'Absolute Experience' as defined by Bradley ?

Pure Spirit, according to Bradley's notion of it, is realized in the Absolute. It can never appear as such and with its full character in the scale of existence i.e. among the phenomena. It is a unity of the manifold in which the externality of the manifold has utterly ceased.⁸ The Spirit is described by Bradley as "absolute life" and "absolute experience". The concrete content of absolute life is 'experience' and nothing but sentient experience. Bradley identified existence with experience. By describing the Real as Absolute Experience he intends to bring out and emphasize the immediacy characterizing the supreme reality or Absolute Life and to show that the externality of the manifold is overcome in the Absolute. The main features of Absolute Life, to some extent, are within our own experience and they are drawn from it. We have a suggestion here of the unity of a whole embracing distinctions within itself. This we have in 'mere feeling or immediate presentation' which is the experience of felt unity. Bradley thus reaches the idea of a higher experience in which thought shall as it were, return to the immediacy of feeling. "We can form the general idea of an absolute experience in which phenomenal distinctions are merged, a whole becomes immediate at a higher stage without losing any richness".⁹

In describing the Absolute as Absolute Experience, Bradley emphasizes the 'content' side of reality and neglects the 'that' aspect of experience which he identifies with reality. According to Bradley, in anything considered real we find two aspects, a 'that' and a 'what' an 'existence' and a 'content', and the two are inseparable. We cannot get the one without the other. That anything should be and should yet be nothing in particular is impossible. That a quality should not qualify and give a character to anything, is equally impossible. We can get neither the 'that

nor the 'what' by itself. They are distinguishable only and are not divisible. In isolation neither of them can be taken as real. Bradley speaks of "the dualism of the 'that' and the 'what'".¹⁰ Judgement is essentially the reunion of two sides, 'what' and 'that' provisionally estranged.

In no judgement are the subject and predicate the same; but in every judgement the subject is more than the predicate and is a 'that' beyond a mere 'what'. In every judgment the subject is reality which goes beyond the predicate; but the subject is never mere reality, or bare existence without character. But the 'content' or 'what' aspects of experience gets the upper hand in Bradley and the Absolute comes to be treated as Absolute Experience. Reality must be one Experience, self-pervading and superior to mere relations. Thought which provides the test of reality for Bradley—for only what satisfies the intellect is to be taken as either true or real—can be absorbed into a "fuller experience", in a superior form, namely "immediacy" which we find in feeling. I would become "experience entire"¹¹ and "be present as a higher intuition"¹² involving a complete transformation of thought which is also its consummation. To go on calling it 'thought' would, however, be indefensible even according to Bradley. The Absolute Experience, however, is, in the end, the sole perfect realization of Spirit.¹³ Pure Spirit is not realized except in the Absolute.

In reducing the concept of the Absolute Reality to that of the Absolute Experience and reconstructing it in terms of mere 'content' to the obvious exclusion of the 'that' aspect of the real Bradley has done violence to the very structure of reality. The main features of reality, of the Absolute, are down from our own experience which wears the two aspects of the 'that' and the 'what', an 'existence' and a 'content'. These two are inseparable. They are distinguishable only and are not divisible. The main features of Absolute Life are within our own experience and the genral idea of the Absolute has to be formulated in terms of this experience. Finite experience involves the dualism of the 'that' and the 'what'. It has a 'subject' aspect and a 'content' aspect. It is in the works of Cunningham, centre-content. Bradley seems to indentify experience exclusively with 'content'; the real is 'experience' 'sentient experience' for him. He neglects the 'subject' aspect of experience and regards it as of diminishing significance in the pro-

cess of self-transcendence. 'Content', apart from a 'centre' or 'subject' of experience is an abstraction. The relation between the 'subject' and the 'content' is a crucial problem for any philosophy which takes up the problem of the real. The subject or centre is what the content makes it, and the content is as it is defined by the centre or the subject. If one is abstracted from the other we have to face the dilemma: either "sublation" of the individual or complete "self-sufficiency" i.e. existential distinctness of it.¹⁴ In Bradley's absolutism the individual has met the same fate. Self transcendence for Bradley turns out to be sublation. For him the individual is quite unreal from the side of the Absolute, self-hood being a vanishing distinction. The finite self is "embraced and harmonized in the Absolute through its being suppressed as such". The finite as such disappears in the Absolute. 'Merged', 'blended', 'fused', 'absorbed', 'run together', 'dissolved', 'destroyed', 'lost'—these are some of the words used by Bradley to express the disappearance of the finite individual in the Absolute.

If we keep in mind both the aspects of experience, the content as well as the subject aspect, self-transcendence will mean not only the expansion of the content but also the enrichment of the centre and fullness of emergence. This will not be the perpetuation of "the dualism of the 'that' and the 'what'" but the overcoming of it without neglecting these two aspects of human experience. The presentation of the Absolute only in terms of the 'what' or the 'content' aspect of experience, its presentation as Absolute Experience, as "experience entire", as "immediacy" or "higher intuition", neglecting its presentation as the 'that' as the 'subject', which is more than the what and is never mere reality, or bare existence without character, is not to overcome the dualism of the 'that' and the 'what'. The way to overcome it is to realize, on the basis of experience itself, that there is a point where "that" and "what", existence and content, fact and meaning, reality and value fuse in one. 'That' and 'what' are thought concepts and for thought they will remain distinct to the end. But their distinction cannot deter 'something' or an 'entity' being both, reality *and* value, existence *and* content, and realizing in its life the fusion of the two. The truly real can be its own meaning. Its existence can be its meaning and its meaning embodies in its existence. For thought there can be no more adequate way of

giving expression to the overcoming of the dualism of 'existence' and 'content' than by pointing out that self-transcendence in human experience is a double movement and human language can embody this by speaking of the (i) expansion of the content as well as (ii) the enrichment of the centre, both taking place *pari passu*. Śaṅkara described the Absolute, the Brahman, as Ātman, as the subject, and also as Liberation (Mokṣa, Muktyavasthā). The word Ātman brings out the 'subject' aspect of reality; the word Mokṣa brings out the 'content' aspect of it. While emphasizing both these aspects of experience to which thought cannot turn a deaf ear, Śaṅkara brings out the oneness of Brahman, Ātman and Mokṣa for experience. Brahman, the supremely Real, is "Bliss entire" for Śaṅkara, in Bradley's phrase, "experience entire"¹⁵.

But for Śaṅkara it is the supreme reality also, the Ātman, the subject *par excellence*, for which there is nothing other (anātmavastu), no non-self. Rather for him the whole universe is the Self. The Ātman is the supreme Bliss, the supreme 'that' and the supreme 'what'. Bliss and the Blissful are one at this point. "Bliss is not anything different from the Blissful Self"¹⁶. "When he thinks, 'This (universe) is myself who am all', that is his highest state". In Bradley's phrase "the Universe is substantially one with each of us, and actually as a whole feels and wills and knows itself within us"¹⁷. Bradley is voicing forth Śaṅkara's conviction that Brahman, having created all this universe, entered, for its own realization, all the bodies having life and having so entered, it realized its own real self directly thus: 'I Brahman, am all this'¹⁸. But it is Bradley's failure to realize that the Spirit is to be realized not only as an absolute 'experience', but also as the absolute 'subject' or 'self' which has disfigured his idealistic enterprise and landed it in a bog from which the individual is not able to extricate itself and recover its authentic status as substantially one with the Universe. We are thus brought back to the point where philosophy is called upon to weave together in one system the human insight concerning the profound significance of human life, the realm of value and the order of the real. The spirit in man is to be the centre of this philosophic weaving, "for the man to whom his own life is a triviality is not likely to find a meaning in anything else". The idealistic reconstruction will centre around the notions of Reality, Value and Spirit in the context of a mean-

ingful human existence, for, as Pringle-Pattison pointed out, "every form of philosophical idealism appears to involve this conviction of the profound significance of human life, as capable of appropriating and realizing these values"¹⁹. The Idealism of Bradley has to address itself to the problem of the recognition of the Spirit not only as absolute experience but also as the absolute subject, the Ātman, the Self. What Śaṅkara has said about the Self as having an authentic existence, as being *svārtha* and not *parārtha*, as being the very *a priori* of intelligible thought, and what, in recent times, K. C. Bhattacharya has reconstructed as transcendental spiritual psychology with the notion of the Subject as Freedom as central to it, has almost a finality about it. Brahman, for Śaṅkara is liberation itself (*muktyavasthā*)²⁰. It is at the same time the supreme cause of the universe²¹.

III

There is another doctrine of Śaṅkara which, if incorporated into western thought and assimilated therein, would yield a fruitful harvest. This is the doctrine of *Māyā* or illusion. It is in the context of authentic spiritual life that Śaṅkara developed his doctrine of *Māyā*. "The witness of the three states (of waking, dreaming and deep sleep) who ever remains the same, is not affected by the three variable states. This appearance of the supreme Self as involved in the three states is mere illusion, as in the case of the rope appearing as snake"²². Śaṅkara philosophised within the frame-work of a religious traditions which he inherited and strengthened. "This adds seriousness and urgency to his endeavours which seem to be lacking in the efforts of many pseudo-philosophers of today, who no doubt think quite freely, entirely on their own and in utter disregard of all traditions, but hardly to any serious purpose"²³. For the authentic spiritual life it is all one existence, one Spirit being forth. If there appears to be something other than it (*anyatvāvabhāsam*) it must be an illusory experience. Śaṅkara's doctrine of *Māyā* is not a doctrine of rationalism or agnosticism, nor a "rigid exercise in logic". Incorporates an experienced truth. The *Ādwaita* realization and the doctrine of *Maya* are knit together in his philosophy which is "the record of a strong conviction", "involves the communication of a grave experience, and not

the mere frame-work of a theory". It is spiritual experience which bears the weight and provides the substance of the doctrine of Māyā or illusion.

Bradley does not know "why or how the Absolute divides itself into centres, or the way, in which, so divided, it still remains one. The relation of the many experiences to the single experience, and so to one another is, in the end, beyond us".²⁴ It is here that Śaṅkara's doctrine of Māyā and Upādhi is relevant and provides the clue to the understanding of the being and the nature of "appearances". Śaṅkara's dual vision of the Supreme as unconditioned (nirupādhika) and conditioned (sopādhika), Māyā being the necessary conditioning factor (upādhi), is a significant contribution to the solution of the problem of the togetherness of the Absolute and the world-appearance. The real, though beyond dynamis and stasis, becomes dynamic-cum-static in its role as Creator (Īśvara) through the association of Māyā which is neither wholly one with Brahman nor wholly other than it, and which is the creative power of the Supreme. The supreme figures as Mahāmāyā, the Māyāśabala Brahman, which is the synthesis of the dynamic and static—a synthesis expressed in Art by the image of Nataraja in that wonderful expression of movement and rest and in metaphysics in the revelation of a contradiction or ontological antinomy within itself which Śaṅkara calls anirvacanīyata or Māyā,²⁵ an antinomy which is eternally present and eternally resolved therein. This is because the Absolute of Śaṅkara is substance as well as subject, Brahman as well as Paramātmān. The concept of Māyā, the cosmic energy of the Supreme, is a religious concept in the philosophy of Śaṅkara and cannot be rendered intelligible in dissociation from the concept of Īśvara. Śaṅkara in his poetic moods describes it as the consort of the Lord (parabrahma-maḥiṣī). Māyā is operative in two ways. In one aspect it brings about the "illusion of empirical existence" of the self; in another the "illusion of isolation" of the self.

The concept of 'Illusion' is both significant and intelligible. Illusion is never recognised as illusion so long as it is not sublated. So long as it remains unsublated it possesses stubborn reality. The empirical illusion is the very pattern of world-existence. The Absolute which divides itself into centres and which, so

divided, still wants to remain one, can do so only through the instrumentality of *Māyā*. Bradley's Absolutism whose Absolute has no history of its own, though it contains histories without number, must find a place for a doctrine like that *Māyā*. So should Hegel's Absolutism whose Absolute takes upon itself and makes its own the stupendous labour of world's history and in the process, which is at once eternal and in time, reconciles itself to the world and the world to itself. It is only through some such doctrine (*māyā*) that the Aristotelian idea 'that the Real will be without movement or change, not because it is not active, but because its activity is determined by itself', can be rendered intelligible. The meaningfulness of the concept of "illusion" in the context of the world-existence in relation to the Absolute Spirit and its richness have to be explored by philosophy both in the East and the West. The appearance of the Spirit, the Self, the Absolute, as undergoing a spatio-temporal existence which seems to be integrated to it, while in its own, original existence, it has an authentic, transcendental nature unsullied by time and temporal trappings—this is *māyā*, the great illusion. Saṅkara likens it to the "appearance of the snake in the rope", to a "great sleep" in which the soul during its empirical existence, lies embedded, unaware of its true status.

Bradley was preoccupied with a "critical discussion of first principles"²⁶ and an endeavour "to get sound general view of Reality"²⁷ merely without making any attempt "to show how the world, physical and spiritual, realizes by various degrees the one absolute principle".²⁸ This "would involve a system of metaphysics" which he was "not undertaking to construct".²⁹ Being content with a sound general view of Reality only, he "was not able to deal systematically with the various forms of appearances. If I had done this, it would have become clear that, and how, each form is true as well as untrue".³⁰ Bradley does not, as Saṅkara does, extract the element of truth and reality in the constitution of the 'self' or (I) and is content to call it an 'appearance'. The absolute is present in, and, in a sense, it is alike in each of its special appearances.³¹ The Absolute is each appearance, and is all, but it is not any one as such. And it is not all equally.³² Saṅkara's

analysis of the I or Self goes deeper and is more thorough in that (i) he extracts the element of reality in it and (ii) deciphers the element which is superimposed on it, and turns it into an "appearance", both together constituting the empirical self. The jīva, the empirical self, according to Śaṅkara, is not Brahman wholly, nor something other than it.³³ Bradley was prevented from grasping this "duality" in the nature of "appearance" (self and nature) which is enshrined in Śaṅkara's doctrine of 'anirvacaniyata' or 'māyā'. The reason, in the first place, is that he did not undertake a thorough analysis of the phenomenon of 'illusion' though at the very outset of the first chapter of his *Appearance and Reality* he recognizes that "The fact of illusion and error is in various ways forced early upon the mind; and the ideas by which we try to understand the universe, may be considered as attempts to set right our failure".³⁴ This recognition needs to be supplemented by what Śaṅkara has said in the opening pages of his *Commentary* on the *Brahmasūtra* about adhyāsa. In the second place, Bradley was prevented from having this insight into the nature of the self, because he failed to distinguish between two qualitatively different types of "appearances". The 'self' as appearance is not qualitatively of the same character as 'nature' or what Bradley calls "the sphere of dead mechanism". The world of nature is an "effected" realm, what Śaṅkara called "vikāra". The self is not an affected something. Nor is it what Śaṅkara called the *vivarta* of Reality. It is what Śaṅkara describes as the 'Ātman' and Bradley as 'Spirit'—Spirit which "is a unity of the manifold in which the externality of the manifold has utterly ceased".³⁵ According to Bradley "Nature is quite absorbed into Spirit, and at every stage of the process we find increase in reality".³⁶

As Bradley does not distinguish between the qualitative characters of the 'self' and of 'nature' as appearances of the Absolute and lays emphasis only on the 'content' aspect of "experience" to the total neglect of the 'subject' aspect of it he fails to distinguish between the diametrically opposed ways in which Nature and self can respectively be said to be absorbed in Spirit. They are both appearances of the Absolute. But as they are appearances in qualitatively quite different senses, they can be so absorbed differently and in unique ways. Bradley

does not distinguish between these ways. The Advaita of Śaṅkara does this. The silver in the shell-silver cognition is illusory, because it is sublated; similar is the fate of the illusory snake. The reality of the illusory silver is the conch-shell, that of the illusory snake is the rope. The reality of the world-appearance is Brahman (Śaṅkara) or the Absolute (Bradley). The appearance is 'absorbed' into the Reality, the Substratum. Of this Bradley would say that it is 'lost', 'destroyed'. This absorption is described by Śaṅkara as sublation (bādha). But the individual self is not sublated in Brahman. The great saying of Advaita '*tattvamasi*' does not teach sublation of the 'thou' in the 'that'. With the rise of knowledge the individual self is not sublated but is recognized as one with the universal Spirit. The mahāvākya, *tattvamasi*, does teach oneness and unity of the two, but not by way of sublation; only by way of recognition of the intrinsic Brahman-nature of the self. It is a case of '*sāmānādhikaraṇyam*', but of '*aikye sāmānādhikaraṇyam*' and not '*bādhyam sāmānādhikaraṇyam*'. Had it been the latter, the teaching, says Padmapāda, would not be of the form 'that thou art', but would be 'thou art not like silver is not'. There is need of a "fusion of the old eastern and the new western knowledge" on this point also. It is Bradley's failure to distinguish between the various types of appearances, even when the Absolute is present, and in a sense, is each of its appearances, that has led him to the view that the finite is merged in the Absolute, blended, fused and dissolved therein, as Nature is quite absorbed into Spirit. The authentic spiritual status of the self has been the great theme of the Absolutism of Śaṅkara.

IV

There is a fundamental divergence in their approaches to the philosophical problem. For Śaṅkara the religious problem has always been the fundamental problem of philosophy. Both religion and philosophy have as their ultimate problem the relation of value to reality; and for Śaṅkara the form of thinking about God is the same as the form of thinking about ultimate reality. Brahman is *muktyavasthā*, liberation itself. It is also the *ens realissimum*, *jānmādyasya yataḥ*. For Bradley, however, the religious consciousness is, like the moral, inher-

ntly self-contradictory. It offers thought no satisfactory resting-place. It has been 'the fate of religion to be dissolved into philosophy' in Bradley. There is much truth in W.M. Urban's accusation against Bradley that his *Appearance and Reality* had a share in bringing about this dissolution and in encouraging positivistic and humanistic views of religion.³⁷ Urban distinguishes between four forms through which Idealism in the West has passed.³⁸ Bradley is connected with the third form of Idealism which Urban calls Logical or Absolute Idealism. Adopting this classification we can say that Śaṅkara would belong to what Urban calls the last stand of Idealism, namely Axiological Idealism or the Idealism of Value for which the notion of intelligibility and value are inseparable. For Bradley the crucial option for philosophy is the option between 'thought' and 'being'. For Śaṅkara it would be the option between "the inseparability of being and value" and "the divorce of being and value". I like to think with Urban that in comparison with the option between thought and being, the option between the latter pair is much more fruitful and significant. Śaṅkara's formulation of the idealistic principle represents the true inwardness of the idealistic movement. In any case it serves to distinguish him from Bradley. The categories which Śaṅkara employs in the presentation of his world-view are value categories. The categories of causality which he makes use of in his endeavour to bind the world to the Supreme admits of several formulations which are complimentary and complete each other. Śaṅkara does not, like Bradley, reduce the fundamental categories of metaphysical thought to appearance. The enunciation of the category of causality in Śaṅkara has a religious ring about it, and the world, even when it is said to own an illusory character, does not give up its spiritual ring, *Pūrṇamadah pūrṇa midam* that is infinite and this is infinite. The doctrine of illusion is an organ of Śaṅkara's spiritual philosophy.

The true ontological problem for us is not 'Reality and Appearance' as Bradley poses it, but the problem : How the one Reality exists as (i) Unconditioned or Absolute (*nirupādhika*) and as (ii) Conditioned (*sopādhika*) with the world of name-and form as its limiting adjuncts (*upādhi*) as Śaṅkara poses it. The problem is one of the dual vision of the

Supreme, the Supreme figuring (i) as the Absolute and (ii) as the Creative Spirit, the Mahāmāya, the Māyāśabala Brahman. Māyā operates in two ways, as bringing about the "illusion of isolation" and the "illusion of empirical existence". The meaningfulness and the fertility of the concept of "illusion" have to be explored by philosophy both in the East and the West, if they are to hold that illusion can be overcome. On the contrary view there can be no problem of "appearance and reality". Even if we hold with some (Alexander) that 'Reality is reality' and everything can be said to be real, we must note that this statement can be true and intelligible only with a proviso: 'provided we do not take it for what it is not'. But we do take things for what they are not. Does Bradley tell us that the 'illusion about' Reality is at any point overcome? At least Śāṅkara does tell us. This overcoming of the illusion has, for Śāṅkara, a sacredness about it and marks the point where the ideal and the actual fuse in one. It is liberated existence. We can have access to it only by "trenching on the mystical".

Some of us may have their own doubts about the utility or fruitfulness of a seminar on *Comparative Philosophy*. They may also labour under the illusion that a philosophical conference is like an examination hall and the philosophers the candidates taking the examination who have, in their own way, to answer the same questions set to them. We should awaken to the truth that there is a uniqueness in the formulation of the problem by a major thinker, even when the problem for the professional text-book writer is the same. The problem, say, of reality, of value of universal, of knowledge, etc. acquire a uniqueness as handled by a major thinker. Every genuine philosophical problem has a many sided richness about it, and the problems run into one another. The philosopher-sage of Harvard, A.N. Whitehead, said that "in human experience the philosophic question can receive no final answer. Human knowledge is a process of approximation. In the focus of experience there is comparative clarity. But the discrimination of this clarity leads into the penumbral background. The endeavour to make our utmost approximation to analysis of meaning is human philosophy".³⁹ This is the supreme reason for the

utmost toleration of variety of opinion.' A clash is not a disaster; it is an opportunity. "Let both grow together until the harvest".

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NOTES

1. A. N. Whitehead : *Process and Reality* (1929), p. VII.
2. Ibid., P. 9.
3. W. M. Urban : *The Inteligible World*, P. 435.
4. *Appearance and Reality* (1930), p. 489.
5. Ibid., p. 489.
6. *Apperance and Reality* (1930), p. 489.
7. Ibid., p. 489.
8. Ibid., p. 441.
9. Ibid., p. 141.
10. Ibid., p. 148.
11. Ibid., p. 152.
12. Ibid., p. 152.
13. Ibid., p. 489.
14. G. Watts-Cunningham : *The Idealistic Argument*, etc. (1933), p. 523.
15. Ibid., p. 152.
16. Brhad. SB. IV. 3.33.
17. *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 243.
18. Aitareya. SB., II. 1.1; Brhad. SB., II 5.19.
19. *The Idea of God* (1920), p. 236.
20. SB. III. 4. 52.
21. *Brahma-sūtra*. I. 1.2, Janmādyasya yatah: ।
22. *Brahma-sūtra*. SB. II. 1.9
23. R. V. Das in *The Journal of the Indian Academy of Philosophy*, Vol. VI. (1967). Nos. 1 and 2, p. 20.
24. *Appearance and Reality* (1930), p. 467.
25. A. B. Dhruva : Presidential Address to the Third Indian Philosophical Congress (Madras).
26. *Appearance and Reality*, Preface, p. IX.
27. Ibid., p. 318.

28. Ibid., p. 318.
29. Ibid., p. 318.
30. Ibid., p. 496.
31. Ibid., p. 405.
32. Ibid., p. 431.
33. *SB.* II. 3.50, na sa eva sākṣāt nāpi vastvantaram ।
34. *Appearance and Reality*, p. 9.
35. Ibid., p. 441.
36. Ibid., p. 439.
37. *Humanity and Deity* (1951), p. 41.
38. *Beyond Realism and Idealism*.
39. *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. 46 (1937), p. 178.

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I.

BEING AND BEING KNOWN

What I present in these pages is really an abstract of a much longer article. I shall, in this paper, search for some consideration in favour of the admission of cognitive acts. What prompts me to this is the fact that in the West most of the philosophers, at present, refuse to admit any act of knowing or cognitive act. But it was not very long ago when the philosophers used to speak in terms of act of consciousness or act of knowing. It was then thought that a distinction between the act of knowing and the object known could remove the confusion to which Berkeleyan subjectivism owed its origin. Now though the "official academic doctrine" in the West continues to be some form of realism yet it is no longer felt necessary to subscribe to the doctrine of cognitive acts. I shall, in this paper, try to find out with reference to the Buddhist Philosophy what might possibly have led many of the contemporary western philosophers to deny cognitive acts. I shall not claim, however, that this could be the only reason which determines their refusal of cognitive act. Nor shall I claim that this is the actual reason. For whatever may be the reason, the denial of cognitive act exposes the contemporary western philosophers to the same difficulty in epistemology to which the Buddhists exposed themselves. They experience in common the same difficulty in solving an epistemological problem. And, if I can show that admission of cognitive acts can solve the problem in question then I shall be deemed to have shown some consideration in favour of the admission of cognitive acts. Whether the consideration is conclusive will, however, depend on the availability of alternative solution.

There are certain genuine problems relating to knowledge which were either not recognised or left undiscussed by the British and American philosophers. In a book² recently published from America attempt has been made to enumerate the main problems relating to knowledge and to discuss them. In this book one does not find even the mention of the problem I am going to discuss. The book, of course, refers to problems not enumerated actually as metaphysical. I, however, think that the problem is really epistemological. My reason is this. In India, at least, the problem in question has been discussed with all seriousness by philosophers

whose strict metaphysical standpoint would render impossible even the every statement of the problem. For the statement of the problem, as I shall show presently, presupposes certain distinctions between the factors in the knowledge situation. These distinctions have been denied by the idealist metaphysicians. And this denial is not an accidental but characteristic feature of idealism. Yet the idealists never ignored the problem to be discussed here. Therefore, so far as the problem remains the same, irrespective of the metaphysical position of the philosophers, it cannot be ignored in epistemology as metaphysical. Metaphysically speaking, the distinctions in question have no reality and the problem does not exist for the idealists. But so far as the distinctions are already involved in ordinary usages and presupposed in common practice the idealists in India along with the philosophers of the other schools felt obliged to tackle the problem.

Many common sense usages are there which already draw or show certain distinctions among the factors of knowledge situation. Let us take some specimens of such usage :

- (1) I know the table.
- (2) I know the table but not the clock in the room.
- (3) I can know the colour of the wall if and only if my eyes are functioning normally.
- (4) I can know at this moment the sound of the car plying down the street even if my eyes are not functioning normally.
- (5) I am seeing if there is any evidence in support of the cognitive acts.

If we examine these sentences closely we find that they make certain distinctions between factors of a knowledge situation. As these distinctions are familiar and we have not much space at our disposal I shall simply name the distinctions instead of discussing in detail the manner in which the above usage reveals them.

In the first three sentences the word "know" occurs in such a way that it can be replaced by the expression "have knowledge of" without altering the sense of the statements. The word "know" occurring in this way stands for a state of possession rather than action. It is a case of having rather than doing. The word

- “know” does not occur in (5). Here the ‘I’ is intended to be taken as cognitively active. It is a case of judging as distinguished from judgement. Here the subject is attributed with the cognitive activity of *jñāna-kriyā* rather than merely with a state of cognition or simply *jñāna* which is a particular *guṇa* as the Naiyāyikas will call it. Again comparing the sentence (3) with the sentence (4) we find another distinction—that between the knowing activity and the instrument employed in bringing about the action or the instrument in the employment of which the cognitive activity consists. The instrument is called *jñāna-sādhana* or *pramāṇa*. With reference to the *pramāṇa*, the cognition as the resulting state is called *pramāṇa-phala*. In addition to all these factors and as distinct from each of them there are, the usages show, two more factors called respectively the subject of knowledge or *jñātā* and object or *viśaya*. The *Jñātā* is also called *pramātā* while the *viśaya* is called *prameya*. Thus the commonsense usages clearly show, among other distinctions, a distinction between *pramāṇa* and its *phala* on the one hand and *pramātā* and *prameya* or *viśaya* on the other. These two distinctions, we shall see, are very closely related. The denial of the first tends somehow to render unintelligible the notion of object. The distinction between *pramāṇa* and its *phala* has much to do with the proper understanding of the concept of *pramāṇa*—a topic which, though epistemological, has almost completely been ignored by Western philosophers.

The Buddhists seem to obliterate the distinction between *pramāṇa* and *phala* when they define *pramāṇa* as true cognition. And on this point they are severely criticised by the Naiyāyikas. We shall presently seek to discover the reason for the Buddhist refusal of the distinction in question. But before proceeding with the Buddhist account of *pramāṇa* I shall sketch once again and more clearly the line of the argument I am going to adopt. While subscribing on the whole to some form of realistic epistemology the contemporary philosophers will admit the above distinctions between the factors in a knowledge situation. Even if they are not aware of all the distinctions, we saw to be actually involved in common usages, they are aware of at least the distinction between knowledge and its object or *jñāna* and its *viśaya*. They will further agree with common sense in maintaining that the relation that obtains between knowledge and its object is external. In other

words, objects may exist or have being without being known. But once we start, as we do in common sense and in realistic epistemology, from a distinction between knowledge and its object or between being and being known it becomes our responsibility to show how a being becomes a being known. It will not do to say that a mere being becomes a being known the moment we turn our attention to it. For this hardly means more than that a being becomes a being for knowledge when we know it. The question still remains how knowing can turn an existent into object or a mere being into a being known. In other words, how is knowing to be conceived if it is to turn a being into an object. It may be said that a thing becomes known when a knowledge relation is established. But this relation requires activity on the part of the subject to be established. Just as felling a tree requires the relation between the axe and the tree to be established by the act of the cutter so also, in the language of the Indian philosophers, the subjects of knowledge must use some *pramāṇa* through the agency of which the knowledge relation can be established. And nothing more is required to turn a being into an object other than establishing this relation. In short, therefore, to make it possible for a mere being to become an object a *pramāṇa* is necessary. And the concept of *pramāṇa* cannot be admitted in any intelligible or significant sense of the term unless a subject is admitted as possessing the activity of operating with the instrument or *pramāṇa*.

The Buddhists define *pramāṇa* as true knowledge or *avisa-mvādakam jñānam*. One point to note here is that the definition is much narrower and restricted than another, perhaps more familiar, definition of *pramāṇa*. The definition is to the effect that *pramāṇa* is the instrument that brings about the cognition. In accordance with this second definition, which the Naiyāyikas among others accept, anything can be a *pramāṇa* if it helps in bringing about or producing knowledge—whether that thing is a piece of cognition or something material does not matter. But so far as the Buddhist definition identifies *pramāṇa* with cognition, such things as eyes or ears or lamp cannot be regarded any longer as *pramāṇa*. The Naiyāyikas hold that this restriction has been introduced by the Buddhists in violation of such commonsense usages as “we see by means of our eyes” or “we see with the help of the lamp” where eyes and lamp have been assigned the status of *pramāṇa*. The

Buddhists, however, can, I think, meet this charge in more than one way. And if *pramāṇa* is then defined as cognition then the Buddhists can do by identifying *pramāṇa* with cognition or *pramāṇa phala*.

From the above account one may receive the suggestion that the Buddhists obliteration of the distinction, already noticed by common usages, is the result or consequence of their definition of *pramāṇa* as cognition. For, if *pramāṇa* is defined as cognition, it is not distinct from what is regarded as *pramāṇa phala* by those who maintain a distinction between *pramāṇa* and the cognition resulting from it or the *phala*. For, on this theory, it is the *phala* which is cognition.³ I maintain, however, that it is better not to accept the suggestion. One should rather view the situation in another way. Instead of the Buddhist denial of the distinction between *pramāṇa* and *phala* being the result of their definition of *pramāṇa*, the latter is the result of the said denial. For, if *pramāṇa* and *phala* are not distinguished then *pramāṇa* is to be incorporated either within *pramāṇā* or within *pramā*. And since whatever else a *pramāṇa* may be it must remove *ajñāna* or false knowledge it must be identified as true knowledge. For it is only true knowledge which removes *ajñāna*.

We have observed before that the Buddhists can well answer the charge that to define *pramāṇa* as cognition is to offer a too narrow definition which runs counter to the common practice of regarding such material things as lamp or eye as *pramāṇa*. But the charge that the definition violates the common distinction between *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇa-phala* is more serious. The *Mīmāṃsakas* also define *pramāṇa* as cognition but they escape the charge in so far as they admit a *pramāṇa phala* as distinct from *pramāṇa*.

But what exactly is this charge and how far the said identification of *pramāṇa* with its *phala* is objectionable? Or, in other words, how the charge against the Buddhists can be construed? To say that the identification under consideration violates certain common usages does not appear to be sufficiently formidable. The charge or objection so construed does not become decisive. But what do then the critics contend when they hold the Buddhist identification of *pramāṇa* with *pramāṇa-phala* is objectionable? Is it contended that to obliterate the distinction in question amounts to a denial of the distinction between cause and effect which, there is reason

to believe, is a valid distinction? The answer must be in the negative. For even from their strict metaphysical or transcendental point of view the Buddhists⁴ need not deny the casual relation. According to them, on the other hand, under the transcendental condition of *nirvāṇa* the beginningless and endless series of conscious moments keeps on flowing free from all phenomenal associates.⁵ So far, therefore, as they do not deny all distinctions in the state of *nirvāṇa* and so far as the casual relation can obtain between homogeneous entities the Buddhists are under no compulsion to deny the distinction between cause and effect. Thus the Buddhists not only do but also can accept casual relation while denying any distinction between *pramāṇa* and its *phala*.

Thus we cannot bring the charge of denying the casual relation against the Buddhists. The distinction between cause and effect on the one hand and *pramāṇa* and its *phala* on the other do not exactly coincide. Nor can we bring the charge of violating the common practice of referring to certain material things as *pramāṇa*. However, we maintain that by identifying *pramāṇa* with its *phala* they can hardly solve the epistemological problem as to how a thing which is a mere being becomes known. We anticipate an immediate objection. If our charge against the Buddhists is construed in terms of things that are mere being then the charge does not apply to all the Buddhists, but only to the Vaibhāsikas and the Sautāntikas. At least the charge so construed does not affect the Yogācaras. For the latter do not admit any thing other than conscious moments. Even if we grant this defence in favour of the Buddhist to be legitimate to some extent, our charge, nevertheless, may be shown to hold against them. For the notion of *pramāṇa* cannot be made intelligible in terms of conscious moments which alone the Yogācaras admit. I shall not argue this point here. On the other hand, I shall show that the charge does not suffer from the limitation the defender thought it to suffer. For even if it were true that the charge has relevance only in the context of the admission of an external world the problem affects the idealists none the less. They also have to admit such a world even if they do not grant it any ultimate reality.

The problem under discussion does not, therefore, arise from the fact that the idealist school of the Buddhists refuses to accept the *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇa phala* distinction in the sense that such

distinction has no ultimate reality. For the Advaitins also do not hold the distinction to have any reality in the ultimate sense of the term. The problem arises rather due to the fact that the Buddhists deny the distinction altogether. In other words, here there will be a problem if and only if the Buddhists deny the distinction in question in its phenomenal form also. To put it in a still different way the problem will arise if the Vaibhāsikas and the Sautāntikas also deny the *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇa phala* distinction. And they do. Taking the text by itself and without entering into the controversy over the metaphysical standpoint of its author the *Nyāya-Bindu* may be regarded as representing the view of the non-idealist Buddhists. And in this book also we see that *pramāṇa* has been identified with its *phala*.

All the Buddhists alike deny the distinction between *pramāṇa* and *phala*. Is there any common reason that leads them all to obliterate the distinction which, we saw, is already involved in common usages? I think that there is one. All the Buddhists deny the existence of self over and above the conscious moments. And anybody refusing to admit a self over and above the stream of conscious moments cannot render intelligible the notion of knowing activity. He, therefore, will find it impossible to admit *pramāṇa* in the sense that it is something other than *pramāṇa-phala*. For the notion of *pramāṇa* as distinguished from *pramāṇa phala* can be made intelligible only in terms of cognitive activity. This point needs some clarification.

We have shown above, with reference to common sense usages, that many factors are involved in a knowledge situation and that each of these factors is distinct from all the rest. But it did not perhaps become clear from the usages that the factors are also very closely related. The notions of *pramāṇas*, *prameya* etc., form a family or group and each bears relations to others. But among them the notion of knowing activity is somewhat more basic. For if we analyse the notions *pramāṇa*, *prameya* etc., we shall find that their meaning cannot be understood in any knowledge situation without reference to *jñānakriyā*. The terms *pramāṇa*, *prameya* and *pramāṇa* are all "*kāraka-śabda*". And something is a *kāraka* only in relation to a *kriyā*. Taking the notion of *jñāna-kriyā* as basic we can understand the other notions somewhat in the following way.

Pramātā is the agent or subject in relation to cognitive activity. In any sentence in which the word "*jñāna*" or some form of it occurs in the role of a verb, we can find another word to occur which stands for the person who is the knowing agent. And this agent is the *pramātā*. This shows that without an agent the knowing activity cannot take place. And unless we can attribute to this agent the cognitive activity it cannot be regarded as the *pramātā*.

Pramāṇa is that which brings about the action called knowing. That is to say, in a sentence in which the word "know" occurs in the role of a verb there occurs, if not always actually and explicitly at least by way of implication, a certain other word which names that (the instrument) which the agent employs and in the employment of which his activity called knowing consists. *Pramāṇa* then is that which when it relates a subject to the object relative to a particular knowledge situation, the subject is said to know the object or perform the *jñāna-kriyā* relative to that object.

Prameya is the object of *jñāna-kriyā*. That is to say in a sentence in which the word "*jñāna*" occurs in the role of a verb, there occurs a certain other word in the role of accusative. And the thing denoted by this word is the object or *prameya*. *Prameya* in relation to a particular *jñāna-kriyā* is that which is determined in a way in which such things, the names of which do not occur in the role of accusative, are not determined. For example, an object can be made use of if and only if it has already been made object of some knowing activity of some person.⁶

Two things follow from the above account of the notions of *pramātā*, *pramāṇa* and *prameya*. Even though the notion of *jñāna-kriyā* remains somewhat vague as it has been taken to be basic, it is fairly clear that this is the activity that turns a thing into an object of knowledge. And, secondly, the knowing activity consists in the employment by the agent of some *pramāṇas*.

The definition of *pramāṇa* that does not identify it with *pramāṇa-phala* identifies it as the *kāraṇa* of *pramā*. And this is in agreement with the analysis of the concept presented above. For the definition of *pramāṇa* as *pramā-kāraṇa* means that *pramāṇa* is the instrument through the agency of which the subject gets to know an object. But taken in this sense *pramāṇa* implies a cognitive agent as much as cognitive activity implies it. For nothing is a *pramāṇa*

by virtue of its existence. It becomes *pramāṇa* only when in relation to a subject it functions as the agency through which the subject comes to know the object it knows. And self has actually been inferred by using *pramāṇa* as *hetu*. In such inference *pramāṇa* has been taken as implying a conscious agent in accordance with the views that knowing is an activity which consists in the employment of *pramāṇa* by the subject.

Now we are at the end of our journey in search for a common ground on which all the Buddhists refuse to view *pramāṇa* as the instrument that brings the knowing activity. The ground is their rejection of a self in the sense of a conscious agent. Once they refuse to admit a conscious agent they have to deny cognitive activity and also *pramāṇa* in the sense of *pramā-kāraṇa*. But when they deny cognitive activity and also *pramāṇa* they find it difficult to explain the notion of object and to solve the problem how a being becomes a being known.

The results we have achieved at the end of our excursion into the Buddhist philosophy may now be used in understanding the position of some contemporary Western philosophers. I shall only suggest rather than discuss in detail that the case of many contemporary philosophers is very much like that of the Buddhists. They deny the notion of a cognitive act because they are not prepared to admit any conscious agent. And their denial of cognitive activity leaves them in no better position than it leaves the Buddhists in relation to the epistemological question how a being becomes a being known. The problem in the case of Western philosophers is more serious as they appear to subscribe to realism in a more radical way than even the Buddhists.

I would not like here to argue the point that the denial of the conscious agent did constitute actual, let alone the only, ground for the Western philosophers' denial of knowing activity. The historical fact that epistemology as a separate branch of study owes much to the empiricists who refused to admit any conscious agent and that the influential creed in contemporary British and American epistemology is empiricism lends much support to the point. Nor should I be taken to mean when I draw an analogy between the Buddhists and the Western Philosophers that the grounds for rejecting self in both the cases were identical. I simply wish to say that

Western Philosophers, at least most of them, are not ready to admit any conscious agent and it is also a fact about them that they deny the existence of cognitive activity. And I further wish to suggest that the two are not unrelated. The denial of any conscious agent may very well constitute a ground for the denial of any cognitive act. Prof., Ryle, for instance, has rejected⁷ what according to him is the Cartesian myth of the Ghost in the machine and he has also denied strongly any form of mental activity. I do further maintain that the denial of a conscious agent constitutes a better and a more decisive ground than some of the explicitly used arguments against the existence of cognitive act. For example, when Russell⁸ or Ayer⁹ says that he has been convinced about the absence of cognitive acts by introspection one may enumerate the name of quite a few eminent psychologists who claim evidence of direct experience in favour of those acts.¹⁰ And again when Russell says¹¹ that the cognitive acts do not enjoy any theoretical justification, he takes the sentence "I see" to be equivalent to the sentence "there is a thought in me". And this clearly betrays his refusal to admit any conscious agent. He does not appear to have noticed that "know" cannot be replaced by "have knowledge of" in all contexts. And again in so far as the notion of cognitive act helps rendering a group of other notions intelligible the admission of cognitive acts cannot be said to serve no purpose at all. And even if Western Philosophers do not consciously make much use of all these notions, the notion of objects in the sense of being known is very familiar to them.

If, therefore, the denial of cognitive acts renders certain fundamental epistemological notions unintelligible and makes it impossible to discharge their responsibility of showing how a being can become being known, then it may be expected from the contemporary Western Realist Philosophers that they would admit the reality of cognitive acts, rather than deny them. But this they would have done if they were not scared, with what justification it is beyond the scope of this present article to discuss, of the ghost in the machine. It goes to the credit of some Indian realists, some Mīmāṃsakas I mean, that they did what was just expected. They admitted the reality of cognitive acts, as otherwise the problem could not have been solved.

One word of caution, I think, is necessary before I end. I should not be taken to have represented in this article the view that most Indian philosophers admitted the reality of cognitive acts. For the truth, as is apparent even to the most casual student of Indian Philosophy, is just the reverse. In India there were more critics than advocates of cognitive acts. And it is highly doubtful if even those few advocates subscribed to the doctrine of cognitive acts in any significant sense. But this creates a new problem for me to discuss which is beyond the scope of this paper. Otherwise, this fact about Indian Philosophy has no relevance for this paper. For, I have not claimed to represent the Indian point of view in the matter of cognitive acts. I have just stated how my study of Indian Philosophy has suggested to me the possible motive behind the denial of cognitive acts by some contemporary Western philosophers, and the far reaching consequences of this denial, and lastly, a way of criticising the denial and defending the admission of cognitive acts. Whether I am right in receiving these suggestions from my study of Indian Philosophies and in applying them to understand and criticise some Western philosophical doctrines is a matter for discussion.

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NOTES

1. A. M. Quinton's article in *A Critical History of Western Philosophy*. ed. D. J. O'Connor, p. 531.

2. R. M. Chisholm's *Theory of Knowledge in the Foundation of Philosophy Series*.

3. I disregard here the cases where the Naiyayikas take some cognition to function as *pramāṇa*. For even though the difference from the Buddhists still remains it is no longer so much pronounced.

4. Of course this observation does not hold for those who maintain that in *nirvāṇa* the flow of conscious moments comes to a stop.

5. Udayanacarya : *Kiraṇāvali* (Benaras Sanskrit Series) p. 7.

6. Nothing can be an object of desire or volition (*icchādī viśaya*) unless it is already an object of the cognition (*jñāna viśaya*) which functions as the cause of this desire and volition.

7. G. Ryle : *The Concept of Mind*.

8. D. J. O'Connor's article in *A Critical History of Western Philosophy*, p. 483

9. A J Ayer : *Foundations of Empirical Knowledge*, p. 62.

10. B Blanshard : *The Nature of Thought*, vol. I, p. 397.

11. D. J. O'Connor's article in *A Critical History of Western Philosophy*, p. 483.

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IBN MISKAWAIH'S CONCEPT OF JUSTICE AND ITS METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS

The importance that the concept of justice occupies in Miskawaih's ethics is evident from the fact that in his celebrated *Tahdhīb al-Akhlaq*, one of the seven chapters of the book is devoted to the discussion of justice. But a recently translated monograph, *An unpublished Treatise of Miskawaih on Justice or Risāla Fī Māhiyat al-ʿAdl li Miskawaih* (ed. and tr. M. S. Khan, Brill, Leiden, 1964), throws some more light on the metaphysical basis of Miskawaih's concept of justice. The *Risāla* indeed helps us to a great extent in the clarification of certain points regarding the sources of his concept of justice which appear to have been presupposed in the *Tahdhīb*. Even the later followers of Ibn Miskawaih's ethics in the Persian tradition i.e. men like Nasir ad-Dīn Tūsī and Jalāl ad-Dīn Dawwānī have only confined themselves to what has been explicitly stated in the *Tahdhīb* without any reference to the *Risāla*. Nor do we find any explicit reference to it in al-Ghazali's *Ihyāʾ al-Ulūm al-Dīn*, *Kīmīyā-e-saādah* (*The Alchemy of Happiness*) or his *Mizān al-Amal*. The present paper is an attempt to locate the various sources to which we must turn in order to determine the metaphysical strands underlying this important ethico-socio-political concept in Miskawaih's thought. Bereft of these, his treatment of justice in the *Tahdhīb* seems to be nothing more than a clumsy synthesis of a little bit of Plato (of *Republic*) and a number of points discussed by Aristotle in *Nicomachean Ethics*. In his detailed discussion and classification of various kinds of justice, Ibn Miskawaih has followed Aristotle very closely – indeed some of his arguments appear to be mere transliterations of those from Aristotle or, at best, they have been grafted in his thought. The general scheme of virtues is the Platonic cardinal virtues¹ which are also accepted by both his predecessors (like Al-Farabi) and his followers (like Al-Ghazali, Tūsī and others).

The parallels which are evident between Greek thought and Arabic philosophy should not, however, be interpreted as

mere uncritical borrowing or the result of the traditionally high esteem in which Aristotle was held by most of the Arab philosophers. My intention, nevertheless, is not to deny the deep impact which Aristotle had made on the Arab mind. But this was possible only because there were socio-cultural and intellectual affinities between the Greek and the Arab minds. The genius of Aristotle was readily recognised by the Arabs because the path to it was already paved by the earliest filtering of the philosophical ideas of Porphyry and Plotinus in various garbs. Often it was difficult to know whether it was Plato and Aristotle who were masked as Plotinus or the latter as Plato or Aristotle. But at the same time one cannot afford to ignore that the Qurān also contained many elements in its moral code which were very similar to the Greek insistence on virtues like courage, temperance or justice. And these, again, were not complete innovations but continuations or transformations of the old pagan ideals of the nomadic Arabs.²

But, above all, the most significant reason for the similarity between the Greek and the Arab approaches to the concept of justice must be found in the linguistic habits of the two people which reflect their forms of life – their culture and philosophy. The Greek word *dikaio-syne* (usually translated as justice) is derived from *dike* which originally meant a way or a path but later came to mean a proper or normal course (even natural). That this meaning was the uppermost in Plato's mind is clear from his account of justice in the individual and in the society. The fact that Plato's account of justice is in fact prescriptive and not descriptive does not alter the situation for what he found to be natural and normal in the human soul was idealized to fit into his understanding of social reality. But when Aristotle tried to trace the signs of the proper or normal course in conduct and virtue, he invariably applied the model of the intermediate or the mean and came to identify the just with the equal (*Nicomachean Ethics*, BK. V : Chs. 3). The general characteristic of justice is proportionality though, of course, Aristotle distinguishes between geometrical and arithmetical proportion, where he treats of distributive and recti-

figatory justice. The Aristotelian understanding of justice comes very close to the Arabic connotation of the equivalent word *al-'adāla* which is a derivative from the root '*adl*' which means 'to make equal'. Another derivative from the same root is *i'tidāl* which also has the same meaning.³ But the primitive meaning is later extended to include harmony, proportion and moderation which are more evident in the latter derivative term. Hence, it is not surprising that though the Arab thinkers found the scheme of the *Republic* quite acceptable, it was the treatment of justice in *Nichomachean Ethics* which appeared to them more convenient and in accordance with their own understanding of the same.

Justice, for Miskawaih, is one of the four virtues, the other three being *al-hikmah* (wisdom), *al-shajā'ah* (courage or bravery) and *al-'iffah* (temperance or chastity). The *Tahdhīb* assumes the Platonic classification but their detailed discussions are carried on mostly under the shadows of the authentic Aristotle of *Nichomachean Ethics* though at some places the not-so-authentic Aristotle of *Magna Moralia* also seems to influence his formulations. In *Tahdhīb al Akhlaq* (Ch. IV), Miskawaih exalts justice to the position of the highest or the ultimate virtue – nay, it is 'the whole of virtue' – of which other three virtues are manifestations. Wisdom has, however, an edge over the others since it also in turn determines the practical application and adherence to justice in and through certain patterns of conduct. It indeed echoes Aristotle's statement in *Nichomachean Ethics* (BK. V : Ch. 1, 1129 b) that justice is 'complete virtue', 'the greatest of virtues' and that 'in justice is every virtue comprehended'.⁴ Since virtuous conduct is always contrasted with those which are manifestly opposed and contrary to it, the general schema of the 'mean' or the 'intermediate' is found to be involved in every practical situation of deciding upon the right course of action. Justice is, therefore, regarded as something which avoids both *zulm* and *inzilām* i.e. doing wrong and being wronged.⁵ It, of course, seems difficult to think of a 'mean' in the context of the abstract principle of justice and that is why Aristotle also considers it as having a

mean in its particular forms of distributive and rectificatory justice which he identifies as lying between gain and loss or, in other words, between making others suffer and suffering (*zulm* and *inzilām*). But Miskawaih's acceptance of the principle of mean in general and in the case of justice in particular need not be merely due to Aristotle's influence. *Qurān* also refers to the principle of mean in most unambiguous terms at several places. In an almost Aristotelian strand, the *Qurān* exhorts the virtue of striking the mean between prodigality and niggardiliness (XVII, 26-7, 29; XXV.67). In *Surahs* II. 173, V. 2, and at other places people are in general enjoined upon not to be seduced to act in a transgressing manner. Transgression is almost equated with sin. But not to transgress certain limits is semantically bound up also with various other words which are essential to an analysis of the concept of justice. As earlier pointed out, justice is said to avoid both *zulm* and *inzilām*. But the word *zulm* (V. *Yazlim*) means to do injustice, going beyond one's own bounds. *Zalim* (unjust) is, therefore, one who transgresses the bounds of God (*hudūd Allah*). Other terms which often occur in the *Qurān* in the same or similar context with *zulm* also have this semantic element in them. For example, *mu'ta'ī* (participial form of *v. itada*) means one who passes beyond one's proper limit. Al-Baidāwi understands it as *Zalim*, transgressing the bounds of God. And so is *mustaf* (from the root *srf*) which means one who exceeds or transgresses the right measure; immoderate, extravagant etc. In *Hadīth* also there are many sayings which extol moderation or the intermediate courage of action as the basis of the good and the virtuous. Ali, the son-in-law of Muhammad, the fourth caliph in the line of actual succession, and the first *Imam* according to the *Shi'a* creed, is said to have pronounced: "Blessed is he who knows his real worth and does not trespass (transgress) his limits" "Do not trespass (transgress) the limits..... Moderation is the path of safety..... We, the true Imams, use moderation in every thing." In the light of this it may not be unreasonable to believe that Aristotle's insistence on finding a mean for particular manifestations of virtues was nothing but a concurrence with an element already present in the

Arab way of life. The period known as *jāhilya*, was marked by the excesses of vanity, pride, self-glorification, lust, anger, vengeance, wrath etc. Islam had to bring about a moderating influence over most of these though not rejecting them all. Hence, the need of moderation or the mean. But, it is neither Aristotle nor the *Qurān* which provides the metaphysical basis for Ibn Miskawaih's concept of justice. As we will have an occasion to see later, it is in Pythagoras, Plato and Plotinus that we will have to search for this. Aristotle's view that justice is the greatest or the most complete virtue rests on the assumption that it is involved in the determination of other virtuous acts. But the sense which is involved here is only that of being proportionate or equal (as a mean between more and less). And this consideration is echoed in al Ghazali's *Mizān al-Amālī* and at other places. But in Miskawaih we find much more than this.

In the *Tahdhib*, Miskawaih talks of three kinds of justice : (a) Justice within the self, (b) justice with regard to others and the society, and (c) justice in relation to God. As regards the first, Miskawaih holds it to be the disposition of the rational soul which directs all our activities in such a way that harmony and moderation follow. It is this which leads to the coordination of all activities in accordance with 'the right principle'. In the context of the second and the third, Miskawaih includes *al-makāfat* (return of beneficence and benevolence with good, even sometimes including return of good for evil), *husn al-shirkah*, (fairness in fellowship), *al-sadāqah* (friendship), *al-ulfah* (amity), *silat ar-rahm* (Care of Kin), *al-ta waddud* (acquiring love of others by pleasing manners) *al-'Ibadah* (devotion, worship, reverence and obedience), *taqwa* (fear of God and piety) etc. In general, however, Miskawaih follows Aristotle in regarding fairness, which he understands as *masāwāt* (equality), and law-abidingness as constituting justice.⁸ The latter is implied in his admitting of the three authorities (nawāmīs) viz. God, the ruler and money. Miskawaih is in full agreement with al-Farabi in acceptance God as the highest authority of the land or *sharī'ah* as the final and most authoritative law.⁹

In his elucidation of the second kind of justice, i.e. social, Miskawaih, following Aristotle, distinguishes between (i) distributive justice, and (ii) rectificatory justice which has also been translated by some writers as 'reparative' or 'retributive' justice.¹⁰ In distributive justice he talks of geometrical proportion which may be either continuous or discrete i.e. either *al-nisbat al-muntasilah* or *al-nisbat al-munfasilah*. The former can be expressed as the equation : $A:B::B:C$ ('as the line A is to the line B, so is line B to the line C'). Here A and C being persons, and B being the share in the wealth or goods to be distributed we have perfect proportion, i.e. justice. The discrete proportion also demonstrates the same principle : $A:C::B:D$ (A and B being persons and C and D the portion or share due to them). The relation of the share C to A and of the share D to B must be according to the relative merits of A and B. This equation, *componendo*, also appears as $A+C:B+D::A:B$. The same principle holds good for Miskawaih in cases of distribution of public funds, wealth and honour and in transactions of contracts and exchanges.

In the case of rectificatory justice the underlying principle is to establish the arithmetical proportion which will equalise the gains and losses. But even in distributive justice, sometimes, arithmetical proportion appears to be relevant. When distributive justice has not been maintained, a geometrically disproportionate distribution has taken place which can be rectified by taking away the surplus from the one and to restore it to the other who has been wrongly deprived of his due share. That is why it is likely to be misunderstood that for Miskawaih even some forms of distributive justice consist in maintaining arithmetical proportion.¹¹ The chief function of rectificatory justice, however, is to restore the original relative position present before the wrong had been done. But this is primarily relevant in civil cases, not in criminal ones. The talk of arithmetical proportion is meaningful in those cases where, by dint of certain damages claimed upon, and paid by the wrong doer, *status quo ante* can be brought back. The final appeal is to the principle of equality which Aristotle has very clearly illus-

trated.¹² The arithmetical proportion has been represented as :
The values of A and B being equal,

$$(A + C) - (B - C + C) = (B - C + C) - (B - C).$$

The general principle of taking away from the wrongdoer what he has usurped and restoring it in the same quantity to the one who has been wronged so as to maintain equality (*musāwāt*) and proportion between the parties concerned is clearly brought out in the above equation to which Miskawaih subscribes. This principle which is quite relevant in civil laws and justice can also, with a natural extension, be applied to criminal justice where proportion and equality can be restored partly physically and partly psychologically.

In administering justice in transactions and commerce, the other important factor is money whose function, for Miskawaih, is to maintain social justice (*al-'adl al-madani*) which is directly under the dictates of the government. The role of *Dīnār* (money) as a measure for the exchange of value (*muqawwīn*) is accepted by Miskawaih for the same reasons which Aristotle has to offer in support of his similar contention. Miskawaih calls it a 'silent agency', one of the laws or authorities (*namūs*) under the higher law of the state. Aristotle also explains the etymology of the word money (*nomisma*, derivative from the word '*nomos*' meaning 'law') and holds that it is justly called a law. Nasir ad-Dīn Tūsī, following Miskawaih, says : "... money is a just mediator between men, but it is silently just, and the requirement for a rationally just being remains."¹³ Hence, the need of a human arbitrator, i.e. the ruler.

In the context of justice towards God, Miskawaih talks of *al-'ibadah* and *taqwa* which can guarantee justice both to God and from God. God also, as the perfect reason, acts according to the rational principle of justice because God, in the *Qurān*, has also promised a fair deal to all men on the principle of justice. No doubt, there lurks here the *mu'tazale* stand that even God does abide by the laws of reason.

The above is a brief account of Miskawaih's views as enunciated in the *Tahdhīb*. Now we may turn to the philosophically

more pregnant account of the same in the *Risāla*. This treatise begins with the classification of justice into (i) Natural, (ii) conventional and (iii) Divine. Though the former two kinds are clearly admitted and discussed by Aristotle, the third one is a blend of Islamic ideology with Platonic and neo-Platonic philosophies. But as we shall see later, it is different from his account in the *Tahdhīb* concerning justice in relation to God. Miskawaih also admits that "there is a voluntary justice peculiar to human beings, but it is included in the three". It does indeed seem incredible that voluntary justice is included in natural and divine justice and, hence, the remark that "it is illogical"¹⁴. But it becomes clear in the light of his detailed account of natural justice (which will come up in the course of our discussion) where he observes that it is also applied to man "who is the noblest of all existing beings in the world of becoming".¹⁵ Though natural justice and divine justice exist in matter and metaphysical things respectively, man participates in both. Thus, the view that voluntary injustice is included in all the three presupposes Miskawaih's concept of man as expounded in other treatises like *al-Fauz al-Asghar* and the *Tahdhīb*.

To the discussion of natural justice he appends, what he calls, "two accepted premises": (A) "The Absolute One, the Truth in whom there is no differentiation in any way or by any cause, is the noblest, the most honourable, and the most excellent of all (existing) things. He has, therefore perfection of existence, and abundance of it, in Himself". (B) "The Absolute Good (*Khair al-mahaz*) is the Perfect Existence of which we say that its perfection lies in the abundance of the good it possesses, since the very nature of the Good is the nature of existence, there being no difference between the two". Since both the above premises underlie his concept of natural justice, we will look at them more closely to understand their metaphysical bases.

(A) In elaborating on the first premise, he asserts the identity of denotation between "The Perfect Being" and "the One, the Truth". This identification is the result of Miskawaih's interest in Plotinus, Plato and the Parmenidean element which

he had, may be unknowingly, gathered through Plato. The differentiationless Absolute One is a clear echo of what has been said in the *Enneads* of Plotinus where the One is described almost as negatively as the *Nirguṇa Brahman* of Saṅkara. Plotinus is, however, more rigid in his insistence on negating any qualification or description of his One. The premise under discussion presupposes the fundamental antithesis between Being and not-being or Existence and non-existence. This One (without the other)¹⁶ is also termed as "the noblest, the most honourable and the most excellent of all (existing) things". From the above statements it becomes quite logical for Miskawaih to infer that what is opposed to this one (= Being = Existence) is plurality and multiplicity which becomes the cause of all that is 'the basest, lowest and meanest'. The first premise, as we see here, evidently assumes that which is separately asserted in the second premise. The diffusion of existence in things is a movement which takes them towards the other extreme of Many and the non-Truth. It is unity and not multiplicity which accords existence to the things that there are. And the things share in the underlying unifying principle in varying degrees. There are higher and lower degrees of existence, reality and perfection in accordance with the proximation of things to the underlying unity. Though it comes quite near to the Pythagorean concepts of harmony in the universe or Plato's theory of participation it is closest to Plotinus both in language and content. Plotinus, in the Ninth Tractate of the sixth *Ennead* (On the Good, or The One) says :

"It is in virtue of unity that beings are beings. This is equally true of things whose existence is primal and of all that are in any degree to be numbered among beings. What could exist at all except as one thing? Deprived of unity, a thing ceases to be what it is called Any thing that can be described as a unity is so in the precise degree in which it holds a characteristic being; the less or more the degree of the being, the less or more the unity"¹⁷.

The concept of perfect unity as identical with Perfect Existence, excluding all multiplicity, opposition or contrariety, is also

found in al-Farabi who held that contrariety implies defect in existence.¹⁸

(B) The second premise of Miskawaih identifies Perfect Existence with Good – absolute or Good as such, (*Khair al-Mahaz*) – free from all contingencies and *accidence*. The application of the term ‘good’ is due to the fact that “all bodies desired it essentially”. Hence, Perfect Existence is that which may also be termed the Desirable in the absolute sense : The Perfect Existence as Pure Form and Unity, the One and the Good is the Being or Reality towards which everything tends or to which all things proximate in order to possess whatever degree of reality they have. There is indeed an element of Platonism here, specially in the identification of Perfect Existence with the Good, but it also combines Aristotle with Stoicism and Plotinism. The Stoics also held that the world is one, harmonious and good. Plotinus did not only agree with the Stoics but also accepted the Platonic view that the One and the Absolute must be wholly transcendent. Miskawaih comes very close to Plotinus who says :

“This Absolute Good other entities may possess in two ways – by becoming like to It and by directing the Act of their being towards It.”¹⁹

Now, by converting the second premise Miskawaih arrives at the conclusion that the opposite of the Good or the One is evil, not-existence and not-one. That “the good is existence in the One and the evil is non-existence in plurality”. But what is the principle of non-existence ? Miskawaih clearly identifies it with matter. Within the matter – form and potentiality – actually schema of Aristotle’s metaphysics, it is the form which imparts reality to particulars. A thing is what it is by virtue, not of matter but, of form. And, when kinetically understood and the reality of change is assumed, it is the actuality of the latent potency which brings something into reality. The highest reality thus becomes Pure Form or Actuality without any matter or potentiality. It is full Existence *per se* which of course becomes a logical prerequisite in Aristotle’s philosophy

in the same manner as pure matter is a logical postulate. But the former, not so much the latter, was hypostatized into something ontologically real and existent. This tendency of Aristotle becomes too dominant in neo-Platonism. But apart from the Aristotelian necessity of conceiving of Pure form or Actuality as Perfect Existence, Miskawaih uses certain epithets for matter which, in ancient philosophy, are found in Plotinus alone and which has only one philosophic parallel in the history of western thought and that is Berkeley's immaterialism. Miskawaih says that since prime matter is an underlying potency for receiving the forms it is connected with many non-existents." This statement, connected with the identification of Perfect Existence with the Good, leads to the further statement that "Matter is, therefore, the mine of evil and its source." And that which gives existence and form to matter is "the mine of good".²⁰ Plotinus also calls Matter 'the cause of evil', 'a non-existent'.

The identification of good with existence and its opposite with evil manifestly raises a difficulty whereby anything which exists, e.g. things like, disease, tyranny etc. will, by sheer dint of existing, become good and it might be said that it is better that they exist rather than that they do not. But this difficulty is overcome by treating these concepts as belonging to the category of privation (One of the contraries in Aristotle's categories). Disease is nothing but the loss of equilibrium in the physical constitution, tyranny is the loss of justice and death is the loss of the activities of the soul in the body. These terms are deceptively positive, affirming the existence of something though in fact they are only negations of something positive. Plotinus also identifies Matter with Privation because it is 'indeterminate, unfixed and without quality'. This state of utter destitution is essentially 'ugliness, disgracefulness, unredeemed evil'.²¹ Of the pairs of opposites, one possesses existence, while the other is non-existence. The spectrum of reality is thus delimited by the two ultimate and fundamental contraries of Existence and non-existence, being and non-Being. Within these two extremities lie most of the existents which are relatively more or less 'existent' or 'non-existent'.

While talking of bodies in general, both celestial and terrestrial, Miskawaih admits that 'there must be besides plurality a unifying cause so that all bodies stand under one law'. But there is an inherent superiority which the heavenly bodies enjoy over the terrestrial ones. The unifying principle in heavenly bodies works most harmoniously due to the presence of the 'fifth element' (an echoe of Aristotle and Avicenna indeed) which is manifested in their circular movement which is the most perfect form of movement. On the contrary, the sub-lunar world is marked by a certain lack of unity because of the four elements in them that are opposed to one another. Hence their underlying unity is far from being perfect and is marred by strife and struggle among the elements contrary to one another. Thus the eternity of the heavenly bodies is ensured by the oneness in them which preserves existence. But the terrestrial bodies too have something resembling unity and that is equalities between the elements. It is the extent to which equalities exist in them that they come nearer to "Oneness" and "existence" in varying degrees. The equalities may be in substance, in quality or in other categories (Miskawaih talks of the "ten categories". All the Aristotelian categories were totally accepted and termed *al-maqūlāt* by classical Arab philosophers). Miskawaih also talks of 'equality in essence' where the term identity can also be used, e.g. between a drop of water and another drop of water or even between two portions of the same compound as one piece of gold and another piece of gold. The identity of substance can be both an equality of quality and that of quantity. Where there may not be 'equality in essence', there may, however, be equality in quantity and measurement between one portion of one part and a similar portion of the other part. Since this is a phenomenon which is observable by our senses, "natural justice" (in the sense of equality of quality or quantity in physical substances) 'becomes clear to sense-perception'. In his concept of natural justice Miskawaih almost identifies it with equality which, as shown above, is the original meaning of the word *al-'adl*. The clearest analogy in this context can be given from geometry. So, like Aristotle (*Nicomachean Ethics*, V., 4), Miskawaih illustrates this notion

with the help of two equal parts of a line which, when hung horizontally and to whose ends two pieces of earth of equal substance and size are tied, remain parallel and maintain balance and equilibrium, i.e. justice. And, similarly, if two substances are equal in quality, there is also an equilibrium or justice which is described by Miskawaih as congruity with oneness and existence. So natural justice can be maintained between any two physical substances, however different in their respective natures they may be, if there is equality between them on any of the common qualities or points e.g. quantity, worth, relation or any other relevant feature. In case of compound elements or molecules it is the mutual relations of proportion among various constituent elements which enable these physical objects to maintain their inner structure, unity and function. Otherwise, any disproportionate imbalance in them will destroy the nature of such things and this will amount to the prevalence of injustice. In different orders of existence—celestial and terrestrial—proportion and harmony are responsible for giving them relatively more or less unity and permanance. This lesson Miskawaih manifestly draws from the science of Alchemy where harmony of relations is the basic principle.

As regards the application of all that has been said about natural justice to man, Miskawaih rightly feels upon himself the onus of providing an explanation. It might be objected to because man, despite being the most complete compound of all the substances, "is the noblest of all existing beings in the world of becoming". But man is accredited with this nobility precisely because there is a principle in him which unifies the multitudinous faculties, elements and propensities in his psychophysical existence. Miskawaih calls this "common sense" and adds: "..... this one ruler operates in the parts, rejects some of those that are false and confirms that are true."²² This common sense is over and above the other senses which man shares with some animals. But in man perception is not mere sensation. There is a discriminatory power or faculty which is a rational or spiritual faculty. The functions which Miskawaih assigns to this faculty, i.e. of rejecting the false and

confirming the true, indicate that it is an epistemological concept. It is in 'Knowing' (in the widest sense of the term) that this "common sense" becomes the ruling faculty, giving rise to knowledge as a unity—the Kantian transcendental unity of apperception!²³ Now, without there being unity, harmony and balance among the various senses and their product, there may not be any cognitive activity worth the name. Hence, natural justice is also involved here. But since Miskawaih, in his metaphysics and his concept of man, admits human freedom, the exercise and function of this discriminating rational faculty is within the power of man himself. And it is in this sense that Miskawaih affirms in the beginning of the *Risāla* that voluntary justice is involved in natural justice as well. Once we have understood in what sense natural justice is applied to man, the apparent inconsistency or anomaly is dissolved. It, nevertheless, has to be remembered that voluntary justice is involved in natural justice as applied to man.

As for conventional justice, the *Risāla* does not contain much whereas, as has been discussed above, it has been expounded at length in the *Tahdhīb*. However, in the *Risāla* he distinguishes between two kinds of conventional justice, i.e. particular and general. The latter is what is agreed upon by all people. For example, the fixation of the value of all labour and services in terms of gold. The basis of monetary systems is accepted to be gold which ensures parity and harmony in transactions not only in one country but which also systematises and harmonises international trade and commerce. Miskawaih in this short treatise does not mention money or *Dīnār* at all as he has explained its role, function and authority in social justice in the *Tahdhīb*. But here he seems to be concerned more with the fundamental issues which provide a basis and justification for what he has said at length about his ethical theory. So instead of talking about money he justifies and explains the basis of the monetary system and observes that it is gold because of the chemical structure and constitution of this substance. As he says, gold is "the most lasting of all existing objects in the world, and the lightest of all for carrying, most esteemed of all to the soul, most attractive to the eyes and most

precious of all in existence, and most remote from 'distruction.'²⁴ Hence, the general conventional justice becomes universally applicable not only because of the needs and demands of the economic activity of man but due, also, to the nature of certain substances.* Aristotle of course does not talk of general conventional justice but he does talk of political justice as partly natural and partly legal. The former is "that which everywhere has the same force". He also mentions of universal and particulars in case of just and lawful things. Though there is no parallel between Miskawaih and Aristotle on this point, there is still a basis in Aristotle for what Miskawaih had to say later.²⁵

Particular conventional justice, on the other hand, may be agreed upon in different cases and contexts – from countries and nations to every house and every pair of individuals. In this conventional and contractual mode of justice the minimum number required to perform justice or to bring about a just situation must indeed be two individuals because social or conventional justice is, by definition, impossible unless the possibility of interaction is guaranteed. Equal rights and claims become meaningful only in the context of social interaction. The need and force behind conventional justice, which is peculiar to each society at a definite stage of its development and growth, is exemplified in the role and the binding nature of our customs. Customs, mostly, reflect the socio-economic and cultural needs, demands, manners and aspirations of a people. That polity also took care of all these phenomena was an accepted view both with the Greeks as well as the Arabs. The efficiency and utility of customs and convention which are changeable, though not arbitrary, are brought out by Miskawaih in these words: "... the ordainer of an institution and the framer of law prescribe certain laws according to the conditions and the ability of the temperaments which they administer, and according to the customs they observe which should not remain for ever and should change with the change of conditions, customs and manners (or peoples)"²⁶ Thus, in relation to a given time and place, each of these laws is justice and trespassing it becomes injustice and tyranny. Therefore, for Miskawaih, as for Aris-

totle, law-abidingness is one of the significant modes of being just.

Finally, as regards his concept of divine justice in the *Risāla*, Miskawaih does not bring in his views concerning justice in relation to God as expounded in the *Tahdhīb* but is only concerned with nature of justice as manifested in the eternally existent metaphysical and unchanging things. This species of justice is more akin to natural justice than to conventional justice with the difference that whereas the former has no existence except in matter, divine justice is best exemplified in characteristics of numbers. The *a priori* necessity, self-evidence and logical certainty of mathematics have been upheld by philosophers from Pythagoras and Plato to Schlick and Ayer. But Miskawaih is surely drawing on the views of the Pythagoreans. He says : "The follows of Pythagoras illustrate this meaning with number because if a number is separated from the object numbered it possesses in itself necessary qualities and a regularity which does not suffer any changes. . . ." ²⁷

It is not only the indubitable and unchanging character of propositions in mathematics and geometry which brings out the sense of divine justice but the underlying idea is that of proportions, harmony and equality which is equated with justice. Now on this analogy, if we understand the nature of the immortal soul in man, the rational activity of the highest order is bound to reflect the same order and harmony which we gather from our understanding of numbers and figures in Geometry. For him, voluntary justice is essentially "the cultivation of peaceful cooperation among the different faculties of the soul" - a Platonic idea indeed ! Therefore, so long as man is able to maintain this kind of proportion and harmony (i.e. justice) in soul, he is voluntarily affecting divine justice in the unchanging (*sarmadiya*) life of the soul.

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NOTES

1. Al-Farabi in *Fusūl al-Madani* and *At-Tanbih 'ala Sabīl as-Sa'dah* is closely Aristotelian in his treatment of the cardinal and other virtues. Al-Ghazali in *Mizān al-'Amal* also accepts the Platonic-Aristotelian approach. For different sources of influence on Miskawaih see D. M. Donaldson's *Studies in Muslim Ethics* (S.P.C.K. London, 1953), and articles on 'Akhlāq' and Ethics in *Encyclopaedia of Islam* and *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*.
2. For a lucid discussion of the point as to how the pre-Islamic virtues got transformed and assumed new meaning and basis with the introduction of Islam, see Toshihiko Izutsu's *Ethico-Religious Concepts of the Qurān*, (McGill University, Press, 1966).
3. Miskawaih himself recognises it in *Al-Mawāmil Wash-Shawāmil* (authored jointly with Abū Hayyān al-Tawhīdī, eds. Ahmad Amin and Ahmad Saqar, Cairo, 1951).
4. Nasir ad-Dīn Tūsī has the same things to say about justice. "..... none is more perfect than the virtue of Justice" and "..... justice is not a part of virtue, but all virtue in its entirety". *The Nasirean Ethics* (Tr. G. M. Wickens, George Allen and Unwin, 1964), pp. 95 & 98.
5. Nasir ad-Dīn Tūsī also says : "Now, since deviations refer to two kinds, one necessarily arising from transgressing in the direction of excess and the other necessarily arising from transgressing in the direction of neglect; therefore, corresponding to every virtue are two classes of vice, the virtue standing at the middle-point and the two vices at two extremes ... two (vices) correspond to Justice namely Injustice and the suffering of wrong". (The words used in the original text are *zulm* and *insilām*). *The Nasirean Ethics*, *Op. cit.*, pp. 86-7.
6. See *Sermons of Ali : Nahjul Balāgha*, ed. and tr. Dr. Md. Ali Al-Haj Salmin (Bombay, 1956), pp. 307 and 248 respectively.
7. *Mizān al-'Amal* (Al Matba' at al-Arabiya, Egypt, 1342 A.H.), pp. 64 and 70-71.
8. *Nichomachean Ethics* (Ross's translation), BK. V, Chs. 1-2, esp. 1129a and 1130b.
9. See Al-Farabi's *Fusul al-Madani* and other works. *Nasir ad-Dīn Tūsī* also admits it and refers to Aristotle though it is not explicitly stated in *Nichomachean Ethics*, *The Nasirean Ethics*, *op. cit.*, p. 97.
10. M. A. H. Ansari's *The Ethical Philosophy of Miskawaih* (Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, 1964), p. 110. See *Tahdhib al-Akhlāq*, (Cairo, 1329 A.H.), pp. 94-95. Though there are about five editions

of this book published at Cairo between 1305 and 1329 A.H., the latest edition is referred to here. The same edition has been referred to by Dr. Ansari.

11. Dr. Ansari (*Op. cit.*, p. 110) fails to understand this when he observes: "This proportion (i.e. continuous) can also be called arithmetical proportion". Though the problems of distributive justice often lead to those of rectificatory justice, the two are distinct and should not be mixed up. Miskawaih is quite Aristotelian in maintaining the distinction between the two.
12. The entire discussion of social justice in *Tahdhīb al-Akhlaq* (ch. IV) is a very faithful reproduction of *Nicomachean Ethics*, BK. V, Ch. 2-4. And Nasir ad Dīn Tusī has nothing to add significantly but only elaborates Miskawaih's Chief conclusions with repeated allusions to Aristotle. See *The Nasirean Ethics*, (*Op. cit.*), First Discourse, Second Division, Seventh Section, pp. 95 ff.
13. *The Nasirean Ethics*, *Op. cit.*, p. 97, *Tahdhīb Op. cit.*, p. 96; *Nicomachean Ethics*, BK. V, Ch. 5.
14. *An Unpublished Treatise of Miskawaih on Justice or Risāla Fi Māhiyat Al-'Adl Li Miswawaih* ed. & Tr. by M. S. Khan (Brill, Leiden, 1964) hereafter, *Risāla*, p. 21. The remark by the translator occurs in footnote, 2.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 28.
16. Miskawaih uses the word *ghariyah* which literally means 'otherness' *Ibid.*, p. 12.
17. Plotinus *The Enneads*, Tr. Stephen Mackenna (Revised edition, Faber and Faber, 1956) VI, 9.1, p. 614. See also VI, 7.41 for the non-dual One, the First.
18. Al-Farabi *Fusul al Madani*, Ed. D. M. Dunlop, Cambridge, 1961) p. 50.
19. *The Enneads*, *Op. cit.*, I, 7.1. Elsewhere, Plotinus also talks of the participation of Virtue in the Good, I. 8.8.
20. *Risāla*, *op. cit.*, pp. 13 and 23. Miskawaih states that matter is the source of evil also in his *Fauz al-Asghar*. Plotinus speaks of the metaphysical necessity of assuming the existence of Evil as the Last in contradistinction from the First which he identifies with the Good. He says :

"Given that the Good is not the only existent thing, it is inevitable that, by the outgoing from it or, if the phrase he preferred, the continuous down going or away going from it, there should be produced a Last, something after which nothing more can be produced : this will be Evil.

As necessarily there is something after the First, so necessarily there is a Last : this Last is Matter, the thing which has no residue of good in it : here is the necessity of Evil." *The Enneads*, I. 8.7. See also II, 4.16.

21. *The Enneads*, II, 4.16. See also I. 3.6, II. 4.14. 15.
22. *Risāla*, p. 28.
23. Miskawaih's reference to the "common sense" shows the influence on him of what, Aristotle has said in *De Anima*, 426b-427a. But calling it a 'ruler' or a 'ruling faculty' betrays the Stoic influence more than that of Aristotle.
24. *Risāla*, p. 29.
25. See *Nichomachean Ethics*, BK. V : Ch. 7.
26. *Risāla*, p. 30 Comp. also al-Farabi, *Fusul al-Madanī* (Op. cit.) p. 51, where he speaks of the purpose of the earlier generations being carried over into the laws and traditions of the later ones.
Aristotle also offers the relativistic account of human enactments, though he admits, within this general frame of reference, that 'there is but one which is everywhere by nature the best'. *Nichomachean Ethics*, BK. V : Ch. 7.
27. *Ibid*, p. 31. Farabi also says that numbers do not change. *Fusul al-Madanī*, op. cit., pp. 30-31. Miskawaih might have also borrowed from al-Kindi who was a mathematician and held neo-Pythagorean principles.

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CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE CAUSAL THEORIES OF THE BUDDHIST, HUME AND MILL : A COMPARATIVE STUDY

I

One of the corner-stones of the entire structure of Buddhist Philosophy is the emphatic denial of the concept of permanent substance. The *Upaniṣads* and the Brahmanical systems believed in permanent physical and spiritual substance immutable amidst their outer modifications. For several reasons Buddhist thinkers unanimously rejected such a concept of an enduring and immutable substance.

In the absence of the concepts of substances or things over and above qualities the whole superstructure of the concepts of 'agents' and 'production' seems to tumble down. It is my friend Manju who switches the fan on. It is the alarm-clock that wakes me up. If instead of these things there were only a collection of fleeting qualities, it would have been impossible to say that someone or something is an 'agent' who or which brings about certain changes.

But although the Buddhists deny 'agency', it must be remembered that causal explanations play a very vital role in their philosophy. Accordingly they had to devise a special theory of causation which would not need the concept of 'agent'. This theory is known as the theory of dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*). The formula which succinctly expresses this special theory of causation often takes the following form :

"imasya satīdam bhavati; imasyāsato idaṃ na bhavati, imasyotpādād idaṃ utpadyate; imasya nirodhād imaṃ niruddhati". (*Mahāvastu*, II, 285)

This may be rendered into English as : If this is present that comes to be; if this absent, that does not come to be. From the arising of this that arises; on the cessation of this that ceases. This formula expresses the idea of 'constant conjunction'. If

fire should be the sole cause of heat, then if fire is there heat will always be conjoined with it; if fire is absent, no heat will follow.

This analysis of the notion of causation seems to be a natural consequence of denying 'agents'. If you deny that there are any switches the turning of which to the 'on' position produces light in the room, and also that there is anyone to turn the switch to the 'on' position, we should have to analyse the causal situation involved here in terms of the 'constant conjunction' of certain events such as the being of the switches (described with the help of qualities that appropriately describe switches) in the 'on' position with certain others such as the illumination of the room (described also with the help of relevant qualities). Although concepts like agent, production and efficacy have been implicitly denied in all schools of Buddhism, nowhere have they been so explicitly and emphatically denied as in the causal analysis of *Sāntaraksita* and *Kamalaśīla*. We would, in the present paper, examine the special causal theory propounded by these two Buddhist philosophers.

Now the above discussion of causation does also, at once, bring to our mind the Humean analysis of causation. Hume proposed to eliminate the idea of causal efficacy or power from the conception of causation altogether, maintaining essentially that causes and effects are merely changes that we find 'constantly conjoined'. We should not, according to Hume, explain changes in terms of causes having the power to produce them.

It would, therefore, be not out of place to compare, in this paper, Hume's theory of causation with the causal theory enunciated by *Sāntaraksita* and *Kamalaśīla*.

A very illuminating account of the theory of causation enunciated by *Sāntaraksita* and *Kamalaśīla* can be found in the *Tattvasaṅgraha* and its commentary, *Pañjikā*. Their theory of causation is a consequence of their doctrine of 'universal momentariness'. If things or persons are (in the ultimate analysis) series of momentary existence (i.e. 'dharmas') how can they have any time to produce anything? Hence they claim that there is nothing called 'production' in reality. There is

neither any agent nor any causal efficacy. An event only arises depending on certain other conditions (*pratyaya-samutpāda*).

In the *Taitvasaṅgrahapañjikā* Kamalaśīla tries, basing his arguments on those of *Sāntaraksita*, to establish the validity of their theory by considering first some objections. These objections arise from the consideration of the momentary nature of causes advocated by them. Since the future event is not yet in existence and the past event is defunct and hence bereft of causal efficacy, neither the future event nor the past event can be supposed to bring about the present event. The present event also, being momentary, is absolutely destroyed in the next moment. Hence it will no longer remain in existence in order to exert its causal influence on the effect which invariably succeeds the cause. It might be argued by the Buddhist philosophers that there is no need for the cause's exerting any influence on the effect; the mere antecedence of the cause is sufficient to establish a causal situation. But the opponent urges that the Buddhist philosophers would be led to an absurd position if they argued in this way. If mere precedence were a sufficient criterion for establishing causal relationship, they would be forced to call the colour, for example, which exists in an earthen pitcher, before it is destroyed by burning, the cause of the smell which one gets as a result of burning of the pitcher. (TSP, pp. 168-169).

Let us now examine the answers that *Sāntaraksita* and *Kamalaśīla* gave to these objections.

To the first objection that the Buddhist position implies the absurdity of the effect's coming into existence from a defunct cause, they give the following reply. In their view the effect comes out of the cause while the latter is still in existence. In the words used by *Sāntaraksita*, "what happens is that the effect comes into existence at the *second* moment through its *dependence* upon the cause which has come into existence at the *first* moment and has not yet become destroyed. So that when the effect comes into existence, it does so from the cause while it is still undestroyed at the first moment" (TSP, p. 175).

Sāntarakṣita and *Kamalaśīla* argue that it is even necessary that the effect comes into being through its dependence upon a preceding cause that has ceased to exist at the time the effect appears. Otherwise, in their opinion, we shall have an absurd theory that the effect comes into being at the same time as the cause. *Simultaneous beginning* of the cause and the effect is impossible in their opinion, because if the effect is already existing, what will the cause bring about? (TSP, p. 175, "niṣpanne kārye tasya akīñcitkārivāt", "Satyām api cānuvṛttau na tadānīm tasya kāraṇatvam").

The force of the above argument undoubtedly rests upon the significance of the word 'dependence'. Yet, unfortunately, it is not very easy to grasp what the authors mean by this word. Nevertheless, I shall try to state what appears to me to be the sense in which the authors used it.

There are some obvious cases of physical dependence. For example, a building is said to 'depend' on the foundation. Here the word 'depend' is used in the sense of being 'supported' by. But in all cases of physical support, the object supported and that which supports it, both exist at the same time. Such cases of dependence will obviously not help the authors advocating the temporal precedence of the cause. The word 'dependence' is used in another sense as well. This sense is demonstrated by statements such as 'the success of the CPI in the next election depends on their having a good party machine'. Here the word 'depend' is used in the sense of being 'caused by', which sense will not help the authors either.

The sense of 'dependence' which *Sāntarakṣita* and *Kamalaśīla* did probably have in mind is perhaps the following: What is popularly known as the cause of X, is nothing but a set of conditions or events that precede the appearance of X. The appearance of X, the conditioned, *depends* on this set. We shall have to get rid of our imagery of the cause as a substantial thing equipped with a separate quality called 'productive power'. Since the preceding set of conditions is no such substantial thing, it does not have to co-exist with X and exercise its productive power, which is somehow appended to it, on X.

Sāntarakṣita and *Kamalaśīla* accuse the advocates of the theory of simultaneous beginning of the cause and the effect of anthropomorphism. They say that there is no need to suppose, as the advocates of the theory of simultaneous causation would have it, that the cause grabs hold of the effect like a pair of tongs and then 'works' on it. Nor does the effect come into being like a sweetheart caught up in the tight embraces of her lover.

Not only do the Buddhist philosophers argue that the cause need not and cannot co-exist with its effect, they also say that they do not see any necessity why the cause must exert its influence on the effect. In fact, there is no casual operation, distinct from the cause anywhere in this universe. We can speak of the 'agent' and the 'patient' in a metaphorical way only. These words do not stand for any objective reality. ("yāvataṁ nirvyāpāraṁ evedaṁ viśvam, na hi paramārthataḥ kaścitkartā vāsty, anyatra dharmaśankarād iti samudayārthaḥ." TSP, p. 176).

But if there is nothing called 'casual efficacy' how will the Buddhist philosopher then explain such colloquial expressions as 'the fire produces the smoke'? *Kamalaśīla* replies that sentences such as 'the cause produces the effect' are only metaphorical expressions of propositions such as, 'the effect arises depending on the cause'. ("janayatīty upalakṣaṇaṁ. tattadāśrītyotpadyata ityapi vijñeyam". TSP, p. 176). In fact the word 'depend' only signifies, in this context, that 'the effect always arises immediately after the cause'. And what is meant by the word "the cause acts on the effect" is nothing but 'the cause is always conjoined with the appearance of the effect'. ("idaṁ eva hi kāryasya kāraṇaṁpekṣā yat tadanantara bhāvitvam, kāraṇasyāpi karye'yam eva vyāpāro yaḥ kāryodayakāle sadā sannahitatvam." TSP, p. 177). In fact, the hypothesis of a functioning of the cause in addition to its existence itself is an unwarranted assumption. ("sattaiva vyāpāraśabda-vācyaṣtu". TSP, p. 177).

Sāntarakṣita and *Kamalaśīla* have ruthlessly criticised this concept of casual efficacy which, according to them, has neither

the sanction of logic not that of experience. They bring out a series of objections against this concept.

What is the factual evidence on which this hypothesis of a causal factor distinct from a cause, is based? Surely, this mysterious entity called 'causal efficacy' is not amenable to sense-perception. "adr̥ṣṭaśakter hetuive kalpyamānēpy nesyate kim anyasyāpi hetutvam"? (if you assume the causal character of the (entity called) 'efficacy', when this 'efficacy' is not amenable to perception, then why do you not assume the same of something else also? (TSP, p. 178).

Whenever we discover that an object comes into existence if and only if another is present we call the latter the cause of the former. If this is the case, why should we attribute the causal character to a mysterious entity called 'causal efficacy'? Why not attribute the causal character to the cause itself? (TSP, p. 177).

We should note the remarkable similarity of these arguments with that of Hume. Hume grants that, at least according to common notions, the concepts of *power, force, energy or necessary connection*, etc. are fundamental to the concept of cause. Yet he restores that "There are no ideals, which occur in metaphysics, more obscure and uncertain, than those of power, force, energy or necessary connection." (Enquiry, p. 63).

According to his special method of clarifying obscure ideas by referring to the "impression or original sentiments, from which the ideas are copied", Hume urges his readers to examine the impression from which the idea of power is derived (Enquiry, p. 63). But, Hume declares that "when we look about us towards external objects and consider the operation of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary connection" (Enquiry, p. 63).

In order to appreciate the full value of Hume's arguments against 'power', 'force', 'necessary connection' it seems worthwhile to look back at a very old theory strongly believed by many philosophers. According to this theory things behaved

in the way they did because of their possessing a certain property called 'productive power'. This 'productive power' was supposed to be hidden from our view. Now although this notion of 'hidden power' had already been the target of philosophical criticism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (e.g. by Newton, Locke etc.), yet it remained a favourite notion of those philosophers who endeavoured to seek a kind of certain knowledge of the future. For in order to know that a certain medicine will cure, we need only to ascertain that it possesses the hidden power of curing us. If we could somehow visualise this occult power we could be sure that the medicine would cure us and hence could predict the future with as much certainty as we know the present state of affairs.

Hume makes several points against such a theory of occult powers. The first point that Hume makes is that we never have any experience of such a thing as power in the things around us: "We never have any impression that contains any power or efficacy". Now, it is not very clear from his writing what Hume is exactly pointing out here! Probably what he means is that we do not see anything over and above the objects related by causal relationship and particular states of them. We see only salt and water and the dissolution of salt but nothing else which could be expressed by saying that *water 'made' the salt to dissolve* (the sense conveyed by most transitive verbs).

Even if, for the sake of argument, we admit that such powers do exist in causes, it would be a thoroughly useless concept, in our causal enquiries. Even ordinary men constantly use such terms as 'cause' and 'effect' in their daily lives. Yet they do not have to penetrate into the essence of 'cause' (Treatise, p. 86) in order to find out some such secret 'power'. They do not need to go to a scientist to determine whether this plant is dying because of the attack of insects. It is by experience only that they infer that this plant is going to die as it has been attacked by insects. They remember that every case of insect-attack on plants in the past has been followed by the subsequent death of these plants. "Without any further cere-

mony" they call the insect-attacks 'causes' and the subsequent dying of plants 'effects' and 'infer' the dying from a new case of insect-attack that they come across.

Besides, the notion of 'secret' power leads to some sort of conceptual absurdity. If we do not ever come across any such power in the world around us how can we form any concept of power at all? The word 'power' would not have any meaning at all. "We do not understand our own meaning in talking so." (Treatise, p. 168).

But it may be urged that although external objects do not serve as mines from which such metals as 'power' may be extracted, yet the mind might well serve as such a mine. After all, we are every day confronted with the 'force' that our 'will' is exerting.

Hume disposes of arguments like this in the following way. Firstly, both the command of the will over body and thought are extremely 'mysterious'. How does the most refined thought actuate the greatest matter? Whether any such mastery of the will over the idea is a reality or not, Hume says, he cannot conceive at all *how* the will commands the ideas.

The influence of the will, both over the organs and over thoughts, is limited. We cannot move certain organs of our body like the liver and the heart by our will. We are masters of our thoughts and sentiments at certain moments, and at other time we are not. It is only by experiments and observations that we know the limits of the will. But were we conscious of a 'power' or 'secret' 'connection' which binds them together and renders them inseparable (Enquiry, p. 66), we would have known the limits *a priori*.

As regards the theory of the "universal energy and operation of the Supreme Being", Hume comments, "are we not equally ignorant of the manner or force by which . . . even the supreme mind operates, either on itself or on body?" (Enquiry, p. 72).

It could be argued that the resistance which we sometimes feel external objects to put forward against us and the conse-

quent exertion of our force or power in conquering that resistance give rise to the idea of force. Hume answers that, we attribute power to a vast number of objects where we cannot even imagine the subsistence of any resistance or exertion.

Let us, after this brief discussion of the Humean criticism of the concept of causal efficacy, come back to the further criticisms. *Sāntaraksita* and *Kamalaśīla* brought against the notion of an occult 'causal power'.

Does this efficacy, they ask, produce the effect through the medium of another efficacy or not? If it does, then the causal character should be imputed to that other efficacy. And this latter efficacy will also, in that case, depend on another efficacy to bring about the effect. The same argument would apply to the third efficacy, and hence we shall be faced with a vicious infinite regress. If, on the other hand, we hold that this efficacy produces the effect by its mere 'existence' then, by the same logic, it may also be argued that the *cause itself* produces the effect by its mere *existence*. And the hypothesis of an additional efficacy will be entirely futile (TSP, p. 178).

Anyway, the authors reject the utility of the concept of causal efficacy and say that, 'the only basis for the relation of cause and effect consists in immediate sequence, and not in any efficacious action' ("ānantaryaka-mātram eva kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva-vyavasthā-nibandham, na vyāpāra," TSP, p. 180).

As regards the objection that if mere sequence is considered to be the sole criterion of causation any arbitrary sequence would have to be regarded as a causal sequence *Sāntaraksita* and *Kamalaśīla* gave the following reply: We do not say that mere immediate sequence is the basis of cause-effect relationship. Rather, what we do say is that one thing is to be regarded as the cause of another when the latter is *always* found to appear in immediate sequence to the former. Moreover, one thing is regarded as the cause of another when the latter is found to appear in immediate sequence to former *only*. ("na hi vyaṁ ānantaryamātram kārya-kāraṇa-bhāvādhigati-nibandhanam brūmah. kiṁ tarhi? Yānniyatam tathā hi yasyaivānantaram

yat bhavati tat tasya karanam isyate. TSP, p. 180). Thus although smoke is, in some cases, seen to follow the presence of certain animals such as cows, horses etc., yet it is not caused by these animals, because it is *not always* found to follow the appearance of those animals. Sometimes these animals may be present, yet there may not be any smoke in the vicinity. Moreover, smoke does not appear *only* in the presence of those animals, it appears even when these animals are absent. We shall have the occasion to discuss this point in more detail in the next section.

II

In the first section we have seen that Hume analysed causal relations as relations of uniform sequence between events. But Hume took a simple view of what it is that is found to recur in causal sequences. He often wrote as if it were pairs of single events which are related by way of unvarying sequences. Mill rightly insists that, "It is seldom, if ever, between a consequent and a single antecedent that this unvarying sequence subsists. It is usually between a consequent and the sum of several antecedents; the concurrence of all of them being requisite to produce the consequent." (SL, Vol. I, p. 378). Thus what causal generalisations inform us of is that an occurrence of a given kind regularly follows when a complex set of conditions is satisfied. Each of the members of this complex set, from which we usually select one as *the cause*, is required to complete the set. This complex set consists not only of positive conditions, but also of certain negative conditions (i.e. absence of any preventing or counteracting causes). Hence a cause is "the sum total of the conditions, positive and negative together which being realised the consequent invariably follows." (SL. Vol. I. p. 383).

But if causal relations are equivalent to those of unvarying sequence between phenomena, are we to suppose in that case, that any case of unvarying sequence would qualify as a case of causal connection? Are we to suppose that night is the cause of day, and day the cause of night? Now, Mill pointed out

that certain additional conditions need to be fulfilled if day is to follow night always. (These additional conditions are factors like the existence of the sun above the horizon, there being no opaque medium in a straight line between the sun and that part of the earth where we are situated). Night will thus not be followed by day under all circumstances or invariably.

If a case is to be, on the other hand, a case of causation, then, Mill argues, the consequent will have to follow the antecedent under all circumstances. And this is possible only if the consequent follows the antecedent unconditionally. Hence a cause is the concurrence of antecedents on which the effect is invariably and *unconditionally* consequent.

We have already seen some Buddhist philosophers had also argued that every case of causation is essentially a case of constant conjunction. Now, if we consider the philosophical treatises of *Sarvāstivāda* school which preceded the school of Buddhist logicians like *Sāntarakṣita* and *Kamalaśīla*, we shall see that they did not consider causation simply to consist in a connection between pairs of single events. They too had visualised the complexity of the causal situation and conceived of such a situation as consisting of a connection between a *set* of antecedent conditions and the consequent following it. (A similar spirit is noticeable in the proposition often quoted in the *Pramāṇavārtika*: "na kimcit ekam ekasmāt, sāmagryāḥ sarva sambhavaḥ").

Their awareness of the complexity of a causal situation becomes evident if we undertake a study of the four '*pratyayas*' and six '*hetus*' enumerated by *Sarvāstivāda* texts like the *Abhidharmakośa*. The scope of the present paper prevents us from undertaking an elaborate study of each and every '*hetu*' and '*pratyaya*' mentioned in this work. But it will be sufficient for our purpose to give a *very brief* introduction to the '*hetus*' and '*pratyayas*' and comment at length on one or two of them.

The '*pratyayas*' refer, as far as I understand, to only those factors that are *indirectly* responsible for the emergence of something else. In the technical terminology of western philosophy

these factors are known as 'conditions'. All the three 'pratyayas', the (i) 'ālambana-pratyaya', (ii) 'samānāntara-pratyaya' and (iii) 'ādhipati-pratyaya', which could be translated as (i) 'object condition', (ii) 'immediately antecedent condition' and (iii) 'dominating condition', explain how certain conditions can be indirectly responsible for the coming into existence of certain objects and events. The 'immediately antecedent conditions' refer to those antecedent mental events which are immediately followed by other similar events. They are the antecedent mental conditions which explain the uninterrupted flowing of a particular stream of thought. Just as the preceding sounds of a single tune that is being played do not produce, but are only indirectly responsible for (i.e. they influence the player to play the next ones) the sounds following them at subsequent moments, so the 'immediately antecedent condition' is only indirectly responsible for the subsequent happenings of similar mental events.²

An 'object condition', which is described as that which helps a cognition to arise (in the way analogous to that in which a stick helps an old man to stand up to his feet), is a sensation interpreted by applying concepts to it. Accordingly, visibles, audibles, smells etc. are the 'object conditions' respectively, of processes like the visual, auditory, and olfactory perceptions. One ought to remember that an object is only one of the factors responsible for the origination of a particular cognition. The other factors responsible for knowledge are, the existence of sense-organs and, as the Buddhists themselves tell us, the 'correlation' ('sannipātaḥ') of sense-organs and their corresponding objects. Hence an 'object condition' cannot, by itself, be said to be directly responsible for the emergence of anything.

A 'dominating condition' is described to be that condition which, although it does not positively help the arising of another phenomenon, nevertheless does not stand in the way of its coming into existence. This non-interference is comparable to the way a sovereign³ ('ādhipati') although he may not do anything constructive to make his subjects happy, may nevertheless be the indirect cause of their happiness by not oppressing them.

The 'general cause' (*kāraṇa-hetu*), which we shall discuss later, is said to be the same as this 'dominating condition'. The 'dominating condition' is thus only a 'permissive' condition, and consequently is not directly responsible for the emergence of anything.

As contrasted with the '*pratyayas*' or conditions, the '*hetus*' or causes represent factors that are directly responsible for the arising of other events or objects. One should not, however, interpret the words 'being directly responsible' as meaning 'producing'. Instead of explaining every case where one thing is said to be directly responsible for the origination of another, as a case of production, the *Sarvāstivādins* try to explain even what is known as 'production' as : involuntary reaction of a sort under certain conditions, or appearance of certain events in a particular way depending on certain specific circumstances.

The *Sarvāstivādins* analysed the '*hetu-pratyaya*' into five different '*hetus* : (i) '*sahabhū-hetu*', (ii) '*sabhāga-hetu*', (iii) '*samprayuktaka-hetu*', (iv) '*sarvatraga-hetu*' and (v) '*vipāka-hetu*'. We may translate these respectively as (i) 'interdependent cause', (ii) 'homogeneous cause', (iii) 'closely associated cause', (iv) 'all pervading cause' and (v) 'retribution cause'. I do not want the readers to be bogged down by the details of the hair-splitting analysis which the 'Buddhist scholastics' have presented in their categorisation of the different sorts of causes. I would rather like them to be acquainted with the main ideas underlying the five-fold classification.

The category of '*sahabhū-hetu*' comprises all those objects and events which mutually cause one another and which are interdependent. The category of '*sabhāga-hetu*' is brought in to explain what is commonly known as 'homogeneous production' as well as the apparent continuity of a particular object. In this way, although the 'five constituents of a person' ('*pañca skandhas*') are momentary and, as a result, are destroyed in the next moment to that in which they are born, similar '*dharma*' arise immediately and take their place and give us the feeling that they constitute a continuity. The '*samprayuktaka*'

hetu is supposed to represent an intense form of co-operation between '*dharma*s'. As contrasted with the co-operation between '*dharma*s' exhibited by this cause, the next two causes are paradigm cases of unilateral causation. The '*sarvatra*ga-*hetu*' comprises the passions ('*anuśayas*') which later give rise to all sorts of demeritorious consciousness. Both the demeritorious ('*akuśala*') and those of the meritorious ('*kuśala*') '*dharma*s' which proceed from craving lead to certain painful or pleasurable consequences. Such meritorious and demeritorious '*dharma*s' are then said to act as '*vipāka-hetus*'.

Now we come to the discussion of the '*kāraṇa-hetu*' which can be translated as 'general cause'. For some technical reasons the *Sarvāstivādins* have included this cause not under '*hetu-pratyaya*', but under '*adhipati-pratyaya*'. We shall have to make a detailed study of this category of cause for reasons which will be apparent to us as we proceed.

The 'general cause' is described to be that factor which does not constitute an obstacle to the arising of '*dharma*s' that are 'capable of being born' (i.e. which have all the positive conditions of their coming into existence fulfilled). In this sense all the conditions that are present at the moment when an effect comes into existence, but do not obstruct the effect's appearance, are the 'general cause' of the effect. This description naturally brings to our mind the concept of the negative condition.

The case of a 'general cause' is comparable to that of a king, who, although powerful enough to oppress his subjects, refrains from doing so.

The '*dharma*s' then, that are capable of constituting obstacles, may possibly be designated 'general causes'. But what about those that are incapable of being obstacles? The *Sarvāstivādins* maintain that even such '*dharma*s' are 'general causes' of other '*dharma*s'. The reader may naturally stagger at such an apparently unintelligible statement. But what is implied is probably something like the following :

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COMMUNICATION : THE AUTOTELECITY OF THE FUNDAMENTAL MODE OF SOCIAL ACTIVITY

Fundamentally, two kinds of inter-subjective, or self-enacted modes of relationship that obtain in social activity, can be discerned. Formal and substantial; when agents are related to each other solely in virtue of the common rules of action to which they all subscribe, the relationship is formal, that is, it is to be reckoned in terms of considerations which composes a practice or institution; on the other hand association in bargaining or joint bargaining with others for the satisfaction of wants, from which an agent may extricate himself by a choice of his own, brings about substantial relationship, the association is in terms of purpose, as a means to some further end. Examples of formal relationships are, say, the way 'citizens' are related, or the speakers of a particular natural language are related, or the followers of a religious sect are related, whereas substantial relationship would be, say, the way the co-participants of an enterprise or corporation are related, the way the employers are related to the employee, the way, for example, I am related to the shopkeepers in the market, etc.

Till now I was considering the two fundamental kind of relationship that obtains in social activity. Now consider the social activity that obtains in these relationships.

Social activity consists in human beings participating in various ways, co-operating, collaborating, etc; participating is not the same as interacting, it is qualitatively different. This can be argued out in detail. I do not wish to do so presently. I am using 'participation' as generic term, the necessary condition of which is that it be both voluntary and rule regulated. Any kind of activity amongst human beings, which is a consequence of mutual agreement to act in a particular way, can be characterised as participation.

The possibility of participation amongst human beings is actualized in two ways. Human beings may participate, co-operate, to achieve some particular end, or participate just solely to participate, for its own sake, not aiming at any further goal beyond itself. It can be argued out that strategically those are the only two logically possible ways of actualizing the possibility of participation. I do not wish to emphasize this point here.

Participation which is meant to achieve an end, in which the relationship between the participants is thus evidently substantial, I wish to call '*teleotelic*' activity (telos—goal, telic—towards), which is to be differentiated from '*autotelic*' activity, in which the relationship between the co-participants is formal.

Examples of autotelic activity are playing games, singing, in a choir, picknicing, celebrating festivals, climbing Mt. Everest, etc, etc. These could be activities done for their own sake. One could think of various other activities. Examples of teleotelic activities would be selling and buying, forming governments, corporations, writing exams; one could count thousand others.

The necessary condition for the autotelicity of an activity is that the *possibility* of maintaining its autotelicity should always be there. What this means to say is that an autotelic activity may be turned into a teleotelic activity; for example, one may play games, games only to earn money. However, the possibility that he plays the game for its own sake is always there. Hence ~~the~~ autotelicity of games. Though autotelic activity may be turned into teleotelic activity, the other way round is not possible, that is, teleotelic activity can not be turned autotelic.

I have stated the necessary condition of autotelicity, namely that the possibility of maintaining its autotelicity should always be present. The sufficient condition of this is that when this possibility is so realized there be joy in doing that activity. This is a contingent fact; it happens to be so in this world.

I think it is necessary for me to state clearly the nature of the

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work I have done above before drawing further conclusions from it. It should be evident that I am not proposing theories, or hypostatizing about social activity. All that I have done is to give a descriptive account of social activity, of what is the case. In doing this, I have characterised social activity in a particular way. It is not contended that this is the only way of going about the matter; but this I think is certainly a fruitful way of doing so.

Communication is the basis of all other teleotelic and outotelic activity. But what kind of activity is communication itself?

Communication is a participative activity, an activity in which human beings have mutually agreed to use a common syntax and vocabulary. Of course that acceptance to participate in this social mode of being is not an overt statement at some stage of life. Human beings are inducted into this common pool of syntax and vocabulary and acquire the skill of this practice gradually.

To say that communication satisfies the conditions to be characterised as participative activity is only half the truth. It should be possible to answer what kind of participative activity is it essentially, basically, autotelic or teleotelic?

Let me try to explicate this question in another way. One kind of participative activity, namely, communication, is the presupposition of all other teleotelic and autotelic activities. That is, to be participating in a game or enterprise, it is a necessary condition that one be able to participate in a larger participative situation, namely, communication. Now, can the most fundamental mode of participation, which is presupposed in all other activities itself, have a goal? Can it itself be teleotelic? What can be the goal of such a participation by human beings at large? The question in its most general form is: the fact that there is communication at all in the world, how is this fact to be explained? Is the existence of communication conditional, that is, does communication exist because something other than itself is to be brought into existence, to be achieved, or does

communication exists because it is what is to exist in itself, without there being any further condition to fulfil?

Since there are teleotelic activities and since these cannot give rise to autotelic activities, whereas autotelic activities can give rise to the former, it follows that the basic participative activity which is presupposed in all other activities itself cannot be teleotelic in its essential nature. For then there would be no autotelic activities, whatsoever, possible. Participation for the existence of communication by human beings at large cannot be for a purpose other than itself. It must be for its own sake. It must be goal-neutral. The existence of communication cannot be conditional; it is autotelic in the most fundamental way.

Given a grammar and vocabulary, we can frame rules for various 'situational' activity, that is, we can lay the conditions under which there would be, say, a government, a corporation, municipality, or a game of chess, cricket, olympics, etc, etc. I have called these 'situational' activities so as to differentiate them from the basic 'non-situational' activity, that is, communication itself, 'non-situational' in the sense that it is not conditioned for any particular situation. It can and does exist in every social situation.

Let me illustrate the feature of communication which I have been describing above. Suppose there is no participation or cooperation amongst human beings. Take an ab-initio initial situation. If I were to start a corporation now, for the manufacture of X, or say, a game, I would need people to co-operate with me for the existence of this corporation or game. People would be participating in a situation which satisfies the conditions for a corporation or a game, the goal of the former would be to manufacture X, and the latter would be meant to have no goal other than itself. For people to participate to bring about a corporation or a game, they would have to communicate. Now communication itself is a participative activity. If this participative

activity had a purpose for its existence other than itself, then this purpose would have to be fulfilled first and since it would consistently be a teleotelic activity, the game would never start. For there would permanently remain some purpose unfulfilled, some goal not achieved. Similarly the corporation for the manufacture of X would never come into being since the goal of the participative activity, which is presupposed in it, will always have to be attained first.

The central point of the above example is to emphasize the fact that the non-situational participative activity presupposed as a necessary condition for every situational autotelic or teleotelic activity must necessarily itself be autotelic.

There is a possibility of a misapprehension here. To say that communication is autotelic in its fundamental nature does not mean that it can not be turned into or used for a teleotelic activity in a given particular context. On the contrary, as I have been emphasizing it is a feature of all autotelic activities that it is possible to use them teleotelically. It can be shown that much of human social life depends on the possibility of communication being used teleotelically in a particular context. When I am talking about the autotelicity of communication, I am talking about the participation by human-beings at large for communication as such. To characterise it so is to state the fact that there need not be any purpose for there being communication at all in this world. Even if men did no bargaining or transaction whatsoever, communication would even then exist. Purpose is not a necessary condition for the existence of communication, communication is logically prior, purpose posterior.

If this characterisation of communication is true then it follows that it should be possible for human beings to carry on a conversation with each other purely for the sake of conversation, without having any particular purpose in mind, and it also follows that what is true of other activities, such as games,

should be true of this too, namely, if two human beings are talking to each other purely for the sake of talking to each other it should give them joy, and this joy would come while in conversation and not at the end of it, this feature too being common to all other autotelic activities. I think all these conditions are in fact satisfied by communication. One has only to reflect a little on our social life to see its veracity.

If we understand communication as a whole to be a non-situational autotelic participative activity there are some very important conclusions that follow from it I would wish to discuss them one by one.

First, it clearly shows that any interactionist, behaviouristic account of communication will totally fail to capture the essential feature of it, since communication is a mutually understood cooperative venture, a description of it in observational terms would completely miss out the meaning giving inter-subjectively comprehended intentional acts. Moreover, such actions are not causally determined. They cannot be explained in stimulant-response categories. My calling out your name can only function as a 'stimulant' for you to 'respond' and look towards me if there is already mutually understood and subscribed to rules, tacitly presupposed in this behaviour, which it makes possible for me to call *your* attention to myself rather than look towards you and make a series of sounds. I would be able to cause nothing to you communicatively if we have not already co-operatively agreed to practice the same rules of behaviour, linguistic behaviour. (I would not even be able to abuse you without your co-operation !!)

Secondly, all the scientific theories that there are presently about the origin of communication are ill-founded. There is no ground for their justification; on the contrary, as our analysis shows, they are false. All such theories look for the origin of communication in causes which are external to it, such as imita-

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tion of the birds and animals, or desire to carry out transactions and bargains, or the necessity of mutual physical help, etc. All such theories presuppose a conditional existence of communication, which I have tried to show it is not. Due to its autotelicity communication would exist even if there were never any necessity to inform each other about anything or ask each other for help; think of it, would there be any communication between the all powerful and omnipotent gods? Even gods would not need to but *like* to talk. What I am suggesting is that the cause or reason for its existence lies within itself. Most simply put, communication came in to being because being able to say something to each other is a great fun.

Thirdly, linguists and psychologists who have interested themselves with language, being swayed by the zeitgeist of scientism, I suppose, have concentrated too heavily on 'information' and knowledge gathering function of language, thereby greatly underscoring the autotelic significance of communication. Since this is its basic nature people who theorize about language acquisition and people interested in theories of child development should pay far more importance to the joy aspect in language acquisition and development than they have hitherto paid.

There is a further line of thought that I would like to suggest here but not develop presently: If the autotelicity of the basic mode of participative activity is apprehended then its similarity in some respects to games and play is comprehensible. Then as such, it is understandable why man's-world in the Hindu theology has been characterised as 'Līlā' (play). It is not only the Sat, Cit, but also greatly the Ānanda aspect of Brahman which manifests itself in social activity.

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RUSSELL'S INVENTORY OF THE WORLD

In recent and contemporary Western philosophy, there are, roughly speaking, two extreme types of philosophers—word analysts and world-analysts. The former confine their activities to the analysis of language, whereas the latter, not feeling satisfied therewith, proceed to analyse the world also. Besides, there are certain eclectics who are concerned more to analyse language but have occasional excursions into the analysis of the world as well. Moore and Carnap belong to the first category, Alexander and Whitehead to the second, and Russell and Wittgenstein to the third.

And this despite Russell's abhorrence of categorial schemes. "What exactly is meant," he observes, by the word 'category', whether in Aristotle or in Kant and Hegel, I must confess that I have never been able to understand. I do not myself believe that the term 'category' is in any way useful in philosophy, as representing any clear idea." ¹ In *The Problems of Philosophy*, he has unwittingly been able to propound a veritable scheme of categories both ontological and epistemological. The scheme has been embellished in his later writing. According to *The Problems of Philosophy*, there is knowledge of things on the one hand and knowledge of truths on the other. Each of the two kinds of knowledge is either immediate or derivative. The immediate knowledge of things is called knowledge by acquaintance which is also of two kinds—knowledge of particulars and knowledge of universals. The knowledge of particulars is also of two kinds—the knowledge of sense-data and (probably) knowledge of ourselves. Some universals, too are known by the acquaintance though Russell knows no principle by which it can be decided which universals are known by acquaintance. There are some universals which are known by acquaintance, there are some others which are known by description, and there are certain others which are known neither by acquaintance nor by descri-

ption.² How Russell has been able to come by this knowledge of the universals belonging to the third category is shrouded in mystery. He believes, however, that such universals as sensible qualities, relation between space and time, similarity, and certain abstract logical universals are known by acquaintance. The derivative knowledge of things is called knowledge by description which always involves acquaintance with something and knowledge of truths. The immediate knowledge of truths is called intuitive knowledge. The intuitive knowledge gives us self-evident truths, such as those which merely state what is given in sense, and also certain abstract logical and arithmetical principle, and probably some ethical propositions as well. Whatever is deduced from self-evident truths by the use of self-evident principles of deduction is in the nature of derivative knowledge, knowledge of truths.³

From this account of knowledge and its objects we get the following inventory of the world.

1. Particulars
 - (1) Sense data
 - (2) Ourselves (probably)
2. Universals
 - (1) Those known by acquaintance.
 - (1) Sensible qualities
 - (2) Relations of space and time.
 - (3) Similarity (or resemblance, vide p. 102)
 - (4) Certain abstract logical universals.
 - (2) Those known by description, not specified.
 - (3) Those known neither by acquaintance nor by description.

The inventory has to be expanded on the basis of certain observations made elsewhere in the same work.⁴ So, the list

of relations known by acquaintance requires the following new items :-

1. Relations between universals.
2. Relations between particulars.

It is pertinent to point out here that Russell does not seem to have raised the question of relation between universals and particulars. This question has been poignantly posed by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system of Indian philosophy according to which such a relation does hold and is termed "inherence" (Samavāya).

The inventory needs to be modified in another way, too. The objects of knowledge by acquaintance are mutually exclusive, because they are original entities, while the objects of the knowledge by description are derivative entities, derived by logical construction from some of the objects of the knowledge by acquaintance. Though the concept of logical construction does not seem to have dawned upon Russell while drafting *The Problems of Philosophy*, yet it seems to be implied in his concept of derivation. So, in order to avoid overlapping or mutual inclusion of the items of his inventory of the world, the objects of the knowledge by description must be discounted.

Russell could not keep the above list intact in his later writings. There was a stage in his philosophical career at which Russell seemed to be inclined to dispense with universals altogether. In *An Outline of Philosophy*, he seems to dispense with the idea that universals are objects of knowledge by acquaintance. He says that the reality of universals "... is a metaphysical question".⁵ Our interpretation is reinforced by his later statement, "It has often been supposed that, because we can use a word like 'man' correctly, we must be capable of a corresponding 'abstract idea' of man, but this is quite a mistake."⁶ This proved to be a passing mood on the part of Russell. In a subsequent work entitled *Human Knowledge : Its Scope and Limits*,

he grants ontological status to similarity, a clear case of universal. "The fact that we need the word "similar" indicates some facts about the world, and not only about language. What fact it indicates about the world, I do not know." ⁷ Earlier he had maintained in his paper entitled "On Relations of Universals and Particulars" that at least likeness "...must be admitted as a universal, and, having admitted one universal, we have no longer any reason to reject others." ⁸

According to Russell in *The Problems of Philosophy*, the world contains particulars like sense data and, as he says, "probably ourselves." He maintains that "...proper names stand for particulars, while other substantives, adjectives, prepositions, and verbs stand for universals. Pronouns stand for particulars, but are ambiguous... The word "now" stands for a particular... but like pronouns, it stands for an ambiguous particular." ⁹ The two statements do not appear to be compatible with each other. If only proper names have to be treated as particulars, sense data cannot be particulars at all, because they are not proper names.

In fact, Russell's notion of particulars and his position with regard to the question of their reality or unreality is highly puzzling to us, as also, we daresay, to many others. He has all along been against the idea of substance, which he regards as a metaphysical mistake. This being the case, things are not unities, but mere bundles of sense-data. Even individualities designated by proper names do not deserve to be called particulars but merely a string of sets of universals.

Later, even in his lectures entitled *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism*, he defines particulars as terms of relations in atomic facts. Here, too it appears that particulars are things. Elsewhere in the same lectures he treats patches of white as particulars. Any way, he was an upholder of the existence of particulars in those lectures.

In his *Human Knowledge : Its Scope and Limits*, he maintains three main views regarding particulars. First, Leibniz's view that a particular is just a bundle of qualities with nothing else besides. The second is Thomas Aquinas' view defining a particular by its spatio-temporal position. The third is the view, expressed or implied, of most modern empiricists which regards numerical diversity as ultimate and indefinable.¹² Russell expresses his agreement with Leibniz and regards a particular as a complex of compresence. According to him, the kind of object which acquires a proper name is nothing but a single such complex or a string of such complexes causally connected in a certain way. This being the case, "only our ignorance makes names for complexes necessary. Otherwise, each complex is fully exhausted by enumeration of its component qualities."¹³

It is noteworthy, however, that, as he avers in a note added to his article "Relations of Univarsals and Particulars," in 1955, he does not say that the theory which asserts particulars is wrong. What he does mean to suggest is that it cannot be proved to be right. According to him, the theory which asserts particulars and the theory which denies them are equally tenable. He is inclined in favour of the theory which denies particulars only on the ground that it has the merit of logical parsimony.¹⁴

In this connection attention is invited to the fact that sense and sensibilia yielded place to percepts and events in Russell's *An Outline of Philosophy*. A percept is in the brain¹⁵, in our heads¹⁶ Russell also makes it clear that the percept is subjective and that the subjectivity of percepts is a matter of degree.¹⁷ As regards events, he maintains that everything in the world is composed of them. An event has a small finite duration and a small finite extension in space; or in view of the theory of relativity it is to be regarded as occupying a small finite amount of space-time.¹⁸ The peculiarity of the events is that they are neither physical nor mental, they are in the nature of a kind

of neutral stuff which is at the root of both matter and mind. This is what is meant by the neutral monism of Russell.

Percepts and events have been propounded rather in replacement of sense data and sensibilia. It is, therefore, incumbent upon us to replace sense data by these in the inventory of the world drawn earlier on the basis of *The Problems of Philosophy*.

Besides the entities listed above on behalf of Russell there are also such entities as facts which he commends for inclusion in the list. Facts are juxtaposed to things. The juxtaposition reaches its limit in Wittgenstein who remarks that the world is a totality of facts, not of things.¹⁹ By a fact is meant a thing's having a certain quality or things having a certain relation. For example, one should not call Napoleon a fact, but one should call it a fact that he was ambitious or that he married Josephine. A fact always has two or more constituents.²⁰

Facts are expressed by Propositions. These facts are objective, i. e. belong to the objective world.²¹ Russell makes it perfectly clear that no inventory of the world can be said to be complete without including facts which are part of the real world.

Russell refers to a great many different kinds of facts, such as particular facts and general facts, positive facts and negative facts and so on. We have no occasion to go into his classification of facts. We cannot, however, resist the temptation of noticing his negative facts which are directly related to our task in hand. The inclusion of negative facts in the inventory of the world has the effect of expanding it enormously so as to include all sorts of non-existents.

Our account of Russell's inventory of the world will remain incomplete without taking account of what A. J. Ayer has to say on the subject. Ayer's finding is that Russell's world consists of simple particulars, which have only simple qualities ... and which stand in simple relations to one another.²³ Ayer is quite aware of Russell's view that, although propositions do not be-

long to the objective world, facts do. Ayer raises a difficulty in interpreting this existential statement of Russell. Russell sometimes speaks of the objective world as consisting of events without making it clear whether there are facts as well as events. He sometimes gives us the impression that he would regard speaking in terms of events and speaking in terms of facts as alternative ways of telling the same tale. Ayer construes Russell's assertion, that facts belong to the objective world, to mean no more than that either events or facts exhaust the real world, the suggestion being that events and facts are so blurred by Russell as to make them interchangeable. This is the only conclusion one can draw from Ayer's words. Says he, "It is not clear whether he thinks that there are facts as well as events, ... or whether, *what would appear more sensible*, he would regard speaking in terms of events and speaking in terms of facts as alternative ways of telling what is in effect the same story." ²⁴ Ayer continues: "This point is not decided by the arguments which he gives in favour of there being facts which are, first, that a true description of the world or any part of it, cannot consist simply in a list of objects, and, secondly that something's being the case is not, in general, dependent on any one's believing it to be so." Ayer ends his statement with the remark: "It may be, indeed, that in saying that facts belong to the objective world, he means no more than that both these arguments are valid..." ²⁵

We are inclined to the view that Ayer's construction is far from valid. Russell has all along been clear on the issue whether or not facts and things are identical. He makes it clear, off and on, that, besides particulars, qualities, and relations, there are facts, which "are not properly entities at all in the same sense in which their constituents are." ²⁶ So far as events are concerned, they can, as pointed out by us above, take the place of sense data but not of facts. It is true that Russell's neutral monism is based on his concept of neutral entities called events,

but it does not mean that he has dispensed with facts altogether.

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NOTES

1. Bertrand Russell; *History of Western Philosophy*, (London; George Allen & Unwin, 1946), p. 222.
2. Russell; *The Problems of Philosophy*, (London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 101
3. *Ibid.*, p. 109
4. *Ibid.*, p. 102-103.
5. Russell; *An Outline of Philosophy*, (8 th. impression, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1961), p. 57
6. *Loc-cit.*
7. Russell; *Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits*, quoted in Alan Wood, *Bertrand Russell: The Passionate Sceptic* (London: Unwine Books, 1963), p. 225
8. Russell; *Logic and Knowledge*, (Essays 1901-1950), Charles Marsh, ed. (2nd impression, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1964), p. 112-
9. Russell; *The Problems of Philosophy*, p. 93
10. Russell; *History of Western Philosophy*, p. 225
11. Russell; *Logic and Knowledge*, p. 199
12. Russell; *Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits*, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1961), p. 310 ff.
13. *Ibid*, p. 325
14. Russell; *Logic and Knowledge*, (Note added in 1955.)
p. 124
15. Russell; *An Outline of Philosophy*, p. 139
16. *Ibid*, p. 143
17. *Ibid*, p. 141

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17

18. *Ibid*, p. 287
19. Wittgenstein ; *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus*, (4th .
impression, London : Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1949), 1.1
20. Russell ; *Our Knowledge of the External World*, (6th .
Impression, London : George Allen & Unwin, 1972), p. 60
21. Russell ; *Logic and Knowledge*, p. 185
22. *Loc-cit.*
23. A. J. Ayer ; *Russell and Moore : The Analytical Heritage*,
(London and Basingstoke ; Macmillan Co. 1971), p. 54
24. *Ibid*, p. 83
25. *Ibid*, pp. 83-84
26. Russell ; *Logic and Knowledge*, p. 270

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We would readily grant that the appearance of a thing is, besides being directly caused by certain things, also indirectly conditioned by certain other factors. But we usually think that *only a limited number* of conditions are directly and indirectly responsible for an effect. The *Sarvāstivādins* try to show that it is not possible to restrict ourselves in this way in our investigation of the conditions. It is true that a particular effect comes into being through its dependence upon a particular set of conditions (both direct and indirect conditions). But there is a causal background from which this set of conditions itself arises. This background itself is, in its turn, dependent on another causal background. All these factors are, according to the *Sarvāstivādins*, indirectly responsible for the emergence of the effect. If they did not exist and constitute, so to speak, a 'general background' in which the effect in question appears, the effect could not have secured its existence. In fact these philosophers wanted to show that if we conducted our search for the conditions to its farthest limit, then we would find that nothing short of the conditions of the whole universe at a particular time is in a way responsible for the appearance of the effect.

Our examination of certain aspects of the Buddhist causal theories has, as it has proceeded so far, revealed to us some general points of resemblance between the position of the Buddhists and that of British empiricists like Mill. But the same question which we have asked in the case of Mill's exposition of causation can be repeated in the context of this Buddhist theory of causation as well. How can the Buddhist logicians avoid the necessity of designating every case of constant conjunction as a case of causation? Buddhist logicians like *Kamalaśīla* have shown that the presence of cattle in the cowshed cannot be said to cause the smoke in that area. The reason is, smoke may be present *in some cases at least*, even when no cattle are around (see Section I). Whereas nothing can be the cause of smoke if smoke could be present *even in some cases* in its absence. In other words, the Buddhist logicians are trying to say that smoke can be caused by something only if the former (in addition to being constantly con-

joined) is necessarily connected with the latter. That this is what the Buddhists imply, is evident from the following consideration :

The statement, 'No case of X is possible without Y' really means, 'X is necessarily connected with Y'. If no case of being a bachelor is possible without its being a case of a male, then being a bachelor is necessarily connected with being a male. Thus one can conclude that if *no case* of smoke is possible without a case of fire, then smoke is necessarily connected with fire.

Mill had argued that only that phenomenon is a cause which besides being immediately antecedent to the effect, is also an *unconditional* antecedent to the latter. But how does one determine whether an antecedent is unconditional or not? Surely we do so only by repeated observation of the phenomena. Thus we arrive at the 'further quality' which, Mill says, an antecedent must possess if it is to deserve the title of a cause, through our experience of the unvarying succession of several phenomena. How can he then be said to have improved upon the position of those empiricists according to whom causation can be fully explained without residue in terms of constant conjunction?

The Buddhist logicians would, however, say that the 'further quality' which a case of causation must possess is that of 'necessary connection', and they do not arrive at this concept through observation of several instances of succession. That everything is necessarily connected with the effect it produces follows from the very definition of something as real. A real entity or '*paramārtha sat*' must be able to give rise to an effect, it must be '*artha kriyā kāri*' (See *Nyāya-bindu*, verses 14-15, and commentary on them. See also *TSP*, Vol. I. p. 140: '*akāraṇaṃ bhavatām dvidhā - nityam asat ca*'). An imaginary fire, whether we imagine it to be in the vicinity or at a distance from us, fails to make any impact on us. That is because it is an unreal entity. A real fire, on the other hand, is bound to make a difference to our sensation by its vicinity or remoteness from us. That a cause must be necessarily connected with its

Causal Theories

effects, does, therefore, follow from the very definition of something as real.

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RITA GUPTA

NOTES

1. *Pramāṇavārtika*, ch. II, verse 536.
2. If a contrary mental state were to arise, then the continuity of a particular thought, consisting of similar mental events, would break.
3. 'Sovereign condition' would perhaps be a better translation of the word '*adhipatipratyaya*', which is usually translated as 'dominating condition'. The usual translation is rather misleading, since it suggests the idea of an overwhelming influence.
4. The protection which a group of merchants travelling together in a caravan give each other from the dangers of the road, is comparable to the way the various '*sahabhū-hetus*' help each other. The merchants are more united when they have the same food and drink, and do exactly the same work. This is comparable, according to the *Sarvāstivādins*, to the unity which an act of consciousness ('*citta*') and its concomitant mental phenomena or '*caittikas*' (viz. conception, feeling, volition etc.) have when they have the same 'point d'appui' ('*samāśraya*'), same object and the same time of origination. Such an intense co-operation between an act of consciousness and its concomitant mental phenomena is an example of the causal functioning of the '*samprayuktaka-hetu*'.

ABBREVIATIONS

- AK : *Abhidharmakośa*, Ed. Louis de la Valle's Poussin, 6 Vols. Louvain, 1923-31.
- Enquiry : *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, David Hume, Selby-Bigge's edition, Oxford, 1894.
- SL : *A system of Logic*, Vol. I, 1872, London.
- TS : *Tattva-Saṅgraha* : with Pañjikā, Ed. E. Krishnamacharya, 2 Vols, Baroda, 1926.

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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE THIRD WORLD AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

The relationship between scholarship and ideology presents many difficulties. After adequate concepts have been formulated the traditional ideologist places an interpretation upon fresh political data in such a manner that his downright claims are not accepted by further empirical studies. It is instructive to take a look at some manifestations of the principle of *cognitive dissonance* which can be a source of anxious concern to those in the Third World who wish to participate in a rational analysis of the international environment. The failure to utilise *cognitive inputs* from Viet Nam turned the American "dream" into a "nightmare" and a feature of this nationwide shift is a pervasive scepticism about the central notions of official American ideology. The politically corrosive effect of neo-colonialist ideology comes into sharp focus in the following statement in "*The British Survey*", May 1962, when the British Government had not shed its *hubris*: "Who are the 'Angolan leaders'? If there existed any prospects of a genuine negro government formed by persons manifestly enjoying mass support throughout the territory and having such competence in political and economic management as have the majority of those who have come to the fore in the independent Frenchspeaking states of Africa, for instance, or in Nigeria, there would be so strong a case for the transfer of powers, that no Portuguese Government could resist it in the existing climate of opinion. We, for our part, should be the first to recommend it. But it is sheer dishonesty to pretend that any such situation exists." The contemporary British policy in Angola had learnt a new dimension of "honesty" in 1975 when it was in certain fundamental ways different from the prevailing view of Dr. Henry Kissinger, before he was silenced by the U. S. Congress and forced to abandon an interventionist role in Angola.

What again is equally obvious is that Dr. Kissinger's verbiage of pragmatism did not represent the kind of synthesis of idea and action which would have fitted the pluralistic situation that existed in Angola. It was at the United Nations in September, 1973, that he had declared: "Independently of bilateral diplomacy,

the pragmatical agreements and the dramatic steps of the past years, we have in mind a comprehensive, institutionalised peace". This statement did not modify the American ideological impulse to start viewing Angola in the context of Super-Power conflict in the year that followed.

In spite of its indubitable advantage over the United States and other Western powers, the Soviet Union's macro-learning about the Third World and its place in the international system has not been free from confusion and avoidable frustrations. One great problem is that Soviet official ideology, while gaining significant acceptance in the Third World after the 20th Congress of the C. P. S. U., has shown either constraint or passivity in developing adequate political categories which can convey truly objective knowledge about the underlying processes of rapid change of Third World social systems. A line of investigation is the careful study of Umberto Melotti on Marx and the Third World which makes a meticulous analysis of the genuine Marxist content of the Soviet ideological view of "historical development". The roots of the problems that have arisen in the application of Soviet foreign and economic policies in the Third World lie in the inherent characteristics of a "uni-linear scheme" for which the evidence is not convincing that it is universally applicable. On the contrary a creative Marxist response to the "new" questions posed by the Third World would require that Soviet experience should not be made too absolute and due recognition must be given to the distinctive adaptation to historical forces in different societies. If Soviet foreign policy is to make a sustained contribution to the long-run development of the international system, the Soviet official ideology will have to permit *cognitive inputs* which are not fictionalised accounts of Third World historical development. The Melotti model visualises the following elements in its analysis :

1. The principal works of Karl Marx, *The Communist Manifesto*, *Das Kapital*, *The poverty of Philosophy*, as well as the relatively recently discovered *Grundrisse*, do not support the uni-linear position adopted as a comprehensive ideology to support the logic of Stalinist developments in the Soviet Union.

2. The false identifications and theoretical flaws of the Stalinist uni-linear position are shared by bi-linear position of Plekhanov

The International System

which cannot claim greater validity in the analysis of the general aspects of the world-wide historical process.

The neo-unilinear approach of Godelier, Chesnaux and Suret-Canale, also do not contribute to the solution of the problems raised in the discussion.

4. To avoid the difficulties and weakness of the "traditional" approaches Marxism can explain the changing historical conditions by utilising the multi-linear approaches which have been long neglected by official theoreticians. The study of problems in the multi-linear context is a decisive factor in the Marxist contributions of Eric Robsbawn, Maxime Rodinson and Guy Dhoquois. A broad and stimulating discussion of Marxist theory leads to a multi-linear Marxist theoretical model which in turn helps in finding a creative path towards the improvement of the analysis of the Third World in the international environment.

5. The Melotti model distinguishes (a) parallel from (b) successive socio-economic formations. This has profound consequences for understanding the dissolution and transformation of the *primitive community*. The discussion compels clear thinking about 1. Asian Society 2. Ancient (European) Society and 3. Feudal Society. These are viewed as "three specific developments on a secondary level".

6. The identification of Third World problems arises out of the historical development of Asian societies like those of Indian and semi-Asian societies like those of Russia. The line of development in Europe is in the break-up of ancient society on account of internal crises and external pressures; this is followed by the breakup of feudal society through the development of capitalism. The important key to Asian society is that it "resists the test of time". The Asian transformation from semi-colonialism to imperialism takes place when Asian society clashes with Western capitalism. This led in the case of India to the "development of under-development" because the Indian society was brought into line with Western historical development but deliberately confined to a "peripheral position". By contrast, in the case of Russia (a semi-Asian society) the Western

impact was felt less deeply. The transition takes place from the Asiatic mode of production to the "bureaucratic-collectivist" mode of production. The Soviet Revolution is therefore strictly comparable to the Western transition from Feudalism to Capitalism, although the faith which inspires is noble and exalted.

7. The essential parameters of the international system from a Marxist Multi-linear point of view cannot be understood until it is conceded that the structures and institutions of contemporary political societies do not fulfill Marx's own requirement of socialism "the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all". The spread of official ideology on the claim that socialism already exists in one or more states is the result of linear political thinking.

8. The Melotti model specifies contemporary tasks on the basis of Marx's conviction that every country in the world today can transform itself to socialism. Thus the three contemporary forms of political society (1) Advanced Capitalism (2) Bureaucratic Collectivism (3) Third World Societies (ranging from peripheral capitalist, pre-capitalistic and feudal types) must all pursue lines of dynamics which lead to the world society of the future. From these considerations emerges the main task of eradication of exploitation which originates in the "metropoli" of imperialist capitalism in order to ensure the harmonious development of international society.

The Globalism of the United States and the Soviet Union expresses itself as enormous ideological pressures in the Third World. The goal of international peace and security in the new horizons held by the great powers gives scant attention to the hopes for new vistas for achieving freedom and growth without the "paternalism" which the colonial regimes had employed in their assault upon the national-cultural identity of Third World societies. This "paternalism" can be illustrated quite clearly in the numerous instances of psychic gratification which American and Soviet ideologies derive by contrasting the intellectual entrenchment of Western Judaeo-Christian ideology or the sophisticated perspective of "the Future" of Soviet-style Marxism with the amorphous and plebeian parochialisms that are the verbal expression of Third

World political experience. After the creation of a new detente-relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, the problems of the Cold War have ceased to be of practical import. The Third World countries, however, find themselves in a condition of incessant Cold War in the international environment in which their bargaining positions are sought to be impaired by self-reinforcing of ideological sanctions whose outcome is to suggest that feelings of autonomy in developing countries contravene the long range tasks of the emancipation of man and his creative potential. The realisation of a "single" supra-national proletarian interest or the convergence of "elite" attitudes to a common scientific-technological or technotronic concept will be the prelude to complete conformism and the fulfilment of the imperialist-colonialist dream of destroying the creative autonomy of societies in the Southern Hemisphere.

The existential response of the Third World points to several flaws in the current ideological theories which inspire Western and Soviet political strategies to the developing countries :

First, while narrowing the limits of action in their mutual confrontation, at the deep ideological level, neither the Soviets nor the Americans possess analytical perspectives which would link instabilities in Third World countries to the antagonism and bitterness injected into the international system first by their Cold War political rivalries.

The functional-technical rationality which exists in the domestic policies of the dominant political coalitions in the Western Capitals does not help in discovering the determinants of policy decisions which involve what Julius Nyerere has aptly called "international bullying". The dubious nature of values and schemes of peace and justice in some Third World societies does not exonerate the *industrial-military complex* which is a major source of political cynicism in any serious discussion of the future of the international system. A realistic appraisal of the situation must also include a discussion of the paradoxical trend of the use or threat of use of military force between states with defined attributes of socialist ideology.

The range of issues and political norms in Third World societies

are very much affected by the pervasive threat systems and war industries of the great powers. As Leo Mates observes : "... the logic of the cold war increasingly pushed confrontation with the rival power or powers to the forefront and even minimal consideration of the particular interests of the people of these countries was respected less and less. This policy ultimately developed to the point where it was precisely the United States that waged the last great colonial war in history, even though it did not have a colonial empire and despite the fact that it had never had any vested interests in that part of the world, in Indochina." Instead of elevating issues and acting as a benign influence on the social fabric in the Third World, both the torch bearers of technological revolution have in the course of winning spheres of influence occasionally imagined themselves to be operating in an environment very close to the Hobbesian state of nature.

Second, the substantive value of "equality" has been missing in the generalised process of the Third World's interaction with the great powers. In an era of decolonisation Third World politics, committed to their own way of life, have found, to their dismay, that the game of international politics has primary significance for disruptionist activity against the common care of shared national experience. Nyerere asserts : "I am neither a Marxist nor a Capitalist. I do not believe that every human value is, or need always be, sacrificed to economic interests." Specifically Third World leaders are explicit in saying that their societies will resist indoctrination into principles of economic development which are inherently manipulative of universal maxims of national ethics. The reason for this assurance is simply that economic and financial penetration has often converted the friendly outsider into the ultimate arbiter and supreme decision-maker in past as well as recent history.

Third, having acquired inter-continental strategic capabilities the super nuclear powers, as they proceed to institutionalise the SALT arrangements, are likely to come into conflict with the legitimate security aspirations of other countries. This is not a matter of trivial importance as far as Third World areas are concerned. India's experience with the U. S. S. Enterprise and the expressed goals and priorities of the Americans and the Russians in the Indian Ocean will repay careful attention and may be of more general interest for all developing countries.

Fourth, in the lack of a balanced approach to the exchange of information, a good deal of interest and controversy has been generated. Information has important implications for international political analysis and policy preferences are conditioned by learning biases determined by information flows. The New Delhi conference recently attempted to explore tentatively the media and information problems facing the non-aligned. The western media has defined attributes of "exploitation" vis-a-vis the Third World as the interpretation of evidence from western sources clearly shows. In spite of the sympathy of the Soviet Union and East European countries for the revolutionary struggle in the Third World it is doubtful whether "socialist bloc" media would meet the stringent tests of the Non-aligned countries to gain an objective and empirical basis for information flows in the international society of tomorrow.

In guiding social and political change in China, Mao Tse-tung and his associates found a natural vocation for themselves as a global catalyst for a new international system. They relied upon Marxism as the authorised scripture for generating popular political awareness as well as the textbook for undertaking the process of special alchemy. Mao Tse-tung affirmed: "Marxism-Leninism has by no means exhausted the wealth of truth but is only providing ever new roads towards the practical realisation of truth." Although the Chinese communist political tradition avoided the type of ideological self-sufficiency which was beloved of Soviet orthodoxy, yet in portraying the name of Third World interrelationship the Maoist ideological view, although enlivened by deep conviction, remained largely simplistic. As a model of Marxism, the Chinese variety promotes the same irrational identification with the "uni-linear" approach and thus leads to extravagant propositions about the historical process in the developing countries and an assertive but undocumented Chinese role in them.

The disappointments and paradoxes of the Chinese role in the Third World as well as China's efforts at spokespersonship are largely traceable to a "forward strategy" combined with a "role-ambiguity". The international involvement of China has fluctuated in a manner which has made it look, at times, like an old fashioned imperial power and at other times as a symbol of a new inter-

national society based on new non-exploitative structures. To the faithful adherents of Maoism, China will always remain the Delphic Oracle but a broader non-dogmatic view would suggest that there are numerous examples of substantial gap between Maoist rhetoric and political reality : (a) Peking's concentration on Super-power problems and an operational style embedded in the search for a place in the two-way communication process between the Soviet and the Americans. (b) China's acute problems in harmonising its action with the majority of Third World countries in Bangla Desh, Chile, Rhodesia and South Africa. (c) China's poorly organised efforts in controversial domains like the tribal strife between Ruanda and Burundi and the appalling conflict in Biafra. (d) Problems caused by China's needs to invest her trade earnings in Western technology which in turn affects her trade and aid pattern with Third World countries.

There is, however, room for guarded optimism as one makes a prognosis of China's further development. If a multi-linear model comes to be accepted the Chinese political consciousness could have benign systematic consequences for the Third World. To quote Roger Garaudy : "As the Chinese Revolution has shown, it is possible to proceed directly from a grianian-feudal society to socialism without any intermediate capitalist phase. Hence it would seem probably that economic and technical backwardness could be overcome, not by industrialisation of the old type but by a less indirect approach to the new scientific and technological revolution. The question of the diversity of developmental criteria arises at all levels."

Professor Garaudy, however, gives a clear warning to China if she is to avoid a Faustian drama : "Where China is concerned, it would be a disaster were she to isolate herself by dogmatization and by the extrapolation of her own model on to the rest of the world instead of using her experience to help other countries and other socialist parties towards a better understanding of the need for a diversity of socialist models and for development criteria; towards a better understanding too, of the need for objectivity in regard to values and to the types of civilisation and socialism that have evolved in the Western world."

In spite of a sustained scholarly study of the power elites in

major countries and a coherent system of ideas on elite values and preference, there are grounds for concern that this approach has not yielded rewarding results in terms of insights on the actual patterns of developments in the Third World.

In a book entitled *The Real and the Negative*, Basanta Kumar Mallik provided a typically Indian insight into political and social change. Looking at the prevailing stage of human conflict he wrote : " The implication is that values appear in two distinct forms : (a) The form in which the function with regard to them is negation or abstention—this appears in conflict. (b) The form in which the function with regard to them is affirmation or realisation—this appears in harmony ".

That Indian foreign policy has paid close attention to the normative dimension may not amount to an incisive political analysis. Yet the tentativeness of an initial theoretical statement in Indian official pronouncements should not prevent a systematic development and appraisal of a new internationalism which overcomes obstacles to thought and communications. The existing discussion whether in terms of " nonalignment " or the " group of 77 " has yielded a partial conception of India's initiative at the international level. What is urgently needed is a methodological advance which can go beyond the preliminary exploration of issues to a discussion of the historic types of social and economic order. As Mallik says about survival in the twentieth century of societies : " Two alternatives are open to them : (a) They may go on repeating the stages of alternative success and failure of history. (b) They may be subjected to a new principle of ethics and be overhauled by a new interpretation of individual and group. " To put the latter alternative in Garaudy's language : " It is also and above all necessary to demonstrate the possibility of conceiving and realising a different order, of changing the rules of the game so as to reduce the gap between what, hence forward is in fact realizable and what is actually and pitifully real. "

It was, therefore, certainly no exaggeration when in her address to the Pugwash Conference, the Indian Prime Minister posed the question : " But can countries, particularly developing ones, succeed without a con-commitant change in the nature of international

relationships? There is some grouping towards a new international economic order, especially after the fuel crisis. But major interest groups in the industrialised world seem reluctant to accept the implications of such change. Can it be evolved when powerful nations refuse to reduce their military budgets and their patterns of consumption? Can the small rich segment of the world's population claim four-fifths of the world's resources? Karl Marx has expressed an important symbiotic relationship when he formulated the concept of "praxis". India's experience as a developing country and her power in the evolving relationship of the Third World and the International system should find expression in a synthesis of idea and action which should avoid the dilemmas of uni-linear models. India's international political praxis should be identified in conjunction with the following questions: (i) What are the pitfalls of the structure of deterrence? (ii) What are the perils implicit in the hierarchy of objectives of the great powers? (iii) What can be done to avoid the breakdown of diplomacy in conditions where dogmatic ideological influences create confused reaction?

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HOW TO MAKE PHILOSOPHY MORE RELEVANT

Visiting ten Indian universities in January, 1976, I found several persons concerned about how to make philosophy, generally, and their own departments, specifically more relevant to the needs and interests of students and of their communities. This problem is neither a new one nor one peculiar to India. Hopefully, the following suggestions resulting from my American experiences may help.

These suggestions will be divided into three groups : relevance to personal problems, to university problems and to contemporary crises.

Relevance to Personal Problems

Much teaching of philosophy is concerned with presenting and explaining the views of historically prominent philosophies and philosophers. This is as it should be. We should learn from history. But if students fail to see the relevance of such historical studies for the solution of their personal problems, they tend to lose interest or do not have their interest aroused in the first place.

1. My first suggestion is that at least one introductory course should be organized around a problems approach. Philosophy consists, initially and continuingly, in problems. No problems, no philosophy. All of the major problems of philosophy are personal in the sense that they arise out of questions that every person asks himself sooner or later. Surely by the time persons become college students, they have asked some of these questions, in varying ways, many times. Thus interest in most philosophical questions is already present in many students. Philosophy teachers have an opportunity to satisfy, stimulate and inspire such interests, or to frustrate, stultify, deaden and destroy them. Method of approach and skill in using such approach can make the difference between relevance and irrelevance for students.

a. What are these problems? Every person wants to know : "What am I?" What is a self? How is it like and different from other selves? Is it one or many? What are its constituents? Does it have a nature? How did it originate? How long will it

last? Is it permanent or changing? Is it caused? If so, how? Can it cause? If so, how? How are mind and body related? If a self, or its parts, has certain characteristics, such as being spatial or non-spatial, temporal or non-temporal, purposive or non-purposive, free or unfree, then questions about these characteristics naturally occur.

Once doubts arise about answers that are given, as they do naturally, then every person wants to know: "How can I be sure?" What is knowledge? What is certainty? What is belief? These beget further questions about truth and falsity, about kinds and ways of knowing, about intuition and inference, about validity and invalidity, and about clarity of understanding and communication.

Why live? What difference does it make whether I live or die? Why is life good, and what in life is good? What are goodness and badness? Are there different kinds of goods? Which are better: means or ends? What are the end values, the ultimate values, the goals of life? What are beauty and ugliness? What is art? When faced with alternatives, one of which seems better than another, which should I choose? What ought I to do? What is oughtness?

Since persons are essentially social, each student also wants to know how he is, and should be, related to others? The nature and kinds and importance of association, of groups, and of social processes, including those of education, earning a living, maturing through bearing social responsibilities, and of government all arise as personal problems. Philosophy teaching is inadequate as long as teachers, and departments fail to recognize these problems, their importance to students as persons, and the need for skillful efforts in trying to help students to solve them.

b. How are these problems organized? The variety and complexity of problems constituting philosophy leads to a grouping of them for convenience. One may teach students by explaining that special fields of philosophy, known as metaphysics, epistemology, axiology and social philosophy, have become established, and so students should learn about them. But the problems approach makes sure that the problems are primary, not the fields. The

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fields are derivative, at least so far as nurturing student interest is concerned. The problems mentioned in the foregoing four paragraphs constitute (at least partly) these four fields.

An instructor may call attention to the fact that when a student is inquiring about the nature of self, or time, or cause, he is already dealing with a metaphysical question, and that, in doing so, is already engaged in metaphysical inquiry. His efforts to solve his problem constitute him a metaphysician. One does not have to master the history of metaphysics in order to be a metaphysician. All he needs to do is to ask metaphysical questions and to be trying to solve them. As a beginner, he is not an expert, but he is already a metaphysician. When students discover themselves already functioning as metaphysicians, for example, they often take more interest in exploring their own extended identity.

The same is true of epistemology and its subdivisions such as logic, philosophy of science and philosophy of language, and of axiology and its subdivisions of aesthetics, ethics and philosophy of religion and of social philosophy with its economic, political and educational subdivisions.

Too often omitted from classifications of problems into special fields is that function of philosophy as a comprehensive science. Each person wants to know not only about the natures of his existence, his knowledge, his values and his groups, but also about how they all fit together consistently. This concern for comprehensiveness includes concern about consistency of theory and practice, or how to live one's philosophy, especially when one has kept in mind that his efforts to answer more specific questions have served as contributions to his more wholesome philosophy of life.

2. Raising questions and understanding their personal significance is not enough. Persons may do this by themselves without needing the services of colleges, departments and instructors. My second suggestion has to do with improving the adequacy, and thus another kind of relevance, of the answers. Discussions among students usually bring up different kinds of answers, especially regarding popular problems already receiving popular solutions.

One contribution an instructor can and should make to student discussions is to assure that all major relevant kinds of solution become clear to students before they decide upon their own conclusions. An instructor may do this simply by asking further questions that will elicit the alternative types. When this does not work, he may propose such alternatives, even in the form of questions : "What do you think of this solution?"

Thus my second suggestion is that introductory courses should be organized around a problems *and* types approach. How many types of answers should be given for each kind of problem is something that will vary with both the level of maturity of students and the competence of instructors. Having at least two types is necessary to sharpen the issue and to clarify each of the two answers. But understanding most problems will be enriched by considering more types of answers and exploring more issues in the process. For me, three seems a minimum number, so that both extremes may be stated and also some moderate or middle view can be considered. But, for bright students and those expecting further study in philosophy, surely a larger number is desirable.

One factor to consider regarding types selected for consideration is that some types are more significant than others, either because they have contributed to shaping the problem historically, because they come closer to solving the problem satisfactorily, or because they have achieved prominence in local sectarian doctrines needing adequate recognition and exposition. Nowadays, when more dynamic, evolutionary and complex solutions have emerged, students may be cheated if such newer options are omitted. Where greatly differing types occur in different cultures, student understanding of problems can be greatly enhanced by citing solutions from other cultures.

3. Continuing use of the problems and types approach tends both to require and to promote an attitude of tentativity in students. When more alternative solutions to each problem are examined, habits of entertaining solutions as hypotheses proposed for critical examination tend to become established. Students who become able to suspend judgement about issues thereby achieve ability to survey more alternatives before makingup their minds. Surely

consideration of more alternatives is conducive to more soundly based conclusions.

Survey of types invites not merely comparison but also argumentation. When instructors supply typical arguments for and against each type, they not only enrich student understanding but also provide opportunity for participating in constructive debate. Judicious critical evaluation of arguments presented by students may help to improve students' capacities for rational and constructive argument. A skillful instructor can use some occasions not only for distinguishing between dispute and debate but also for showing both the futility of disputes and how considerably argued debates may yield new information, new insight, and even newer solutions to personal problems.

Uncontrolled discussion by immature students soon yields waste of time for all. But an instructor who keeps in mind the goal of the discussion, and keeps reminding students about such goal when they wander, can help to generate not only interest but also enthusiasm for philosophical discussion. How much creativity can be expected or should be desired is itself a matter for further consideration. But much student potential remains untapped in most philosophy classes.

Permit me to recall as an example my proctoring a class in elementary engineering for my son who had to be absent to conduct a conference in a distant city. I had expected student reports to reveal understanding of views presented in an introductory text. Instead I found beginning students reporting of genuinely new engineering projects that each had originated by his own initiative and had tested, in a laboratory or in the community or both, and was now presenting for critical evaluation by other members of the class. When freshmen engineers are encouraged to exercise their creative initiative for personal and social benefit, why should not philosophy students be encouraged to initiate constructive proposals about philosophical problems? Such encouragement not only makes philosophy more relevant for students, but it also makes philosophy teaching itself an exciting adventure.

My third suggestion has been to include arguments for and against each type, both a survey of typical arguments and

encouragement of student participation wherever there is prospect for creative contributions and/or for stimulating student interest.

4. My fourth suggestion is that the problems, types and arguments approach be used in other introductory courses, such as introduction to metaphysics, introduction to theories of knowledge, introduction to ethical theories, introduction to philosophies of religion, etc., when these are offered. Standard histories of philosophy, and histories of ethics, histories of metaphysics, etc. essential as these are for students specialising in philosophy, may be reserved for the third and fourth years. Although instructors will differ regarding the amount of detail needing presentation regarding each type when it is presented, continuing interest of students tends to be maintained longer in beginning courses when types are somewhat streamlined. Although undergraduate student interest in mastering a particular philosophy or philosopher may occur, probably most such interests are better served at the graduate level.

Relevance to University Problems

Whoever teaches in a genuine university (most universities and colleges have become so departmentalized that they should be called "diversities") will find that students and teachers in many different departments have some common and some overlapping interests. Furthermore, the more specialized people in each department become, the more they need the services of other departments as supplements. i. e., to supply what their own narrowing specialization progressively omits from the larger picture of life which, together, the university departments aim to understand.

Philosophy is especially suited to both serve and to be served by other departments. Three kinds of such suitability may be observed.

1. Service to, as well as service from, single departments often occurs. Law programmes sometimes require courses in ethics and logic (background for evidence and argumentation). Some business programmes include courses in ethics, either a general introduction to ethics or an ethics course designed for business students. Mathematics departments often give credit for philosophy courses

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lized, people in other departments no longer have the previous in symbolic logic; sometimes they teach symbolic logic courses for which philosophy departments give credit. A course in philosophy of science may be found desirable as a prerequisite by many science departments. Courses in philosophy of history, philosophy of education and social and political philosophy often serve departments of history, education, sociology and political science. For twelve years I taught a course in introduction to aesthetics required for students majoring in speech and drama. Art departments often desire courses in aesthetics and philosophy of art.

Techniques for cooperating with other departments vary. In addition to giving a philosophy department course as desired by others, a philosophy teacher may offer to teach a related course in another department. That is, he might teach business ethics in a business department, symbolic logic in a mathematics department, philosophy of education in an education department, or philosophy of history in a history department. Still another method is to list the same course in two departments, so that students may obtain credit in either department; such a course could be taught in alternate years by instructors from both departments or, if money is available or instructors are willing to take the time, two instructors can join in teaching the course each time it is offered.

When courses with considerable philosophical content in other departments are recognized, they may be authorized for philosophy credit. Foreign language departments often teach foreign philosophies. History departments sometimes teach intellectual history. Cultural anthropology and human geography courses tend to emphasize philosophical ideas and ideals at times. Richness and variety can be added, especially to small departments, by judicious selections of courses from other departments. One who expresses willingness to accredit such courses may discover or create willingness to reciprocate.

2. Groups of departments, such as the natural sciences, social sciences and humanities, provide special opportunities for philosophy. Survey courses in the natural sciences often include sections on philosophy of science, inductive methods, history and methods of discovering new knowledge. Social science survey courses also include introductions to scientific methods, and to social and political

lac philosophies, as well as historical treatments of the origins of ideas, types of philosophy, and their distribution as described by cultural relativists. General courses in the humanities should find the influence of philosophy pervading each course, unless philosophy instructors are timid, lacking in insight, or haughty. Whenever a new course in the humanities is organized, some one from the philosophy department should be present and, if insightful, cooperative and diplomatic, he may be called on to lead in organizing it.

3. The university or college as a whole needs a wholesome perspective. The philosophy of a university may have been stated originally by its founders. But times change. Universities taken on new functions. Advances in knowledge can make earlier ideals obsolete. New demands by students increasingly challenge university policy. An alert and concerned philosopher may play a central role in establishing or changing university policy.

For many years my university has a standing committee on the aims and objectives of the university. The philosophy department chairman was chairman of that committee. Its task was two-fold: On the one hand, it sought to formulate as much agreement about the general aims of the university as possible, including unmet goals and desirable limits, in light of present and prospective financial support and student needs. On the other hand, it had responsibility for ideals about balance and fairness to departments (and thus to students) when some tended to expand too much and others too little. What is not always obvious to a philosopher is that, if he himself has such ideals resulting from his philosophical studies, he may be better suited than others for giving assistance in deciding upon general university policy.

Fifty years ago in the United States I observed that philosophy professors became college deans and presidents quite out of proportion to their numbers as faculty members. Why? The philosophers tended to "see things whole" and thus to see the relation of each part (i. e., each department) in its relation to the whole. He thus naturally recognized the need for the contribution made by each. People in other departments could trust the philosopher to do justice to their interests more than specialized competitors in other departments. But times have changed. Now that much philosophy

teaching has become increasingly specialized, even narrowly specialized, reason for trust. When our university sought a new president recently, it employed a specialist in public administration, with no training in or interest in philosophy at all. When philosophy departments become narrowly specialized, it may well be that they deserve to become extinct. The task of seeing things whole, in a person, in a university, and in a nation, still needs to be done.

My point here is twofold. On the one hand, many colleges in India may still need the guiding hand of a philosopher in policy making and even in administration. On the other hand, universities increasingly fractionated into multiversities and diversities also need the insights and motivations of philosophy to keep them together and, increasingly, to help restore them to wholeness. When a philosopher achieves a wide-ranging understanding, insight into human nature and human needs, wisdom about the goals of personal and social living, appreciation of the contributions made by all departments and specialties, and sufficient urbanity not to be disturbed by petty deficiencies in daily practice, his services are needed for university guidance. His task is not merely to keep philosophy relevant to the university and the university instructed by, inspired by and guided by wholesome philosophy. His task is also to help keep the university itself relevant, something increasingly difficult to do these days. But plenty of opportunity awaits those who become competent.

Relevance to Contemporary Crises

News headline readers cannot escape awareness of mounting evidence of growing crises threatening extinction of mankind. Doomsday prophesies have failed in the past. But scientifically established evidence in many different professions point to the same conclusion. If we do not change our extravagant ways, the end of mankind is in sight. Extravagant population production, resource consumption, environmental pollution, military preparation, criminal permissiveness, and now deficit spending, all contribute to cumulating crises.

Philosophy is relevant to such crises in two ways: First as contributor and cause. Second as possible saviour, or as partly responsible for providing guidance in changing our ways

1. Philosophy has helped to cause our crises by permitting itself to become increasingly irrelevant to practical issues. This occurred partly because philosophical traditions embedded in cultures, including religious institutions, that originated millenia in the past have tended to remain static. Reverence for ancient seers and their insights has been too strong to permit renewed contributions needed to account for significant changes. Popular, and in many cases professional, philosophy has become increasingly obsolete. Failure of philosophy teachers to call attention to such obsolescence and to seek vital replacements is a part of such cause.

The problem becomes both more obvious and more aggravated when comparative philosophy and comparative religion reveal similar obsolescence in other cultures also. When philosophers cannot overcome obsolescence in their own culture, how can they expect to do so in other cultures? I must not dwell on causes of irrelevance. What is important is to regain relevance. The importance of regaining relevance here may make the difference between survival and extinction of mankind.

2. If, as seems increasingly so, the world lacks an acceptable guiding philosophy, whose task is it to provide such a philosophy? Our crises have accumulated partly because, for some time now, our leaders have made decisions on the basis of immediate and local pressures to the neglect of relating such decisions to the long-range needs, aims and goals of mankind. Leaders who try to be farsighted too often find philosophical and religious advice impractical because based on obsolete presuppositions. In the United States, where freedoms of speech, press, religion, etc., nurture diversity, and in the world, where conflicting cultural presuppositions cannot be overcome under the pressures of decision making, leaders have developed the habit of making decisions without reference to philosophy. Thus, in practice, philosophy itself, at least as a responsible and authoritative profession, is where not obsolete or extinct, at least extremely ineffective.

If mankind cannot change its way wisely and effectively without some agreement about its ideals and goals that are workable in terms of contemporary conditions, then, doomsday prophets claim, mankind will cease. Why should not today's philosophers willingly face the task of rethinking the nature of man and the universe?

terms of present knowledge yielded by the sciences? Why are we not capable of mastering the newer insights needed to understand present crises when we have had examples in the past, such as Augustine and Hegel, who have, with help from others, produced masterful syntheses of many diverse and seemingly contradictory trends in human nature, society and the world? The very needs facing mankind in critical ways themselves provide clues to the kind of solution needed.

I cannot take time here to more than sketch some characteristics that the needed philosophy must have. First of all, complexity. It must be able to depict multitudes of different kinds of complexity. It must explain how and why person socially become increasingly more and more interdependent. It must account for increasingly rapid rates of change and demonstrate whether and what limits of growth and of rapidities not merely in quantities but also in intricacies exist. It must incorporate Asian and Western opposites by showing how they function complementarily. It must restore confidence in the value of honesty in dealing with persons one will never see again and, indirectly, persons one will never see at all. It must rediscover the ultimate bases for moral appeals in human nature, so that arguments regarding policy decisions can, with confidence, be shown to rest on sound bases. It will include still other musts, some of which I do not know.

It is not my purpose here to propose the kind of philosophy needed. I have some suggestions to offer, under the name "Organicism," but these are tentative and will be modified as new evidence appears. My point is that now what the world needs most is philosophy, a philosophy that is adequate to guide our leaders in terms of soundly based, demonstrable principles. Whose task is it to provide such a philosophy? Is it not the task of present teachers of philosophy? If a teacher does not feel adequate to put forth such a proposal, he may still feel some compulsion to understand the problems and to survey solutions suggested by others.

One of my philosophy department colleagues is using the Club of Rome publications as classroom textual material to stimulate discussion as well as to provide understanding of crisis issues. Should not every department of philosophy have at least one

course concerned with mankind crises? The future of mankind is a philosophical problem. Today it seems an increasingly urgent one. Do not philosophy departments, which fail to demonstrate their concern for relevance by alerting and enlightening their students to the kind of philosophy needed for human survival, themselves deserve to become extinct, even if mankind does not become extinct as a result of their neglect? Current crises for mankind provide philosophy with one of the greatest opportunities it has ever had for demonstrating its relevance. Why not help to make philosophy relevant now?

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THE LAWS OF THE TRADITIONAL LOGIC AND THE INTERPRETATION - PROBLEM*

The Antilogism Theorem as a test for the validity of the syllogistic moods of the traditional logic worked as a stimulus to analyze the interpretation-problem. It has become a fashion among the formal logicians to maintain that a consistent interpretation of the traditional system cannot be given. To this it has been replied by the opposite camp that a consistent interpretation can be given. I have, in this paper, elucidated and analyzed two solutions offered by Strawson - the Formalistic Solution and the Realistic Solution.

For extraneous purpose of my own, I have divided the paper into four parts. Part I gives the first interpretation and introduces Lord Franklin's Antilogism Theorem, and further shows that this interpretation not only fails to cover all syllogistic moods but even the traditional square of opposition as well as a few eductive inferences are left out. Part II tries to improve upon the first interpretation by giving the second one. And there although some progress is made, the interpretation fails to cover the whole system. In part III, I say that let us not give up hopes. There I give three more interpretations in order to reach the goal. I also examine there, Strawson's Formalistic Solution, and upon analysis, it is found not to be a solution. And lastly, Part IV explains Strawson's Theory of Presupposition which is conceived by him as a Realistic Solution.

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I

I will first interpret the traditional four-fold scheme as follows, and call this interpretation 'I₁'.

$f a g \rightarrow \sim(\exists x,)(fx \cdot \sim gx)$ - It reads as : "It is not the case that there is an 'x' which is both 'f' and 'not-g'."

$f e g \rightarrow \sim (\exists x) (fx \cdot gx)$ - "It is not the case that there is an 'x' which is both 'f' and 'g'."

$f i g \rightarrow (\exists x) (fx \cdot gx)$ - "There is an 'x' which is both 'f' and 'g'."

$f o g \rightarrow (\exists x) (fx \cdot \sim gx)$ - "There is an 'x' which is both 'f' and 'not-g'."

In I_1 , the traditional square of opposition will lose its status, and three of the four types of the traditional relations will vanish. The contradictory relation is the only one which will stand in tact in I_1 .

Contrary relation does not hold good if 'f' is assumed to be a null class. Traditionally, we say that the truth of 'A' implies the falsity of 'E'. In I_1 , it reads as;

$$"\sim (\exists x) (fx \cdot \sim gx) \supset \sim \sim (\exists x) (fx \cdot gx) "$$

Now if 'f' is a null class, then intuitively it is very clear that the truth of 'A' does not imply the falsity of 'E' inasmuch as the whole of antecedent is true while the consequent carries as its truth-value 'falsity'. Even its demonstration is indubitable. In I_1 ,

$$"\sim (\exists x) fx \supset \sim \{ \sim (\exists x) (fx \cdot \sim gx) \supset \sim \sim (\exists x) (fx \cdot gx) \} "$$

reads as : If 'f' is a null class, then it is not the case that the truth of "All f's are g's" implies the falsity of "No f is g".

Subcontrary relation also vanishes in I_1 if 'f' is assumed to be a null class. Traditionally, we say that the falsity of 'I' implies the truth of 'O'. In I_1 , it reads as :

$$"\sim (\exists x) (fx \cdot gx) \supset (\exists x) (fx \cdot \sim gx) "$$

Now if 'f' is a null class, then intuitively it is very clear that the falsity of 'I' does not imply the truth of 'O'. This is because the antecedent gets 'true' truth value while the consequent becomes false. Its demonstration justifies the point.

" $\sim (\exists x) fx \supset \sim \{ \sim (\exists x) (fx \cdot gx) \supset (\exists x) (fx \cdot \sim gx) \} "$ which reads as : "If 'f' is a null class, then it is not the case

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that the falsity of "Some f's are g's" implies the truth of "Some f's are not g's", can be demonstrated.

Subaltern relations too do not find place in I_1 if 'f' is an empty class. The traditional expressions are that the universal proposition 'A' implies the particular proposition 'I', and similarly, the truth of 'E' implies that 'O' is true. In I_1 , these expressions read respectively as :

$$"\sim (\exists x) (fx \cdot \sim gx) \supset (\exists x) (fx \cdot gx)" \text{ and}$$

$$"\sim (\exists x) (fx \cdot gx) \supset (\exists x) (fx \cdot \sim gx)"$$

Here even if the class 'f' has no members, then these implications do not hold good. If 'f' is a null class then it is not the case that the truth of "All f's are g's" implies the truth of "Some f's are g's", and surely this can be demonstrated.

" $\sim (\exists x) fx \supset \sim \{ \sim (\exists x) (fx \cdot \sim gx) \supset (\exists x) (fx \cdot gx) \}$ " is a logical truth. So is :

$$"\sim (\exists x) fx \supset \sim \{ \sim (\exists x) (fx \cdot gx) \supset (\exists x) (fx \cdot \sim gx) \}"$$

And taking the same trend of thought, we can demonstrate that converse and obverted converse of 'A', partial and full contrapositions of 'E', partial and full inverses of 'A', partial and full inverses of 'E' and the six subaltern eductive inferences do not find a place in I_1 .

After having made this clear, I at once pass on to elucidating the Antilogism Theorem. It reads as follows : A syllogistic mood in order that it be valid under I_1 , should have its antilogism with the below-mentioned three characteristics :

- (a) The antilogism should contain two propositions beginning with the denial of existential quantifier and one proposition beginning with the existential quantifier.
- (b) In the two propositions beginning with the denial of existential quantifier, there should be a common variable, and if ϕ is that variable, then ϕ should stand negated in one of these two propositions and should remain unnegated in the other.
- (c) If ψ and Ω are the remaining variables in the propositions beginning with the denial of existential quantifier, then their occurrences there should be as they are in the propo-

sition beginning with the existential quantifier.

Consider, for instance, Celarent of Figure I, Festino of Figure II, Disamis of Figure III and Camenes of Figure IV, whose antilogisms respectively read as follows :

$$\begin{aligned} & \sim (\exists x) (fx \cdot gx) \cdot \sim (\exists x) (hx \cdot \sim fx) \cdot (\exists x) (hx \cdot gx) \\ & \sim (\exists x) (fx \cdot gx) \cdot (\exists x) (hx \cdot gx) \cdot \sim (\exists x) (hx \cdot \sim fx) \\ & (\exists x) (fx \cdot gx) \cdot \sim (\exists x) (fx \cdot \sim hx) \cdot \sim (\exists x) (hx \cdot gx) \\ & \sim (\exists x) (fx \cdot \sim gx) \cdot \sim (\exists x) (gx \cdot hx) \cdot (\exists x) (hx \cdot fx) \end{aligned}$$

It will be noticed that the above antilogisms, selected at random, satisfy the conditions put forth in the Theorem, and thus the corresponding moods are proved valid. Nevertheless, following observations need to be made : (1) Out of the 256 possibilities, 15 moods are proved valid, and the rest proved invalid. (2) Darapti, Felapton, Bramantip, Fesapo and the five subaltern moods which from the traditional theory, are valid, are proved in I_1 as invalid.

Thus, to recapitulate, in I_1 , the square of opposition fares very badly, not all eductive inferences find place, and the above-mentioned syllogistic moods fail to fit themselves.

II

From what has been said, we need not jump to the conclusion that we are left in a chaotic condition. A slight reflection on the seeming chaos will show that the fragments of the traditional system which are left out, are not arbitrary fragments, but parts which have some common characteristics. It will be noticed that those valid inferences of the traditional scheme in which a proposition which begins with the existential quantifier is inferred from one or two premises which begin with the denial of existential quantifier, turn out to be invalid in I_1 . This is very much explicit in the outcasted moods, eductive inferences and the subaltern relations of the square of opposition. But even in Contrary and Sub-contrary relations of the square of opposition, where the abovesaid characteristics do not leap to the eye, upon analysis we find that the conclusion begins with the existential quantifier while the premise begins with the denial of existential quantifier. In Contrary, we say : If "All f's are g's" is true, then it is not the

case that "No f is g " is true; $(f a g) \supset \sim (f i g)$, and the consequent is equivalent to $(f i g)$. Again, in Subcontrary relation, we say: Denial of the truth of "Some f 's are g 's" implies the truth of "Some f 's are not g 's"; $\sim (f i g) \supset (f o g)$, and the antecedent is equivalent to $(f e g)$. Here too, therefore, we infer a proposition beginning with the existential quantifier from a proposition with the denial of existential quantifier.

Now all these are left out for quite an obvious reason. In I_1 , "All f 's are g 's" and "No f is g " have been interpreted non-existentially. In "All f 's are g 's", we have denied the existence of an ' x ' having ' f ' and ' $\sim g$ '. In "No f is g ", we have denied the existence of an ' x ' having ' f ' and ' g ', but not affirmed or asserted the existence of an ' x ' having ' f '. But so far as "Some f 's are g 's" and "Some f 's are not g 's" are concerned, they have been interpreted in I_1 existentially. In "Some f 's are g 's", we have asserted the existence of an ' x ' having ' f ' and ' g '. In "Some f 's are not g 's", we have asserted the existence of an ' x ' having ' f ' and ' $\sim g$ '. The reason demands, therefore, another interpretation of the traditional scheme. While retaining the interpretation of ' I ' and ' O ' as given in I_1 , we now modify the interpretations of ' A ' and ' E ', interpret them in explicitly existential terms, and call the whole unit I_2 .

$f a g \rightarrow (\exists x) fx \cdot \sim (\exists x) (fx \cdot \sim gx)$ — There are a few individuals in the universe who are ' f ' and it is not the case that those individuals fail to be ' g '.

$f e g \rightarrow (\exists x) fx \cdot \sim (\exists x) (fx \cdot gx)$ — There are a few individuals in the universe who are ' f ' but it is not the case that those individuals are ' g '.

$f i g \rightarrow (\exists x) (fx \cdot gx)$ — (Reading as in I_1)

$f o g \rightarrow (\exists x) (fx \cdot \sim gx) - (\text{Reading as in } I_1)$

But construing I_2 in this way should not lead any one to believe that the game is over. While trying to gloss over the gaps in I_1 , we have succeeded a little bit; nevertheless, we have failed to cover all, and moreover, dug a few different graves. Let us have a bird's eye view :

I *Square of Opposition* : again fares badly. Subcontrary and the two contradictories do not hold good.

II *Eductive Inferences* : The following inferences fail to fit in Converse and Obverted converse of 'E',

Partial and full Contrapositions of 'A', Partial and Full Inverses of 'A', Partial and Full Inverses of 'E', Subaltern of Converse of 'E', Subaltern of Obverted Converse of 'E', and Subaltern of Partial and Full Contrapositions of 'A'.

III *Syllogistic Moods* : Camenes of Figure IV and its subaltern mood AEO do not find place in I_2 .

Have we made in I_2 any progress? In I_1 , 27 items were left out. In I_2 , 17 items are left out. The goal is not yet near.

III

But let us not give up hopes. Let us see why we have failed where we have failed. Consider the Square in I_2 . The Contradictories have vanished. But isn't it obvious? The contradictory of 'A' in I_2 $(\exists x) fx \cdot \sim (\exists x) (fx \cdot \sim gx)$

is not 'O' of I_2 $(\exists x) (fx \cdot \sim gx)$ but rather

$\sim (\exists x) fx \vee (\exists x) (fx \cdot \sim gx)$. Similarly, the contradictory of 'E' in I_2 $(\exists x) fx \cdot \sim (\exists x) (fx \cdot gx)$ is not 'I' of I_2 $(\exists x) (fx \cdot gx)$ but rather $\sim (\exists x) fx \vee (\exists x) (fx \cdot gx)$.

Thus retaining 'A' and 'E' of I_2 , let us give this new interpretation to 'I' and 'O', and call the whole unit I_3 .

$f a g \rightarrow (\exists x) fx \cdot \sim (\exists x) (fx \cdot \sim gx)$ (Reading same as in I_2)

$f e g \rightarrow (\exists x) fx \cdot \sim (\exists x) (fx \cdot gx)$ (Reading same as in I_2)

$f i g \rightarrow \sim (\exists x) fx \vee (\exists x) (fx \cdot gx)$ (Either nothing is 'f' or there is an 'x' which is both 'f' and 'g'.)

$f o g \rightarrow \sim (\exists x) f x \vee (\exists x) (f x . \sim g x)$ (Either nothing is 'f' or there is an 'x' which is both 'f' and 'not-g'.)

While trying to save the contradictories, we have, in I_3 not only succeeded in doing so, but also have been able to cover the whole Square. All the six relations hold good in I_3 . But so far as the educative inferences are concerned, seven of them fail to hold good in I_3 . They are Converses of 'E' and 'I', Obverted Converse of 'E', Partial and Full Contradpositions of 'A', and Partial and Full Contradpositions of 'O'. And we fail to cover Camenes, Dimaris and Fresison also.

Let us check the progress : In I_7 , 27 items were left out, in I_2 17 items did not find place, and now in I_3 , 10 items are thrown out.

It will be interesting to note that I_3 is not the only interpretation which saves the whole of the square. If we bring in a few changes in I_3 , then not only we will be able to save the whole Square but also feel elevated for covering all the 24 valid moods. While retaining the interpretations of 'A' and 'O' of I_3 , we may bring in the interpretations of 'E' and 'I' of I_1 . Let us call this unit I_4 .

$f a g \rightarrow (\exists x) f x . \sim (\exists x) (f x . \sim g x)$

$f e g \rightarrow \sim (\exists x) (f x . g x)$

$f i g \rightarrow (\exists x) (f x . g x)$

$f o g \rightarrow \sim (\exists x) f x \vee (\exists x) (f x . \sim g x)$

Thus so far as the Square and the Moods are concerned, we have made a good progress. Nevertheless, we have regressed in so far as the total number of items kicked out are concerned. The following thirteen educative inferences are not covered by I_4 :
 Obverses of 'A' and 'O', Obverted Converse of 'E', Full contrapositions of 'A' and 'E', Partial and Full Contradpositions of 'O', Full Inverse of 'A', Partial and Full Inverses of 'E', Subaltern of Obverse of 'E', Subaltern of Obverse of 'E' and Subaltern of Full Contradposition of 'A'.

For a final break-through, let us go back to I_3 and see why the converse of 'E' failed. In I_3 , 'E' reads as : $(\exists x) fx . \sim (\exists x) (fx . gx)$. And this leaves open the possibility of 'g' being a null class. In other words, the denial of existence of an 'x' belonging to 'g' is consistent with this scheme. And it should be consistent with the simple converse of this scheme if we are to say that "No f is g" implies "No g is f". But in fact, it is not consistent. $\sim (\exists x) gx$ is not consistent with $(\exists x) gx . \sim (\exists x) (gx . fx)$. Hence Converse of 'E' in I_3 fails. But let us repair the damage. 'E' may be interpreted as $(\exists x) fx . (\exists x) gx . \sim (\exists x) (fx . gx)$. And this will imply its simple converse :

$$(\exists x) gx . (\exists x) fx . \sim (\exists x) (gx . fx).$$

Now 'I', the contradictory of 'E' will have to be obviously modified. The negation of 'E' as now interpreted will yield the following :

$$\sim (\exists x) fx \vee \sim (\exists x) gx \vee (\exists x) (fx . gx).$$

Following this trend of thought, we interpret 'A' as follows :

$$(\exists x) fx . (\exists x) \sim gx . \sim (\exists x) (fx . \sim gx).$$

And when we negate this, the contradictory will yield 'O' which will read as :

$$\sim (\exists x) fx \vee \sim (\exists x) \sim gx \vee (\exists x) (fx . \sim gx).$$

Thus our I_5 is ready :

$$f a g \rightarrow (\exists x) fx . (\exists x) \sim gx . \sim (\exists x) (fx . \sim gx)$$

$$f e g \rightarrow (\exists x) fx . (\exists x) gx . \sim (\exists x) (fx . gx)$$

$$f i g \rightarrow \sim (\exists x) fx \vee \sim (\exists x) gx \vee (\exists x) (fx . gx)$$

$$f o g \rightarrow \sim (\exists x) fx \vee \sim (\exists x) \sim gx \vee (\exists x) (fx . \sim gx)$$

I_5 covers all the six relations of the Square of Opposition, all the twenty-six eductive inferences, and all the twenty-four syllogistic moods. Seeing this, Strawson says : "For this interpretation, all the laws of the traditional logic hold good together." This he regards as the formalistic solution which according to him, overthrows the orthodox criticism hurled by formal logicians at the traditional system.

It would have been better if before, making this remark, Strawson had realized that the traditional Law of Identity is very much in

existence and is hostile to I_5 . Perhaps someone argues: "But 'A' in 'A is A' surely is a variable standing for an individual and not for a term and hence cannot be within the domain of syllogistic formulation!" To this it has been replied that even if the scheme "All f's are f's" is rejected as a formulation of the Law of Identity, the fact remains that it is well formed. Being a well-formed formula, it should be covered by the formalistic solution. But there is a difference between 'should' and 'is'. The formalistic solution should cover it but in fact, does not; and hence I_5 ceases to be a solution. "All f's are f's" will read in I_5 as:

$$((\exists x) fx . (\exists x) \sim fx . \sim (\exists x) (fx . \sim fx))$$

Something is 'f' and something is not 'f' but nothing is both 'f' and 'not-f'. This sounds pretty good and intelligible. We say, something in this universe is blue and something is not blue, but nothing is both blue and not blue. But now let 'f' stand for "barren woman's son." Surely the first conjunct is false! $(\exists x) fx$ is not true. And now let 'f' stand for "identical with itself". Here the second, $(\exists x) \sim fx$, is false.

The assertion "There is a barren woman's son" makes "All barren woman's sons are barren woman's sons" hostile to I_5 . And so does the assertion "There is something which is not identical with itself" in the case of "All things which are identical with themselves are identical with themselves". Thus, we say, "x is blue" has an instance and a counter instance; "Barren woman's son" has a counter instance but does not have an instance; "Identical with itself" has an instance but does not have a counter instance. "All f's are f's" will work in I_5 only for values of 'f' having an instance as well as a counter instance. I_5 fails.

IV

Suppose we overlook the fact that the Law of Identity is hostile to I_5 , and then ask the question: "Have we achieved something valuable?" So far as the playing with symbols and polishing the mind by giving it some exercise is concerned, we will say: "well done". But is it valuable in the given context? Strawson himself admits that the interpretation is "a kind of ad hoc patching up of

the old system in order to represent it, in its entirety, as a fragment of the new." But further we ask: "Has this 'patching up' paid us anything or have we paid a price for it?" The answer lies in affirming the second alternant. While trying to bring in consistency, we have done a great injustice to Aristotle and his followers. "Either nothing is a flower or nothing is white or something is both a flower and white." Surely Aristotle would scratch his head if he hears that we are made to believe that this is the meaning of his 'I' form of proposition—"Some flowers are white"! But this is what I_5 does! The cases of fag , feg and fog are no better. What I_5 does is that it enables an individual to convert a good, simple English into a bad, complicated one.

Let us see if we can trace the trouble-shooter. We began to weave the web when I_1 failed. And the reason which we gave for its failure was that some propositions are interpreted existentially and some are not done so. Hence to repair the damage, we said that time, the interpretation should be "in explicitly existential terms". And this is the root cause of the present problem. If we stick to those words, all that we finally get is a 'patch-up' and that too not fully pervasive. But, on the other hand, if we free ourselves from these words, then a new light might show us the right path.

Suppose Avinash says: "All Sucharita's philosophy books are stolen away". Immediately we say two things: Avinash would not have, under normal circumstances, made this remark if he knew that Sucharita did not have any philosophy books. If he knew that Sucharita did not have any philosophy books, and yet made this remark, then the utterance, under normal circumstances, is improper. If he has a mistaken belief about Sucharita's possessing philosophy books (i. e. suppose in fact she did not possess any philosophy books) and if we ask whether what Avinash says is true or false, then a problem arises. The truth-value cannot be true. Yet, at the same time, to label it as false will also be very much misleading. But a slight reflection onto it makes us think that Sucharita did not possess any philosophy books, then the question about her philosophy books having been stolen away does not arise. Let us check it with reference to I_1 : $\sim (\exists x) (Sx \cdot \sim Tx)$.

reads as : "It is not the case that there is an 'x' which is Sucharita's philosophy book and which is not stolen away". Now here if Sucharita did not in fact have any philosophy books, even then this non-existence will be sufficient to make the remark of Avinash true ! Let us check the same with reference to I_5 :

$(\exists x) Sx . (\exists x) \sim Tx . \sim (\exists x) (Sx . \sim Tx)$. Here the said non-existence will be sufficient enough to falsify what Avinash says ! But under these circumstances (viz., (1) Sucharita did not in fact possess any philosophy books and (2) Avinash remarked "All Sucharita's philosophy books are stolen away"), damad for a truth value for what Avinash says is not appealing to a reflective mind. And equally revolting will be the mind if someone attempts to assign a truth value. Reflection rather demands that we should say : If she did not possess any philosophy books and if Avinash made that remark, then the question of truth or falsity about what Avinash says does not arise. We should add : The existence of Sucharita's philosophy books is a "necessary precondition" for an intelligible assignment of a truth value to what Avinash says. Thus when we interpret the traditional four statements, the interpretation should follow this trend of thought viz., the statements, in order to carry a truth value, should have members in the subject class. Or, in other words, the person (like Avinash) while making his statement, commits himself to the existence of members in the subject class (like Sucharita's philosophy books).

Strawson, at this stage, makes a distinction between 'Entailment' and 'Presupposition'. And this follows from two sorts of logical absurdities. Schematically, Strawson's view is this : There is a statement 'X' and there is a statement 'Y'. Now if 'Y' is a necessary condition for the *truth* of 'X' and if we assert 'X' and 'not-Y' in the same breath, then there will be one kind of logical absurdity. But now conceive another set of statements. There is a statement 'P' and there is a statement 'Q'. Further suppose that 'Q' is a necessary precondition for the *truth-value* of 'P'. That is, we cannot raise the question as to whether 'P' is true or false unless 'Q' is true. We cannot intelligibly assign a truth value to 'P' unless 'Q' is true. If this be the case, and if we assert in the same breath 'P' and 'not-Q', then we will again have a logical absurdity. But the point which Strawson wants to draw home

is that this second absurdity is different in kind from the first absurdity. The first is a "straight forward self-contradiction" but the second is not so. The relation between 'X' and 'Y' is that of Entailment. The relation between 'P' and 'Q' is that of Presupposition. 'X' entails 'Y' but 'P' presupposes 'Q'. "This is a pink flower" if conjoined with "This is not coloured" leads to a straightforward self-contradiction because "This is a pink flower" entails "This is coloured". "All Sucharita's philosophy books are stolen away" and "Sucharita did not possess any philosophy books" cannot be conjuncts of the same statement because "All Sucharita's philosophy books are stolen away" presupposes "Sucharita possessed philosophy books". Therefore, to interpret "f a g" as done in I_2 and then try to bring in consistency among the laws of the traditional logic will be improper, and will only lead us to a 'patch up' and that too, as earlier pointed out, not fully pervasive. If, on the other hand, we interpret the traditional propositions in keeping with the thesis of Presupposition, then, says Strawson, it will be a realistic solution.

Whether or not Strawson's theory of Presupposition works as a solution, has been for a long period, a live problem—the Russellian thinkers considering the relation between "All Sucharita's philosophy books are stolen away" and "Sucharita possessed philosophy books" as that of entailment while the camp of proponents trying to justify Strawson's stand, and it is this controversy that this paper now leads to.

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ANOTHER LOOK AT THE BUDDHA- HUME " CONNECTION "

Attempts to discuss parallels between David Hume's Philosophy and Gautama Buddha's philosophy have become very popular for scholars in the East and in the West. Although it might seem far-fetched to some philosophers, there do exist certain similarities between Buddhism and certain aspects of Hume's philosophy. In this study I propose to discuss : (1) The parallels between Hume's philosophy and Buddhist philosophy, (2) the question of whether or not Buddha influenced Hume; and (3) the contrasts between Buddha and Hume. My discussion will evaluate the thesis of Nolan Pliny Jacobson,¹ who holds that Hume was influenced by Buddha insofar as Buddhist philosophy was carried to the West by way of Chinese cultural traditions. and Edward Conze², who sees no real parallel between the two. It is my intention to show that the Buddhist conception of the self is more intricate than the Humean conception, and that this is due to the viewpoints on perception adopted by each of these men. I am going to restrict my remarks on Buddhist philosophy to Buddha as he is interpreted in the Theravāda tradition.³

My discussion will begin with the specific points on which a comparative study can be made. First of all, there is the issue of atheism. Hume's reflections about the nature of the universe and its relation to God are mainly contained in his *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*. The speakers Philo and Cleanthes give a number of arguments and expose many difficulties which philosophers of religion must try to solve. Hume's attitude about the existence and nature of God can be given in Philo's words :

If the whole history of Natural Theology, as some people seem to maintain, resolves itself into one simple, though somewhat ambiguous, at least undefined proposition, *That cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence* : If this proposition be not capable of extension, variation, or more particular explication : If it afford no inference that affects human life, or can be the source of any action or forbearance : And if the analogy, imperfect as it is, can be carried no farther than to

the human intelligence, and cannot be transferred, with any appearance of probability, to the other qualities of mind : If this really be the case, what can the most inquisitive, contemplative, and religious man do more than give a plain, philosophical assent to the proposition, as often as it occurs, and believe that the arguments, by which it is established, exceed the objections, which lie against it.

Here Hume asserts that causes or order in the universe bear a remote analogy to human intelligence. The impression we get is that Hume believes that the existence of God is assured by reason of the amount of order discoverable in the universe, but due to insufficient evidence no conclusion about his nature and attributes can be drawn.

In a similar manner Buddhists also argue that the nature of God is beyond human understanding, and cannot be grasped by the finite intellect. Whenever Buddha was asked questions concerning the nature and existence of God, he refused to answer them. However, his atheism was not based on either scepticism or agnosticism, but on rational critical analysis that speculations about the existence of God are useless and a mere waste of time. All the arguments given to prove the existence of God are inadequate. In theism it is believed that there is a God who is almighty, omnipotent, and all-pervasive. Different religions of the world, like Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, and so on, believe in the concept of God. But according to Buddha, we do not have any direct way of knowing such a God and so discussions about him are unprofitable.

Second, there is the issue of the existence of substance. Buddhists deny the existence of any permanent substance. According to them, the world is in state of flux (*anicca*). Things are changing from moment to moment. Everything—perception, feelings, objects, etc.—is in state of flux and belief in substance is nothing but the figment of imagination. Similarly, Hume also denies the existence of substance. He accepts the empirical theory of the origin of knowledge and holds that we only know our impressions. Accordingly, we have no right to assert the reality of substance. Thus, Hume rejected the existence of substance, as do Buddhists, although clearly for different reasons.

A third point of comparison is that of the existence of self. Since our knowledge for Hume consists of perceptions, he rejects the idea of

self, because we do not have any impression of it. Hume remarks that some philosophers are of the opinion that they are conscious of self as something which is permanent and constant throughout our lives. But from what impression could such an idea be derived? If there be such an idea which gives rise to the idea of self, it must remain unchanged and therefore we do not have any such idea. He says :

For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call *myself*, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch *myself* at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep, so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist. An were all my perceptions removed by death, and could I neither think, nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor hate, after the dissolution of my body, I should be entirely annihilated nor do I conceive what is further requisite to make me a perfect non-entity. If anyone upon serious and unprejudiced reflection, thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continued, which he calls himself, tho I am certain there is no such principle in me.

But setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind, I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement.⁵

From this, he concludes that :

The mind is a kind of theatre where several perceptions successively make their appearance, pass, re-pass, glide away and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. There is properly no *simplicity* in it at one time, nor *identity* in different; whatever natural propension we have to imagine that simplicity and identity. The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind, nor have we the most distant notion of the place, where these scenes are repre-

sented, or of the materials, of which it is compose'd.⁶

In a similar fashion Buddhists also argue that there is no such thing as the soul or the self in the sense of a permanent entity (*anattā*). As Lekshmi Narasu puts it, according to the Buddhists :

That which is called the Ego, which says 'I am', is merely an aggregate of *skandhas*, a complex of sections, ideas, thoughts, emotions and volitions. It is not an eternal immutable entity behind these. The word 'I' remains the same, but its significance continually changes. It originates in the child with the development of self-consciousness (*svasamvedanam*), and denotes first a boy, then a youth, after that a man and finally a dotard. There is an identity in a certain sense only. As the Blessed One says in the *Kūṭadanta Sūtra*, the sameness is constituted by continuity; just as we speak of the identity of a river or a fountain, though the water is continually changing, or of the identity between the flame of a lamp at one moment and that at another moment, although different particles of the wick and oil are consumed in succession, and the flame itself might have been put out for some time in the interim.⁷

Self, for Buddhists, is made of five *Khandas* (Sanskrit : *Skandhas*) which are impermanent and so cannot give rise to a permanent entity called self. Thus, the notion of a self as permanent entity is nothing but an illusion. So, for Buddhists as well as for Hume there is no thinker, but only thought, no perceiver but only perception.

Thus far we have seen the similarities between the views of Hume and Buddha on substance, self, and God. There are very important differences between the two thinkers, and it seems that the differences override the similarities. Before these differences are discussed, however, it seems appropriate to consider to what degree, if any, Hume was influenced by Buddha. Are the parallels between the two "real"? Different philosophers have taken different positions on this issue.

Edward Conze, in his article, "Spurious Parallels to Buddhist Philosophy," maintains that any parallels between Hume and Buddhist Philosophy are superficial. "Spurious parallels", he holds, are those parallels which "often originate from a wish to find affinities with philosophers recognized and admired by the exponents

of current philosophy, and intend to make Buddhist thinkers interesting and respectable by current western standards."⁸ He agrees that there is a parallel between Hume's and Buddha's concept of the self, since both reject the notion of a permanent self. But as they have different purposes, the parallel is "merely deceptive."⁹ As he says, "A negative proposition derives its true meaning from what it is directed against, and its message entirely depends, therefore, on its context." In different contexts two identical negative statements may, therefore, have nothing in common,"¹⁰ because negative statements which are merely destructive of another point of view derive their meaning in connection with what they are negating. Humean and Buddhist philosophy lead in opposite directions. Hume "reduced selfhood to the level of the subpersonal," and the Buddhist doctrine of *anattā* invites us to search for the super-personal."¹¹ And since these two philosophies have different goals and purposes, he claims that the parallels which we find in the two are deceptive.

Nolan Pliny Jacobson, in his article, "The Possibility of Oriental Influence in Hume's Philosophy," on the other hand, maintains that Hume's ideas to a large extent were borrowed from Buddha via China. His thesis is that in the areas of ethics, education and political thought, Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, was much more influenced by Oriental ideas than by its own historical thought. He suggests that Montesquieu and Voltaire in France, Leibnitz and Wolff in Germany, and Shaftesbury and Anthony Ashley Cooper in England, all were influenced by Oriental thought to a significant degree. Jacobson proceeds to show that Pierre Bayle was not only a vehicle of Oriental thought, but also a major influence on Hume's thoughts and ideas.

Jacobson holds that Hume's central ideas, particularly his treatment of causality, God, substance, and self, were shaped by Bayle. Starting with the paradoxes of Zeno, Bayle attacks all sorts of ancient and modern forms of atomism. He attempts to show that all knowledge which carries us beyond the empirical world is contrary to reason, the doctrine which is central in Hume. According to Jacobson, Hume read Bayle when he was writing the *Treatise*. Bayle was very much impressed by the "tolerance of the Chinese emperor for Jesuit missions."¹² There was a craze for Chinese art culture in European markets at that time. Jacobson writes that:

Efforts to seek out the sources of Hume's major ideas must soon come to acknowledge the wide range of influences, both western and Oriental in origin, to which Hume was part deliberately, part unconsciously subjected. Ideas propounded by 'the yellow-garbed monks of yore' climbed the Himalayas, and were linked with an unexpected destiny by being synthesized and sharpened in a thousand years of Chinese philosophic discourse, whence they travelled the Old Silk Road and ocean trade routes to make a major contribution to the struggle of Western man to wriggle free from the fading philosophic tapestry of the Ancient world.¹³

Therefore he concludes that Hume had to be influenced by Oriental thought.

Oriental influences were so much a part of the intellectual climate in which Hume moved that neither he nor anyone of comparable prominence in the debate of the time could have formulated his thoughts apart from these influences. Asia played a dominant role in the thinking which had the longest future to play in the secularization of modern life; it played a prominent role in the shaping of Hume's thought, particularly in his working over of the notions of causality, substance, the role of reason in religion, and the enduring, ever-identical self.¹⁴

To sum up: we have, on the one hand, the view of Conze who maintains that there is no real parallel between Humean and Buddhist philosophy, and on the other hand, we have Jacobson's view that Hume was greatly influenced by Buddha.¹⁵

Conze's thesis that there is no real parallel between Humean and Buddhist philosophy is one-sided. Alex Wayman, criticizing Conze's article, points out that "I set no limit on the valid comparisons that can be and ought to be made,"¹⁶ a statement with which I agree. He explains Conze's thesis thus: "What Conze means is that if two persons seem to agree on item X, and seem to disagree on items $Y_1, Y_2, \dots Y_n$ - it follows that they do not agree on X; for if two persons seem to disagree on several things, they do not agree on anything,"¹⁷ a conclusion which must be regarded as absurd.

There is bias in Conze's article. His view that there is no real parallel between the two seems to be based on the thesis that there

is a very little hope for interchange between East and West in philosophy. As a matter of fact, he is convinced that the time has come to abandon the quest for parallels between thinking in the East and in the West.¹⁸ The fact that Hume's and Buddha's philosophies lead in opposite directions does not make the parallels "spurious," as Conze claims. It appears that Conze forgot that there is an affirmative aspect of every negation, and so in spite of the differences the parallels between the two cannot be denied. Simply because two parties happen to develop their central idea in obviously different directions, this, in itself, need not imply the central idea is, *ipso facto* dissimilar. In fact there might well be genuine similarity in the idea selected as points of departure for philosophic inquiry. For example, two parties might entertain a similar view that the Industrial Revolution was a key factor in the improvement of agriculture. While there is a genuine similarity regarding a certain statement of affairs, the parties might proceed to explain the specific effects of this revolution quite differently. One party might come to the conclusion that since this revolution rendered production possible on a much larger scale than ever before, hence it served as a betterment of our way of life; the other might conclude that it introduced nothing but a machine oriented, capitalistic social system in which the sense of human value is lost. The point I am trying to make is that Hume and Buddha have a real similarity so far as their conceptions of self are concerned, although they have different purposes, and reach different conclusions. Stated differently, both regard the self as a bundle of perceptions. There is a similarity here, and it would be erroneous to conclude that the differences make the similarity superficial.

Jacobson's position, on the other hand, also seems to be far-fetched. If one puts his position into logical form, we get the following premises and conclusion :

Bayle was influenced by Oriental thought.

Hume was influenced by Bayle.

Therefore, Hume was influenced by Oriental thought.

While Jacobson's logic appears sound on the surface, his use of "influence" is perhaps questionable. Clearly there are cases in

which one can be said to be "influenced" by another and yet the specific area of influence be, at least, ambiguous. Consider a primary case of influence that of the parent-child relationship. Certainly a great deal of the child's attitude and knowledge comes from his parents. Yet it is doubtful that anyone could *specify* that it was the parents' influence that caused the child to do such-and-such in any given situation, *unless* the observer had first-hand knowledge of *that particular* situation from talking with the parent or the child. Obviously, this first hand experience is lacking in the case of knowing about Bayle's influence on Hume. Jacobson's thesis has speculative weight, but it is lacking in historical and intellectual weight. Hume never mentioned Buddha in his writings and so there is no direct evidence that Hume was influenced by Buddha. Jacobson builds his case solely on "circumstantial evidence," and in order to strengthen his thesis, he maintains that sometimes circumstantial evidence is more "compelling" than direct evidence. And he observes that "Carter's early European typography may be mentioned, in which the case for Asian models for early European playing cards and religious drawing is said to rest on such strong circumstantial evidence as to be accepted with a reasonable degree of certainty."¹⁹ He also mentions that philosophers of Hume's time did not document their sources and states that "powerful support to the case for Oriental influence is provided in the fact that Hume and intellectuals of his time felt themselves under no obligation whatsoever to document the source of their ideas, and the evidence for this is boundless."²⁰ Then Jacobson continues by saying that Bayle was a major influence on Hume, although Hume mentions him by name only once in the *Treatise* (I. iv. 5. 213n), and only once in the *Enquiries* (I. 12. 155n). He quotes Norman Kemp Smith and Richard Popkin on this point, and he concludes, on the basis of circumstantial evidence, that Hume was influenced by Buddha.

Although Jacobson makes his case on the basis of circumstantial evidence, and gives examples where circumstantial evidence proves to be "compelling," he has failed to describe the examples of contrary evidence which would appear to outnumber the evidence he employed. The fact that circumstantial evidence is strong in a particular case does not prove that it is strong in all the cases. The force of circumstantial evidence is hardly a cogent basis to put forth

for an argument or thesis. While there may be some point in his suggestion, as we cannot totally disregard cultural influences and psychological factors, we cannot, on the basis of these alone, conclude that Hume was influenced by Buddha. In other words, that sort of alleged influence is by itself not convincing. However, this is not to say that Jacobson's thesis ought to be regarded as necessarily wrong; rather, the most that can be said is that the manner in which he argues the case fails to demonstrate certainty.

Thus we can safely conclude that, due to the lack of evidence, we cannot say to what degree Hume was influenced by Buddha or if he was at all influenced by him. In view of the fact that the attitudes and goals of Buddhism are so different from Hume's, Jacobson's thesis that Hume borrowed his ideas from the Buddha seems to be improbable.

I do not intend to suggest that there are only similarities between the two philosophies. There are major differences between the two and I agree with Jacobson that "differences certainly outweigh the similarities." ²¹

Having dealt with the similarities, we will proceed to look at the major differences between Humean and Buddhist philosophy.

The chief aim of Buddha was to free people from sorrows and delusions of life. Life in this world is full of suffering (*dukkha*). All human beings who are involved in this cycle of birth and death should try to attain salvation from it. Birth, death, decay are painful. Even the pleasures are painful because they are always accompanied by the fear that we may lose them. Therefore, all human beings in this world need to be saved from suffering and released from suffering which can be possible only through *nirvāṇa* or attainment of Buddhahood. Buddha did not stop by telling about life as *dukkha*, but in the second Noble Truth pointed out the cause of *dukkha* and in the third and fourth showed that there can be a cessation of the *dukkha* and the way by which one reaches the cessation of *dukkha*. *Dukkha* depends on some conditions, and if those conditions cease, *dukkha* ceases also. Thus, cessation of suffering is possible and attainable in this life, if certain conditions are fulfilled. Buddha followed the path which leads to the extinction of misery and affirmed that others can also follow it, if they want to attain a state free from

misery, that is, *nibbāna* (Sanskrit : *nirvāṇa*). Thus, Buddha as a teacher and physician diagnosed the disease but did not stop with the diagnosis; he went further and also provided the cure.

Hume, on the other hand, was not bothered by the suffering in the world, and we do not find in him any concept comparable to the Buddhist concept of *nibbāna*. He was not trying to save human beings from the suffering of this world. Hume's aim was to analyze different ways of knowing and to discover the principles which would meet the most critical examination.²² Hume wrote that he hoped he could contribute something to the advancement of knowledge by expounding on some particular which could give a new turn to the speculation of philosophers, as well as pointing out to them "more distinctly those subjects, where alone they can expect assurance and conviction. Human Nature is the only science of man."²³

Even with their similarity about the conception of self, their different purposes are obvious. Since Hume rejects all concepts which are not based on sensory experience, he necessarily rejects the view of self as substance : "when I enter most intimately into what I call myself I always stumble on some particular perception or the other... I never can catch myself at any time without a perception and can observe anything but the perception."²⁴ This observation raises some very important problems. The question immediately is : If we can only observe perceptions, how can we know about the "observer," the "self"? Hume cannot say that these perceptions inhere in some substantial subject as the qualities do because he rejects the notion of substance. He raises the question : From what impression is the idea of substance derived? Since we do not have any impression of the idea of substance, there is no such thing as substance. No one has ever perceived the underlying substance or substratum, and so it does not exist.

If perceptions do not inhere in any substratum, it might be said that the factor which integrates the particular perception in the self is some kind of relation. But Hume rejects both the relation of identity and of cause and effect as necessary connection. Identity is one of the seven relations mentioned by Hume. He holds that the relation of identity involves a paradox. To say that two things are identical is to say that they are two, but identical. Identity refers

to two things but a pair is different, and not identical. As he puts it :

The view of any one object is not sufficient to convey the idea of identity. For in that proposition, *an object is the same with itself*, if the idea expressed by the word, *object*, were no ways, distinguished from that meant by *itself*; we really shoul'd mean nothing... One single object conveys the idea unity, not that of identity.

On the other hand, a multiplicity of objects can never convey this idea, however resembling they may be suppos'd. The mind always pronounces the one not to be the other, and considers them as forming two, three, or any determinate number of objects, whose existences are entirely distinct and independent.²⁵

This, then, means that he maintains that we "feign an identity" between our present impressions and remembered ideas. There is no such relation as identity which belongs to different perceptions and unites them together. In a similar manner, he also rejects the view that there is necessary connection between cause and effect. Although we observe that one event follows the other, we never observe any necessary connection between cause and effect. It is a custom-born habit of the human mind to read necessary connection into constantly conjoined events. Causality as a necessary connection is only a fiction of mind which does not exist. In the world of external objects around us we are unable even in a single instance to find a "power or necessary connection, any quality which binds the effect to the cause and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. We only find that one does actually in fact follow the other."²⁶ Therefore, the only conclusion to be inferred is that the self is just a collection of different perceptions, "which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity and are in a perpetual flux and movement... They are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind."²⁷

Buddhism holds that everything is impermanent (*anicca*). There is nothing in experience which is impermanent but change. Unchanging substance exists only in thought and not in reality. *Anicca* or impermanence is a cyclic process. The law of change passes through the phases of birth, growth, decay, and death. And as everything is impermanent there is no such thing as a self which is permanent and endures through the changes. The very search for self is wrong, and

all false doctrines and notions arise out of this misconception. The belief in a permanent self causes attachment to it, and that, in turn, brings craving for pleasure. Buddha maintains that self is composed of five *Khandhas* which are impermanent, and therefore cannot give rise to a permanent entity called "self." Search for permanence in this impermanent world is the cause of our sorrow. And as self is nothing but a flow of these impermanent *Khandhas*, there is all the more reason that we should try to avoid it.

Due to the fact that Buddha and Hume have different purposes, their philosophies lead to different conclusions. Accepting *nibbāna* as the final aim, Buddha taught the doctrine of the *Middle Way* and held that extreme asceticism, and self-mortification are only another source of suffering. The ideal in Theravāda Buddhism is the *Ārhat* ('worthy' or 'holy'). *Ārhat* is the true disciple of Buddha and attains the highest stage for and by himself. On the other hand, Hume looks upon man as a social being. He maintains that sympathy is a propensity of human nature, and with the help of this quality we share pains and pleasures of other human beings. Sympathy is the faculty of our approbation and disapprobation of virtues and vices. He states that : "Now we have no such extensive concern for society but from sympathy; and consequently it is that principle, which takes us so far out of ourselves, as to give us the same pleasure of uneasiness in the character of others, as if they had a tendency to our own advantage or loss." 28

Man is a social being and as he is in possession of the principle of sympathy he breaks off from egoism. Hume compares the minds of men to mirrors not only in that they reflect the emotions of one another "but also because those rays of passions, sentiments and opinions may be often reverberated, and may decay away by insensible degrees...One of the most considerable of these passions is that of love or esteem in others, which therefore proceeds from sympathy." Thus, social consciousness precedes "I" consciousness. So, sympathy in Hume means fellow-feeling. Although both Hume and Buddha regard the self as unreal, Hume describes man as a social being, which he regards as a natural element of human nature, Buddha offers us *nibbāna* which is not a social experience in any sense, but a very individual salvation.

Although Hume's conception of the self resembles Buddha's con-

ception of the self, the latter's conception goes further than the former's by explaining the continuity of seemingly separate perceptions. Buddha in essence has a way of avoiding Hume's dilemma in this case. He maintains that self is nothing but a stream of consciousness (*dhammas*). These *dhammas* are arranged in an intellectual hierarchy starting from the sensual states of consciousness and progressing to the ultimate goal which is *nibbāna*. These *dhammas* in themselves are not static but are regarded as "events" or "processes". Each *dhammas* rises from the preceding perception, develops and then passes its links to the succeeding perception. Every phase of perception has within itself the potentialities of its predecessor. So, *dhammas* are not only parts of the process but the process at the same time. With the help of the above analysis, the Buddhists explain continuity in the conception of the self as a stream of consciousness. Hume's self, on the other hand, stands out "loose and separate," without any connection between parts of the selves. Hume simply could not find a way to ground the notion of self. "But all my hopes vanish, when I come to explain the principles, that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness. I cannot discover any theory, which gives me satisfaction on this head." ²⁹ And then he explains in the next paragraph: "In short there are two principles, which I cannot render consistent, nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, viz: *that all our distinct perceptions are distinct, existences and that the mind never perceives any real connection among distinct existences.*" ³⁰ He concluded: "For my part, I must plead the privilege of a sceptic, and confess, that this difficulty is too hard for my understanding. I pretend not, however, to pronounce it absolutely insuperable." ³¹ And here the matter rests.

This discussion will close with the observation that Hume wrote what he merely "thought". More encompassing, however, is the contribution of Buddha. Buddha not only "thought" what he preached, but also he had a "belief" in *nibbāna*. He not only conveyed belief in *nibbāna* but also he displayed in feeling and action the meaning of that consummate religious perspective. Hume wrote about the theory of knowledge; Buddha talked about a way of life. Hume's empiricism implies the task of conforming to the standards of knowledge; Buddha clarified the ethical dimension of one's way of life. The similarities which we find between the two are really

remarkable and the contrasts which we see between the two make the similarities all the more remarkable.

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NOTES

1. Nolan Pliny Jacobson, " The Possibility of Oriental Influence in Hume's Philosophy," *Philosophy East and West* XIX (Jan. 1969), pp. 17-37.
2. Edward Conze, " Spurious Parallels to Buddhist Philosophy," *Philosophy East and West* XIII (Jul. 1963), pp. 114-115.
3. Theravāda Buddhism emphasizes the teachings and thoughts of the historical Buddha. The account of Buddhism we are concerned with in this study is based on the original teachings of Buddha. Buddha wrote no books, and all his instructions were oral instructions. Whatever knowledge we possess about Buddha depends on *Tripitakas* or the " Three Baskets " which comprise Buddha's views as recorded by his intimate disciples. There is no doubt that the *Tripitakas* are the earliest and most authentic accounts of Buddha's teaching which are available now, and they are the Canon of the Theravāda Buddhist.
4. Hume, *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* in *Hume on Religion*, ed. Richard Wollheim (Cleveland and New York : The World Publishing Company, 1954) pp. 203-04. In the *Dialogues*, Hume does not appear in his own views, and there is a great deal of controversy regarding the question, which of the two views is his own. It is difficult to say whether he wished to be identified exclusively with Philo or Cleanthes. But as their views are opposed to each other, it seems that we can associate Philo's views with Hume, because Philo is a sceptic.
5. Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, edited with an analytical

- index by L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford : at the Clarendon Press, 1888) p 252.
6. Ibid; p. 253
 7. L. Narasu. *The Essence of Buddhism*, (Bombay : Thacker and Co., Ltd., 1948), p. 218.
 8. Conze, " Spurious Parallels to Buddhist Philosophy, " p. 105.
 9. *Ibid.* p. 106.
 10. *Ibid.* p. 113.
 11. *Ibid.* p. 111.
 12. Nolan Pliny Jacobson " The possibility of Oriental Influence in Hume's philosophy, " p. 35.
 13. *Ibid.* p. 36.
 14. *Ibid.* pp. 36-37.
 15. Jacobson maintains that when Hume came to France to write the *Treatise*, Europe had been under the influence of Oriental culture for three centuries. He states : " China by this time had become a repository for all major ideas of the entire Continent of Asia, and far too much coalescence of Hindu, Buddhist and Chinese philosophy had occurred over the centuries to permit any dissociation for our purposes here between the influence of Chinese thought, on the one hand, and the influence of Buddhist and other Indian ideas, on the other. " *Ibid.* p. 28.
 16. Alex Wayman, " Conze on Buddhism and European Parallels. " *Philosophy East and West* XIII (Jan. 1964) p. 361.
 17. *Ibid.* pp. 361-62.
 18. Conze, " Spurious Parallels to Buddhist Philosophy, " p. 105.
 19. Jacobson, " The Possibility of Oriental Influence in Hume's Philosophy, " p. 27.
 20. *Ibid.* p. 27.
 21. Jacobson, " The possibility of Oriental Influence in Hume's Philosophy, " p. 23.
 22. Hume, *Treatise*, p. 272.
 23. *Ibid.*, p. 273.
 24. *Ibid.*, p. 252.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 200.
26. David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. C. W. Hendel (New York : The Library of Liberal Arts Press, Inc., 1955), p. 74.
27. Hume, *Treatise*, pp. 252-53.
28. Hume, *Treatise* p. 579.
29. Hume, *Treatise*, pp. 635-36.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 636.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 636.

THE SOCIAL MILIEU IN INDIA AND DEVELOPMENT (I)

1.1. The Old Debate and the New Setting

From the earliest discussions during British times regarding the possibilities and prospects of economic and social progress in India the social aspects of the problem have figured quite prominently in the debate. Unfortunately the political and nationalistic considerations were imported into the discussion quite early and the subsequent debate became impassioned and of course distorted. That the Indian social milieu was radically different from the one found in England and Europe was a fact that could not be disputed. But the inferences that could be drawn from it could be, as the debate showed, completely opposite of one another. Viewing the Industrial Revolution in England and Europe, as a natural evolution from the preceding social and economic conditions, it was quite natural for British and foreign observers and scholars to conclude that since Indian conditions were radically different they could not be the basis or the source of a similar evolution. With one further step, it was easy to regard these conditions as obstacles to progress. In effect, unless Indians themselves changed these conditions (it was unthinkable to imagine a foreign government changing them) there was no possibility of progress. In emphasizing the refractory character of the Indian social milieu the critics pointed out that the Indian social milieu was characterised, on the individual level, by an other-worldly attitude, fatalism and passivity about happenings in the actual world and at the societal level by the caste system and the joint family system together with a social atmosphere surcharged with religious sentiments and thought. This resulted in a social ethos in which individualism was absent, there was great passivity and lack of initiative and commitment, no social mobility, etc., all inimical to a modern industrial society. The nationalists regarded this as a slur on the Indian people, their institutions and society and hypocritical excuse on the part of the rulers and the foreigners to shift the blame for the poverty and misery in India from themselves to the natives.

The nationalist reposte was that under the impact of the West the institutions of caste and joint family were fast disintegrating in

India and their adverse effects were either a thing of the past or a fast declining phenomenon. The passivity of the masses was a result rather than cause of their poverty and misery and it was foreign rule that was in the way of removing them. The same was true at the individual level. Historically the Hindus had displayed great achievements in the past in the intellectual and practical fields in spite of all the social conditions that could be listed as inimical to modern progress. The argument was thus historically false.

The biases of the arguments on the two sides are too obvious to be underlined. There is no need also to examine them in detail because after a quarter of a century of political independence and self-rule Indians can look at these problems in a more self-introspective manner. They have, it is significant, not shown any inclination to ignore these problems or to banish them out of the discussion. The above account of the old debate is just a brief background for more recent discussion of the relevant problems.

The New Setting : More than twenty-five years have elapsed since the attainment of political independence. Indian effort at economic and social development during all this period has not been inhibited by foreign rulers. Indians have had the fullest scope to develop in the way they liked and in the direction they chose for themselves. And yet the degree of progress attained has been unanimously held to be unsatisfactory. The battle against poverty has not been won and what is more, it does not seem as if that it is even going to be won. The dream of legislating progress by means of the abolition of caste, untouchability, etc and that of dissolving all social impediments to economic growth by putting emphasis on economic development through successive five year plans has largely been shattered. The persistence of inequalities, poverty, shortages, the lack of national and emotional integration, the growth of casteism, nepotism, corruption have again directed attention to social, institutional and structural factors in the Indian situation together with the economic ones. The talk is now not of economic development but development with social justice for which an all-sided revolution in all walks of life is said to be necessary. The study of social factors in the Indian setting in the context of all-sided socio-economic development with social justice has become an urgent necessity. Though the context is different, the new debate is not free

from the overtones of the old debate briefly summarised in the previous section. To deal with the new problem it may be necessary to deal with some aspects of the old one occasionally.

1.2 What is Wrong with Us

To bring the discussion to a focus we must begin by an attempt to formulate clearly what we think is wrong with us. Why is it that we are not succeeding in our efforts at economic development with social justice? I formulated the answer to this and such other questions in the following way a few years ago and I believe the passage of years has not made it necessary to alter it. Socio-economic development is economic growth plus social change. Development is, or should be, a self-sustaining process once begun. It builds upon itself. It is qualitative and touches most of the people, institutions, behaviour patterns values, etc in a country. It energises the people to undertake and carry out successfully the tasks of development on their own. However effectively a technical problem, like that of economic planning, is solved it cannot by itself bring about the rising tide of human endeavour, effort, daring, persistence, involvement and dedication which is the very essence of the process of self-sustaining development. This is what is lacking in India. We are not only non-aligned in foreign policy but also in personal work commitment and endeavour. We generally seem to act from a sense of duty (*dharmā*), "the pale ash of a burnt out fire". There is very little sense of purpose or involvement. Our intellectual tradition is more theoretical than operational and, possibly as a result, we tend to believe too much in the power of the spoken or the written word. Steady hard work, though we do not say so, does not seem to us very attractive. In the famine of human endeavour that this gives rise to, it is no wonder that self-sustaining development is not generated. This apathy, passivity, lack of involvement, etc is not a recent development. It has been noted by prominent Indian leaders in the past. Ranade wrote long ago that our greatest enemy was the general apathy of the people. Tilak spoke about the slumber and indolence of his countrymen. The thoughts were, however, not allowed to surface prominently under the convenient doctrine that it was the effect of foreign rule and not an inherent characteristic of the Indian people. After

twenty-five and more years of independence that doctrine stands self-repudiated.

The causes of this malaise lie deep in our cultural heritage and social structure however unpalatable this may be to us. We must face the bitter truth if we want to remedy the situation. An analysis of the causes will have to range over a wide field and range along many false trails that have been drawn across it. The search will have to be carried out at the personal or individual level and the societal level and each of these will have to be discussed on the ideological and the actual structural level, keeping in mind both the static and the dynamic aspects. This is a tall order and though ill-equipped for such a formidable task, I am going to attempt it, if not for anything else at least to provoke more capable minds to answer the questions that I shall be raising.

2.11 The Religious Aspect : Hinduism

In considering the religious background of Indian society we have primarily to consider Hinduism which is the religion of the overwhelming majority of the people in the country. Hinduism is one of the oldest religions of the world and has evolved over centuries. Evolution of religion is usually traced along the path of the rationalization of religious symbolism, for example, from pantheism to monotheism to the *advaita* doctrine. Such a philosophical evolution is quite evident in Hinduism. But along with such evolution we must consider how far these philosophical doctrines were translated into the mundane world of everyday affairs. Sociologists often describe the two as the Great Tradition and the Little Tradition or folkways or structural expression of ideological positions. We have to consider both these in regard to Hinduism.

But before this is done an overall view is necessary and in that respect Max Weber's analysis cannot be bettered. Weber found that in religion cultural values, personal motivation and social structure came together and this led him to make a subtle and complicated analysis of Hinduism : " Weber finds the notion of *dharma*, religiously prescribed obligation, to be the core of Hinduism, especially in its deeper inner connection with the idea of *karma*, the endless chain of causation working itself out in successive rebirths. The orthodox view is that whatever position one finds oneself in this life, is due

to the force of *karma* in previous existences and one's obligation is to fulfil the *dharma* of one's position so that one will improve one's chances in the next incarnation. The intellectuals, revolting against this notion, always sought escape from the wheel of rebirth through some sort of individualistic salvation. Weber shows how these conceptions hindered cultural rationalization beyond a certain point. On the one hand, they contributed to the development of special technologies appropriate to the *dharma* of each profession - "from construction technique to logic as the technology of proof and disproof to the technology of eroticism." - but at the same time they hindered the development of levels of generalization above the technological because of the fragmentation involved in the notion of occupational *dharma*. On the other hand, the intellectuals were so completely preoccupied with the problem of salvation that all philosophy was made subservient to this end.

"With respect to social structure, it is the *dharma* concept as integrated with the idea of caste, which is the key to the situation. In spite of the remarkable achievements, including economic achievements, of certain castes, there is always a limit imposed by the traditionalistic definition of the caste *dharma* itself. Further, the division of society into innumerable watertight compartments, while engendering a very stable integration of sorts, allows a minimum of flexibility and especially limits the generalization of political power, making the society a relatively easy prey to foreign conquest. The major religious movements which reject this mode of social organization either fall back into it, in the form of a new caste, or, as in the case of Buddhism, remain an individualistic and socially neglected group existing symbolically in relation to traditional society and unable to generate any really different mode of social organization.

"In terms of personality, the *dharma* idea results in the fragmentation of response directed to the external demands of ritual obligation on the one hand, or a passive withdrawal into mysticism and asceticism on the other. There is no basis for inner unification of personality, for action in response to the command of a transcendental God. The Indian alternatives tend to be action without unification and unification without action."¹

Regarding the structural reflection of this ideological ethos in

Hinduism Max Weber pointed out that among the historical religions examined by him—namely, Judaism, Islam, Christianity—Hinduism alone had achieved a total correspondence between the ideological ethos and the actual social life lived. "The single inwardly consistent interconnection of performance in the world with the extra-worldly soteriology was in the caste soteriology of Vedānta Brahmanism in India. Its conception of calling had to operate politically, socially, economically in an extraordinarily traditionalistic manner. However, it is the single logically closed form of 'organismic' holy and societal teaching which could occur."²

2.12 Max Weber's analysis is, at the intellectual level, based on published and printed material regarding Hinduism and Hindu society. It is empirical only to the extent to which his sources were empirical. Yet, as Weber himself remarks, as the total Hindu ethos is a very integrated complex compared to any other religion, ideological and structural elements are much more mixed in Weber's analysis of Hinduism than in that of any other religion. Though for the convenience of discussion I treat each of the three aspects of this complex, namely, cultural values, personal motivations and social structure separately it should never be forgotten that they are inextricably intertwined and bound together supporting and reinforcing one another in that extraordinarily integrated complex. Of these three aspects the first is purely ideological and the third purely structural. The second lies in between but nearer to the third than the first because in so far as personality is a very slowly changing variable not amenable to quick change, it amounts to really a structural factor.

Hinduism and Hindu society have evolved and persisted over several centuries. As will be made clear later on in this discussion, the internal springs of change within Hindu society have been extremely weak, particularly at the structural level. Only the impact of other and different cultures from outside India could be, therefore, expected to bring about any noticeable and marked change, in the total complex. Two such impacts were those of Islam from the thirteenth century on and of the British from the eighteenth century. Of these the first does not amount to much. The second does to a greater degree. In dealing with the above aspects, therefore, I will try to indicate, as far as possible, the consequences of the British

in part separately and specifically though this may not always be possible.

Weber's analysis has been faulted as concentrating too much on the high level philosophical ideologies of the Hindu ethos and its 'other-worldliness' and neglecting the long-standing and parallel materialistic streams of thought in Hindu thinking and behaviour. In the same strain, it is pointed out that the highly philosophical Vedāntic concepts of 'advaita', 'Brahma', etc. could not have spread or percolated beyond the numerically small elite, mostly Brahmins and the remaining vast mass of peoples could not but have materialistic and "this-worldly" traditions of thought and behaviour. The distinction between the Great Tradition of the Vedānta philosophy and the Little Tradition of the folkways or *Lokāyata* or Cārvāka philosophy is emphasised in this connection.

The whole argument is superficial and totally faulty. I will begin with the last point, Cārvāka or *Lokāyat* philosophy. First, *lokāyāta*, that is what is traditionally and actually practised and believed by the mass of the people, is a derisive name that has been given to the Cārvāka *darśana* of Hindu philosophy by its critics and is not at all what the folk beliefs and traditions reflect. Cārvāka is one of the *darśanas* of Hindu philosophy whose original texts are extinct or not yet discovered and which has been reconstructed from the quotations from it that have been given by its critics in their criticism. Judging from these quotations and their criticisms, the Cārvāka *darśana* is, first and foremost, a system of logic which accepts only empirical verification of any proposition as the only valid criterion of the proof of it. Even inference, unless repeatedly proved by direct experience, is unacceptable to it. With such a system of logic, there is naturally no place in Cārvāka philosophy for such concepts as, god, soul, the other world, rebirth cycle, etc., all concepts so vital and crucial to the Vedānta philosophy. The materialism of cārvāka philosophy is thus implied by its basic logic or rather logical postulates.

The need to obliterate this doctrine was urgent and obvious to the proponents of Vedānta philosophy and this they successfully did by all the means at their command. The fact that most of the original texts of the Cārvāka *darśana* are not available or discovered

red so far and that only those parts of it which the critics selected for refutation are available is itself an indication of one of the means possibly used in this attack. Another method was the one of 'giving the dog a bad name and hang it'. They characterised the Cārvāka *darśana* as one propounded and believed in by the ignorant masses who were too moroanic to grasp or understand the subtle and lofty Vedānta philosophy. It was natural and easy for the Brahmin elite, with the usual contempt of the elite for the masses, to deride the doctrine as *Lokāyata*, that which is prevalent among the ignorant masses and therefore naturally benighted.

It can be easily appreciated that the Cārvāka system of logic from which the Cārvāka philosophy was derived could not have been accepted whole heartedly by the masses. People have faiths, beliefs, myths, etc. which transcend logic, let alone the empirical logic of Cārvāka *darśana*. If the Cārvāka logic were to be followed, it would have been empirically obvious to the masses that a rocky or a sandy soil could not be made fertile by observing the fertility rites and practising the fertility cults that were to be found in the folk culture in India. Following Cārvāka logic they would have lost faith in them and would have had to abandon them. This never happened in the long history of the Hindu people. No primitive or mediaeval society could have done this and the Hindu society did not. The epithet *lokāyata* given to the materialistic philosophy of Cārvāka is meant as an abuse and should not be construed as one that reflected the ideology and behaviour of the masses.³

This is so far as the argument based on the existence of the materialistic Cārvāka philosophy and its relation to the folkways of the Little Tradition is concerned. Let us now take up the argument about the gap in the Great and the Little Tradition in Hindu society. This gap was and is very small in Hindu society than in any other society and Weber was right in emphasizing that fact. The difference between orthodox religion (Great Tradition) and folk religion was largely in respect of language (Sanskrit instead of the regional Prakrit languages), elegance and subtlety of logic (highly philosophical and abstract as against simple and folksy), style (high flown as against simple), etc. rather than in respect of basic concepts or ideas or the philosophy as a whole. The Great Tradition (orthodox religious ideas and behaviour) consisted of the highly

logical *Advaita* philosophy, the core of Vedānta culture, was mainly confined to the Brahmins. It reached the society at large through the great epics, *Rāmāyaṇa* and *Mahābhārata*, and the subsequent *Purāṇas* culminating in the evolution and development of *Bhāgavata Dharma* (*Bhakti* cult) in and around the thirteenth century. It continues in that form even today. This mass religion, so to say, contains little new. It consists of the same main ideas of Vedānta philosophy like *dharma*, *karma*, cycle of births and rebirths, *māyā* or unreality of this world, the importance of renunciation and *sanyāsa*, evils inherent in the pursuit of wealth and power, etc. There is hardly any difference, any gap in the value system of the great and the small traditions of Hindu society as a whole. There is no ideological disjuncture in Hindu society as has been alleged.⁴ And yet the rituals can differ as much as they can. The paradox is explained by the fact that Hinduism is not a religion in the Western sense of the term. It is a method of organizing society which has an overall homogeneity of value systems but at the same time a great tolerance of heterogeneous folkways of innumerable groups or castes. The castes, however, are not independent religious systems but parts of the larger Hindu system. Perhaps when the innumerable primitive groups were, when first admitted or absorbed in the expanding Hindu system, distinct religious systems of sorts but once they became parts of the total Hindu system and took their place in the caste hierarchy as it evolved they ceased to be separate and distinct religious entities. They could easily do so because their rituals, gods, etc. could be retained without any change within the total Hindu system. A heterogeneous society like this cannot come into being and persist without a great degree of religious tolerance and Hinduism possesses that tolerance to a great degree. This was possibly the cause or the consequence of another historical characteristic of Hindu society, namely, that the Hindu cultural entity was not tied to any political framework and the Brahmanic value system and structure of the caste system had not an organized, homogeneous, unified centre.⁵ As will be explained later this tolerance in Hindu society is one of the effective and powerful checks on any basic social change in that society.

2.21 Modern Ideological Reappraisal

With the British conquest of India and the establishment of British

rule, Indians began to be exposed to the impact of the West with much more intensity than before. The new system of education, introduced by the British, began to produce a band of scholars, thinkers, reformers, etc. who had imbibed, to varying degrees, the values, thoughts, philosophy, knowledge, etc. of the West. The fact of British conquest left no doubt in the minds of Indian people and particularly the educated elite, that the new civilization that the British represented was in many respects comparatively superior to their own and that in turn their own was in some respects defective. This prompted a fresh self-analysis and self-introspection both to discover and remedy the defects of the Indian system and also to discover the strong points of the new system brought to India by the British rulers. The intellectual reappraisal of Indian religion, culture, etc. began early in the nineteenth century and can be briefly described as follows.

The new Indian intellectuals realised early that only imitation of European ways was of limited use. The thrust of re-thinking, therefore, turned in the direction of a basic analysis of the social and religious order and the changes that need to be made in them to keep up with modern progress. A major attempt in the field was to search for new values in the old traditions and thoughts. There seemed a fair possibility that Indian thoughts and behaviour would develop more and more on the Western lines. But in this nothing new was happening. The rational scientific outlook that dominated Western civilization was also to be found in India's old traditions of learning. In regard to grammar and linguistics, for example, the Indian traditional systems were as rational and as scientific as the comparable European ones. In this field there was really nothing specifically European as such. Therefore in trying to assimilate European thought and modes of behaviour the Indian intellectuals felt that Indians have not to develop or imbibe any new values or intellectual and other capabilities. They could easily develop them from elements that were already present in their traditions and learning. Such a shift of emphasis should be easy to make. If the achievement of Indians remained limited that would be mainly due to their economic and social situation and system. These latter they must tackle energetically.

The main shortcomings of Indian people were : (1) The caste

system that had led to a deeper and more extensive social stratification than in Europe and the consequent absence of equality of economic and social status or opportunity. (2) The other-worldly attitude of the people which led them to regard the affairs and operations of this world as of subsidiary importance. There was, therefore, less effort and concern about the every day affairs of the world. (3) As the gaining of freedom from the endless cycle of births and deaths (*mukti*) was an individual affair and was strictly an individual's concern and goal, there was no stress on ideas or rules of behaviour, etc. regarding social duties or social responsibilities except within the narrow caste and kin circles. The best rule of conduct recommended for the individual was that of *sanyāsa* or renunciation of the world.

Regarding caste and social inequality inherent in a caste society, the new thinkers argued that in the very old days caste was determined not by birth but by skills, qualities and functions of individuals. In later times this had gradually ceased and the caste system had taken the present form. For modern times this had to be corrected by reviving the old values and traditions by which caste was not determined by birth. In regard to the other-worldly attitude of the Indian people and the ideal of *sanyāsa* for individual salvation, the new line of thought, argued particularly vigorously by Tilak, was that the advocating of *sanyāsa* or the renunciation of the world was not a proper interpretation of the ancient scriptures. The proper interpretation was that it was not necessary for individual salvation to become a *sanyāsi* by renouncing the world but only to develop the attitude of a *sanyāsi* i. e. of *niṣkāma karma* and then continue to act in the world for the good of others with that attitude without any longing for the fruits of that action. In other words, to do your duty for duty's sake. That was the true teaching of *Gītā*, *Karma Yoga*.

These attempts at reinvigorating the intellectual and philosophical climate by reinterpreting the old traditional thinking and concepts that have been summarised so far were partial and completely non-operational and theoretical. Even intellectually they were unsatisfactory because the new thinking did not say or prescribe to the passive Hindu individual what he should do but told him to develop a mental attitude with which he should do what he wanted to do. None

of the new thinkers prescribed or recommended to the individual the uninhibited and single minded pursuit of wealth, success, power etc. as desirable. Nor was the individual prescribed any duty regarding the social group or society in general to which he belonged. In the old traditional way of thinking and acting no social duties inhere to the individual except incidentally as things to be customarily done or fit to be done in particular circumstances and places. Nobody emphasized the duty of the individual to the society as a whole.

2 22. Indian Personality

Analyses of culture usually deal with the group rather than the individual. Yet culture can only be mediated through individual personalities. The study of common characteristics among people sharing the same culture adds an important dimension to our understanding of the culture and society. The relationship between culture and personality types may be described as a partial reflection of one another. Both culture and personality are abstractions and refer more to process than to things. "Broadly speaking culture is a way of life of a group of people, the configuration of all the more or less stereotyped patterns of learned behaviour handed down from one generation to the next through the means of language and imitation. Similarly, broadly defined, personality is a more or less enduring organization of forces within the individual associated with a complex of fairly consistent attitudes, values and modes of perception which account in part for the individual's consistency in behaviour." "When the focus is put on the similarities in personality characteristics among people sharing the same culture, it is not denied that personalities vary widely in a culture. All that is sought to be conveyed is that some kind of personality, a modal personality rather than a basic personality structure or national character, corresponds to each type of culture but evidently the correspondence is not one-to-one but partial. Within these limitations the study of personality in culture or culture in personality is certainly rewarding.

In the late sixties in a discussion of the non-economic factors in India's economic development I tried to bring in the information thrown up by a few personality studies in India and suggested that the light shed by them on our social and cultural situation may be

valuable from the point of view of bringing about social change of the requisite kind.⁷

I cited the studies of Taylor and Carstairs and the conclusion of Taylor that Orthodox Hinduism is "able to create a basic personality pattern in which personal initiative is replaced by the sense of conformity, in which responsibility is exercised without personal authority, in which security is associated with a sense of dependence and self-respect with a sense of helplessness, and in which opportunities for frustration and acute anxiety are minimised. It is a basic personality whose integration and stability are primarily a function of the cultural system to which it belongs and are not organized around any system by personal choices."⁸

The studies of Carstairs and Taylor were limited in time and scope and dealt with only one or two regions in the wide continent of India. It is now possible to study the personality question from a broader and a historical perspective because of the insightful study of P. Spratt.⁹ Spratt undertakes a detailed study of ancient literature legends, etc. to support his psychological analysis. One need not agree with everything that he says. But his analysis is very stimulating and suggestive and seems to fit certain things in India so well that it is worthwhile taking it seriously as a hypothesis.

Spratt argues that the Hindu psyche differs radically from the Occidental (European). Freud assumes two kinds of psychic energy, libido and aggressiveness. Broadly as between Hindu and European, these two psychic forces are interchanged. In Europe the punitive¹⁰ personality type is normal, the narcissistic exceptional. In India the narcissistic type is common, the punitive exceptional. The outstanding peculiarities of the Hindu personality type can be accounted for on the assumption that it is distinguished by the related characteristics of narcissism, a mother fixation, and a weak suppression of the infants annal attachments. Only a community of narcissists could have discovered Yoga. But this achievement, by making the Yogi the ideal personality type, must have established once and for all the predominance of narcissism.

A society composed of individuals who are chiefly of the narcissistic type¹¹ will tend to differ in organization and institutions from societies in which punitives predominate. According to psychoanaly-

tical theory the child in its early years assimilates current ideals and example of adults, and these form the ego-ideal. Actual behaviour falls short of the ideal, but the ego is spurred on by the super-ego, which is an unconscious image of the aggressive side of authority, especially the father; the super-ego draws its strength from the subject's own aggressiveness. The conscience is thus a charge of aggressiveness directed against the ego and forcing it to try to live up to its ideals. The emotion which is engendered is that of guilt. (This is in the punitive type of the West.)

The Hindu conscience differs markedly from this. The ego-ideal is formed in the same way, but the big charge of inward directed libido, love for the self, gives it a more idealistic character. In the narcissistic type the inward directed aggressiveness is weak: the super-ego is weak. The Hindu strives to act rightly, or to improve himself, not so much out of love for himself and derivatively for the ideal. If the European conscience is a product of fear, the Hindu conscience is a product of pride. The Hindu's principal moral emotion is aspiration. But if in any individual this aspiration is weak, and the gap between ideal and achievement is wide, the weak super-ego does not cause the subject any distress. The Hindu psyche is not free from guilt but it is the guilt arising from the fear of the operation of an impersonal law, *Karma*, implanted not in early infancy but in later childhood through verbal teaching, and in consequence less deeply felt.

The majority of narcissists respect high ideals but will need little temptation to abandon them. As their outward oriented ego is weak, their attachment to the community, beyond the kinship group, is weak as compared to that of the punitive. A nation of narcissists will show weak patriotism and public spirit.

The attitudes of punitives and narcissists towards rulers differ appreciably. Both adopt the attitude of the son of the respective type to the father. The punitive feelings will be relatively intense but ambivalent. He will be either strongly attached or hostile to the ruler, and in many people these feelings can replace each other quickly. This explains the political instability, or the marked political polarization of most punitive societies. On the other hand, the strong attachment to a common head enables punitives to form large political communities in contrast to narcissists whose attachment to a

leader outside the kinship group is weak. A typical narcissist, though he hopes for benefits and tries to gain them by submission, will less readily undertake positive action for the ruler. He tends towards political indifference. But his allegiance seldom wavers so long as the ruler's power seems to be secure. The politics of a narcissist in society is therefore likely to be stable. There will be few changes of ruler initiated by popular movements, and relatively few by palace intrigue. Because of the weak attachment to the ruler Hindu states will be weak vis-a-vis other states or minorities of different mental type. It is a fact of history that Hindu rule is stable internally but weak in opposing attack from without.

Narcissists probably show little of the punitive's revolt against the heritage of his forefathers. This is true in matters of literacy and artistic styles. India shows nothing comparable to the rapid changes of taste which distinguish the artistic history of the West, or the excessive depreciation of the work of previous generation often followed by a rehabilitation a generation later, which results from the hostility to the father. Protest against caste has been endemic since Buddha but it has been always in the spirit of Vivekananda not an aggressive desire to pull down the privileged castes but an aspiration to equal their spiritual attainments. The effect has of course been quite slight. Buddhism in fact, like all reforming movements, shared the narcissistic character of the parent society and therefore effected very little changes. This is equally true of the *Bhakti* movement. It lacks conspicuously in aggressiveness.

In a society of narcissists a small proportion of the citizens will be narcissists of the type in whom the libido cathects on the ego-ideal. Of these, some will be concerned only with spiritual matters, but some will cherish an ego-ideal of an outgoing character. Some may be of the projective extrovert type. These will hold the highest ideals and will be public spirited, just, balanced; in short the best type of citizens. They will differ from all but a few of the best type of punitives in that the punitive normally needs an enemy, whereas the projective extrovert and the other high type of narcissists are benevolent towards everybody. The punitive is typically a nationalist whereas the higher type of narcissist is a world citizen.

When narcissism is carried to the extreme point, the concentra-

tion of all the libido upon the ego endows it with all value and deprives it of all other objects of value. The subject feels a total lack of interest in external objects and normal life (*Vairāgya*). This state has to be attained by voluntary effort, Yoga, which is long and arduous. For the typical Yogi and other ascetics this is the final state. However, a step beyond is possible. When in this state ego appears to be the only object that exists, the ego may then identify itself with the world; it may expand, as it were, to include everything within itself. As the Upaniṣads put it, "that art thou". With the identification of the ego and the world the process is not complete. The final step which the Yogi does not take, is to direct upon the world the love which is directed upon the ego. (*niṣkāma karma*, *Ārhat*, *sthitaprajña*). This situation resembles that of the extrovert but differs from it in two respects : (i) Unlike the extrovert he does not have preferences. He is impartially balanced. (ii) His attachment to the world differs in quality from that of the extrovert. It is relatively cool, passionless, that of the artist perhaps than that of the lover.

The relative cultural sterility of India in recent centuries is due to the weakness of the revolt against the father i. e. against the ideas of the past, and the weakness of the creative impulses. Cultural activity may be the work of almost pure libido, for example, the work of projective extroverts like Kālidāsa and Tagore. But much cultural activity contains an appreciable aggressive element. This is especially true in science, even pure science. The desire to understand seems to derive in part from the desire to dominate.

How does one account for vigorous cultural activity in some past periods? The key is the projective extrovert. The necessary condition for the flowering of Hindu culture is the occurrence of a large number of projective extroverts. Their outlook is universalistic, not nationalistic, impractically idealistic. The ordinary men of the narcissist type introject the figure of such leader and he raises them to a high level of public spirit, which they can no longer sustain when he is gone. This latter is also promoted by the characteristic parochialism of the majority of the narcissists of the lower type.

The unconscious convictions of the narcissists inspire the characteristic fantasy of the bureaucrat. He feels himself to be universally benevolent, endowed with omniscience and omni-competence; sitting

at the controls of society, wiping the tears from every eye and steering the state to utopia. Bureaucracy expresses the non-aggressive superiority feeling of the narcissist and the desire to exercise unostentatious power. The urge to expand the state power and to establish this bureaucratic order was persistent in Hindu history but it had to contend with the parochialism which is also characteristic of narcissism. And on the whole local influences prevailed.

Spratt's detailed analysis of the modal Indian personality is based on historical and literary texts as well as on the empirical inquiries of recent date such as those of Taylor and Carstairs. It is a highly suggestive and insightful picture of culture in personality or personality in culture. And this is an aspect of the Indian cultural ethos and structure that had not been touched in the old debate. But that was because the study of personality in culture is a recent development. That is more the reason why we should take cognizance of it in our analysis. It illuminates the structural aspect of the human material that is generally produced by the culture and which in turn perpetuates it from generation to generation.

It is interesting to note, in this connection, that to the increasing prevalence of the narcissistic character has been traced the increasing social disorder in the U. S. A. in recent years by some psychoanalysts. Simon Sobo¹² writes : "Narcissism, in affluent Western societies, ordinarily reaches peak in adolescence and young adulthood. It is when it is extended too long into life, and remains too intense, unformulated and unrealizable, that we think of it as a problem."

He describes the main characteristics of the narcissistic character which closely parallels the description given by Spratt. "The narcissistic character finds it difficult to love. His main concern is to be loved. Other people disappoint him as does his own concept of himself. He wants and waits for perfection, finding all else unsustaining. He cannot accept the plainness, the greyness of reality and can only exist with possibilities. True "reality" is found in his imagination of how life could be, and soon this transforms itself into how it should be...the narcissist seeks to have his own vision of the world judged perfect."

"Those with difficult narcissistic problems can only imagine peace when they have become what they are not, when they are

recognized for their fantasies of what they could be. They must gain paradise or remain in hell. When their feet become grounded on earth, they are in turmoil. They feel frail, too close to the common fate awaiting them beneath the soil. They dream of being the child's superman who can fly, they are waiting (in Leonard Cohen's lyrical words) 'for the sky to surrender'."

2.23 Social Structure

The three basic institutions of Hindu social structure were the caste system, the family and the village community which had evolved through centuries. Complex considerations of ritual pollution and purity kept the castes distinct and apart, through rules governing intermarriage, commensality, occupation and other patterns of interaction. The socio-economic pattern of the largely self sufficient village system integrated them to a certain degree but divisive rather than unifying tendencies prevailed. The family system was well integrated into this overall pattern. There was little room for the individual who had his duties (*dharma*) prescribed to him on his birth in any caste and the sanctions against not following that *dharma* were divine. The individual's duties were primarily to his family (ancestors), to his caste and to his village in that order of priority. The only escape out of this structure of obligations and duties was through *sanyāsa*, the renunciation of the world. One could be an individual only by abandoning the world. Individual in the society was, in the Hindu system, a contradiction in terms.

The successful maintenance and continuation of the caste hierarchy could not have been possible without there being in the social structure a certain latitude for change and movement. This was provided by, what has recently come to be known as, the Sanskritization process, a process to be historically found in all parts of India. It broadly signifies the upward mobility of castes within the total caste structure. When a low Hindu caste acquired wealth and/or political power, it tried to change its customs, rituals, ideology and way of life in the image of a high, frequently twice-born caste and thus tried to get included in the bracket of the high castes. The new status had to be sanctioned by the political power, which was its traditional function. This so-called Sanskritization process brought about only positional change within the overall caste structure and was not a structural change.¹³

There were no other internal springs of action or change in this social structure leading towards any structural change nor could any have arisen, as they actually did not, within the overall functioning of that structure. The only possibility of structural change could arise from some external impact. The earliest impact of an alien culture/religion on India was that of Islam. Under the impact of this aggressively proselyting religion Hinduism shrank into itself and became even more rigid than before to preserve itself. But apart from this, the impact was very limited. Islamic rulers, perhaps a little more mercantile-minded than the Hindu rulers, did bring to India their interest and skill in the development of roads, communications, markets, etc, together with irrigation and horticultural techniques. But these were of too feeble a strength to bring about any structural change in Hindu society. On the contrary, Islamic society seemed to have been overwhelmed by the Hindu social system by successfully implanting the institution of caste into Islamic society and helping the evolution of a caste system in it though not in all particulars.

The British impact was deeper and apparently more far-reaching. The development of modern means of communication and an efficient impersonal bureaucratic government administrative system in India under the British, destroyed the old self-sufficiency and autonomy of the village system. Economically the village economy became much more integrated with the total economy of the country through the development and working of the market economy. Administratively the village *panchayats* lost their old autonomy and became cogs in the bigger centralized wheel of administration. But even so the villages continued to be caste-ridden and the village caste hierarchy and the social life that went with it was only superficially affected. With the conferment of the right of private property in land the British bequeathed by a misunderstanding of the traditional system of the rights in land, gave rise to a land hierarchy which was parallel with the caste hierarchy. The twin hierarchies mutually strengthened one another. The British also refused to perform the traditional function of political power in a caste system, that of altering and sanctioning the 'Sanskritization' process which naturally clogged its functioning and imparted additional rigidity to the caste system. On the other hand some measures that British rule adopted,

like equality before law, etc. eroded the caste system to a certain degree. As a whole, however, the British impact did not result in any marked structural change in the caste structure in India. Moreover, communalism and casteism, as we know them today, is exclusively a product of British rule.

It was a commonly held view that society at the time of British conquest was characterized by the joint family system and that it began to disintegrate under the British impact. This view has been recently found to be incorrect. The picture of the Hindu society in pre-British days, as predominantly consisting of joint or extended families, was built out of deductive reasoning from the Hindu scriptures describing and defining the Hindu family system in the abstract. It had no empirical basis. The picture was conjured up from the "homemade models of the Hindu literati, British law courts and judges and the new class of lawyers. That the Hindu law dealt with the family as a coparsonary unit in respect of family property was taken as the basis for inferring that as a household or a living unit also the Hindu family was joint or extended."¹⁴ Empirical data mostly belonging to the British period (census etc.) showed decisively that the Hindu family as a living unit or a household had always been small in size and more nuclear, though in respect of property it was a coparsonary or an extended unit. The picture of a disintegrating joint family system under the impact of British rule is therefore a myth. The Hindu family system continued largely unaffected under the British impact.

The social structure of Hindu society as constituted by the three basic institutions of the village community, the caste structure and the family system were only marginally affected by British impact. There was hardly any structural change in any of them so far as social matters were concerned.

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Notes

1. Robert N. Cellah, Review of "*The Religion of India : The Sociology of Hinduism*" by Max Weber translated by Hans

- H. Certh and Don Martindate, American Sociological Review, Vo-24, No-5, October 1959, pp. 731-733.
2. Max Weber, *op cit.* p. 333
 3. Kurandkar, Narhar; 'Lokāyata' *Māgovā*; Deshmuk & Co; Pune 1967
 4. Dr. Bellah errs in describing Hindu Society as subject to such an ideological disjuncture and even more so in tracing the tolerance of Hindu societies to this disjuncture. He writes: "An overtolerent religion is one that fails to communicate its message to important group in society and possibly assents in their adherence to heterogeneous and often less developed orientations. Perhaps the extreme case is Hinduism, which left the mass of the Indian people hermetically sealed in caste-bound religious syetems, only rare and usually ineffectively challenged through movements based on Hindu religious universalism." "Epilogue" in *Religion and Progress in Modern Asia*, 1965, Free Press, New York, p. 191.
 5. S. N. Eisenstadt in *Traditicon, Chance and Modernity* John wiley, Now York 1973; pp 280-306.
 6. V. Barnouw, *Culture and Personality*, Dorsey Honrewood (Illl) 1963; Chapter 1
 7. N. V. Sovani; "Non-economic Aspects of India's Economic Development" in *Adntnistration and Economic Development in India*, (Ed.) Braibanti and Spengler, Duke University Press, Durham, 1963.
 8. Quoted in *op-cit.*, p 267.
 9. *On Hindu Culture and Personality: A Psychological Study*, 1966
 10. By punitive is meant the psychic type in which much agressiveness is erected against the ego generting a guilt feeling.
 11. According to theory, in every Psyche a certain quantum of libido is directed upon the ego. This condition is established in the first months of life and some trace of it remains : this is called primary narcissism. But in some cases a big charge

of libido is cathected on the ego. This is secondary narcissism. The normal Hindu psyche shows secondary narcissism. p. 5.

12. "Narcissism and Social Disorder". *The Yate Review*, Summer, 1975.
13. M. N. Srinivas, *Social Change in Modern India*, Allied, Bombay, 1966 p.93.
14. S. A. M. Shah, *The Household Dimension of Family in India* Orient Longman, New Delhi, 1973

AN ANALYSIS OF 'SYĀT' IN SYĀDVĀDA

Many scholars have acknowledged the importance of the role that *Syādvāda* or *Saptabhāṅgi* plays in the exposition and explanation of the central tenet of the Jaina Philosophy. In the elaboration of the doctrine of *Syādvāda* the expression 'syāt' is rendered by such corresponding expressions as 'possibly', 'may be', 'it is possible that', 'perhaps' etc. The point of such renderings and their explanations is that some kind of modal predicate or possibility is involved in the doctrine. But, unfortunately, hardly any effort is made to analyse and explain the kind of possibility that is involved in such a doctrine. It is the object of this paper to focus attention on this issue. The entire paper falls into four main sections : the first deals with the brief statement of the various kinds of possibilities which western philosophical and logical discussion have brought to forefront, the second attempts to offer interpretation of 'syāt', the third focusses on the question of the kind of possibility or possibilities that such an interpretation of 'syāt' embraces and the final section discusses some of the important consequence this explanation leads to.

I

Starting from Aristotle many philosophers and logicians have concentrated their attention on elaborate explanation of such modal predicates as necessity, possibility, impossibility etc. Of late, logicians like von Wright have also been maintaining that modes are principally of four kinds : Alethic modes or modes of truth, Existential modes or modes of being, Epistemic modes or modes of knowing and Deontic modes of obligation. The entire discussion is very important. But we need hardly concentrate on it here. For *Sāyādvāda* in particular and Jaina Logic and Philosophy in general do not talk about every modal predicate but rather about one modal predicate viz. possibility. Even if we decide to focus our attention only on one mode viz. possibility, we might not have to, as will appear later, take into account all kinds of possibilities. We shall, therefore mainly concentrate only on the mode of possibility.

If we think over the various kinds of possibilities that have been considered during the development of modal notions in western

philosophical thought, it would be clear that they fall under six main heads : (i) the Absolute possibility (ii) the Relative possibility (iii) the Epistemic possibility (iv) Possibility understood as ability, capacity, disposition or what Aristotle called potentiality, (v) Technical or etiological possibility and (vi) Possibility as minimal probability. The first again is of two kinds : (a) Conceptual or apriori and (b) nomological, physical or real. Similarly, the relative possibility can be considered under (a) and (b) above.

We shall presume the general sense in which these modal notions are understood in modern philosophical thought. However, some discussion about them may be useful to us for the consideration of the concept of 'Syāt'. First, the notion of possibility as minimal probability is not usually employed in technical language, although in our ordinary language we are familiar with such a notion. Secondly, not only the absolute nomological possibility can be subsumed under absolute conceptual possibility or the relative nomological possibility can be subsumed under relative conceptual possibility but also the relative conceptual and nomological possibilities are definable in terms of the absolute conceptual and nomological possibilities respectively. Thirdly, the major controversies that have arisen recently are about the possibilities of the first and fourth kind. Again, the way sometimes its explanation is given, the fourth kind of possibility is tied to an important presupposition about both the world and things in it. Lastly, possibility of the third kind presupposes the possibility of the fourth and sixth kinds but not vice versa.

In connection with the discussion of possibility in Aristotle Hintikka¹ has argued that the Aristotelian broad notion of possibility really embraces two important kinds of it within its fold : (a) 'possibility proper' or what we would term today to be conceptual possibility and (b) possibility as contingency. The latter kind of possibility, again is of two kinds : (a) Possibility that is short of necessity and (b) the one that is descriptive of something indeterminate. This kind of possibility is generally expressed in the form of 'thus' or 'not thus' without prevalence of either one of the alternatives. Hintikka has further argued that although Aristotle mentions and uses both these kinds of possibilities yet no sharp distinction between them is made by

him and that the second kind of possibility is, according to Aristotle, connected with generation or change of a thing while the first is not. The first kind of possibility of these comes to be stated in terms of what Quine calls 'eternal sentences' while that of the latter kind in terms of what Quine calls 'occasion sentences'. All these earlier considerations about possibility as also the points Hintikka has made have an important bearing on the discussion of possibility or possibilities indicated by 'syāt'.

II

Although there is an important relation between *Anekāntavāda* and *Syādvāda* yet it should be borne in mind that the two are distinct. Similarly, although there is an important relation between *Nayavāda* and *Syādvāda*, one should not be confused with the other.² The point, however, is made to avert the possible confusions of mixing between them.

The expression '*Saptabhaṅgī*' suggests a set of seven formulae.³ Each one of such formulae is prefixed by the expression 'syāt'. It is on account of this perhaps that the doctrine of *Saptabhaṅgī* is also known as *Syādvāda*. The expression 'syāt', as mentioned in the beginning of the paper, is rendered and understood in a particular way; i. e. in the sense of a modal predicate or modal notion.

It may be admitted that the expression 'syāt' is used by grammarians in different ways i. e. as a form of 'ās' and as *Avyaya*. In the context of *Syādvāda* these two uses seem to be important. Several scholars have used it as *Avyaya* (indeclinable or grammatical particle).⁴ In the sense of potential *liṅ*, however, 'Syāt' is left understood by some texts. This sense is clear, however, not only from dictionaries but also from reliable Jaina philosophical texts.⁵

It is urged that although the word 'syāt' is understood in the sense of *anekānta*, *vidhi*, *vicāra* etc. yet in the context under consideration, viz in the context of *Saptabhaṅgī* it is only to be understood in the sense of *Anekānta*. *Anekānta* means that a given object or thing is (potentially) beset with many *dharma*s.⁷ The grammatical particle (*avyaya*) *syāt* is indicative (*dyotaka*) of this. *Syādvāda* as a doctrine arises from this consideration. *Syādvāda*,

thus, essentially is that hypothesis (*abhyupagama*) in accordance with which it is maintained that (any) one thing is (potentially) beset with many *dharma*s, invariable or variable (*nityānitya*).⁸ Understood in this way *Syādvāda* emphasises that different *dharma*s can be predicated of a given thing.

There is, however, another equally important, sense in which the word *syāt* is used. In this use it is the potential third person singular of the root 'as'.⁹ But it is not merely the grammatical consideration that brings this sense to the foreground. Equally important are the philosophical and modal considerations. 'Syāt' in this sense brings out symptomatically (*pratirūpakah*) that a thing is a collection or conjunction (*Nipātaḥ*) of *dharma*s potentially it is beset with.¹⁰

If both these interpretations of the expression 'syāt' are brought to bear upon each other then two important consequences seem to follow, the fuller implications of which will become clear as we proceed, and they are : (a) *Syādvāda* is the explanatory foundation of *anekāntavāda*, the explanatory frame in terms of which *anekāntavāda*, the doctrine according to which a thing can have many *dharma*s without contradiction,¹¹ becomes significant and meaningful; and (b) *Syādvāda* is connected with potentiality, capacity or dispositions of a thing which actualize. Such actualized dispositions are given either right with the emergence of a thing (*sahabhāvi-dharma*s), in which case they are called *guṇa*s or as those which happen to be actualized collectively or sequentially (*kramabhāvi*) in course of time. In the latter case they are called *Paryāya*s. Both these interpretations have important consequences in the context of the Jaina Philosophical explanation, but more of it later.

III

In order, for us, to determine the kinds of possibilities that are involved in the doctrine of *Syādvāda* we shall have to understand the expressions, *dharma*, *guṇa* and *paryāya*. The nature of a *Dravya* can be understood only in the light of these expressions. To me it appears that the Jaina philosophers use the term *Dharma* for any potential feature of a thing. We need to assume that totality of such *dharma*s are given to us as dispositions. *Guṇa*, on the other hand, means for them the actual feature of a thing. But such a

feature shall be either of the nature of a differentia or proprium. These features of a thing are given along with it. *Paryāyas*, again, are those features of a thing which are actualized through a thing undergoing a change. Such features are actualized either simultaneously or successively in course of time. These features could be of the nature of accidents – inseparable or separable.¹²

In Jaina philosophical texts, it appears that, the terms *Padārtha*, *Dravya*, *Tattva*, *Vastu* and *Sat* are used almost interchangeably. This leads to number of problems. But we need not bother about them here. It is for this reason, perhaps, that what is said about a *dravya* becomes *inter alia* applicable to a *vastu* or *sat*.¹³ We shall understand these terms broadly in the sense of any physical thing.

One striking point about a thing that is brought out in one definition of it is that it has three kinds of characteristics : (a) emergence (*Utpāda*) (b) decay or degeneration or change (*vyaya*) and (c) some kind of permanence (*dhrauvya*).¹⁴ that becomes the basis of re-identification and recognition of it. Such a definition of a thing reveals a general, although important, feature of a thing. Such a thing further has two kinds of features (on the plain of actuality) : (a) *guṇas* or those features that are given to us experientially along with the thing itself and are, as stated above, of the nature either of differentia or proprium, and (b) those features which the thing has only contingently. They, as argued earlier, could be of the nature of accidents. We describe a thing either in terms of *guṇas* or *paryāyas* or both.¹⁵ Since any feature that is epistemically given to us is given in course of time and since epistemically any descriptive statement about a thing presupposes maximally the totality of such features that are either collectively or alternatively given to us in course of time, either along with the emergence of a thing or in course of its life-history, a thing is also defined as the one that has many (literally innumerable) such features.¹⁶ The reason being that a thing can change and through a change can come to have newer and newer features and never shall we be in a position to say that a thing has so many features and not more. A statement about a thing can be made only with reference to the given occasion. If we make a statement about a thing independently of the stipulation of occasion it would hardly be informative in the genuine sense of the term.

A thing, nevertheless, does not have those and only those features that are given to us in experience from time to time. We shall rather be in a position to say that a thing either has at least those features which it is now having or those which it would have in the course of time. Thus a thing potentially has not only those features that are actualized but also those which were or will be actualized. That is, a thing potentially has all the features, whether they are actualized or not. This is how a thing is also defined as that which is beset with totality of all features potentially.¹⁷

If we bring to bear these three descriptions of the nature of a thing upon one another then it turns out that the possibilities that we can envisage with regard to a thing fall readily into two groups : (a) epistemic possibilities— the ones which figure in the descriptive statement about a thing, and (b) possibilities understood as capacities, abilities or dispositions. Here capacities or dispositions or potentialities are understood perhaps as a sub-visible structure of a thing. Unless a thing has potentialities they will never be actualized. It is in this sense that dispositional possibilities are prior to epistemic possibilities. But, contrarywise, all our statements about dispositions of a thing are anchored in epistemic possibilities and which are, therefore, prior to possibilities as potentialities. But the features a thing comes to have either as differentia or otherwise are those and only those, it is maintained by Jaina philosophers and logicians, which it must have as dispositions. It is in this sense that epistemic possibilities presuppose possibilities as potentialities.

One important question arises here. Granting that there are possibilities, what kind of possibilities are they ? In this connection four alternative stand out prominently : (a) possible events, both specific and otherwise, (b) possible courses of events, (c) possible kinds of individuals, and (d) possible individuals or particulars. Out of these, in the context of *Syādvāda*, the first two are ruled out simply because they are basically technical possibilities. Although they are explainable in terms of nomological possibilities, to the extent to which they are at heart etiological or causal possibilities and to the extent to which Jains are talking about physical objects independently of causal chain in the context of *Syādvāda*, these possibilities are out of question. The basic issue the *Syādvāda* is concerned with is to describe a thing vis-a-vis the feature it has.

Some of these are given alongwith the thing, others the thing comes to have in course of time. Further, these features the thing comes to have simultaneously or in succession. This issue is different from the issue of the explanation of the either emergence of a thing or its features. It is in this context that etiological possibilities will figure. More importantly, however, we should understand that every genuine characterization of a thing consists in giving a determinate value to determinables; and for this determinables need not at all be conceived as causally enchained possibles. But what about the last two? In some text it is argued that the expression 'Syāt' is envisaged to bring forward the possibilities in the sense of such objects as a *ghata*.¹⁸ But an object may be considered as a kind of individual or as an individual or a particular. Now, out of these the former is ruled out at least so far as the contention of some texts is concerned. The reason for this is that same text adds that such an entity, which is potentially beset with many *dharma*s, must be the one that is existent.¹⁹ But this view does not seem to be uniformly borne out by all scholars or Jaina philosophers would not have an objection, it seems, to the acceptance of the kind of individuals. In this case, however, the possibilities that would figure in our consideration would not be existential possibilities but nomological possibilities although they are explicable in terms of conceptual possibilities. But the issue being of the description of a thing absolute conceptual possibilities are out of questions, as such statements would be descriptively impotent and irrelevant. The conceptual possibilities would figure on the level of explanation and justification of descriptive statements. But that is quite different a story.

Even then a question may be posed that can we not say that although the Jaina thinkers do not expressly deal with formal possibility in the context of the descriptively significant statements, might they not be dealing with relative possibility? This alternative too is ruled out. For the question of relative possibility arises only where we are talking about a thing either with reference to another thing or a prior state of itself. The descriptive statements in terms of possibility that Jainas envisage in the context of *Syādvāda* are non-relative statements and are, by the very nature of the case, supposed to be about a particular thing alone independently of the

reference to another thing or its prior state. Hence the alternative of relative possibility, too, is ruled out.

Out of the two kinds of possibilities Aristotle talks of the Jaina philosophers are not talking about what Hintikka calls 'possibility proper' or logical possibility. They are rather considering possibility of the kind of contingency. Such contingency they further understand in both of its senses : either the one that is short of necessity or the one that is descriptive of an indeterminate.

The kind of statements that bring out possibility in the sense of contingency that Jaina philosophers envisage are also those in which contingency is understood in the sense of two features of a thing going together or their compatibility, a notion weaker than that of consistency of two *dharma*s or *guṇa*s or *paryāya*s. Further, it is important to remember that possibilities that are under consideration in the frame of *Syādvāda* are those that come to the foreground with respect to emergence, or degeneration or change of a thing. This is why, perhaps, eternal sentences are considered to be out of question and occasion sentences are emphasized upon.

The entire programme that Jaina logic envisages to put forward in terms of its doctrine of *Syādvāda* needs to be considered in a still wider perspective. In contrast to the view of the modern logicians, the Jaina logicians seem to hold that although a given sentence may express the same proposition on different occasions, yet in spite of the fact it is the same proposition, its truth-value changes with time. The propositions that are considered relevant in the context of *Syādvāda* are descriptive propositions. As sameness of a thing does not preclude it from undergoing change and taking on different features similarly although it is the same proposition that is expressed on different occasions, this in itself should not prohibit it from taking different truth values. That things change, in spite of retaining their identity, is a fact. Thus things assume different features in course of time. Correspondingly, on the plane of propositions, Jain logic seems to hold, that although propositions are the only bearers of truth-values yet they are bearers of not the same but perhaps of changing truth-values. It accepts change both of truth-value of a proposition and features of thing. On the plane of things it seems to argue that things or *dravya*s are the only entities that can take contrary *guṇa*s or *paryāya*s on different occasions and yet retain their

numerical identity at least which can form basis of re-identification and recognition of them. That is why temporally indefinite sentences are taken to be paradigms of informative sentences. In saying this they indeed are in a great company of such masters as Aristotle. The reason for this seems to be that temporally indefinite sentences about a thing are the proper vehicles of communication. This contention obviously presupposes that knowledge properly so called must come ultimately in terms of direct acquaintance.

This position, moreover, seems to propound that correspondence between proposition and facts is the basis of assigning truth values to propositions. Things change and take on new features. Such changed things cannot be matched with older propositions and yet get truth value truth. In order to be able to cope with the situation of things changing their features and our being able to describe them by means of propositions which not only bring out new features of a thing but also take truth-value truth we shall have to take either one of the following two courses : (a) frame altogether new propositions or (b) allow older propositions to change their truth-values. Without ruling out the first alternative completely the Jaina logicians seem to maintain that to be able to cope with such a situation propositions should also be taken to be changing their truth-values. Either changed proposition or propositions with changed truth-value correspond with changed things and this is how they take truth-value truth. Thus correspondence is the crux of the problem and changing thing is the reinforcing situation. Both these taken together seem to thrust on them acceptance of the change in truth-value of a proposition. This is what Jaina logicians seem to advocate. It is perhaps this which they intend to convey when they say that truth-value of no descriptive proposition is fixed in so far as things change.

The contention that truth-value of a proposition changes, however, raises two important issues : (a) what is the basis of drawing a line of demarcation between sentences and propositions ? and (b) if it is maintained, and it is so maintained by Jaina logicians, that a thing has number of potentialities, then how to account for change in the truth-value of a proposition ? For whereas insistence on number of potentialities would demand an assumption of number of propositions descriptive of them, a change in the truth-value would demand that number of propositions available at our disposal is a

limited one. Perhaps a distinction is sought to be made between propositions descriptive of potentialities and those descriptive of actualities, the latter being treated as genuinely descriptive of the nature of a thing. Obviously the number of the statements of the latter kind is limited. If this phenomenon is connected with changing things then change in truth-value seems a possible alternative. But still, why not frame a new proposition? In spite of the fact that Jaina logicians admit temporality within the fold of their logic what would be their reaction to this problem is very difficult to say. But we need not bother further about this issue here.

One thing, nevertheless, is clear. The doctrine of the change of truth-value neither amounts to the doctrine of relativity, nor scepticism nor again to the notion of historical relativity. For the position of an historical relativist is different from that of the one who holds possibility of change in truth-value of a proposition. What historical relativist is out to maintain is that we do not have any absolute truths simply because we do not have any absolute criterion of truth. The one, on the contrary, who argues in terms of changing truth is not at all bothered about change in the criterion of truth. That is, he is not saying the truth value changes because our criterion of truth changes. What he focusses his attention on is change in object about which we are making a statement. Since things change, he seems to argue, the truths we have discovered will have to undergo change too for we shall have to rediscover the truths about the changed thing although the criterion of truth, viz. correspondence which Jaina philosophers accept, is retained. For him, in this way, discovery of truths about changing things is a never-ending and yet not a hopeless and fruitless programme.

The entire contention of Jaina logicians seems to be based on the presupposition that the dispositions that a thing has happen to be actualized in course of time. Every genuine possibility is actualized in time. It is not necessarily the case that each possibility is realized but it can be assumed to be realized without contradiction. They hold that everything has a 'sub-visible structure of dispositions' that are, as Quine maintains, 'its built-in enduring structural traits'; yet the typical sentences used to express human knowledge in the form of descriptive sentences are not 'eternal or standing sentences' but rather what are called 'occasion sentences.' Although the

modern general philosophical opinion is that the former kind of sentences are superior, Jaina logicians seem to maintain that the sentences of the latter kind are the ones to which we assent or from which we dissent. Such assent or dissent is further determined by the feature or features of the occasion on which they are uttered. Such sentences are temporally indefinite to make explicit the full sense of which we have to employ such expressions as 'now' etc. Even if, therefore, it is assumed that there is a correspondence between grammatical and logical form of a sentence, yet it requires stipulation of occasion. Independently of such stipulation of occasion our assent to or dissent from is impotent, misleading and even logically indefensible.

IV

Our investigation so far has made it clear that out of the many kinds of possibilities Jaina logicians do not consider technical possibility in the context of *Syādvāda*. The cases where causal consideration are predominant an account of technical or etiological possibilities is significant. But such considerations are unimportant from the point of view of descriptive statements about a thing, the proper context of *Syādvāda*. It is for this reason that such possibilities are beside the point in this context. Similarly, the possibility as minimal probability, too, is nowhere considered. Further, absolute conceptual possibility is not expressly and explicitly employed, although it is possible to say that it is presupposed for explanation of nomological possibility. In the context of *Syādvāda* three kinds of possibilities are clearly acknowledged : possibility as potentiality, epistemological possibility and nomological as well as existential possibility. Etiological possibility that figures in the causal explanation falls outside the perview of *Syādvāda*.

Jaina logicians and philosophers believe that this world is full of things or *dravyas* and hence accept, it seem, what A. O. Lovejoy calls the Principle of Plenitude. In this they are in great company of Aristotle and Leibnitz. They further hold that dispositions are actualized in course of time. Possibilities for them, thus, figure on two levels : potentiality and actuality. Potentialities are given in order of being, but not necessarily in order of knowing. Actualities are given in order of knowing. This is how they become epistemic

possibilities. All our statements, descriptive of the nature of things to which one can assent or from which one can dissent, are and should be occasion sentences and not eternal sentences, although former are explainable in terms of latter. Jaina logicians and philosophers, however, do not clearly draw a line of demarcation between possibility proper and contingency, for neither on the level of potentiality nor on the level of epistemic possibility can this distinction be drawn. The distinction comes to the foreground, that is, not on the level of truth-conditions but on the level of explanation of the way truth-conditions are presumed to be given to us. This is indeed an important consideration and a detailed account of it would require consideration of three main issues : (a) total-truth values acknowledged, (b) the kinds of truth-conditions envisaged and (c) the way truth-conditions are presumed to be given to us. These considerations, although important in the full context of *Syādvāda*, must be set aside here because our purpose here is to analyse ' *syāt* ' and the possibilities it brings to the fore.

In conclusion it can be said that Jaina logicians and philosophers acknowledge, in the context of *syādvāda*, possibilities of potency, epistemic and nomological along with existential possibilities. Outside the context of *syādvāda* etiological possibilities too are acknowledged. They seem also to accept conceptual possibilities in the context of explanation although not for describing. Moreover, in the case of descriptions, according to them, no distinction can be drawn between possibility proper and contingency understood in any sense.

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NOTES

1. Hintikka, J. : *Time and Necessity*, 1973, Oxford.
2. It would not be possible, in this paper, to deal in details with the relation between *Anekāntavāda* and *Syādvāda*.
3. Vadideva Sūri : *Pranāyanayatatīvālokālankāra* : IV.14

4. *Abhidhānarājendrakōśa* : Vol. VII, P. 848.
5. Monier-Williams, M. : *Sanskrit-English Dictionary*. p. 1273.
Vimaladāsa : *Saptabhāṅgitarāṅgiṇī* : p. 16.
6. Vimaladāsa : Op cit p. 16.
7. *Op cit*
8. *Abhidhānarājendrakōśa* : Vol. VII, p. 848.
9. Monier Williams : Op cit
10. Devabhadra : *Nyāyāvatāravivṛttippaṇī*, 30
11. Vimaladāsa : Op cit.
12. *Abhidhānarājendrakōśa* : Vol. III, p. 510.
13. *Tattvārthādhigamaśūtra*, V. 37 V. 29.
Prāmāṇyanayatattvālokālaṅkāra : VII. 9.
Nyāyāvatāra, 29
Syādvādamāñjarī, 22
14. Malliṣeṇasūri : *Syādvādamāñjarī*, 22.
15. *Tattvārthasūtra*, V. 29,
16. Umāsvāti : *Tattvārthādhigamasūtra* : V. 37.
17. Kundekunda : *Pravacanasāra*, I. 49
18. Vimaladāsa : *Saptabhāṅgitarāṅgiṇī*, p. 16
19. *Op cit*.

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MICROPHYSICS AND REALITY

The problem of reality has a history of which it is hardly possible to give an exhaustive account. Ontologically, reality is equated with being as such. Real means what is as it is. But epistemologically, reality is distinguished from appearance or from being so far as it is known. In the Kantian context we do not know reality as it is but only reality as it appears conditioned by the categorial structure of our thought. In the history of philosophy, not only is reality conceived differently in different contexts of different systems, but sometimes degrees of reality are posited. Reality is ascribed to the mental world or to the physical world or to both, giving rise to different schools of idealism, materialism and dualism. But reality may be denied both to what is mental and what is material with equal emphasis. Thus in the system of Plato neither the mental individualities nor the material particularizations enjoy the status of authentic being. With Plato what is real must not be subject to change and, conversely, what changes cannot be real. Hence, what is real is the super-sensible world of universal archetypes which are Ideas. The world of the senses or of the particulars is real only in so far as it participates in the eternal and immutable realm of transcendental reality. Again, on a different level of philosophical speculation reality is equated with actuality and the actual is contrasted with the possible. This has special relevance in the Aristotelian system of metaphysics where God is considered pure actuality and matter pure potentiality.

Our purpose here is not to indulge in any metaphysical speculation about reality or to go deeper into the manifold ramifications in history but only to lay bare the concept of reality in its most salient features. Little doubt that the problem of reality is rather an elusive one. We cannot hope to make much headway if we try to confront it directly. We may, therefore, approach the object of our study indirectly, in the light of recent advances in physical sciences, particularly microphysics. Scientists, like philosophers, have always been interested in the problem of reality and it has engaged their attention in no small way, forcing quite a few of them to philosophical speculation within their scientific framework. And in the present century, with the coming to light of two important theories in science, namely, the theory of relativity and

the quantum theory, the problem of reality has assumed a new dimension in physics.

I

Already there is a marked tension between the idealistic and realistic interpretations of the recent revolutionary discoveries. On the one hand, an attempt is made to show that the recent developments which lay emphasis on the effective role of the observer lead to idealistic interpretations; whilst, it is held, on the other hand, that there is no warrant for any hasty conclusions and that the alternative of the ideality and the reality of the universe cannot be decided without taking into consideration all the implications of scientific research. The dilemmas before which the scientists are placed are easily discernible in what has come to be known as the Bohr-Einstein debate. The debate started in the spring of 1920 when Bohr visited Berlin and met Einstein, Planck and James Franck. The basic problem of the debate which lasted over a period of three decades, and which is at the forefront of foundational research ever since, was the question whether the quantum mechanical description of microphysical phenomena could be carried further to provide a more detailed account, as believed by Einstein, or whether it already exhausted all possibilities of accounting for observable phenomena, as claimed by Bohr. In order to come to grip with this issue, the two eminent scientists agreed on the need to re-examine the thought-experiments by which Heisenberg vindicated his indeterminacy relations and by which Bohr illustrated the mutual exclusion of simultaneous space-time and causal descriptions. Bohr, in support of his thesis, pursued a way of thought which led him to indeterminacy relations. Einstein, on the other hand, could vindicate his stand by showing the untenability of Bohr's contention of the incompatibility of a simultaneous causal and space-time description of phenomena, thereby refuting his theory. He, therefore, set out to disprove the Heisenberg relations by a closer analysis of the mechanics of one of Heisenberg's thought-experiments. Of the thought-experiments which Einstein carried one was directed towards demonstrating that it is possible to provide an exact space-time specification of an individual process together with a detailed account of the balance of the energy and

momentum transfer involved. In another 'Gedankenexperiment' which Einstein devised in collaboration with Podolsky and Rose¹ and which is discussed in the celebrated EPR paper "Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality be Considered Complete?"¹ They arrived at conclusions counter to what Heisenberg arrived at with the help of his famous 'microscope-experiment'. EPR began their paper by pointing out that in judging the merits of any theory we have to consider (i) its agreement with human experience and (ii) the completeness which the description gives of the physical world. An attribute of a physical system that can be accurately determined without disturbing the system is an "element of physical reality", and, they argued, a description of the system is considered complete only if it embodies all the elements of reality which can be attached to it. In the experiment they devised they have shown that for a certain system composed of two particles, P_1 and P_2 , a measurement of the momentum of P_1 allows one to predict with certainty the momentum of P_2 without in any way disturbing P_2 , and, that a measurement of the position of P_1 allows one equally well to predict with certainty the position of P_2 , again without in any way disturbing P_2 . Now, since the position and the momentum of P_2 can be obtained by appropriate measurements performed on P_1 , without in any way disturbing P_2 , according to the "criterion of reality"², elements of reality correspond to both the position and the momentum of the particle P_2 . And since quantum theory does not allow both to enter into the description of the state of the particle, such a description is essentially incomplete. EPR concluded their paper on an optimistic note, in keeping with Einstein's "Scientific instinct": "While we have thus shown that the wave function does not provide a complete description of the physical reality, we left open the question of whether or not such a description exists. We believe, however, that such a theory is possible."³

Einstein and his collaborators always regarded their argument as conclusive evidence for the incompleteness of the quantum-mechanical description of physical reality. In his "Reply to Criticisms"⁴, Einstein explicitly reaffirms, notwithstanding the objections raised by Bohr and others, the view expressed in the EPR paper. Fifteen years after the EPR paper, Einstein wrote to

Schroedinger that he felt that "..... the fundamentally statistical character of the theory is simply a consequence of the incompleteness of the description"⁵. At another place faced with sustained criticism he expressed himself thus : "I still work indefatigably at science but I have become an evil renegade who does not wish physics to be based on probabilities"⁶.

It appears odd that Einstein, who had contributed so significantly to the development of statistical methods in physics, should oppose with such uncompromising vehemence the basic tenet of quantum mechanics. The answer seems to lie in his deep philosophic conviction, his "scientific instinct", that statistical methods, though of great use as a mathematical device for dealing with natural phenomena that involve large numbers of elementary processes, could not give an exhaustive account of the individual processes. It was this conviction that prompted him to write in a letter to Born, that he "could not believe in a dice-throwing God."⁷

II

Niels Bohr could not accept the epistemological criterion of physical reality as proposed by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen, claiming that it contains "an essential ambiguity" when applied to phenomena in quantum mechanics. In a paper⁸ which appeared shortly after the EPR paper and which carried the same title as the EPR paper, Bohr pointed out that the ambiguity lay in the EPR criterion of reality, specifically in the expression "without in any way disturbing a system". No doubt, in the case of two particles, P_1 and P_2 a measurement performed on the particle P_1 does not cause any physical disturbance to the particle P_2 , but, argued Bohr, the fact remains that it does affect basically the kind of verifiable statement that we can make about P_2 ; our rational expectations of possible happenings are invariably conditioned by our knowledge of circumstances in which the happenings take place. Each measurement made on the particle P_1 defines a different phenomenon in so far as the same system of two particles is observed under different conditions. By observing the position of the particle P_1 , we can, no doubt, ascertain the position of the particle P_2 by consideration of the correlation between the positions of the

two particles. But, then, we know no means by which we can ascertain the correlation between the momenta of the particles; for, as enjoined by Heisenberg's indeterminacy principle, by measuring the position of the particle P_1 , we have lost control over its momentum. And, in a measurement like this, there takes place an indeterminate exchange of momentum between the particle and the measuring instruments. Similar considerations lead us to conclude that if we measure the momentum of the particle P_1 , we know the momentum correlation alright, but the position correlation is simply indeterminable. These two measurements constitute what are called "complementary" phenomena. Bohr writes in the article : ".....the renunciation in each experimental arrangement of the one or the other of two aspects of the description of physical phenomena, - the combination of which characterizes the method of classical physics, and which therefore in this sense may be considered as *complementary* to one another, depends essentially on the impossibility, in the field of quantum theory, of accurately controlling the reaction of the object on the measuring instruments, i. e., the transfer of momentum in case of position measurements, and the displacement in case of momentum measurements." 9

In fact, Bohr maintains that the object under observation and the measuring instruments form a single indivisible system not susceptible to further analysis at the quantum-mechanical level into distinctly separate parts. And the description of the state of a system expresses a relation between the object under observation and the entire experimental setup, rather than being confined to the object alone. No doubt, this correlation between object and measuring apparatus exists even in classical physics. But there the two systems can be distinguished by an appropriate conceptual analysis. In quantum mechanics, on the other hand, no such analysis is possible, object and measuring apparatus forming an unanalysable whole. Whereas in classical physics the interaction between object and measuring apparatus may be neglected or compensated for, in quantum mechanics it is inextricably linked with the phenomenon. The "feature of wholeness" thus comes to the rescue of Bohr's view of the completeness of quantum-mechanical description : "In the case of quantum phenomena, the unlimited divisibility of events.....is, in principle, excluded by the requirement

to specify the experimental conditions. Indeed, the feature of wholeness typical of proper quantum phenomena finds its logical expression in the circumstance that any attempt at a well-defined subdivision would demand a change in the experimental arrangement incompatible with the definition of the phenomena under investigation."¹⁰

Bohr, thus, maintains that the general structure of the quantum theory is not compatible with the familiar and indeed traditional descriptions based on the assumption that the subject-matter of physics is a system whose properties are observed or measured by independent observer or measuring instrument. He took pains to insist that for quantum mechanics there could be no atomic object to be observed by a separate observer, and he never thought in terms of two such systems divided by any separation between them. Indeed, any reference to such a separation would be inconsistent with his "feature of wholeness".

III

These insights of Bohr coupled with deep philosophic convictions of Einstein may enable us to find some content behind the problem of reality. Now the general structure of our language is such as to involve separate existence of each thing. All relationships of things are made intelligible only through the subject-object structure. A subject is assumed to act on an object, or simply to carry out an action, or else it is said to possess certain attributes or qualities. Such a language form implies the possibility of a complete separation between a thing and what it does or what qualities it has. This separation is basically verbal in origin. But since it tends to be incorporated into the general form of almost all our perception, we have, for the most part, lost sight of its essentially verbal character and have ventured to attribute it a non-verbal status.

However, this separation¹¹ cannot survive a careful scrutiny. If, for example, one could make an effort to abstract a human being from all his attributes and qualities and to separate him from all the acts through which he participates in life, what would he be? Evidently, a philosophical non-entity or an ontological vacuum.

However, our language structure implies that such a human being is a subject or a 'self', who somehow possesses all these attributes and qualities, and carries out all these acts accidentally. Obviously, if this 'self' is shorn of all its 'possessions', one wonders if anything would be left which transcends all that was supposed to belong to it. Thus without arrogating to ourselves the right to dispute the metaphysical status of the 'self' (a question which is deeply rooted in man's non-rational involvements) we may, by extending the chain of Bohr's reasoning, conclude that the importance which the word 'self' has come to assume in philosophical literature is mainly because of our peculiar language structure. Language is to be regarded as an inseparable aspect of one single process which includes perception as well as action. Since all aspects of existence are inseparably intertwined, our language must adequately take account of this fact. What is needed, therefore, is to develop a more clear language structure which will allow us to talk of reality in a consistent frame of reference.

An act of abstraction precedes every judgment about reality. Reality, indeed, in all its totality, is only an Idea in the Kantian language, which cannot become the object of our judgment, but only in so far as it is abstracted in the relevant context. Evidently even the totality of what we perceive and what we know, not to speak of the immeasurably greater totality of all that is, is so vast and varied that it cannot be exhaustively described. Nature is constituted of an inexhaustible diversity and multiplicity of things, all of them reciprocally related and all of them necessarily taking part in the process of becoming. As a result no concrete manifestation can be more than an abstraction from this process—an abstraction that has relevance within a certain degree of approximation, in definite ranges of conditions, within a limited context, and over a characteristic period of time. Such an abstraction, evidently, by the requirements of its very nature, cannot be exhaustive in its reference. This would imply that the scientific research cannot lead to a knowledge of nature that is complete and that needs no further improvement or extension. Rather it involves us in an unending process in which there may be a constant approximation to truth. For any given law of nature, we can never determine all the deviations from it completely. As a result we can never actually reach an absolute precision with regard to the law. And, in

the same way, with regard to nature as a whole, we cannot maintain that the continual process of narrowing down of deviation from our theories will, through a series of successive approximations, ever converge on some fixed and final goal. For, as science advances, we find that the awareness of inadequacy in previous theories consistently points towards the discovery of dimensions hitherto unknown. In addition, for any given stage of knowledge, there are aspects which are not significant in contexts and conditions studied in that stage, but which may well be of crucial importance in new contexts and conditions.¹² As a result, the goal of an absolute precision of knowledge in all possible contexts and conditions keeps on receding and new horizons appear before us as we continue to penetrate more and more and in manifold ways into the inexhaustible characteristics of nature. We cannot but recognize the limitations of our knowledge and we cannot say that all we know at present and all we can know has reached its culmination or will ever reach its fulfilment. Epistemological limitations do not allow our knowledge of reality at any stage of its development to be equated with the ontological structure of reality itself.

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Notes

1. A. Einstein, B. Podolsky and N. Rosen, "Can Quantum-mechanical Description of Physical Reality be Considered Complete?", *Physical Review*, 47 (1935), pp. 777-780. Reprinted in *Physical Reality*, Stephen Toulmin, (ed.) (Harper Torchbooks, New York 1970), pp. 123-130.
2. EPR gives a sufficient condition for physical reality: "If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i. e. with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity". S. Toulmin (ed.) *Physical Reality*, p. 124.
- 3- S. Toulmin, (ed.), *Physical Reality*, p. 130.

4. P. A. Schilpp, (ed.), *Albert Einstein : Philosopher-Scientist* (Library of Living Philosophers, Evanston, Ill., 1949), pp. 663-688.
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6. M. Born, *The Born-Einstein Letters* (Walter and Co., New York, 1971), p. 163.
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9. S. Toulmin, (ed.), *Physical Reality*, p. 136.
10. N. Bohr, "Quantum-physics and Philosophy" in N. Bohr, *Essays 1958-1962 on Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge* (Interscience, London, 1963), p. 4.
11. Cf. D. Bohm, "Classical and Non-Classical Concepts in the Quantum Theory" in *Physical Reality*, S. Toulmin, (ed.) (Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1970); p. 200.
12. David Bohm has brought out this point very clearly in his book, *Causality and Chance in Modern Physics* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1957). See for example, the analogy on pp. 79-80.

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SOME REFLECTIONS ON MISUNDERSTANDING

It is a common grievance that the speaker is being misunderstood by her/his audience. Causes for communicational gap in respect of clarity, distinctness and precision have been studied from different angles by Sociologists, Psychiatrists and also by some Philosophers. I am not going into the intentional aspect of the problem of communication as has been taken up by existential psychiatrists such as Sartre himself and Laing. The focus of this paper will be an analysis of the linguistic structure and its role in understanding and / or misunderstanding. The characteristics that will be taken up here are peculiar to ordinary language. In the course of this discussion I would also like to show that these barriers are not insurmountable.

Every instance of understanding or even misunderstanding involves two parties, the originator of the message or *the coder* and the interpreter of the message or *the decoder*.

As philosophers we must be very careful of the multi-dimensional use of the word "misunderstanding". This word often implies emotional or apologetic applications. There are spurious and genuine cases of misunderstanding. As for example a coder may say "Don't misunderstand me" when he realizes full well that the coded message is inadequate and uses misunderstanding as an apology. Such instances are frequent in spoken language but inadmissible in written language. That which passes as a slip and may be overlooked in speech is usually condemned as an error in writing. Such various standards upheld by spoken and written language do not affect the understanding of a sentence. It is no doubt easier to understand a spoken sentence with a slip in speech because the decoder may take the help of many extralinguistic aids into account, such as gestures, tonal qualities, proxemics, etc., we shall, however, be concerned only with those aspects which are common to both speech and writing.

In a genuine case of misunderstanding one wonders where actually the first lapse takes place. It is indeed amazing to note the extent to which a decoder interprets correctly, in spite of ambiguities, slips or errors on the part of the coder. The more the decoder is able to bridge the gaps or understand the 'areas of fuzziness'

the greater the possibilities for better communication or understanding. By saying that an 'area of fuzziness' in a sentence can be understood, some sort of mystic or telepathic communication is not being implied. Though language is a rule-guided-phenomenon all rules are not equally basic or necessary. Some rules are basic and some are non-basic. When the basic rules pertaining to syntactic rules, semantic rules and phonetic rules are violated then a total language collapse takes place. An absent non-basic rule can be replaced by the decoder. This supplementation must however be guided by the ad-hoc conventions. Thus we find all language is rule-guided. But the presence of rules cannot entirely prevent false moves in language.

A coder does not always follow strict linguistic conventions like those laid down by Wittgenstein when he says that "One dare say cold when he means it is hot,"² nor does the coder take the liberty of Humpty Dumpty³ and holds that a word means what one wants it to mean. There are certain restrictions that a coder has to follow while encoding a message and there are also certain liberties allowed to him. The coder expects the decoder to take account of these restrictions and liberties at the time of decoding, a given message. Of the many rules that a coder has to follow there is one which is universally applicable. Every coder is bound by the linguistic restriction that every sentence must abide by : the subject-predicate dichotomy. That is to say, every speaker must pick out a subject which he refers to and say something about it. In a very simple and unambiguous sentence like "The table is brown", the term 'table' which is in the subject position is that which is being *referred to* and 'brown' is a predicate of this subject. While encoding any sentence the coder will have to decide what the subject will be and then say something about it. The decoder however, in this respect is granted more freedom. He may first begin with the subject or he may begin with that *which is said about it* and later find *what it applies to*. One of the prerequisites of understanding is that at least the subject or the predicate of a sentence be correctly coded. In cases where both the subject and the predicate are wrongly expressed the decoder has no way of solving the problem. Such an instance is not one of misunderstanding but of a total language collapse. In the case of either the subject or the predicate being wrong the decoder has to rectify

this slip and / or error in order to get the correct import of the message. Take for example the sentence : " Indira Gandhi declared war with China "; determining the subject and that which is said about it is no problem for the decoder. But to understand the message in the correct historical context the decoder will have to replace ' Indira Gandhi ' by ' Nehru '. This intervention is often expected of the decoder and it is also expected that he will treat it as a slip and not an error. This is brought out very well in a concrete situation; if such an error is pointed out to the coder he does not think it necessary to rectify it, on the contrary he brushes it aside by saying : " Well you know what I mean ". If the decoder is not competent to make the required intervention there is a snap in communication. This snap may not always be traced to the same source. This is why the coder is heard complaining of being misunderstood on various grounds such as : " That is not what I am referring to ", " That is not what I am talking about " or " That is not what I mean ". On the face of it these complaints seem to be synonymous but a closer examination proves otherwise. Reference, meaning and aboutness of a message are not identical though they are no doubt closely related.

In the above sentence, " Indira Gandhi declared war with China ", the sentence is *about* ' Indira Gandhi ' though the intended reference is ' Nehru '. This disparity between the linguistic expression and the ' topic ' (cf. Chomsky) the coder has in mind may be due to various causes. Sometimes a coder intentionally wants to mislead his audience as in a special *code* or game.

Similarly, the coder may know the limitations of his audience and accordingly use a wrong expression to convey his point. For instance if the audience knows an individual by a wrong description the coder may perpetuate this mistake by using the same wrong description, just to proceed with his discussion. The complaint of misunderstanding does not arise in any of these circumstances. Here the wrong expressions convey the right message without rectification. When a coder's message is taken literally and understood in its literal sense that is what the message is *about*. The protest " That is not what I am talking about " only holds weight when the given linguistic expression of a message is misunderstood.

A disparity between the *literal message* conveyed by a sentence and the *intended message* is the cause of frequent misunderstanding. This indicates that the proper analysis of the 'linear structure' of a sentence does not always guarantee perfect communication. An analysis of the 'linguistic markers' of a given sentence are no doubt the starting point of an adequate interpretation but this device by itself is often not sufficient. This inadequacy hints at a structured level behind the expressed surface structure. This structured level behind the surface structure is what linguists like Chomsky and other transformational grammarians call the *deep structure*. A sentence, to be fully understood, must be taken in its structural totality, that is, its surface as well as deep structure. The deep structure of a sentence is a level which embodies the ideal form of the sentence which is the 'kernel sentence'. It is necessary that a native speaker knows this 'kernel sentence' though he may not express it accurately in the surface structure. A possible difference between the deep structure and the surface structure results in a possible disparity in *reference* and *aboutness*. The distinction brought out here between *reference* and *aboutness* is similar to that drawn by Chomsky between *topic* and *subject* in the deep structure⁴. However, a parity of form between the 'kernel sentence' of the deep level with the 'expressed sentence' of the surface level is a paradigm of sentence construction.

From our discussion so far it may seem that the easiest thing for a decoder is to grasp what a sentence is *about*, provided he is oriented in the same language tradition as the coder. There are no doubt some genuine cases of ambiguity where it is difficult to understand what the message is *about*. For instance in the sentence: "When a woman loses her husband, she pines for a second", the context may help understand whether 'second' is meant to be about a number or whether it is a fraction of a minute. Where the words or phrases used in the sentence themselves are ambiguous only an ad hoc method of disambiguation can be advocated, though context goes a long way in making the understanding simpler.

In order to understand the reference of a sentence one must understand the subject of a sentence. From the above examples: "The table is brown" and "Indira Gandhi declared war against

China", it may be thought that once the grammatical subject of a sentence is understood locationally the reference can thereby be understood. Quine suggested a similar technique for understanding the reference of a sentence. To quote Quine: "We have hit upon a convenient trick of so phrasing our statements of propositional attitude as to keep selected positions referential and others not".⁵ Unfortunately, however, all sentences do not reserve a referential position. Such sentences provide a further scope for misunderstanding. Let us examine the following example: "What worries me is being ignored by everyone". The decoder here has to begin by analysing the immediate constituents of the sentence. They may be analysed in two ways (i) 'I am worried by being ignored by everyone' (ii) 'Everyone is ignoring that which is worrying me'. The crucial point is whether *being ignored* is part of the subject constituent *being ignored by everyone* or whether it is part of the predicate constituent *is being ignored by everyone*⁶. To ascertain which of these is the correct interpretation the decoder will have to undertake a deep structural analysis to find the 'kernel sentence'. A 'kernel sentence' is never ambiguous. Structural ambiguity is a superimposition on the inherently perspicuous deep structure. The point to be noted, however, is that the subject position and reference may not be identical in the surface structure as they are in the 'kernel sentence' or the deep structure. This phenomenon can be due to either a false start or transformations. Quine appears to overlook this locational difference of the subject at different levels, often caused by a process which may lead to a deletion of certain sentential elements. It is due to this deletion that many sentences do not seem to abide by the subject-predicate dichotomy though it is to be found at the deep level. A deleted element is always recoverable.⁷ A subject need not be a simple category, it might even be a complex one such as phrases.⁸

A structural analysis of a sentence helps explain what the sentence *refers to* and what the sentence is *about*. But this analysis alone does not explain the *meaning* of a sentence. By merely understanding the reference of a sentence one does not understand the meaning.

To quote professor R. H. Robins: The meaning relation should not be thought of as a dyadic one between a word and its referent,

but as a *multidimensional* and *functional* set of relations between the word in its sentence and the context of its occurrence. (emphasis mine)⁹. It may be said that misunderstanding is by and large caused by the intended 'topic' not being clearly expressed in the surface structure though it is always clear in the deep structure.

For a deep structure analysis the decoder has to apply generative rules. Along with the application of rules a constant intervention must be made by the decoder on the basis of the situational context, speech context and socio-linguistic conventions. Such interventions help understand those portions of a message that are not fully rule-guided, these are the types of considerations that Professor Hymes has in mind when he writes :

There is much to be learned just from a study of syntactic relations. At the same time, analysis must go beyond purely linguistic markers. Much of the coherence of texts depends upon abstract rules independent of specific linguistic form, indeed of speech.¹⁰

It is therefore both with the help of linguistic and extra linguistic aids that a decoder can accurately interpret a given message.

Extra-linguistic aids then again should be taken cautiously and not as a purely arbitrary streak in communication. The intelligent intervention of a decoder with the extra-linguistic aids do not indicate *absolute freedom* on the part of the decoder. In linguistic communication there is no absolute freedom. Any talk of freedom of creativity is essentially rule guided. It is a freedom within rules.

Freedom, when misused in language gives rise to ambiguity and error. Such ambiguity and/or error is to be overcome by the decoder's fruitful intervention. Hence we find communication is a mutual process in which both the coder and the decoder have active intervening roles to play. The coder's intervention consists of re-modelling language to make it appropriate for communication and the decoder intervenes by patching up the message where necessary. This is where the human decoder differs from the computer. A computer merely gives a mechanical analysis of the message that is fed into it and does not have the capacity to intervene when needed. As a consequence we hear of computers

translating the sentence "Out of sight out of mind" as "invisible idiot". In actuality one must understand what a message is *about*, then find the *reference* which may or may not tally with what the sentence is about. It is only after fulfilling these two requirements that the further step of meaning analysis should be taken. These are the three closely related steps involved in interpreting a message.

That the aboutness, reference and meaning be correctly understood is a highly defining and demanding expectation which a decoder is to comply with. When such a demand is not entirely fulfilled communication is frustrated and one hears the complaint "You misunderstand me"

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Notes

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3. Dodgeson, C. L., (Lewis Carroll) "Through the Looking Glass" in *The Complete Works of Lewis Carroll* (N Y., 1936), pp. 21-314.
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SOME MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT BUDDHA AND THEIR REFUTATION

There are quite a few charges that have been laid at the door of Buddhism either by those whose understanding of the great Buddha's message has been both incomplete and unimaginative or by those who have adopted an unsympathetic attitude to the teachings of the Master. The main charges normally directed against Buddhism, especially by a biased Western critic, have been that it is a *pessimistic* religion, that it is *materialistic*, i. e., believing in no abiding spiritual 'Self' in man, and that it is *nihilistic* with no proper end or liberation for man in view after the final cessation of the cycle of becoming.

I propose to consider in this paper, one by one, these charges against Buddhism which have led to creating certain misconceptions both about the personality and the philosophy of so 'Self-saturated' a person as the Buddha, by exposing their unsubstantiality and untenability, by showing how a little sympathetic and proper understanding of the entire problem points to the facts quite contrary to the existing charges. The thick pall of cultivated misunderstanding, hostile attitudes and unimaginative approach surrounding the original and pristine teachings of the Buddha can be dispelled at one stroke if once an imaginative and sympathetic approach is established in place of the former. My endeavour, therefore, shall be to disabuse some of these misreadings of the teachings of Buddha and re-establish their original and *intended* message.

(1) Buddha and Pessimism :

The first misconception about the Buddha is that he was pessimistic in his outlook on life and that Buddhism, therefore, is a religion or a philosophy of pessimism. Because the Buddha emphasized on sorrow and suffering existing in the world, this was at once seized upon as the central tenet of Buddhism and capitalized by the critics of the types mentioned earlier as the focal point of attack both on the Master and his teachings, conveniently forgetting at the same time in order to please their personal preferences and stances, that the same Buddha had also pointed a way, and a very positive one

at that, out of this mire of sorrow and suffering. Actually this has been the charge always laid at the door of the entire oriental philosophy, whereas the truth is that pessimism in Indian philosophy has always been initial rather than final, as has been repeatedly shown by the scholars of Indian philosophy, both Eastern and Western, like Dr. Radhakrishnan, Prof. Hiriyanna, Sir Francis Younghusband, Edward Holmes, Juan Mascaro and others.

If by pessimism is meant looking only to the darker side of life and *not* making any attempt whatsoever to go beyond it, then the Buddha was definitely a pessimist. But that is not the case. The facts prove the other way round. Buddha himself has emphasized on the cessation of suffering and the way leading one out of this suffering to the final bliss of *Nibbāna*. As Edward Holmes puts it so beautifully, "So far was he from being a pessimistic, in the deeper and darker sense of the word, that at the heart of Nature he could see nothing but light."¹ Thus, according to Holmes, to accuse Buddha of pessimism, would amount to confessing one's own lack of imaginative sympathy for and insight into the sufferings of others. Those who can live perennially in the bright light of optimism should be very impossible figures indeed! Living an entirely happy and hedonistic existence incapable of any insight into the melancholy that is at the heart of the world, is indeed a shallow existence. The problem is, can there ever be an outright optimism unconcerned of all pain or, for that matter, an outright pessimism with no inclination whatsoever to look to the sunny side of existence? Both the states are extremes and hence impossible to exist. The one has to take the account of the other without which it may result into a shallow philosophy with no maturer and sane understanding of life. As Prof. Bosanquet writes, "I believe in optimism, but I add that no optimism is worth its salt that does not go all the way with pessimism and arrive at a point beyond it."³ Outright optimism which does not take into account the giant agony that is at the heart of the universe is not only a wicked and selfish way of life, but a superficial one as well. In the words of Schopenhauer such an unreflective sort of optimism devoid of any imagination, is nothing but a cruel mockery of the suffering humanity. Maturer optimism arrived at through a chastening experience of suffering is more welcome than an untutored and unreflective one.

The sense of pessimism, as understood in Indian philosophical systems, is not a diseased one looking only to the darker side of life, but one which is full of a divine discontent with what is, with what exists and, to use a Shelleyan phrase, 'it looks before and after and pines for what is not', for the light and bliss of *Nibbāna* and not for the night of nothingness or the eternal ceasing to be. What the Buddha was dissatisfied with, was sad at heart for, was this agony and suffering of all living beings 'this still sad music of humanity' (to use a Wordsworthian phrase), and he with his heart as limitless as the skies, went a step further to share, and not only feel, these sufferings as his own. Buddha, to use a Keatsian phrase, is one of those 'to whom the miseries of the world are miseries, and will not let them rest.' — (Keats : 'Hyperion'.)

The very effort made by the Buddha to find a way out of suffering and his success in offering the Noble Eight-fold Path to those who want to extricate themselves from the cycle of suffering in order to arrive at the Final Release, are in themselves proofs enough to show that one can, by one's own will, transcend the given condition of sorrow and rising above it, can achieve the bliss that lies beyond all becoming. And this can be achieved by those who are ever vigilant and diligent in their efforts to rise above this vale of suffering, diligence being a quality that negates all lassitude, all desire for sloth and rest, which are the concomitants of an absurd and shallow type of pessimism. Buddha's pessimism, therefore, is no pessimism at all, but a *healthy realism*, a realistic understanding of the miseries of human life where the finger is pointed at the proper cause of all suffering, and a way suggested to be out of it by making the cause cease to be. Once a man is able to achieve this, life, according to Buddha, becomes a song of joy and liberation and an everlasting music of Peace that passeth all understanding. A craving or *trṣṇā* for the wrong things that bind us to life, for the desires that burn us and perpetuate our existence are, according to Buddha, the cause of all suffering, and once this craving, this desire for an unauthenticated life has been made extinct, the man suddenly finds himself free from all bondage and begins to feel the joy and freedom of a radiant Being released from the tutelege of all becoming. His parting advice also

to his disciples was to be ever vigilant and work out their salvation with diligence. He wanted his followers to be their own refuge, their own lamp, to seek shelter unto themselves, to be their own light and liberator, and to look within and not without for the slow but certain un-folding of the Universal Self out of the melting of the lower self, the empirical ego of every man composed of the aggregates that are transient, changing, and therefore, unreal. This surely cannot be the message of a pessimist. A person who squarely throws the responsibility on the shoulders of man himself for his own making, who makes the man himself the captain of his soul and the master of his own destiny, who asks every follower to be his own way-farer, can never be dubbed as a pessimist, but is an optimist who has the courage of his conviction and whose way of life assures liberation to every one who is prepared to tread upon it by his own will and efforts. Buddha's language therefore is not the language of a dire pessimist, but far from it, the language of a healthy optimist who has realised the light at the end of the road after traversing the tunnel. His message of a self reliant *karma-mārga* instilling every one with self-confidence and courage, his insight into the mind of man as the man's maker or destroyer, his looking upon every being as a potential Buddha to be, are the weapons in the armoury of an undaunted and serene archer bent upon achieving his goal, and not the wail of a helpless, frustrated pessimist refusing to rise above the stars.

A pessimist is a fatalist as well. Buddha with his message of self-help and diligence and his tireless life in the service of all the suffering ones, ranging from a wounded swan to a mother bereaved of her only child, cannot be regarded as anyone but a calm and courageous man who could see into the life of things and having seen its hollowness, *could achieve a state beyond all sorrow*, all suffering and all initial pessimism. The Buddha with his compassionate heart, his rational mind and a will his own can never be regarded as a pessimist. Buddha's final peace and serenity transcending all understanding is generative of nothing but an optimism which comes of placing the man's destiny in his own hands. To me Buddhism seems to equip a person, at least initially, to be a rational pessimist than an uncritical optimist, leading one finally to a

condition beyond all such dualities, to the one, the Infinite, and the Unconditioned. The Buddha, like the Upaniṣadic sages before him, laid stress on the inner will of man and like them had faith in an eternal moral order of the world, all which is something different from that uncritical optimism which may lull one into a false sense of security. Buddha, and for that matter the entire Indian philosophy, do not stop at merely regarding life as a never-ending tale of sorrow, but give a positive message of hope to everyone of us that we can make our lives sublime and free from all bondage, provided each one of us is prepared to live a life that is full of sound values and not a thoughtless, rootless life full of uncontrollable desires and blind impulses. An authenticated existence which may become a beacon-light for others, a model for millions to follow, a life full of dignity, restraint and moral order, rather than an irresponsible, senseless and dissipated life, is the call of the Buddha to every sane and civilized person, whatever his station in life. It is here that we find Buddha so alarmingly modern in his search for the meaning of a true life in the manner of a concerned existentialist. Like the great existentialists, the Buddha puts the responsibility entirely on the man himself for creating his own hell or heaven. Surely such giants cannot be pessimists, giants who, like Sisyphus, raise their own rocks and negate all gods.

(2) *Buddha and Materialism (the Anattā doctrine or the Denial of the Self) :*

I now come to the most crucial and controversial point in the entire range of Buddhist philosophy, the problem of Self and the denial of its existence in man by the Buddha, as interpreted by some critics like Jennings, H. C. Warren, Rhys Davids, J. Thomas and others because of the double interpretation that these scholars have given to the word '*Anattā*' of the Pali canons to suit their own inclinations.

It is a well-known fact that the Buddha always preferred to remain silent about the final and absolute metaphysical questions to talking about them, lest any misreading of an answer to any such question should result into confusing the already confused minds of the people living in an age when more than eighty different schools of thought existed raising hair-splitting argu-

ments about such questions, a solution to which is always either partial or incomplete, and which can finally be realized by oneself through one's own inner experience, rather than through explanations offered at a mere phenomenal level. Truth has profundities which can be realized by one's deeper self than by one's empirical self or ego. Silence about the Supreme or the Absolute does not mean its denial or negation. What is in fact is denied by the Buddha is the self comprising the 'mind-body' organism, consisting of the five compounds or *skandhās* viz., the body with all its physical components, and the ego-consciousness composed of feeling, impressions, cognition, conation etc. Man thus becomes a bundle of changing psychoses, but this is not to be identified with his real Self or 'Attā'.

In '*Mahāvagga*' we repeatedly come across the utterances like 'this is not mine', 'I am not this', 'this is not my Self', with reference to each one of the *skandhas* or the components mentioned above. In '*Anattalakkhaṇa Sutta*' the two words '*attā*' and '*anattā*' are used together as when the Buddha says, '*Rūpaṃ bhikkhave anattā*' (Body, O monks, is not the Self), or '*rūpaṃ ca hiṃsaṃ bhikkhave Attā abhaviṣsa*' (if the body, O monks, were self), etc. This itself should be proof enough to indicate the fact that for the Buddha the Self was something different from these aggregates which constitute our '*Nāma-Rūpa*' or '*Mind-Body*' organism. What the Buddha thus does is not to deny the self as such, but to refute the wrong view that tended to identify it with the changing flux of the *skandhas* or the unreal aggregates. As Prof. Chowdhury has so aptly expressed it, "If we say - 'this is not gold', 'that is not gold', we do not mean 'there is no gold'". When the Buddha says, 'I am not this', 'this is not mine', 'this is not my Self', it automatically invites the counter questions 'Who am I?', 'What is mine?' and 'What is my self?' When all the passions that haunt us, the desires that kindle and burn us, the thousand thoughts that run across our mind making several criss-cross patterns, and the impressions that hover around us are all allayed and eliminated, when this compound of all transient aggregates is realised as ephemeral and unreal; and in short, when all the lower egos or selves are made to dissolve, there is bound to remain something behind which now emerges to the fore and

which we can justly and positively say, 'This am I', 'This is mine', or 'This is my Self'.

The whole trouble about this central concept regarding the existence or the non-existence of the Self in Buddhism has been, as mentioned earlier, due to the wrong meaning attached to the word '*Attā*' by the scholars like Rhys Davids and H. C. Warren. These western scholars and some eastern Pali commentators both have done an irreparable harm to the real message of Buddha by their misinterpretation of a single word which has completely tarnished the image of Buddha as an upholder of a godless and a soulless philosophy of life. As Prof. Chowdury says, "There is no parallel in the history of philosophy to this confusion based on the misunderstanding of a single word (*Anattā*) that gave a turn to the teaching of a religion which was not intended by its founder. The word '*Anattā*' has been used in violation of its intention"⁴

The word '*arattā*' has been interpreted as meaning 'self-less' or 'soul-less' and thus used as an adjective while being rendered into English, whereas the word, being the negative of the noun '*attā*' (the Self) is a noun by itself and as such its real meaning should be 'not self' and not 'self-less'. A correct grammatical application of the original Pali word (*Anattā*), while using it into English, changes the entire meaning of the word and one begins to see the real message of the Master. Seen in this light, the utterances like '*rupam anattā*', should mean 'the matter is not-self' and not 'as the matter is soul-less'. To yield the latter meaning '*rupam anattā*' should be changed into '*rūpam anattam*', *anattam* being an adjective, and *anattā* being a noun. This goes for other terms also like '*vinñānam anattā*' (consciousness is not self) etc. 'An' before '*attā*', is merely a negative prefix which makes the word '*an-attā*', i. e. 'not-self and not 'soul-less'. Thus as Prof. Chowdhury comments, "On grammatical grounds alone the popular interpretation falls to the ground. It is only by mangling grammar that the traditional interpretation can be upheld, but no student of language can support such an interpretation."⁵

Buddha thus was not prepared to identify the real Self with the surface self composed of elements under constant flux. The empirical or the phenomenal self of a person is not his real Self. The person is not It and It is not the person, but that does not

negate the Reality of the Person behind all changing, fleeting selves or persons. When the mind of a great sage like the Buddha's must have suddenly realised the Being that was once realised by the Upaniṣadic sages of old, he, like them, preferred the *Aryan* (noble) silence about the Supreme or, at the most, tried to explain its existence by describing it negatively in statements like 'I am not this, this is no my Self, etc.' Even in the Upaniṣads the ātman is described as *neti, neti* (not this, not this). In his *Ātmaśataka* I, Śaṅkara also declares, 'I am not the body, not the I-sense, nor the vital principle etc. As Prof. Chowdhury so very succinctly puts it, "All descriptions being descriptions of qualities, that which is devoid of qualities can only be denoted by negatives, *but that does not make Reality a negation.*"⁶ It is in this way that we find Buddha's silence or his negative descriptions of the Self being used against him as his very denial of the existence of the Self! The Buddha never did thus deny the reality of the Self, but pointed out how It was wrongly identified with and mistaken for that which is merely an ever-changing stream of consciousness. Since the Buddha did not speak about the Self, it should not be construed as his denial of the Self.

Actually the Buddha, instead of denying the Self, *changed its concept* by refusing to identify it with the accepted sense of the Self in his days. His being the philosophy of Becoming, the Self is not to be taken as something granted and given in advance and therefore to be talked about in a non-chalant manner. It is something that emerges when the surface self or the ego has been completely eliminated and then transcended. Being rises when the cycle of becoming comes a full circle.

Dr. Radhakrishnan's comment on this compels our attention :

"We have to build the self by effort and discipline. The self is something which evolves and grows, something to be achieved and built up by pain and labour, and not something given to be passively accepted and enjoyed. The ego consists of the feelings that burn us, of the passions we brood over, of the desires that we make. These are the things that give life its dramatic character. There is nothing absolute and permanent in them. That is why we *can become something different from what we are.* The reality of

the person is in his creative will. When we deny the clamour of emotions, stay the stream of things, silence the appetites of the body, we feel the power of self within our own being.' '7 While the *Upaniṣads* accept the existence of an eternal Being as granted and admonish the seeker to find it in the innermost core of his being, the *Buddha insists on remaking and refashioning of the entire personality of man in order to grow into the real Self. Man has to become what he is.*

In my humble opinion Buddha's message seems to be one of spiritual emergent evolution where at every stage new qualities and a new person emerge till the person ceases to become, as he has by now realized his real 'person' or 'Being'. It is a process wherein at every stage of purification and spiritual advancement the smaller self or the ego goes on getting itself dissolved on the one hand, with the higher Self rising and asserting itself on the other.

The Pāli canons also speak of the higher Self or the *Mahā-attā* and of the lower self or the *appatunā*, thus making a clear distinction between the metaphysical 'I' and the psychological 'me'. When the Buddha speaks in the *Dhammapada* of the Self being the lord of the self (12.160), it is naturally the higher Self that is regarded as the lord of the lower one. Moreover, how would it be possible for us to explain the parting advice of Buddha to his disciples to take refuge in nothing but in their own selves (*attasārana*) and to work out their salvation with diligence, unless it is assumed that it is the Self behind the smaller selves that the Buddha is asking his disciples to take shelter into and work out their salvation for. This has been interpreted as an appeal to be self-reliant. In that case did the Buddha ask to seek shelter unto a self that by itself is transient, fleeting, and therefore impermanent (*anicca*)? In unmistakable terms, and in text after text, Buddha is exhorting his disciples to return to the Self that emerges after all craving has been completely cooled off by one's own efforts. One has to lead oneself on from the stage of the empirical self to that of the transcendental one that comes to the fore at the end of the process of all becoming. This process of becoming is nothing but the evolution of the Being. Buddha is therefore deliberately silent in describing an experience that is

indescribable (*avākym*) and which, when described, is likely to lead to interpretations which may be both inconclusive in their assertion and disputable in content. As Dr. Radhakrishnan remarks, "Buddha's silence on the absolute indicates that the eternal substance is not in his view available for the explanation of phenomena. Experience is all that is open to our knowledge, and *tha unconditional lies beyond experience.*"⁸

The very mention of something that is unconditional and beyond the law of cause and effect implies the existence of an *attā* or a Self that is beyond all conditions and therefore a Reality that is below, behind and beyond all appearances. Buddha, on a certain occasion, while staying at Jetā Grove, is reported to have addressed his disciples as follows :

"There is, brethren, an unborn, a not-become, a not-made, a not-compounded. If there were not, brethren, this that's unborn, not-become, not-made, not-compounded, there could not be made any escape from what is born, become, made, and compounded."⁹ (*Udāna : VIII*).

In the *Majjhima Nikāya* also we come across an interesting dialogue in which the Buddha is found dis-abusing the mind of one Saccaka, a Jain monk, of the heresy that body is the Self, feeling is the Self, etc. Also when the monk Vaccagotta approached the Buddha to find out whether the soul exists or not after the annihilation of the body, the Buddha maintained silence as he did not want to baffle the mind of a layman like Vaccagotta by entering into a futile metaphysical dispute like this which is always inconclusive and ambiguous in its final assertion either way. Had the Buddha said that such a substance like the soul exists, he would have sided himself with the eternalists (*śāśvatvādins*), and had he declared the soul to be totally non-existent, he would have sided with the annihilationists (*Ucchedavādins*). The Buddha in fact steered a middle course between these two extremes of eternalism and nihilism, the former taking for granted the existence of an ever-abiding entity in the form of a soul-substance, and the latter rejecting its existence altogether. Placing himself between these extremes, he conceived the Self as something *to be felt* rather than described in words; as something emerging with every step taken in the direction of soul-expansion in the cycle of becoming.

For him it became a process from the flux of becoming to the emergence of an eternal, unchanging and an unconditioned Self.

The crux of the problem, however, is that the Buddha was never interested in what exists or what does not exist. *For him the main problem was what was real and what was unreal.* The real to the Buddha was not the superficial ego, the individual self which identifies itself now with feeling, and now with sensation, now with the predispositions of the mind and now with the body. Any of these was not the real 'I', the Self that one achieves after all the delusory selves have been dissolved into nothingness. As Edward Holmes observes, "The more carefully one studies the teaching of Buddha, the stronger does one's conviction become that the ultimate category in which he thought was that of the *real* and the *unreal*, not that of the *existent* and the *non-existent*."¹⁰ The existent and the non-existent, according to Holmes are mutually exclusive terms, the real and the unreal being polar opposites always co-existing. The Buddha regarded the entire tenor of outward life as unreal, though not necessarily as non-existent. His entire scheme of life, according to Holmes, was an answer to the question that he must have asked himself, 'Which is the real pole of existence?' The Buddha had actually gone down deep into the very root of this problem and arrived at the profound truth of *Nibbāna* the eternal, the unbecoming, and the blissful being the real pole of existence. In the *Dhammapada* *Nibbāna* is regarded as the highest happiness (*nibbānam paramam sukham* : 15.204). If *nibbāna* is this state of bliss beyond all description, the peace that passeth all understanding, then again the question arises, 'Who is the enjoyer of this bliss, this peace?' The obvious answer is the Self. For, if there were no Self, none whatsoever to experience this bliss, then the whole question of the spiritual quest, of the annihilation of all desire (*trṣṇā*) and egoistic impulses, of travelling in order to arrive, becomes an exercise in futility; a cry in the wilderness, a journey without an end.

The man who could rush to save a wounded swan or to save a lamb from being sacrificed at the court of the King Bimbisara, offering himself for the sacrifice so the king could achieve a better heaven by sacrificing a man than an animal; the man whose heart.

was moved to compassion at the mere sight of suffering, could not have been anyone but a profound spiritual figure who must have seen the same stream of life flowing in every sentient creature. Without his realising that it is the same stream of life that binds every one together from one cycle of birth to another, that it is the same stream which runs through all beings and brings all of them finally to the state of perfect consciousness of an Enlightened One, the Buddha would not have gone out into the world with an all-embracing heart to share and feel the miseries of the rest as his own. *He clearly saw all lives as links in the running chain of becoming till he could feel the oneness of all life in the rise and embrace of an all expanding Being.*

The silence of Buddha seems therefore to be the silence of a man who has known the Supreme as expanding everywhere and in every being, and who does not want to talk about it not out of any lack of faith or a wish for denial, but out of a profound reverence for it. It is definitely not the silence of an agnostic or an atheist as affirmed by many. His silence simply means that the Final Reality, the liberated condition, the final grounding in Being, is an experience that cannot be described in terms of ordinary experience or language. Silence alone is an answer to and an affirmation of the Real. In the Upaniṣadic verses also we find the same idea expressed, viz., that the one who knows the Supreme does not talk about It, while the one who does not know It, babbles too much about It. And this brings me to the last and final misconception about Buddha and nihilism, an attempt at removing which should clarify much of the fog enveloping this tricky area of Buddhist metaphysics.

(3) Buddha and Nihilism :

Another prominent misconception held about the Buddha is that he was a nihilist, that for him life was merely a total extinction, a blowing out of the flame, an annihilation of everything on the cessation of the cycle of becoming. This means that the Buddhist Nirvāṇa is a state of total effacement, a mere night of nothingness, an extinction of all craving. This again seems to be, according to some critics, the result of Buddha's silence on a pro-

blem like the final state of life entering the threshold of Nirvāṇa. The critics believe that the Buddha refrained himself from describing positively what is *nibbāna* or the Final Release, and that he could merely describe it negatively as cessation of the burning passions of life that bind us to the chain of causation and suffering. But this precisely is an arrested, negative and an incomplete account of the concept of Nirvāṇa, and hence this misconception about the Buddha being an advocate of a nihilistic philosophy.

If the final end of final life is to be regarded as the blowing out of a flame, what about the thin wisp of smoke that still remains after the dying out of the flame? The *Svetāśvatara Upaniṣad* also speaks of the *Paramātmān* (the Supreme Self) as the fire the fuel of which has been consumed (IV. 19). The consumed fuel of the fire manifests itself as a flame and the consumed flame in return blows out only to live in the form of smoke which finally merges with the universal space around. In the same manner, one could argue, the Self that has achieved its Being continues to outlive and outlast the dying cycle of becoming. *Cessation is not extinction, but existence on a level different from the one experienced on an empirical level.*

Secondly, if *nibbāna* or the final release means total extinction, then Buddha cannot be regarded as being liberated till he died. All his claims about the attainment of liberation and wisdom during his life-time, claims which the Pāli canons abound in, would then simply turn into null and void making a myth of all his noble utterances about the *positive* state of *nibbāna*. The Buddha, on the contrary, has repeatedly described the state of *nibbāna* as one of positive bliss, as a state that is beyond all becoming, all origin and all conditioning. Even the *Upaniṣads* have not been able to evolve a language suitable for describing the indescribable. It seems that the language itself becomes an impotent tool in describing the most profound and apocalyptic experiences and visions of life. What the mind has suddenly realised, the heart has intuitively grasped, cannot perhaps be communicated in the form of human speech which may be understood by all. The visions of eternity, the whispers of immortality or, for that matter, whatever that is Grand according to the great mystical poet Blake, is bound to be obscure to weak men. The expressions of the realisation of the Infinite

may finally be displayed only in the form of gestures as e. g. the serene smile on the face of the Buddha while explaining the inexplicable to an initiate, or his mere offering of a flower, instead of a spoken word, to a disciple to dispel all his doubts and queries. This state of Final Realisation, therefore, is something that cannot but be described in a language that is the language of either gesticulation or negation, for it is the description of One who in the words of Prof. F. Northrop is 'all things, yet nothing and yet not nothing'.¹¹ When the mind suddenly encounters the light that has so long eluded it, when it intuitively grasps the meaning that has exceeded its reach, when it lightningly realises the flash of the Vision denied to the inward eye, it experiences a state that cannot be described or explained in any language but that of negation. *Negative description of a Reality does not negate the Reality's positive existence*; it, on the other hand, affirms the existence of such a Reality by establishing the contraries as has been done by Blake and several other mystical poets and prophets. Dr. Radhakrishnan's comment in this connection is worth our attention:

"Buddha's real attitude is probably, that *nirvāṇa* is a state of perfection inconceivable by us, and if we are obliged to offer descriptions of it, it is best to bring out its inconceivability by negative descriptions, its richness of content by positive predicates, *realising all the time that such descriptions are at best approximations only.*"¹²

We can thus see that for the Buddha the cessation of the cycle of becoming is not a negative halt, but a positive leap into something that is eternal, unconditional and unbecoming. If all life were merely a total extinction, then what use is all this struggle, all this effort to liberate oneself from the chain of successive coming-ins and going-outs? As Younghusband would have it, "*Nirvāṇa* is looked upon by Western people as implying a state of Nothingness, extinction, annihilation, whereas *it is in fact a state of somethingness to the nth degree.*"¹³ It is a state beyond all the flux of changing psychoses, a state which may appear to be motionless, but which in reality has the tremendous motion of a top spinning at its highest velocity. This, according to Younghusband, is not the state of nothingness, but of superlative activity. It is definitely that state of pure Being when, in the words of the poet Words-

worth : " We are laid asleep in body, and become a living soul; while with an eye made quiet by the power of harmony, and the deep power of joy, we see into the life of things " —(*Lines Composed above Tintern Abbey.*)

It is a state when the mind fully realising its final union with the Absolute, finds all the dualities and differences of every shade and variety sunk and dissolved into nothingness, and endows one fully with a vision that there is no distinction whatsoever between the dance and the dancer, the dream and the dreamer, the house and the housebuilder. As the Buddha himself says : " I have gone round in vain the cycles of many lives ever striving to find the builder of the house of life and death. How great is the sorrow of life that must die. " But now *I* have seen thee, housebuilder, never more shall thou build this house. The rafters of sins are broken, the ridgepole of ignorance is destroyed. The fever of craving is past; *For my mortal mind is gone to the joy of the immortal nirvāṇa.* "

In *Samyukta Nikāya*, the Buddha while explaining the meaning of *nibbāṇa* to the venerable nun Rādhā, speaks of it not merely as extinction of all craving, but as a positive Release, and when further pressed by Rādhā to explain to her the purpose of this Release, the Buddha relies to her that she was stretching the question too far, for it would not be possible *for her* to grasp the full limit of that question, meaning thereby that it was something that only a released soul like his could understand, but could not describe, as it was something that was indescribable, unutterable and inexplicable, simply because it was a *bliss to be felt* than to be explained in mere words. This does not negate the existence of that state of Self where it merely 'Is' beyond all mind-consciousness, imperturbable and tranquil like a lamp where even the winds can find no footing. The Buddha himself explaining this state to a monk, says " There do water, earth and fire, there does air no footing find; there do, long and short and fine, likewise gross, pure and impure, mind and body, cease to be; leaving not a wrack behind, by ceasing of the conscious mind, there do all these cease to be. " 15

How strikingly similar is this condition of the Self gone beyond all

body-mind consciousness to the one described in the *Gīā*: "Then his soul is a lamp whose light is steady, for it burns in a shelter where no winds come."¹⁶

It (*nibbāna*) thus acquires the same position that is held by the Brahman in the *Upaniṣads* and the *Gīā*, Buddha's categorical assertion of the existence of a Self that is unbecoming, unborn and unconditional as explained in *Udāna* has already been referred to earlier. One can finally say that if the self were merely a bundle of changing aggregates (*skandhās*), if it were merely an impermanent compound of body and mind, then there would be nothing that would get released on the cessation of such a self. Are we then to be lost into the dark night of an unending journey? Do we have to flow perpetually from one eddy to another in the never-ceasing stream of life? The answer is definitely 'no'. It is the surface self that ceases to be and with every step that one takes towards spiritual expansion in the process of becoming, with every effort that one makes to reach nearer the goal of *nibbāna*, one realises the power of the true Self rising within one, and it is this Self which is but another name for all self-lessness, that refuses to be extinct and, extending beyond all conditions, reaches the Bliss that is eternal and unutterable. *Nibbāna* thus becomes a timeless and eternal existence in the lap of the Supreme and not a mere leap into a gaping vacuity. Dr. Radhakrishnan, describing this unconditioned state of the self beyond all chain of cause and effect, says, "..... nirvāṇa is timeless existence, and so Buddha must admit the reality of a timeless Self. There is a being at the back of all life which is unconditioned, above all empirical categories, something which does not give rise to any effect and is not the effect of anything else. *It is the simultaneity which is the support of all succession.*"¹⁷

I should like to end by saying that it is this very simultaneity that runs through all changes and chances of life, that emerges at last as the Self after the total annihilation of the lower self, together with all its constituents, and fixes Itself as the eternal, the unbecome and the uncompounded. *Buddha's message thus seems to be a radical programme for the emergent evolution of the Self by the effort of the self.* It is the blossoming of human personality into the full bloom of its Being which is nothing but

becoming come to a full circle, the coming of the great 'Be', the movement from becoming to Being, from flux to fixation, from the transient to the eternal, as there cannot be any Being out of nothing.

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Notes

1. Edward Holmes, '*The Creed of Buddha*', (The Bodley Head, London, 1957), p. 183,
2. Bosanquet quoted by Dr. Radhakrishnan in '*Indian Philosophy*', Vol. I, (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1956), p. 50.
3. R. P. Chowdhury, 'Interpretation of the *Anattā* Doctrine of Buddhism' : a New Approach, '*The Indian Historical Quarterly*', Vol. XXXI, No. 1, March 1955.
4. *Ibid.* Italics mine.
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid.* Italics mine.
7. S. Radhakrishnan, '*Gautama the Buddha*', (Hind Kitabs. Bombay, 1946), p. 37. Italics mine.
8. S. Radhakrishnan, *Op. Cit.*, p. 379. Italics mine.
9. '*Some Sayings of the Buddha*', Tr. F. L. Woodward (O. U. P., London, 1945), p. 330.
10. Edward Holmes, *Op. Cit.*, p. 119.
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13. Sir Francis Younghusband, Introduction to '*Some Sayings of the Buddha*'. (Tr.) F. L. Woodward (O. U. P., London, 1945), p. xviii, Italics mine.
14. *The Dhammapada*, 11 : 153.54. (Tr.) Juan Mascaro (Penguin Books Ltd., Middlesex, 1973), pp. 56-57, Italics mine.
15. *Diggha Nikāya*, i. 222. (Tr.) F. L. Woodward, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 321-322.
16. *The Gīlā* 6.19. (Tr.), Juan Mascaro.
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A NEW THEORY OF BEAUTY BY GUY SIRCELLO¹

A Critical Review

It was Kant who, according to Guy Sircello, 'opened the gates of subjectivism' by suggesting that 'no criterion of beauty can be given by uncovering features that all beautiful objects 'share', features which would 'constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions for the correct attribution of beauty' (pp. 4-5²). This 'skepticism' says Sircello, 'has dominated most of the up-to-date thought of the last two centuries and no one has yet offered a clear enough or comprehensive enough theory of beauty' (p. 5), but from this, he says, 'there is no compelling reason to conclude' that 'it is impossible to do' so (p. 6). One must find 'features common to all beautiful objects', and that will give us a 'criterion of beauty in things' (p. 6).

Sircello uses "object" (in double quotes) to mean anything denoted by the subject of a sentence in which "beautiful" is a predicate adjective'. "Object" will then include objects in the straightforward sense (e. g., rocks, snakes, people, building), but it will also include mountains, rivers, starry nights and symphonies, the colour or shape of a particular mountain, the brightness of the starry night and the way the Philadelphia Orchestra plays the 'Eroica' Symphony (pp. 5-6). Faced with this array, 'finding a criterion of beauty seems, *prima facie*, beyond human powers, 'for what could all these "objects" possibly have in common? (p. 5). To unravel this mystery Sircello provides the following key:

If, of any beautiful "object" X, which is not clearly a property, we ask... "What about X is beautiful?" then either (a) we can answer the question by naming one or more beautiful properties or (b) we can apply the question again to what we put forward as an answer...until the answer is given by naming a beautiful property (or properties). (pp. 11-2)

Thus, Helen is beautiful because of her beautiful skin and her skin is beautiful because of its clearness. Ultimately, therefore, the beauty of objects (in the ordinary sense), even of objects like starry nights and symphonies, is 'nothing but' the beauty of their properties. Thus 'beautiful properties acquire a privileged status' and 'a

maximally comprehensive theory of beauty need be a theory solely of the beauty of 'those properties' with respect to which ultimately all the "objects", other than such properties, 'are beautiful'. Such properties are also, of course, called "objects", but, excepting these it is not possible for "objects" to 'posses *no* beautiful properties and yet be beautiful'. (pp. 7, 9, 11, 12)

Sircello admits that he has no 'convincing deductive argument' for this thesis, but he believes it because in the case of a great many beautiful "objects" one can specify beautiful properties that make them beautiful; and, even where we cannot do this, 'it is never impertinent' to ask for such properties, and this 'implies' that there 'might well be an answer', 'even if it does not *guarantee* that there is an answer.' This is 'enough' for him, but he can 'sympathise with the temptation' to deny his thesis. (pp. 9-10)

A comprehensive theory of beauty – such as Sircello's New Theory of Beauty (henceforth called 'NTB') – 'needs to account for only beautiful properties', that is, properties that 'constitute what is beautiful about some beautiful "objects" 'whether, he cautions, 'properly *called* "beautiful" or not' (pp. 14-5). This would imply that even properties which are usually considered to be ugly or, at least, nonbeautiful could, under certain conditions, make the "objects" whose elements they are, beautiful. His use of 'beautiful' is thus wider than its standard use, but it is doubtful if he always adheres to this special use. When discussing Harmony ('the beauty things might have because of the way their elements are related'), he writes that one condition that 'deserve[s] consideration' is that 'harmony obtains only among elements that are themselves beautiful' (p. 103). There is no point in this remark if any elements which give beauty to an "object" because of the way they are related are to be called 'beautiful.' It seems, therefore that some elements do not produce beauty however they may be related, and these are the ones we would normally call 'ugly' or 'nonbeautiful'. His examples indicate that this is indeed what he means: 'There can be no architectural harmony among dilapidated, nondescript, and ugly buildings, nor can there be colour harmony among muted colours' (p. 103). This view seems to me false, for ugly or nondescript elements can be beautifully related. Dilapidated buildings, when seen or photographed from a certain angle, can

make a beautiful pattern, and it is a commonplace that a discord or silence can contribute to the beauty of a piece of music.

No property, says Sircello, can be 'considered beautiful "in general"'; we apply the term to it 'as it is instantiated in a specified "object"'. Neither clearness nor clearness-of-skin in general are beautiful; it is the clearness of Helen's skin that is beautiful. Calling clearness a beautiful property 'means only that it is *possible* for it to be beautiful in some of its instantiations' (p. 14). NTB seeks to distinguish between beautiful and nonbeautiful 'properties-as-they-are-instantiated' and see 'what is common to all beautiful properties in virtue of which they are beautiful'. He believes that this must be 'a way of being' a property (i). (p. 15).

Thus we reach the core of NTB. A long and widely recognised fact about beauty is that it is an 'attention-getter'; 'it breaks into our consciousness', 'leaps out at us'. It makes a *sensible* 'impact'; not only does my heart leap up on seeing a rainbow, even 'my eyes "light up"'; the perceptual faculties seem to grow 'larger' and get 'filled' (pp. 19-20). Armed with this re-discovery, he considers the beauty of colour for the next six chapters.

He asks us to contrast an orange cat, green hills, a red car and an orange sunset, on the one hand, with, on the other, the cat spattered with mud, the hills turned yellow under the sun, the car having lost its polish and the sunset after the colour has faded. From this experiment Sircello generalises that the colours, 'in becoming less vivid, become less beautiful or even not beautiful', and 'vividness is thus an important respect in which color can be beautiful' (pp 21-3). From this he goes on, 'it does not follow that a very high degree of vividness...is sufficient to make the color...beautiful with respect to vividness', but it is 'a reasonable hypothesis'. It also appears, conversely, that 'if the color...is beautiful with respect to its vividness, then it is vivid to a very high degree'. 'At this stage of the argument,' he admits, this 'claim is only plausible' - the claim that vividness and beauty of colour, vary directly (pp 23-4)³. He makes the further point (pp 24, 38) that, in spite of being extremely vivid, a colour may not be beautiful ('*simpliciter*'), by which he means 'on the whole'. It may lack

other beauty-giving properties, such as depth or sultriness, so that, on the whole, it is not beautiful (p. 37).

This consideration of vividness and the beauty of colour⁴ brings him to a 'key concept' in NTB (p. 39) - that of 'property of qualitative degree' (henceforth 'PQD'). A PQD is a property (1) which could be more or less than another PQD of the same sort, and (2) the difference in degree is not 'numerically determinable' or 'measurable'. You cannot say in exact mathematical terms how much greener the hills are than the lawn. Being square or full are not PQDs, for there are no degrees of squareness or fullness. Also, properties of weight, size or heat are not PQDs, because they can be exactly measured. Generalising from colour, Sircello concludes (p. 42) that a theory of beauty 'can be' a theory of PQDs, PQDs which, in *some* instantiations, could be beautiful or give beauty to the "object" which possesses them. Here is the New Theory of Beauty :

A PQD of an "object" is beautiful if and only if... it is present in that "object" in a very high degree and any "object" that is not a PQD is beautiful only if it possesses, proximately or ultimately, at least one PQD present in that "object" to a very high degree. (p. 43)

(This thesis is importantly qualified; I shall deal with the qualification later). Sircello clarifies that this gives 'only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for an "object" that is not a PQD to be beautiful' (p. 43). The colour of Helen's skin is beautiful in so far as it is clear in a very high degree, and if it were not so, it would not be beautiful with respect to its clearness; but it may, in spite of having clearness in a very high degree, have other properties, like roughness or paleness, which are not beautiful with the result that the skin may not be beautiful *simpliciter*. Its high degree of clearness is not sufficient to make it beautiful on the whole. But according to NTB, to be present in a high degree is both a necessary and sufficient condition for a PQD itself to be beautiful. Helen's skin's colour's clearness itself is beautiful because it is a high degree of clearness. Sircello believes 'it is impossible to find a theory that specifies necessary and sufficient conditions for any "object" to be beautiful (p. 44).

NTB applies to all kinds of beautiful or beauty-giving properties - colour, gracefulness, tactility, sounds, tastes, smells and the feels of things. The craggy, dentated look of the Santa Ana Mountains, as the sun rises behind them and intensifies the ridgeline, is 'especially beautiful'. Further south the ridgeline is 'flatter and more insipid' and so 'less beautiful'. (p. 46). The phrase 'flatter and more insipid', however, surreptitiously begs the question, for flat landscapes (such as you see when travelling by train across many parts of India) are extremely beautiful and a fellow passenger found the dentated ridges between Neral and Kalyan frightening and ugly. Sircello finds the figure of a shepherd in Giotto's 'Vision of St. Joachim' beautiful because of its 'extraordinarily graceful lines', while that of St. Joachim is so because its 'tactility' 'stands out' (p. 47). All this goes to show that it is not the fact of having some property in a very high degree that makes an "object" beautiful; it is certain specific kinds of properties that make their "object" beautiful. Naturally, if the beauty-giving properties are there, then, if they are present in a very high degree, the degree of beauty will also probably increase (but I do not think this necessarily follows). In fact, Sircello himself gives a list of beauty-giving PQDs of sound: 'shimmering', 'radiant', 'spacious', 'soaring', 'sultry', 'passionate', 'tender', 'joyful' and many others (pp. 59-60).

My point can be established by two further considerations. (1) Some properties not present in a high degree at all may be very beautiful. Sircello himself finds the 'light clashes of cymbals' in Berlioz's *Requiem* 'so gorgeous', and I would instance the unexpected ten quiet notes of the bassoon in the midst of the orchestral hubbub towards the end of the 'Emperor' Concerto. In the latter example, the charming effect is due to the sudden contrast; Sircello 'has never been able to fathom' the cause in the former example. But this does not give him doubts about his NTB. He does speak of a sound being beautiful because of being 'strikingly or eloquently brought out', but such a description is sufficiently vague to fit any theory of beauty and not only NTB. A dull colour may be strikingly brought out by contrast with vivid colours and a soft sound may be eloquent, as we have seen, by contrast with loud sounds. There are several ways in which qualities may be made to

get our attention; being present in a very high degree is only one of them. Of course, one can have recourse to sophistry and say that 'being in contrast to' is a PQD and in order to bring out beauty it must be present in a very high degree ! (p. 60)

(2) Sometimes a PQD present in a very high degree can ruin the beauty of its " object ". A very loud sound could be very jarring in itself and could spoil the general effect of the piece. While, according to NTB, a high degree of saltiness in pickles should ' warrant a judgment of beauty ' (p. 61), Sircello admits that ' some people don't like them, and just because they are too salty for them ' (p. 64). He further admits that when the intended effect is a vague blend of sounds or colours, ' clarity can be the very opposite of a beautiful property ' (p. 59). NTB, thus, does not seem to provide for the concept of ' being just right ', which plays so vital a part in all art. In another context he does write, ' It is not its being of great size, but its being *just the right size*, ... that makes it " do " beautifully ' (p. 75), but, using the Procrustian-bed technique, he says that such examples ' are not counterexamples to NTB ' because things which are just right ' are, to a high degree ', *suitable* to the purpose they serve '. ' In other words, ' he says, they possess ' the PQD of *suitability* ' or ' *fittingness* '. (p. 75). So, even a property which is not present in a high degree may be beautiful because it is ' fitting ', and ' fitting ' in a very high degree and so NTB is saved.

Sircello has a more serious answer to our ' counterexamples '. In his statement of NTB (p. 43), he expressly excluded properties of ' deficiency, lack, or defect '. Hence, when a property is present in a very high degree and yet is not beautiful or beauty-giving, it is because it is a property of the kind described. (This is the important qualification I had referred to earlier.) In a painting of Giotto's, Christ's body is ' awkward, and misshapen ' and so ' simply not beautiful at all ' (p. 47). If we were to argue that, according to NTB, if Christ's body was awkward and misshapen to a very high degree, it would be beautiful, Sircello would point out that these are properties of defect and so excluded from NTB. Thus, the presence in a high degree of properties of defect, etc. does not count as a counterexample to NTB.

Sircello's discussion of such properties is, however, rather confused. A property of defect, for instance, may act in quite a contrary manner to what he suggests. Uneven or slightly protruding teeth – a defect of dentition – can give a roguish charm to some faces. NTB must, therefore, exclude *aesthetically* defective properties and not those which are defective with respect to the natural species to which they belong. A misshapen body may be defective in both senses, but it does not follow that every property which is a defect in the latter sense is also a defect in the former sense. But if NTB wishes to exclude only aesthetically defective properties from its scope, it would be involved in a circularity – a PQD is beautiful if it exists in a very high degree, provided it is not a property that is not beautiful (for an aesthetically defective property would be one that did not contribute to the beauty of its "object.").

Sircello's list of PQDs that are deficiencies, lacks or defects show however, that he is thinking not only of aesthetically deficient or defective properties (p. 41). The list includes 'being blemished, deformed, dilapidated, sallow, rough, shiny, fat and smooth. Excepting the first two, the rest could be defects with regard to certain species of things, but need not be nonbeautiful. For example, being rough, as applied to a road (as he suggests) is a defect of a road as a road, but could be quite attractive to look at or reproduce in a painting. El Greco's figures are physiologically defective; are they ugly to look at?

In any case, some PQDs are not defects or deficiencies in any sense, and yet they are not, when present in a high degree, beautiful. Sircello admits such PQDs (p. 65): the sourness of lemons, the peach seed taste, the urine smell, the sliminess of slugs. Certain species of lemon must be sour, urine must smell as it does and 'being slimy is a sign of health in slugs.'

Two answers could be made to these 'counterexamples'. It could be maintained that tastes, smells, feels of things and other such properties cannot properly be said to be 'beautiful' in an aesthetic sense. When we speak of the smoothness of good scotch or the feel of velvet as beautiful (p. 61), we mean only that they 'give delight', as tickling or scratching do without (certainly in the latter cases) being aesthetically satisfying. But Sircello cannot

take this line. His whole thesis centres round such properties, which 'have forced', he says, from 'most people' a 'judgment of beauty'. (p. 61)

Secondly, it could be maintained that sourness, sliminess, etc. may to some people be 'distasteful' or 'repulsive', but these are facts of personal *taste* and so irrelevant in judging their aesthetic merits. But Sircello does not take this line either, for he says that 'despite these facts, it seems an unassailable axiom that the beautiful is, preeminently, that which is enjoyable' (p. 65). (He later furnishes two fallacious 'proofs' of this proposition, thereby disqualifying it as an axiom.) He grants that it is a 'natural objection' against NTB to say that 'since what is beautiful is always enjoyable.... these various dislikes are actually counterexamples to NTB—and he admits, further, that 'if this objection has any force, then the whole structure of NTB is completely shattered' for not only do people dislike certain tastes, smells and feels, but also certain colours, mountains, lakes, and many other things, and so 'there will surely remain no PQD of a thing at all that...is beautiful'. (p. 67)

His main strategy of defence is to claim that persons who pose this 'apparent threat to NTB' by giving counterexamples are not really 'qualified to judge' whether these examples of tastes, smells or feels provide real counterexamples (p. 66). He argues: 'Most persons' experiences with tastes, odors, and feels of these sorts are extremely limited. I, for one, have *never* felt a slug, and I've tasted a peach seed only once' but 'fairly extensive experience of a property is absolutely required before comparative degrees of it can be judged', therefore, 'we simply are not qualified to judge beauty or nonbeauty with respect to those properties' (p. 66)

The question of judging comparative degrees is a red herring. NTB has not said that first we must *judge* a property to be present in a very high degree and then, because of this judgment, further judge that it is beautiful. According to NTB, if a property *is* present in a very high degree and, one's faculties being normal, is *perceived* to be such, it must be beautiful. Its beauty would then 'strike' one or 'leap out' at one, and, then, according to the 'axiom', one must enjoy it. All that is required by NTB is that the property should be

experienced as being present in a very high degree. Sircello's further reference (p. 67) to a person 'whose eyes literally hurt' when seeing bright colours and so not being 'able to judge' with respect to bright colours, can be answered by drawing a distinction. The person's eyes might hurt so much that he cannot simply bear to see the colours, in which case, of course, he is not in a position—as a blind man is not—to judge whether the colours are beautiful or not. But, though his eyes hurt, he may still, with pain, be able to bear to see the colours, in which case it does not follow that he is not competent to pass judgment on their beauty or nonbeauty. He does not enjoy seeing the colours for a physiological reason; he may enjoy them in so far as their beauty is concerned. Of course, he may find them nonbeautiful and so not enjoy them.

Sircello's claim that one who has experienced certain properties very rarely is 'not qualified to judge beauty or nonbeauty with respect to those properties' (p. 66) requires to be carefully examined. (1) Even if such a person cannot do 'comparative qualitative ranking', he may still be quite capable of recognising that a property is present in a very high degree. (2) One might not have tasted peach seed or touched slugs very often, but surely one has experienced many unpleasant tastes and slimy things and so could be in a position to do a 'comparative qualitative ranking' with regard to peach seed taste and the sliminess of slugs. In order to realise that a particular slug is extremely slimy one need not compare him with other slugs. (3) In any case, most sounds and colours could not possibly be rare and many of these could have many PQDs in a very high degree. One could find some of these to be nonbeautiful and unenjoyable.⁵ Such cases could not be ruled out by Sircello without assuming what is to be proved and they would be real counterexamples to NTB. According to NTB (we have seen), with respect to PQDs, their presence in a very high degree is a necessary and a sufficient condition of their beauty. These counterexamples threaten the sufficiency-claim. We have seen earlier that a PQD may be present in a low degree and yet be beautiful. This would destroy the necessity-claim. Even if the latter claim is granted that unless a PQD is present in a very high degree it cannot be felt to be beautiful (not- $p \supset$ not- q), the sufficiency claim ($p \supset q$) does not logically follow. Our counterexamples challenge it.

After a rather laborious analysis (p. 69), Sircello reaches the thesis that 'my saying and meaning (that is, "judging") that *X* is beautiful implies that I find *X* agreeable'; in other words, it is a necessary condition of a person's *judging* something as beautiful with respect to *F* that he finds it agreeable with respect to *F*. Let us grant this, though it could be questioned. It means that one cannot, without logical contradiction, say, in the same breath, both 'I recognise *F* to be beautiful' and also 'I do not enjoy it', for if *I* do not enjoy it, it could not be beautiful to *me*. But it is quite possible and reasonable on my part to concede that *F* might nevertheless be beautiful. Because I, not finding it enjoyable, am precluded from judging it beautiful, I am not 'obliged to judge it to be not beautiful' (p. 69). From this Sircello concludes, 'If a person finds an instance of a property disagreeable, ...he is not qualified to make judgments of beauty (or nonbeauty) with respect to the instance of that property' (p. 70). The question, however, is this: Does he judge *F* not to be beautiful because he does not experience it — for whatever reason — to be present in a very high degree (though it might, in fact, be so present for others) and so, like the blind man, he is not in a position to pass a judgment on *F*? Or does he experience *F* to be present in a very high degree and yet does not find it beautiful? In this case you cannot just disqualify him as being unfit to judge, for the required necessary condition — finding *F* to be present in a very high degree — has been fulfilled. He is qualified to judge favourably or unfavourably of *F* and he has judged unfavourably. Such a case would constitute a real counter-example to *NTB*. *NTB* cannot rule out the possibility of a property which is experienced as being present in a very high degree and yet found to be nonbeautiful, by appealing to itself without committing a *petitio*, for the counterexample is questioning the very truth of *NTB*. Fetching in the connection between beauty and enjoyment does nothing to dissolve the above difficulty; it only diverts one's attention away from the central issue.

Sircello's argument about the qualification for being able to judge beauty or nonbeauty rests on a fallacy — the equivocal use of 'judge'. He argues thus: 'If it is known that a person will find all instances of *F*, or those instances in which *F* is present in a noticeable degree, to be disagreeable, then it is known that he will

not be able to judge any instances of F to be beautiful ... If that is so, ... he is not able to discriminate between beautiful and nonbeautiful instances of F , and he is therefore not qualified to judge beauty or nonbeauty with respect to F . But if he is not qualified, then he cannot be taken to have grounds for judging an instance of F as not beautiful (p. 70).

I hope the fallacy is apparent. If a person finds the instances of F to be disagreeable, then—according to our logico-linguistic analysis—such a person cannot, in the same breath, judge those instances to be beautiful. 'Judge' here means believe or 'assert'. He cannot assert the instances to be beautiful as opposed to nonbeautiful. But when Sircello tries to deduce from this that such a person is 'not qualified to judge beauty or nonbeauty', 'judge' means something quite different. It means—as he has himself just said—'discriminate between beautiful and nonbeautiful', that is, consider, like a judge before passing sentence, both sides of the question as to whether F is beautiful or not. If a person has the required expertise he can judge (i. e. consider) whether F is beautiful or not, but once he judges (i. e., decides) that F is not beautiful (and, because it is not beautiful, he does not enjoy F), he cannot, without logical contradiction, judge (i. e., also decide) that F is beautiful. If one does not enjoy F , then—according to the 'axiom'—one cannot find it to be beautiful, but one does not have to find it to be beautiful in order to be able to consider whether it is beautiful or nonbeautiful. It would indeed be queer in a very high degree if in order to judge whether F is beautiful or not I would first have to judge it to be beautiful. Sircello's thesis is like an author saying to a critic: 'If your criticism is unfavourable, it means you could not have understood my play, for, if you understood it, you would have reviewed it favourably.' Authors do occasionally argue like this. Thus the possibility of an unfavourable review is ruled out *ab initio*. Similarly, Sircello tries to put out of court a hostile critic of NTB.

He discusses many problems in the light of NTB, problems regarding intellectual beauty, the relation of beauty to utility and morality, the objectivity of beauty and its enjoyment, and many others. His findings are interesting and often debatable, particularly

about the relation between beauty and enjoyment. However, I believe I have dealt with the core of NIB; the rest is peripheral.

I think his basic idea and plan are misconceived—the idea that “objects” are beautiful because, and only because, they possess beautiful PQDs, that in all PQDs a common feature making them beautiful can be discovered, and that this feature is ‘presence in a very high degree’. He does devote a chapter (Ch. 29) to ‘Harmony and Beauty’, but his concept of ‘harmony’ is very limited. While conceding that ‘beautiful’ “objects” are often beautiful because of the harmony among their parts, and probably more “objects” are beautiful because of their harmony than are beautiful because of any other single property’, he takes ‘harmony’ in the fairly vague sense of “the going together of the elements” that it possesses’ (p. 102). Colours ‘go together’ and so do shrubs. He is content to say that ‘harmony’ is clearly a PQD’, but he does not feel ‘obliged’ to give a theory of harmony (p. 102) and does not think there is much ‘hope of discovering a general theory of harmony’ (p. 103).

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NOTES

1. Guy Sircello, *A New Theory of Beauty* (Princeton University Press, 1975)
2. All page references to the book under review are given within brackets.
3. Sircello's general weakness in argument is shown by the following example (p. 25). After asserting that colours refracted by a prism and reflected on a smooth white surface are unusually vivid, he says, ‘It is a consequence of my theory’ that they ‘are beautiful with respect to...vividness’. He adds, ‘I don't think this is a seriously disputable consequence’. But he goes on, ‘Can any one look at the colours in such circumstances and not be fascinated by their beauty?’ Now, it is indisputable that what he asserts about the beauty of the

colours is a *consequence* of his theory. But then the appeal to everyone's experience of being fascinated by the colours is out of place. If one were to dispute this fact of experience, would he admit that would disprove his theory?

4. Sircello devotes 12 pages to colour and the different ways in which colours can be compared with respect to their vividness. Much of this is interesting and some of it is rather dubious, but, in any case, it does not seem to contribute much to NTB.
5. Of course one may enjoy a property which is not *really* beautiful, because one has poor taste and so finds it beautiful. Examples would, regrettably, be countless. This goes to show that 'enjoyment' cannot serve as a criterion of beauty. Dragging it into the discussion has really served no useful purpose.

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THE CONCEPT OF NEGATION (NISEDHA)

The paper attempts to analyse the concept of negation with a view to understand (i) its precise nature and (ii) delimit its various uses in a logical discourse.

I

To start with, it is necessary to distinguish negation from cognate words like 'absence' (*abhāva*), 'non-apprehension' (*anupalabdhi*) etc. which occur prominently in a philosophical discussion. First of all negation has to be distinguished from absence or non-existence. Strictly speaking 'absence' is a word which is used in an ontological context where as 'negation' has its application in the field of logic. We can talk of absence of a thing *in* or *on* or *as* another thing. For example, we can say, (i) 'There is no water *in* the glass', (ii) 'There is no pot *on* the table' and (iii) 'The pot is not (*as*) the table.' But this should not be called negation of one thing by another thing. Negation is applicable to things. The use of the word 'negation' is thus meaningful only in those contexts where we point out distinction, contrariety or contradiction between two terms. One term can negate another term or, if it is a complex one, it can be self-negating. For example, the term 'black' is negative of the term 'white' but the term 'square-circle' is self-negating. Absence, as distinct from negation, refers to the non-existence of a thing *in* or *on* or *as* another thing. Here is a necessary involvement of spatio temporal considerations but these considerations have no place in negation as they are extra-logical elements.

We have also to distinguish between negation and non-apprehension. 'Non-apprehension' is a word used in an epistemological discourse. Some thinkers in India have regarded non-apprehension as a source of knowing (*pramāṇa*) the absence or non-existence, which is different from and independent of other sources of knowing like perception (*pratyakṣa*) etc. 'Knowledge of absence' is not absence of knowledge, but a sort of knowledge of positive facts. Perception etc. are sources of knowing the positive or existent facts and are incapable of knowing the negative or non-existent ones. But there are negative facts much as there are positive facts. Thus non-apprehension is that source of knowing which enables us to cognise absence

of things. Whether non-apprehension has to be regarded as an independent source of knowing depends upon our view of the nature of absence and the relation it holds with its substratum. But it will be out of place to discuss that issue in this context. It is sufficient for our purpose to realize that a talk about non-apprehension is meaningful only in the context of absence and it seems to have no bearing either on the act of negation or on its cognition. Whether in a proposition any one term negates the other, or does not negate, we know on the basis of presence or absence of negative mark. This can be done either by using a negative mark e. g. 'This pen is *not* white', or by putting a negative mark along with the predicate, e. g. 'This pen is *non-white*.' Apparently the latter proposition seems to be affirmative but it is negative only. The above two forms of negation do not have the same logical value. To say that 'This pen is not white' is not the same as to say that 'This pen is non-white.' In the former proposition it is simply stated that the pen is not white. It is a case of denial of predication. Whiteness is denied of the pen. But in the latter proposition it is not only stated that the pen is not white but implicitly it is also suggested that it is of some colour other than white. Here there is predication of a negative term. It denies one predication but leaves open the possibility of another type of predication. So it is not the case of denial of predication. The former proposition contains a closed statement whereas the latter contains an open one.

So far as the mode of apprehension of the negative relations is concerned, it depends upon the nature of the relations between the terms in question. For example, whether 'black' and 'non-black' are negative of each other or not does not require any empirical evidence, but to know that black is negative of white necessarily depends upon experience. In other words, the terms whose mutual relations we know on the basis of analysis of their meaning, the cognition of their negative relation *ipso facto* depends upon that analysis only.

Similarly the word 'negation' should be distinguished from what is called 'truth-functional negation'. It seems that truth functional negation is not negation proper but a *confutation* of propositions. 'Sugar is not bitter' is a negative proposition and 'It is not true that sugar is bitter' is, strictly speaking, not a negative proposition.

but a truth-functional statement about a proposition. It states that the proposition, 'Sugar is bitter' is not true. The function of negation is to show the distinction or opposition between two terms, but the truth-functional negation refers to the truth value of a proposition, or perhaps, it refers to the truth-functional relation between two propositions. 'Sugar is not bitter' is a proposition in which the term 'sugar' negates the term 'bitter'. But the sentence, 'It is not true that sugar is bitter' is not simple proposition but a meta-proposition. Here no term negates another one. It only expresses the rejection of the proposition, 'Sugar is bitter.'. Its linguistic structure may give us the impression of its being a negative proposition but it is not so because it involves the act of *confutation* rather than that of *negation*. Since in order to make a proposition negative it is not necessary that the terms within it are negative of each other, the sentence, 'It is not true that sugar is bitter' cannot be regarded as a negative proposition. The confirmation or confutation of a proposition does not refer to the relation of the terms involved in it, but points out its relation with another proposition. So when we say that, 'It is not true that sugar is bitter', this in fact points out truth value of two propositions, viz, 'Sugar is bitter' and 'Sugar is not bitter', and expresses confutation of the first and confirmation of the second. To sum up, we affirm or negate a term with respect to another term, but strictly speaking, we do not affirm or negate a proposition, we only confirm or confute it. This confirmation or confutation in no way depends upon its affirmative or negative character. Affirmation or negation takes place *within* the proposition but confirmation and confutation are *of* the proposition. And, therefore, to take negation in truth-functional sense is to overlook the distinction between negation and confutation.

II

From the above analysis it is evident that the word 'negation' has a meaningful use only in a logical discourse, as distinct from other cognate words like 'absence' and 'non-apprehension' which have, respectively, ontological and epistemological uses. The act of 'negation' always pertains to terms and indicates their distinction. One term can be distinguished from the other iff they are different or other. To say that 'a' is *other than* 'b' may mean that (i) 'a'

and 'b' are not identical, or (ii) 'a' and 'b' cannot be together. To say that 'a' and 'b' are not identical may mean that they are not identical in *denotation*, or they are not identical in *meaning*. The first possibility can be expressed as 'A in not A', or 'A is not the same as B'. It is a case of mutual exclusion between terms. Two terms can be said to exclude each other if the denotation of the one does not coincide or intersect with the denotation of the other. The second possibility can be said to refer to the denial of synonymy; in both cases it is denial of sameness.

In the denial of togetherness, the case is slightly different. One can deny sameness of two terms and yet can maintain their simultaneity. But if we even deny the possibility of their simultaneity, then it will be negation of a different sort. For example, we may have two terms having a built-in impossibility of going together because of their contradictory meaning. Phrases like 'square-circle', 'son of a barren woman' etc. are of this type. There may be phrases which do not have such an inner contradiction but may contain an empirical impossibility of coming together, their conjunction is conceivable but not real in the present situation. 'Sky-flower', 'golden mountain' etc. are phrases which belong to this category.

If the above distinctions are logically neat and tenable, it may be interesting to work out their delucative properties.

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THE CENTRAL TEACHING OF GANDHIJI : AN OUTLINE

The outline presented here assumes (i) that social philosophy is a part of philosophy, (ii) that a man may have a philosophy although he is primarily a man of action. It may also be mentioned that the presentation lacks the sophistication in the modern philosophical idiom which is expected in an item to be placed before present day students and teachers of philosophy. Nevertheless, I trust its main purport will be readily grasped. I may also add that even in social philosophy, as a man of action, Gandhiji directly offered decisions rather than arguments and logic in the formal sense had not much value for him.

Gandhiji's real contribution, to my mind, is in the field of social thought and action, and the following propositions outline its main points : (i) While the human being is full of imperfections and limitations, basically he is decent and would and does respond to reason, persuasion and affection. (ii) The norms of behaviour and value in social and individual spheres are identical. (iii) The only end which the human being can set to himself sensibly is Sarvodaya - or the all sided well being and progress of all human beings, specially of the downtrodden. (iv) The fact that the history of mankind reveals a series of conflicts, need not be taken as contradicting the above account of human nature and social life, for history is also being made and there are signs that mankind is realizing the futility of the use of force or fraud. (v) Progress towards realizing the Sarvodaya Society could be seen to be in no sense impracticable if both in individual and social life we cultivate simplicity and decentralization. Simplicity is consistent with the utilization of scientific discoveries for providing amenities to vast masses of people and decentralization does not dispense with a national or even a world-state. (vi) With this view of human nature it follows that the use of force, or dishonesty in any sphere is unreasonable and ought to be avoided. The emphasis on purity of means arises out of this. (vii) Gandhi also indicates the need for an individual to discipline his body and mind in order to make it an adequate instrument to fulfil the characteristic objectives of human life.

As regards action, Gandhi thought basically of the common man and advocated self help in the fullest sense. His political (and

social) programme consisted of two strains – one – non-cooperation of such degree as possible, and the other constructive activity – which included items like Khādi, Basic Education, Village self-sufficiency, Communal harmony, Removal of untouchability and Trusteeship.

Together, his contribution in regard to human and social life seems to me to constitute a new step in regard to human advance and the developments of modern science and technology make it imperative for us all to adopt the direction it suggests.

Gandhi's outstanding achievement is due to the fact that he never spared himself, never neglected details and never gave up his convictions. He was in a very profound sense a born fighter and was ceaselessly active. He achieved that combination of universal love with strict and austere discipline, of the concrete with the abstract – of shrewdness with daring vision which is the mark of extraordinary greatness and is the pre-requisite of outstanding achievement.

I have not, in this short contribution, dealt with what may be called the logical assumptions or metaphysical belief of Gandhiji. For what it is worth, I may state that he has not given any serious thought to the question in a theoretical sense or made any significant contribution to it. This is not to say that the position he takes is altogether invalid or has no substance or truth, but only that Gandhi is here only making use of what is more or less common and conventional heritage. His use of words like Truth and God is basically related to his social and human philosophy and not to ontology or logic. On the other hand, while it is true that Gandhiji did not make a special contribution to metaphysics or religion, it is wrong, as some do, to ignore the religious foundation of all his thought or did or to suggest that his achievement is marred or handicapped by his religious approach. Many eminent Gandhians prefer the term spirituality, but that term is itself ambiguous and may mean little in itself. Gandhi has indeed achieved in the field of social reform and awakening more than any secularist; also with regard to religion he deepened and concretized the religious approach by emphasising that service to God meant service to man.

Gandhi understood his role in life as that of a man of God, the motive force of whose activities was essentially religion and even

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more specifically moral. I have sometimes wondered whether the effort, sincere and intense as it was, was not to some extent artificial and egocentric in a sense in which true spirituality would not be. As one comes to think of it, all stupendous and objective achievement probably has this characteristic and perhaps it is indeed true in a way that the greatest amongst us are bound to remain unknown or unrecognised.

There is another point to be noted in this connection. Gandhi being a man of action with vision, allowed or tolerated compromises although never accepting them as necessary. While this explains his practical success it also, in a sense, vitiates it, as achieved through means of doubtful purity. It is true that Gandhi said this was due to his imperfections and was also right in maintaining that one should always aim at and speak of the highest. But this, at lower levels, opens up a sphere for duplicity which is a dangerous element. Many of Gandhi's professed followers illustrate how dangerous it can be.

No man of action in history expounded and tried to propagate these ideas so clearly and persistently as Gandhi did and these teachings well understood seem to provide the best answer to the problems which are facing the world today. In building up our nation we could not possibly have a better guide. It is in no sense turning back on science and technology but rather suggests how to make the wisest use of them. Gandhi's roles as a man of religion and as a patriot are also important and he has made characteristic contributions in these fields but his achievements here are neither unique nor without serious blemishes. As a result of my study of Gandhi's life and activities and his utterances and in the context of what I said above here are a few observations and points for discussion : (i) Gandhi's extraordinary, moral and spiritual development bears the mark of his initial limitations and his environment (field of action) and is artificial and egocentric in a sense which impairs perfect spirituality. This probably is the cost which has to be paid for impressive and objective achievements. (ii) That Gandhi's teachings are superior to his personality to a greater extent than is the case with many other great men, some of whom are greater than their teachings and achievements. (iii) Gandhi's position regarding the relation of ends and means, and his claim that politics is a proper field of action for a saint are not valid except in a very

special sense and that they do not contradict the position of a person like Tilak which Gandhi deliberately contested. (iv) That, by and large, Gandhi's teaching seems at least today to have made very little impact on national policies and action either official or non-official and that even the best of Gandhians have not, since Gandhi's passing away, shown the courage, the spirit of sacrifice and the sense of conviction which one associates with Gandhi. (v) Neither Gandhi's message of constructive self-reliant activity nor his insistence on the removal of injustice and untruth has been substantially heeded even by persons who admittedly and professedly are genuine Gandhians. (vi) As a result, Independence, which could have meant so much more for the common man and should have truly made the nation, has encouraged indifference, idleness and a lack of sense of responsibility which do not augur well for the future of the country.

During the course of most discussions on Gandhi certain basic points of criticism about Gandhiji's approach and achievement are made. What follows is a brief summary of these points and the replies which could be made to them.

Points of Criticism

(1) The notion of Sarvodaya is a good slogan but understood concretely is found to be self-inconsistent. (2) The peace which Gandhi seems to seek is with justice, and freedom. (3) The landlord and the tenant each is right in his own way and a conflict is, therefore, inevitable. (4) Jinnah was as sincere as Gandhi and there isn't anything to choose between them. (5) Since men differ in intellectual and moral equipment and in the context of their existence the talk of equality of treatment or identity of convictions and views is unreal. (6) To say that we are not bound by history is to ignore proved determination in events. (7) The common man is no good judge of things, specially in the complex life of today. (8) Pursuit of simplicity will reduce men to a hand-mouth existence worthy of animals.

My reply to these points is briefly as follows : (i) Sarvodaya is *not* a slogan; it is an attempt to hold fast to an important characteristic of man and the plea which Gandhi makes is that we should so arrange our affairs as to make this truth about ourselves prevail in the practical situations of life; (ii) Gandhi

never sought peace which was inconsistent with honour, justice and freedom and as a matter of fact, lasting peace is necessarily related to justice and freedom; (iii) The natural inequality between men regarding intellectual capacity etc. is strictly irrelevant to the moral equality which Gandhi believes in and wished to work for. Nor is even intellectual inequality so great as most city-bred conventional academicians are prone to believe; (iv) No conflict is necessary between landlord and tenant to the extent each of them is right and realizes the truth that together they have to make best use of the land and fruitfully share in the goods it produces. This applies also to other spheres of life; (v) It is not correct to say that Jinnah was as sincere as Gandhi. Admittedly, Jinnah took a deliberate pose; only under the circumstances it was effective. Events have actually proved and are proving that even if it is true that Gandhi did not succeed, there was truth in what he said and the acceptance of that alone will set matters right; (vi) The notion that the common man is not a good judge is invalid. Even recent Indian history shows that basically the common man is a sound judge of the situation (so vitiated by appalling leadership) and is decent. He has also proved that he can rise to the occasion in crisis. As a matter of fact, the only hope on the Indian horizon is that the common man is still not unresponsive to good sense, and character; (vii) History is certainly useful and must not be ignored. But any careful study of history itself shows that history is constantly being made and that is done by attending to aspects of man and nature which have been neglected—one such aspect is the essential reasonableness of man. Men of genius, moral prophets and great men of action have always done this; (viii) Simplicity means the refusal to pursue material amenities and goods for their own sake and endlessly. It does not mean turning one's back on the proper use of scientific technology for the deliverance of man from abject dependence on nature. It only gives a much needed warning against thoughtless greed.

Finally, I may say that the kind of approach in the queries raised has its origin in a deep, if perhaps unconscious, resistance to anything out of the way, and unpreparedness to think for oneself and take risks which the achievement of truth needs.

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BROWN ON THE NATURE OF SOCIAL PRACTICES

I will examine here a claim made by Robert Brown in *Rules and Laws in Sociology* regarding the logical status of statements about social practices.

Brown's position is contained in the following excerpts: "Most universal statements about social practices are accidental generalisations and not statements of law. For most such statements of social practices are not supported by any accepted theory. Yet they bar hypothetical cases which these theories would admit." (p. 162)¹.

Citing as concrete example the statement "All Australian prime ministers are male", Brown says this is undoubtedly an accidental generalisation. For, "the fact that until now all Australian prime ministers have been men does not support the claim that every Australian prime minister will be, or must be, male. Even if such accidental generalisations turn out always to hold in fact, at all times and places, this will be a happy accident and not a consequence of there being a law-like connection between the properties in question or more basically of there being a scientific theory from which the generalisation can be derived. There seems to be no scientific theory which would preclude a woman from being a prime minister of Australia, and so the fact that no woman has yet filled that post does not seem to support the generalisation that the post can be and must be filled only by a man. The truth of 'All Australian prime ministers are male' is the result of the historical development of local practice and not of scientific necessity." (pp. 92-3)

I shall try and show that there are good reasons, many of which are available in the text of Brown's book itself, not to be so categorical regarding the accidental nature of universal statements about social practices.

Firstly Brown himself notes :

"Sociologists often confuse accidental universal generalisations with empirical universal generalisations. The confusion arises for

1. All page references are to Brown, R. *Rules and Laws in Sociology*. London; 1973.

sociologists because their generalisations are so commonly based on, or derived from observational considerations rather than theoretical ones. Both sorts-accidental and empirical-are sociological generalisations from observed regularities, and the question whether a given generalisation is merely accidental or is a genuine law need not have a ready answer." (pp. 93-4) Again, "the comparative absence of theoretical laws makes it difficult to distinguish empirical laws from accidental generalisations since we cannot use either theoretical support or subjunctive difference as tests for separating them." (p. 94).

It is not clear why in view of all this Brown is confident that the question of the status of 'All Australian prime ministers are male' has the ready answer that he provides. Whether or not it is itself a law there is surely a glaring type-difference between this statement and the other: 'All the books in my room are octavo size' along with which it is classed by Brown (p. 92).

Secondly, Brown's somewhat dogmatic assertion that even if such generalisations "turn out always to hold in fact at all times and at all places" (other than Australia?) this will not be the consequence of a scientific theory, flatly contradicts the spirit of the warning he gives at the end of his book to critics of the view that successful theorizing in the social sciences is possible. Thus Brown: "The critic cannot anticipate the discovery of explanatory theoretical properties. There are no logical bars to their presence and they cannot be abolished by fiat. We can of course cease to look for them and thus decrease our chances of finding them" (pp. 177-8).

Surely by labelling the generalisation under consideration accidental, Brown has himself decreased the chances of finding a theoretical explanation for the social practice to which it refers.

But apart from the inconsistency in Brown's general argument I am interested to examine his claim in its own right. For it does appear that his conclusion that the generalisation is accidental is largely the result of a very narrowly conceived notion of scientific necessity with which it is contrasted, one that visualises connections only amongst natural kinds. For of course, there is no 'natural' connection between being a prime minister of Australia and being male; the notion of a female Australian prime minister does not violate a physical law of nature. But a very large question is begged

if one infers that a generalisation in the social sciences is not scientific for this reason. Surely only the proven nonavailability of *sociological* causal connection can warrant such a conclusion, which as Brown himself assures us, is not a matter to be decided by fiat.

But let us look at the statement 'All Australian prime ministers are male' afresh. Brown asserts that it supports no counterfactual. Is that correct? Surely it does support both counterfactual and subjunctive conditionals. Suppose for argument's sake the existence of an Australian woman politician who has all the statesmanlike and leadership qualities that go to make a prime minister. Would it be absurd today for someone in Australia to say 'Yes, she's ideally suited, but to have been prime minister in this country she'd have had to be a man?' Clearly not. Again suppose the existence of an Australian prime minister with the 'unisex' nickname Pat. To someone inquiring whether the 'Pat' under discussion is a man or woman, would it be inconceivable that the answer given be 'Oh if it's the P. M. we're talking about, it must be a man'. Again the answer is in the negative. What, one is tempted to ask Brown, *would* support the claim that all future prime ministers in Australia will be male? Brown's simple answer would be 'Nothing; it's a sheer happy accident'. But *that* we know is simply not true, since this is clearly just one concrete manifestation of a highly complex and almost universal social phenomenon broadly referred to as the inequality of the sexes and the result of ages of discriminatory social practice. Now claims regarding social phenomena that stem from well-entrenched social practices are not unsupportable; the practices of the past *do* support them. Of course 'support' here does not mean 'entail'; that it does not in the natural sciences either.

At this point let me make it clear that I am not arguing for a notion of historical necessity. Nor am I attempting to establish that the statement under discussion is a law. Still my criticism of Brown is not born of sheer perversity. Granted that almost all social practices are traceable to some set of historical factors – and to what else could they be traceable? – this fact alone does not tend to rule out the operation of 'scientific necessity' whatever that might mean. In other words the causal connections are no weaker if no stronger than those between the initial conditions and the resulting natural phenomenon in, say, an experiment in physics. Historical antecedents,

I wish to contend, *are* the initial conditions in sociological explanation. That these are far more complex and far more varied than in the natural sciences does not establish that here we deal with phenomena of sheer accident and there with those of scientific necessity. I wish to suggest that Brown's example regarding the sex of Australian prime ministers is about as accidental as the generalisation 'All earthquakes in Japan have a minimum intensity of 6 on the Richter Scale'. In the latter case too we appeal to unique and contingent set of geological conditions (including geological history), that account for the kind of earthquakes that Japan experiences. Yet merely to trace the history of the earth's crust is not to give an explanation; the connection between the historical antecedents and the phenomenon under consideration must be demonstrated to be a lawlike one, finally a theoretical one. The temptation to throw back at Brown his statement regarding theoretical properties in the social sciences: "There are no logical bars to their presence and they cannot be abolished by fiat" is irresistible. For, if these are even in principle available, then no phenomenon that is even indirectly explainable by them can be dismissed as falling outside the scope of scientific investigation.

It would be foolish to deny that the probability of change in the initial conditions in the 'social sciences, viz. in the historico-social process, is vastly greater than that in the natural sciences. Middle level generalisations and empirically observed regularities are thus far less secure than their counterparts in the natural sciences. But to label the former 'accidental' for this reason alone, is to reveal an unwarranted prejudice in favour of a natural science paradigm.

Now I do not wish to underrate the importance of Brown's work, which is motivated by a just concern to throw into relief the distinction between rules and laws. His argument that social practices are the immediate result of rule-following rather than of sociological laws is most convincing. But the inference that hence they are accidental is a *non sequitor*. Brown himself observes:

"At some point, of course, an explanation in terms of rule-conformity (or rule violation) will no longer suffice. The question 'why this sort of universal practice rather than some other sort?' will have to be given an answer that does not merely refer to rule following, since not *every* rule can be followed because still other rules are followed" (p. 119).

What kinds of answers are left when explanation in terms of rule-following no longer suffices? Essentially two, according to Brown:

"The answer may be historical in that it refers to the origins of the practice, to the stages of its development or to both. The answer may be theoretical in that it explicitly cites empirical generalisations and does not merely presuppose them" (p. 119).

Note that even Brown strongly suggests that empirical generalisations are at least presupposed by both.

How would one decide which of these methods is relevant to any given case on hand? The answer one would expect from Brown to this question would be: 'If its accidental trace its history; if its lawlike look for a theory.' This is not in fact that he says. He says:

"Now which kind of answer is given will depend upon how the investigator phrases his question and thus on what he wants to know." (p. 119).

But doesn't this make nonsense of his earlier claim that "the truth of 'All Australian prime ministers are male' is the result of the historical development of local practice and not of scientific necessity" which *debars* the investigator from asking for a theory?

The fact is that in elaborating a very important distinction between intended rule-following behaviour and that which is the unintended consequence of the operation of laws, Brown leans too far backwards, thus obscuring an equally important point that is implicit in the rest of his work, namely that the presence of social rules and conventions is itself only explainable on the assumption of more fundamental theoretical principles. I quote: "The sociologist can also ask why...conventions are so widely followed and so successfully transmitted: why, that is, there has been so much *rule-establishing* behaviour. He can phrase this...as a *specific question about particular sorts of conventions in particular kinds of situations*.... The answer will try to explain the presence of rule-following and will not appeal to it as being the explanation which is required. Hence if the answer is not to be merely historical it must refer to social laws rather than to social conventions." (italics mine, p. 123)

I wish now to turn to something in Brown's claim which might appear to be of minor significance but which in fact tells of Brown's own indecision regarding statements about social practices. Recall

that his claim is only about 'most' such statements, not all. But are not all *social* practices as opposed to purely individual or aberrant behaviour 'the result of the historical development of local practice'? And if an acceptable theory has been found for even one such practice – as according to Brown it must have – can we rule out the logical possibility of either extending already available theories or of propounding more comprehensive ones that will some day theoretically explain *all* social practices? To allocate a 'kind' of statement to a logical category is after all, a conceptual not an empirical matter, but the use of the term 'most' suggests that Brown's statement is a matter of discovery rather of analysis. But one can hardly *discover* that no theory will ever support a statement S.

In the end I wish to draw attention to the distinction between a statement that is itself either a law or at least a potential law and one that is just law like. The former kind of statement serves as a basis for explanation, the latter refers to some phenomenon about which it is assumed that a scientific explanation can be found. Thus from the fact that a statement is not a law it does not follow that it is accidental, for it might be lawlike in the sense that it is subsumable – and here it is irrelevant whether the statement is a pure universal, impure universal or singular – either directly under a law or under another wider generalisation that is subsumable under a law. A number of empirical generalisations which are not laws are lawlike in this sense, for e. g. 'butter melts when heated on a fire.' Surely statements about social practices and regularities of behaviour must be placed along side these rather than statements like, 'All the books in my room are of octavo size'. I conclude that Brown is plainly both wrong and inconsistent when he says: "Many social properties are connected by the regularities of behaviour consequent upon rule-following. These regularities are not themselves law-like" (p. 166).

For he has elsewhere conceded that such regularities are also finally explainable by social laws.

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL POSITION OF JAYARASIBHATTA

While studying Cārvāka Philosophy, the main difficulty, one has to face, is of making original Cārvāka texts available. In spite of the problem whether Cārvāka was a real historical personality, one cannot even get a detailed information of any particular Cārvāka Philosopher. The question, who exactly was Bṛhaspati referred to as the originator of Cārvāka system, is still unanswered. (It is obvious that this Bṛhaspati is different from the so-called Guru of Gods. But we find many ancient Philosophical books confused even in this matter. Even the heretic Jayarāśibhaṭṭa denotes him by the name Suraguru at the end of his treatise.) Therefore, one has to take a serious account of *Tattvopaplavasimha* by Jayarāśibhaṭṭa as its philosophical position is near to, though not the same as, Cārvāka position

The main thread of thoughts presented by Jayarāśi can be stated in his two statements :-(1) One should follow the path based upon the worldly view.¹ (2) Hence, all principles being abolished, all the practices are justified, when they become beautiful due to the absence of thoughts.²

In these two statements, Jayarāśibhaṭṭa puts the principles on the one hand and the worldly practices on the other. By showing that, out of these two sides, one side (i. e. that of the principles) is abolished, when thought over Jayarāśibhaṭṭa established the other side (i. e. that of the thoughtless practices.).

Jayarāśibhaṭṭa says that "Laukikomārgonusartavyaḥ"³ (i. e. one should follow the path based upon the worldly view) is the opinion of those who know the ultimate truth (paramārthavid). This expert of the ultimate truth may not be Bṛhaspati. If we take "Laukikomārgaḥ." to mean the path of life which is based upon the belief in this world alone (discarding the belief in any other world), then the opinion suggested in the above sentence will apply not only to Jayarāśi but also to Bṛhaspati. Bṛhaspati's aphorism suggesting that "There is no other world, because there is no one who belongs to other world" (Pāralokinobhāvāt Paralokābhāvaḥ)⁴ is accepted by Jayarāśi also. But "Laukiko mārgaḥ" does not mean only this, but

also a way of life. In this way of life one of the beliefs presupposed may be called as the secular belief. But it is not the only belief. Only believing in the existence of this world alone (i. e. exclusively) is not the sufficient condition of a successful practice. There are some other beliefs also which may be called necessary. These may be described as, to use the expression of G. E. Moore, the common sense view of the world. This common sense view of the world does contain a strong claim about certain principles. Thus, it may be said that there is no necessary dichotomy involved between the principles and the practice. Here the principles' means the common factors found in human experience and the objects of experience. Jayarāśi has expressed the same idea through the word "Tattva". For instance, he says :—" Now, therefore, we define tattvas. Earth, Water, Fire and Air are the Tattvas and the configuration of these acquires the denotations as body, organ and objects. Is it all that (I want to say)? No! Because (my) indication is different. What is the indication? It is 'to reflect'. What is being reflected here? Earth and the other tattvas are famous in the people. Even these tattvas, when thought over, do not stand for justification. What about others?" (*Tattvopaplava*—p. 1)

Here the tattvas mean the genres of the world. For Jayarāśi, these tattvas, when thought over, do not remain to be true. What remains is dry thoughtless behaviour. Thus the conclusion follows (at the end of his treatise)— "All the practices which have the beauty of thoughtlessness become just." Here the question may be asked, whether such a beautiful practice is possible. On the contrary if it is impossible, i. e., if tattvas and thoughts (of tattvas) are inevitable for any conscious practices, then how can Jayarāśi be in such an ambivalent situation of recognising worldly practices, but not recognizing the thoughts involved in them?

A possible answer to this question is that Jayarāśi is not talking of abolishing the principles as they are held by common people, but of the way in which they are treated in different schools of philosophy. The principles thought about in speculative philosophy are generally treated as if they were transcendental, definite in nature (unambiguous), never becoming out-of-date and so on. For instance, the Naiyāyikas' notion of Jāti ('class') suits to such a model. The Naiyāyikas, not having a strictly pragmatic outlook towards class-

concepts, treat them as eternal all-pervading entities. Jayarāśi cannot tolerate this. He takes this as the monarchy of a Nyāya philosopher and in the heat of argument calls him a beast.

Apart from this uncompromisingly hostile attitude of Jayarāśi, we may say that what Jayarāśi wants to oppose is such speculative principles and the speculations producing them. So in the compound word 'avicarita-ramaniya', vicāra according to Jayarāśi, does not mean 'any thought' in general but the speculative type of thinking.

Of course, I suppose that, this cannot be a sufficient reason for justifying Jayarāśibhaṭṭa. Though his intention may be to oppose the orthodox and dogmatic views of philosophers, actually he has not stopped there only, but has opposed other common beliefs also. For example, commonly we do hold that we may have sometimes illusion and sometimes (or, rather, many times) sure and true cognitions. We also hold that in perceiving the things what we really perceive is the material objects and not merely sense-data. If we were always under the impression that what we are perceiving is merely the sense-data, then our common life would be impossible. But in *Tattvopaplavasīmha*, we find that these common beliefs are also denied and refuted by Jayarāśi. According to Jayarāśi—, for instance, we cannot distinguish between true and false cognition.⁷ What we see are the forms (shapes) or percepts and not the material objects. Any case of cognition delimits itself by its own object,⁸ it does not go beyond that. This is such a sceptical position that is unable to validate worldly practices that are commonly experienced. But the conclusion drawn by Jayarāśi that 'Thus all the tattvas being refuted etc.' suggests that from such a sceptical position, one can imply a receptive view towards worldly affairs. And thus the programme of Jayarāśi becomes ambiguous.

Still, while opposing Jayarāśi by pointing out that his scepticism cannot imply the defence of commonsense but rather it implies the opposite of it, one cannot neglect the strength of his sceptical arguments. His scepticism is of a peculiar kind, which does not seem to have been held by any other branch of philosophy in ancient India. That is why his position was given a new name by Vidyānandin (a scholar of the 10-11th Century A. D.) viz. *Tattvopaplavavāda* (a doctrine which is framed so as to abolish all the principles).

Jayarāśi starts his attack with two basic formal principles which, according to him, his opponent has to accept. (If these basic principles are not accepted by the opponent, then the refutation of all principles is pre-established.) These are as follows :— (1) The true cognition can be established only by defining it properly.¹⁰ (2) The reality of the objects of cognition is dependent upon (the establishment of) the true cognition.¹¹

Here the so-called principles or genres of the world are the objects of knowledge, and the reality of them becomes dependent ultimately upon the proper definition of true cognition. According to Jayarāśi every proposed definition of true cognition commits the fallacy of *petitio principii*. Traditionally, in Indian Logic, *petitio* (*itaretarāśraya*) is not taken to be a fallacy of definition. By definition, the definition means the distinctive feature of the definiendum (i.e. the concept or object that is to be defined) which is devoid of any of the three fallacies, viz, being too narrow (*Avyāpti*), being too wide (*Ativyāpti*) and being impossible (*Asambhava*). In other words, if *p* is the definiendum and *q* is the definians (i.e. the term or conjunction of terms in which we define the definiendum) then *q* must be a distinctive feature of *p* and there must be logical equivalence between *p* and *q*. (*Avyāpti* would occur when *q* implies *p*, but *p* does not necessarily imply *q*. *Ativyāpti* would occur when *p* implies *q*, but *q* does not necessarily imply *p* and *Asambhava* would occur when *p* and *q* imply the negations of each other. In all these three cases there would not be equivalence between *p* and *q* and thus the definition will become fallacious).

In this list of fallacies of definition we do not find the mention of *petitio*. But Jayarāśibhaṭṭa does *opine the petitio principii* (*itaretarāśraya*) to be a fallacy of definition. And I think that from a certain point of view (which I call a pragmatic point of view) Jayarāśi is right. This is as follows : The intention in defining a term is making the term known clearly and distinctly. So, if a definition is to be pragmatically significant, at the moment when it is presented, its definians must be known clearly and distinctly. The function of the definition, then will be to bring us from the (clearly and distinctly) known definians to the definiendum not known clearly and distinctly, and make the definiendum known, by pointing out the definitional equivalence between them. But if we

need the clear cut knowledge of the definiendum for the clear cut knowledge of the definians themselves, then there would occur the fallacy of *petitio*. In the present case, the definiendum under consideration is the clear cut knowledge itself. So when any so called proper definition of clear cut knowledge is given to us, if it is to be pragmatically significant, we must already have the clear cut knowledge of its definians. But whether we have the clear cut knowledge of the definians is dubitable because we do not know clearly and distinctly, what the clear cut knowledge is (which is our definiendum). Thus, it is a case of *petitio*.

While criticizing the definition of *pratyakṣa* (perception as true cognition) Jayarāśi's main attack is on the term "*avyabhicārī*" which is one of the definians. If "*avyabhicārī*" means "that which is given by non-defective sense organs", then according to Jayarāśi, the question arises: 'how is the non-defectiveness of sense-organs known?' It is of course not known by perception. If it is inferred from the true perception of the object itself, then it is a clear case of *petitio*.

If, on the other hand, the term *avyabhicārī* is taken to mean that which gives the 'volitional success' (*prayatṭisamarthana*), then apart from other objections, Jayarāśi raises a question whether this meaning of the term *avyabhicārī* is known or not. He asks - "Is this (meaning) known or unknown? If it is unknown how do you say that it is (the meaning)? And if it is known, then how do you know that this knowledge satisfies the condition of being *avyabhicārī*?"

While considering other definitions also he repeats the same kind of objection. It is rare, however, that a philosopher questions every definition of the cognition. In the history of Western Philosophy, an exceptional case can be quoted, that of Sextus Empiricus, an ancient Greek Philosopher, who raised a similar question in the following words: "By what means, then, can we establish that the apparent thing is really such as it appears? Either, certainly by means of a non evident fact or by means of an apparent one. But to do so by means of a non-evident facts is absurd, for the non evident is so far from being able to reveal anything; on the contrary, it is itself in need of something to establish it. And to do so by means of an apparent fact

is much more absurd, for it is itself the thing in question and nothing that is in question is capable of confirming itself."

One of the possible ways of getting rid of this danger is to take a position that the truth of any cognition is self-evident or it is intuitively determined and any how does not need any definition at all. If this way is accepted, then one has to face the difficulty of accepting contradictory cognitions to be true, when two persons have two mutually incompatible cognitions about the same thing and at the same time.

The alternative way of getting rid of this danger is to say that no cognition can be determined to be true. Jayarāśi goes by this way. Here it is to be clearly noted that by saying that no cognition can be determined to be true, Jayarāśi does not mean that every cognition is necessarily false, i. e. illusory. As he has denied the so-called knowledge (i. e. true cognition) he has denied illusion also. Here what Jayarāśi asserts is the indistinguishability between true and false cognitions ("satyetaravijñānayoḥ vibhāgābhāvaḥ abhyupagantavyaḥ"). For him, every cognition has some object (which is, according to him, the content of that cognition). But from this it does not necessarily follow that the object of cognition also exists in ontology. When Jayarāśibhaṭṭa uses the words like *avabhāsa*, *vijñāna*, *jñāna*, *buddhi*, it is not in the sense of the English word 'knowledge' (which generally means true cognition), but it is in the sense of cognition in general. Here, one has to take note of the distinction between illusion and appearance (*bhrama* and *avabhāsa*). Illusion is illusion of something and illusion on something. That is to say, illusion has some existential import (of which it is an illusion), as well as an existential support (*adhiṣṭhāna*). But appearance may have neither of them. G. E. Moore, for example, while explaining Berkeley's philosophy, says that, for Berkeley any appearance is not an appearance of anything. Thus, just by denying that no cognition can be proved to have ontological import, we cannot assert that every cognition is an illusion. For Jayarāśi any cognition is limited by its object ("Svaṛiṣayaparyavasāyino hi buddhayaḥ"). It is like a sense-datum theorist saying that there cannot be unsensed sense-data. Any sense-datum is by definition and any sensation is by definition limited by its sense-data. Jayarāśi

instanciates the objects of sensation by calling them *Rūpa*, *Ākāra* sensed and so on. He regards the object of cognition as the content of cognition (*upādāna*) and ultimately identifies the objects with the cognition itself. ("Vijñānsyapi rūparupatā prapnoti", "Akāra kadambatmakam Jñānam prasakteṁ"). By identifying the object of cognition with the cognition, he denies the possibility of there being pure cognition. Even when we try to cognize the cognition itself we do not directly cognize the pure cognition, but only conceive of it. It is like David Hume identifying mind with the bundle of impressions and by that denying its separate existence.

Almost all the schools of thought in India had accepted the distinction between the knower and the known. Vijñānavādi Buddhist school was an exception. It denied the external object and held the position that all cognised forms are the forms of cognition. For a Vijñānavādin, pure cognition was the ultimate reality to be achieved. Jayarāśi does not agree with this. For him the cognition is reducible to the forms and not that the forms of cognition are ultimately reducible to the pure cognition, as according to Vijñānavādins. Thus denying, on the one hand, the principle of the classification of the material world and reducing the objects of sensation to sense-data Jayarāśi avoids the realistic and materialistic view of the world and reducing, on the other hand, the cognition to its content, he gets rid of idealism.

Of course, one has to note here that this thesis of reducing cognition to its content has not been stated by Jayarāśi very conclusively. According to him this thesis does not remain desirable, because we already assume our cognition to be basically one, assuming different contents at different times, and our thesis is contradictory to this assumption, Jayarāśi suggests this thesis while advocating Bṛhaspati's aphorism viz. "Paralokinobhāvāt" etc. i. e. there is no other world because there is no one who belongs to the other world. Though it is not clear how he uses this thesis to prove Bṛhaspati's aphorism, it is certainly clear that he upholds the aphorism with complete approval.

When on the other hand, Jayarāśi considers another aphorism of Bṛhaspati, he does not approve of it fully. This other aphorism, is

in Jayarāśi's words "Śarirādeva" that is to say, "Life is only the product of body". This aphorism as explained in *Sarva-darśana Saṅgraha*, "Tebhya eva dehākāraparīṇatebhyaḥ kiṇvādibhyo mādaś-aktivat caitanyamupajāyate" (SDS, Cārvākadarśane) is in an inferential form, and in the same book Mādhavārcārya states that Cārvāka do not accept inference as valid means of knowledge. These mutually incompatible views must have been stated by Cārvāka thinkers before Jayarāśi. These give rise to a contradiction and Jayarāśi is aware of it. Dharmakīrti, the Buddhist philosopher had advocated two kinds of inference, viz. natural and causal (Svabhāvānumāna and Kāryānumāna), the second of which was the inference of the cause from the effect. Thus, the famous inference of fire from smoke on the mountain was an instance of the causal inference, where the fire is supposed to be the material cause of the smoke. Now, Jayarāśi argues that if we agree that such an inference is a proper instance of inference then we will have to agree that the material cause need not be of the same form (Sajātīya) as the effect, and utilising this liberty we may be in a position to say that body is the material cause of the life in it (though body and life or body and consciousness are utterly of a different nature). If, on the contrary, we affirm that material cause must be of the same nature as the effect, then we cannot establish the causal connection between smoke and fire and thus the so called causal inference itself comes to an end. This argument of Jayarāśi suggests that he does not approve categorically Bṛhaspati's thesis (regarding the causal relation between mind and body).

Thus, from various evidences, it is clear that Jayarāśibhaṭṭa is not in full approval of Bṛhaspati, the so-called originator of Cārvāka system. At the end of his treatise he declares it and says that the doubts, which did not arise even in Bṛhaspati's mind, may be found raised in this book. We see in *Tattvopaplavasimha* that Jayarāśi approves of those popular doctrines of Cārvāka, which are negative in nature, e. g. denial of the other world, denial of inference as valid means of knowledge etc. But he is not in full agreement with the positive doctrines of Cārvāka e. g. accepting four gross elements to be the classificatory principles of the world, accepting the causal connection between body and mind etc.

In spite of this negative contribution we have seen that, Jayarāśi

has given some positive thoughts to some central problems of philosophy. They may or may not be acceptable, but certainly at the first place they are not popular Cārvāka thoughts but new and original and at the second place they try to give new answers to the old questions.

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NOTES

1. *Tattvopaplavasimha* (Go. Series Vol. No. LXXXVII, 1940)
(Laukiko Mārgonusartavyaḥ -p. 1 line 6).
2. *Ibid*, p. 125 line 11
(Tadevānupapluteṣu tattveṣu avicāritaramanīyāḥ sarve
vyavahārā ghatante iti).
3. *Ibid*, p. 1
4. *Ibid*, p. 45, line 12
5. *Ibid*, p. 1 line 10-14
6. *Ibid*, p. 6 line 15
7. *Ibid*, p. 11 line 18 (Anenaiva vartamānā satyataravijñānayoḥ
vibhāgābhāvaḥ abhyupagantavyaḥ).
8. *Ibid*, p. 14 line 23
9. *Ibid*, Introduction, p. vi-vii
10. *Ibid*, p. 1 lines 15-13 (Sallakṣaṇibandhanam mānavyavas-
thānam
11. *Ibid*, p. 1 line 16 (Mānanibandhanā cameyasthitiḥ).
12. *Ibid*, p. 3 lines 13-15
13. "Against All Logicians" Sextus Empiricus (Referred to by
Hamblin in *Fallacies* p. 95)

14. *Ibid*, p. 11
15. G. E. Moore; *Some Main Problems of Philosophy* (1953) p. 21.
16. *Ibid* p. 14
17. *Ibid* p. 45, lines 9-10
18. *Ibid*, p. 45, line 24
19. *Ibid*, p. 45 lines 24-25 (anīṣṭatām caitat advayarūpatvena abhyupagamāt)
20. *Ibid* p. 88, line 9
21. *Ibid*, p. 88, lines 1-4
22. *Ibid*, p. 88, lines 21-23
23. *Ibid*, p. 125, lines 13-14

SOME COMMENTS ON LOCKE

"..... an objective perception is knowledge "

Immanuel Kant.

Locke's revolt against scholasticism took the form of denying the possibility of innate knowledge and showing how we come to have knowledge by the observation of particulars in experience. In fact he undertook to show that we can explain all that we can claim to know, not by presuming any native legacy either from a source independent of any experience or from the evolutionary process of the development of human race, but by the patient analysis of what we gain from experience and how we gain it. In doing this he was impressed and influenced by the development of the physical science of his time. And we have every reason to presume that he was well versed in the scientific developments of his day. He was convinced that the basic materials of knowledge is derived from experience, and, in his opinion, nothing more than this was required to build up the total edifice of knowledge. So an appeal to experience was the basic foundation of his system of knowledge. In the course of delineating this development of knowledge from experience Locke made use of some of the ideas which were prevalent in his time. And it seems that despite the difficulties that his critics have found formidable in these ideas, Locke seems to think that either these difficulties do not matter or that they are not, as a matter of fact, so formidable as they are made out to be. It is in a sense inevitable that Locke subscribed to the prevalent scientific opinion in his time. The physical science had made spectacular progress in his time and this progress of physical science was the result of the methods of observation and experiment of which Galileo can be taken as the initiator in modern science. At least one reason of Locke's dissatisfaction with the scholasticism is that for the scholastics, as he understood them, knowledge was based on the authority of reason unaided by observation and experiment. Their method was that of ratiocination and verbal disputation and this method, by dividing the things into genera, and species, gave us, in their opinion, the knowledge of the essential nature of things. But in practice this had the effect of justifying dogmatism

and credulity. So devastating was this effect that the respectable done of Pisa would rather not believe their own senses when they were subjected by Galileo to his experiment of dropping two bodies of unequal weights from the tower of Pisa to witness that they reached the ground exactly at the same time. Also the eventual persecution of Galileo speaks volumes for the hold of the dogmatism and credulity.

As against this Locke saw great hopes in the methods of observation and experiment on which the contemporary science was based but he restricted himself to this only. Some contemporary scientists were already beginning to employ the hypothetico-deductive method but Locke was too preoccupied with the scholastics to take enough notice of this. For Locke authoritative knowledge can be based only on the observation of particulars. So convinced he seems to be of this that he decided to show how knowledge is possible only on the basis of an appeal to, and an examination of what is contained in, experience. No innate knowledge, as innate, could ever be authoritative.

Locke believed in the existence of the external world and he also believed that the nature of this reality is essentially knowable. The problem was to explain how we know about it though the problem of what we can claim to know could not be kept much separated from this. So restrictions on what we can claim to know were inevitable. In explaining how we come to know anything Locke made use of certain prevalent theories, namely, the distinction between the primary and secondary qualities and also what is called the representative theory of perception. It is true that Locke was not the author of the distinction between the primary and secondary qualities. He took it from the 'corpuscularian philosophy' of Boyle. But he made use of this distinction to explain what we can claim to know and possibly how. Also, the representative theory of perception was something that Locke found in the air so to speak and he used it to put across his distinction of primary and secondary qualities. This distinction is not based strictly on the representative theory of perception, though Locke as a matter of fact developed it in such a way as to give the impression that the two stand or fall together. Though Galileo can be credited to be the originator of the distinction between primary and secondary

qualities, Locke borrowed it from Boyle's philosophy. Similarly, some form of representative theory of perception was inevitable for Locke to accept because he made a distinction between what the mind perceives immediately or directly and what we come to know mediately through what is perceived immediately or directly. Berkeley in particular was very critical of the distinction between what is immediately perceived and what is not and, convinced that this is the same as the distinction between the primary and secondary qualities, proceeded to show that everything that is perceived is perceived directly or immediately by the mind and in effect to show that there is no valid distinction between primary and secondary qualities. But, for Locke, the two distinctions do not coincide and, moreover, he does not develop independently the representative theory of perception nor does he defend it. He simply made use of it to put across his distinction between primary and secondary qualities. However, the major source of the confusion is the inconsistent and careless manner in which Locke uses the term 'idea'. He was concerned throughout to show that the materials of knowledge were derived from experience only and thus our knowledge of the external reality was composed of nothing but this material. Yet the distinction between the primary and secondary qualities and some form of representative theory of perception form an integral part of his system and they cannot be removed from his doctrines without requiring serious amendments in it and even rewriting it.

Locke made the term 'idea' do a number of jobs. As such there is quite an obvious inconsistency in his use of this term. Broadly speaking he used the term 'idea' to mean whatever we directly perceive or what we are immediately aware of when we claim to see anything and also to mean 'the modifications of matter' that caused such perceptions in us. He expressly defines an 'idea' as 'whatsoever is the *object* of the understanding when a man thinks' and obviously this is too wide. But relevant to our purpose at the moment is the distinction he makes between 'perceptions in our mind' and 'the modifications of matter in the bodies that cause such perceptions in us.' While introducing the distinction between primary and secondary qualities he proposes to call only the perceptions in our minds 'as the ideas' but he does not stick to

this as he proceeds. In this sense the ideas are what we are directly aware of when we perceive an object and it is through ideas so understood that we become aware of the thing that produces those ideas in us. Ideas thus acquaint us with the external reality or external objects. At the same time he seems to maintain that the mind can be directly aware of nothing but its own ideas. In this sense, the external objects or external reality is known only indirectly through the ideas it produces in us. We know the external reality or objects because our ideas conform to the external reality or objects.

Locke introduces the distinction between the primary and secondary qualities by examples. So the primary qualities are such qualities as shape, size, position, motion or rest, and number; he throws in solidity also but it has caused him some difficulties and constant modification of his views about it. Secondary qualities are such qualities as the colours that we see, the sounds that we hear, the smells that we smell, the heat and cold that we feel and so on. The primary qualities belong intrinsically to the material object while the secondary qualities do not belong intrinsically to the material objects. The secondary qualities are 'powers' in the objects 'to produce various sensations in us'; they are nothing in the objects except this. As Mackie points out, the manner in which this distinction is drawn and described gave rise to the opinion, prevalent to this day, that the secondary qualities are in the mind i. e. they exist in the mind, whereas it only means that they are mind-dependent.

It is significant that the primary qualities are countable, i.e. they admit of measurement whereas the secondary qualities are not. The progress of the physical science has, in large measure, been to the use of mathematical methods, and as such the physical sciences have developed and progressed as a result of concentrating on the characteristics which are countable. But the physical science as such does not tell us that the qualities alone are intrinsic to the material objects. This is the step taken by philosophy. So to show that physical science has progressed as a result of the its concentrating on the primary qualities will not be an argument in favour of this distinction. Moreover, philosophers also do not treat this distinction as finally tenable. Russell, for one,

calls it a mistaken distinction albeit one which physical science has found useful and thrived on. But, following Mackie's suggestion, the distinction between primary and secondary qualities can be shown to be justifiable in the following manner. The ideas of both the primary and secondary qualities are in the mind. But the ideas of the primary qualities resemble those qualities in the bodies. But the ideas of secondary qualities are powers of material thing to produce those ideas in us. So the ideas of secondary qualities are totally different from not only these powers to produce them but also from the grounds of these powers in the material objects. So the colours, as we see them, are not literally in the things themselves nor the sounds as we hear them. They cannot be even the determinates of the categories of the medium through which the objects affect us. But the primary qualities are the determinates of the same determinables of which 'the shapes as we see' and 'the sizes as we see' are determinates. As such, the distinction between the primary and secondary qualities looks quite plausible. Yet, in spite of the independent support that the distinction can derive from Aristotle's distinction between common and special sensibles which almost coincides with it, the stronger justification can come from showing the initial plausibility of the representative theory of perception.

Locke himself did not specially develop or defend the representative theory of perception. He simply made use of it to serve his main purpose of showing that the material of knowledge derived entirely from the experience and from no other source. This is also called 'the picture-original theory'. In whatever form it is enunciated the representative theory is open to the basic criticism, namely, 'how shall the mind, when it perceives nothing but its own ideas, know that they agree with the things themselves?'. Locke was aware of this as is clear from his own arguments against the similar theory of Malebranche. But, as Mackie points out, Locke is not disturbed by this criticism because, unlike Malebranche, Locke assumed a causal theory of perception. So according to Locke, what for Malebranche are insoluble difficulties are not so formidable or insoluble for himself on the basis of his causal theory of perception. 'Simple ideas are the natural and regular productions of things without us'.

Locke's theory essentially come to this that certain of our ideas 'conform' to things without us. This clearly shows that the ideas of primary qualities conform to the patterns of material objects whereas secondary qualities do not so conform. Mackie introduces here what he calls intentional objects : what I see is necessarily as it looks to me, independently or whether what I see exists or not. This sense of intentional objects nearly coincides with Locke's ideas in the sense of 'perceptions in our minds'. Thus the resemblance of an idea with object would mean that 'the objects are in this respect exactly 'as they look in the strictly sensory sense of look'. The normal function of our perception is to inform us about external things and compensations enter automatically in ways that help it to perform this function efficiently. This is verified by the experience of those who use the numbered glasses for the first time. This is also supported by the 'unconscious automatic interpretation' in normal adult perception, in virtue of which the visually coloured surfaces are rightly seen as objects of their respective kinds.

All this may not succeed in making good the claim that we have direct awareness of the existence of external objects because what we directly perceive are nothing but 'ideas in our mind'. The main butt of the argument against the causal theory of perception is that we cannot rightfully claim to know the external objects to be the causes of the 'ideas in the mind' as their effects because we cannot argue from the observed effects to their unobserved causes, unless at least on some occasions the effect is seen to follow the cause. But, as Mackie points out, modern physics seems to do exactly this, namely, that it explains the behaviour of large-scale things as being caused by atoms and sub-atomic particles. But the latter are not observed at all, they are inferred from the behaviour of those large-scale objects which they are supposed to cause and explain. Mackie's explanation here is that both the causes and the causal laws that connect them with the effects are introduced here as parts of a system of an explanatory hypothesis. Such an hypothesis can explain, in regard to the external reality, the continuous existence of things and gradual changes where appearances are dis-continuous. And it can do this much better than the phenomenalistic hypothesis. Especially, phenomenalism cannot

rightfully explain the sudden springing into existence, repeatedly, of remarkably similar appearances. Similarly, direct realism does not recognise percepts i.e. 'the things as they appear to us' and as such realism is not disturbed much by such problems, especially not in the form in which it confronts the representative theory of perception based on the causal theory of perception, with its distinction between the primary and secondary qualities. Even so a radical sceptic may still question our very right to infer the existence of external reality on the basis of the distinction between appearances and reality. Here we can make the argument look plausible even against a radical sceptic by insisting with Mackie on the essential simplicity of, what he calls as, the explanatory hypothesis which in Mackie's opinion gives initial plausibility to realism. This simplicity consists in its 'elimination of unexplained coincidences'. This, Mackie explains as what the superiority of Copernican to Ptolemaic hypothesis mainly consists in, namely, that the separate but coincident epicycles of 365 days in a Ptolemaic account of motion of the planets disappear, in the Copernican hypothesis, into the single revolution of the earth round the sun. This is akin to the simplicity of a scientific hypothesis and recommends itself on very similar grounds.

So Locke's distinction between the primary and secondary qualities and the representative theory of perception are plausible accounts of justifying the reception of the materials of knowledge of the external world. No mention is made here, for want of space, of Locke's justification for postulating ideas as the immediate objects of perception nor of his explanations regarding illusions affecting the primary and secondary qualities. Only it remains to mention in passing that once it is recognised that the ideas or the appearances are understood as just how the objects look and that, as Mackie tries to show, that 'real' and 'outside us' do not add any additional features or predicates to the objects, the bridge between the appearances and reality would look quite plausibly enough to be built.

Locke's endeavour to clear the ground in order to give a solid foundation for the edifice of knowledge consisted in his tirade against innate knowledge of ideas and principles. No knowledge

worth the name could be authoritative without empirical support. This is in fact the core of Locke's empiricism. True, he maintains, that: 'Reason must be our last judge and guide in everything' and he defines knowledge as 'the perception of connexions and agreement, or disagreement and repugnance, of ideas'. But the emphasis throughout is on the ideas through which basic materials of knowledge are received by the mind. Locke also speaks of the 'ideas of reflection' through which we become aware of the operations of our mind. So the mind becomes aware of its own activities such as comparing the ideas with one another, calling up ideas from the memory, separating simple components of complex ideas and combining them together to form new combinations, associating ideas with one another and with words and using them both to represent other ideas, perceiving relations between different ideas and forming chains of reasoning out of such perceived relations. It is important to remember that Locke was responsible for building the school of associationist psychology, known as brick and mortar psychology. So Locke claims to be introspectively aware of such operations of the mind as mentioned above. He forcefully denied the possibility of innate knowledge of ideas and principles by showing that what was claimed in his time as innate was, as a matter of fact, not innate at all. That his attack was very hard hitting and had gone home is amply borne by the type and amount of criticism that he had to face. And there is reason to believe at least that no one after Locke has tried to justify what in fact he has criticised as not being innate. But Locke is sometimes stated to have anticipated the critical philosophy of Kant though Kant himself criticises Locke's empiricism and his use of ideas and shows how Locke failed rationally to account for the pure concepts of understanding on the basis of his empiricism. Yet in so far as Locke admits certain propensities of the mind, he can be construed in this sense to have anticipated Kant's critical philosophy. Locke allows the mind to have an innate capacity to know and he has presumed that the external reality is essentially knowable. A radical sceptic like, say, Peter Unger, may challenge even this. But Unger in effect has claimed to know this much at least and has presented us with a book-length defence of his position of scepticism. I think, barring such radical sceptics, Locke's claim to know will not be seriously

challenged. But Locke, in making this claim does not assume any built-in preference for some beliefs rather than others. The mind is in this sense a clean slate and what we know depends entirely on what experience supplies. Moreover, Locke allows, as Mackie points out, possible innate propensities to see things realistically, to interpret impressions as impressions of persisting things or of repeated processes rather than to accept disorder as ultimate, to reason inductively i.e. to learn from past experience and to make the sort of projections that contribute to our concept of causation. Mackie further points out that, if Chomsky is correct, then the general form of grammar is also innate. It is certainly not Locke's fault that he chronologically preceded Hume and as such could not anticipate the force of Hume's argument against some of the positions that we have found implicit in Locke's philosophy. The so-called force of such later criticisms of Locke is attributable to the tendency to see Locke's positions through Berkeleian spectacles and using them simply for 'target practice'. Again, the classification of philosophers into the Empiricists (namely, Locke, Berkeley and Hume) and the Rationalists (namely, Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz) which is irrational albeit convenient for teaching purposes, has been mainly responsible for taking Hume's philosophical positions as the *reductio ad absurdum* of Locke's empiricism. The dominant trend in the history of philosophy together with the resultant disinclination to pay proper attention to what Locke in fact has said is, in my opinion, responsible for distorting the main thrust of his doctrines and his new way of ideas. Only recently Locke's philosophy is being treated on its own merits as is evident from the recent studies which have been published in various journals and also as independent works. And much of the force of Hume's arguments derives from the weightage that one is prepared to give to the starting point of Hume's empiricism, namely, the impressions and ideas. Some may like to maintain that Hume's initial position that we receive nothing but particular impressions from experience and that all inference about matters of fact must ultimately be reducible to the associations between them and explicable in terms of these only is itself an assumption for which Hume gives no support except rhetorical challenges to go to your mind and find anything else if you can. Confronted with such challenges as these

Locke or a Lockean may maintain that he is introspectively aware of some of the positions we have attributed to Locke. And Kant points out as against Hume that necessity derives from the concepts of understanding and experience can only illustrate this necessity but cannot be its original source. Kant was the first to appreciate the real import of Hume's reduction of causation to constancy and conjunction as is evident from Kant's strictures on Hume's criticism at the beginning of his *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*. It was Hume's criticism of causation that on his own admission, awoke Kant from his dogmatic slumbers. Without going into the problem whether Kant has or has not answered Hume, it can be pointed out that, as against Hume's assumption that there is no necessity between particulars and matters of fact, there is contrary assumption, perhaps going back to Aristotle that there is such a thing as natural necessity and Locke seems to subscribe to this view when he talks of resemblances or common characteristics of things. At least in this sense, things in themselves have general or universal aspects, and if assumptions are to be matched by other contrary assumptions, then the latter have in their favour greater explanatory powers.

Bombay

D. N. Govilkar

REVIEWS

ONTOLOGICAL COMMITMENT. Edited by Richard H. Severns; Athens, Georgia U. S. A.; The University of Georgia Press, 1974 pp. X. 137. \$ 4.50.

This small volume contains essays given at a 1970 Philosophy Conference sponsored by the University of Georgia Department of Philosophy. Although the general theme of the conference was Ontological Commitment, there is still no consensus as to the basic entity or entities constituting reality, the participants have arrived at no general agreement as to 'What there is.'

Richard H. Severns of the University of Georgia and Robert Vorsteg of Wake Forest University focus upon Quine's logically oriented dictum, approached through the channel of linguistic reference and framed within the context of the logic of quantification, that 'to be is to be the value of a variable.' The discussion is ably and competently carried out, although Quine's position is not unreservedly adhered to, for he is accused of not penetrating through to an analysis of the ontological criterion in depth. Syntactical devices fail to reach the criterion itself, and the conclusion is that linguistic reference alone can never provide existential import; it is 'no sure guide to ontological commitment.'

A paper by Romane Clark of Indiana University, replied to by Scott A. Kleiner of the University of Georgia takes up the question of adverb modifiers. The claim is that modifiers attach to predicates rather than to subjects, it is suggested that there should be developed a new terminology in order to specify various types of modifier with its own special pattern of inference and without the need for any very extensive ontological commitment for the modifier or modifiers concerned. There would be no appeal to special entities, nor any commitment to an ontology of events either, what the authors in effect are saying is that, although they ostensibly are carrying out a search for an ontological criterion, they have not found it in their selected area of investigation.

This question of an ontological commitment to a deity is examined by Bowman L. Clarke of the University of Georgia with a critical reply by John Heintz of the University of Alberta. These two papers

more so than the others probably come closest to what might be termed a traditional ontology. Clearly argued with the aid of logical symbolism, the essays centre around the conditions required for one to be committed to some theory that establishes the truth of the existence of God. That God exists necessarily, however, seems to be equated with God's existence actually, but the issue as to whether it may first be required to assume Being in order to explain existence of any kind is not raised.

Charles S. Chihara of the University of California and Robert G. Durton of the University of Georgia return to Quine's criterion and his requirement that any theory of ontological commitment be a deductively closed system. Then the question is discussed as to whether a theory of this kind does, after all, need to be a closed theory. Something that does seem to be more certain, however, is that the object required by such a theory must be found to exist. But this viewpoint is surely an unnecessarily limited one to take, for in any theory it is exactly the object of the hypothesis that may not necessarily exist at all, we verify the hypothesis of a theory but not its object. Neither need the object exist in order to be the value of a variable, for variable terms could be adequately valued in the formal language of an epistemology simply according to the universal notions of affirmation and denial rather than according to objects otherwise existing.

Still another theme runs as follows : the language-linked ontological criterion of a theory is the range of values of the variables of the theory, although, the ontic commitment may be narrower than the language system in which the theory is expressed. This approach, which in general defends Quine's criterion, is given by James Willard Oliver of the University of South Carolina and James F. Harris Jr. of the College of William and Mary. Although Oliver's paper is well-documented, clearly presented and for the most part endorsed by Harris, here again we find essays on 'what there is' clinging mainly to the logical approach as well as looking hard to pragmatic considerations in endeavouring to ascertain reality. The question of the assumption of the criterion properties (corresponding to the predicates of a statement) is thought to be of concern, but the issue could be made one of assuming not the properties, but of simply and necessarily assuming only a bare

assumption. The actual existence of a thing can hardly be said to be ontic or necessary, since in the existence of anything we already possess a proliferation to the extremes of its sufficiency much in excess of its strict necessity.

L. B. Cebik of the University of Tennessee and John Beversluis of Butler University branch out into a somewhat different field, examining the ontological status of events in contradistinction to objects. But a more penetrating analysis could have found far more similarities between event and object, ontologically speaking, than the authors have chosen to project. For example, objects have observable and predicable attributes and so do observable events; we select the relevant data for objects and try to interpret this data and we do much the same for events,

The main issue of this series of essays, having turned upon just what is meant by 'the value of a variable', could have brought into sharper focus the question of whether we should be thinking in terms exclusively of reference or in terms of meaning. Exactly what the 'objects' of a theory should be is hardly made clear. For the most part, the essayists insist upon reaching their ontic criterion by means of a linguistic approach, through the schemata of logic, through the values of a variable and at the same time are convinced that the variable must be associated with and satisfied by objects that exist. It is difficult to shake loose the *existing* or sometimes even the physical object from epistemological and ontological thinking. Nowhere in the pages of this book on ontology do we find a full discussion of being as the criterion or object of reality. Nowhere do we find Aristotle's concept of being as being, which should hold a central place in any approach to metaphysics, touched upon.

In all, then, we have a considerable amount of relevant information contained in six essays, each with its reply, whether the accounts concerning the ontic criterion reveal more truth than they conceal is another matter. Many of the references in the bibliographies are of comparatively recent date, having been published within, say, the last thirty years. Only Clarke and Heintz in essay number three pretend to be at all historical in their research.

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A. W. J. Harper

Paul Tillich : *An Essay on the Role of Ontology in his Philosophical Theology*. By Alistair M. Macleod. London, England : George Allen and Unwin Ltd., Agincourt Ontario, Canada : Methuen. 1973. pp. 157. \$ 6.50.

Paul Johannes Tillich grew up in Prussia where his father was an Evangelical minister, but emigrated from Nazi Germany in 1933 at the age of 47. Tillich is described as a Christian Existentialist, a constrictive thinker and an innovator, and as a theologian in the United states in the years remaining to him he not only spoke to the modern world, but spoke to it so that it would listen.

Tillich devoted a large part of his life to philosophical theology and was especially concerned to point out the contributions that philosophy is able to make to theology. An admirer of Parmenidean thought his main interest appears to center on the endeavour to answer the ontological question which may be taken as common to both disciplines, i. e., What is the nature and meaning of being? Professor Macleod of Queen's University singles out and critically analyses this aspect of Tillich's work. Gathering relevant material from Tillich's writings in a closely argued presentation and with a strenuous pursuit of fine detail he carries out a well-rounded and sometimes almost a laboured discussion. It is a serious attempt to expose both the strengths and weaknesses of Tillich's system.

Always strong on ontology, Tillich clings to an interdependence between ontology and theology, but it may be that in surrendering a personal God to an impersonal metaphysics he has sacrificed too much. Being-itself is identified with reality or God, God is simply the religious name for that which concerns man ultimately. Tillich relies on his ontological approach to the extent of employing a philosophical interpretation of reality as a basis for his criticism of the traditional theistic proofs for the existence of God, and rather than accept a revelatory answer to the basic questions about God and being, he shows preference for the ontological solution.

Although being-itself is the same as God for Tillich, being never seems to be considered absolutely apart from something or other that goes with it. There is much talk of being-itself, being as such being, as being, the power of beings and we also hear about the elements of being, being that has being, being derived from being and the structure

res common to all things that have being. As well, there comes into view the typical Existentialist misapprehension that somehow being discloses itself in immediate experience, in short being seems to be indistinguishable from the being of existence. Tillich's ontology never succeeds in depicting being as utterly unpredicated even from itself, being without mention even of being-itself, or being where God is the name of a reality that has only worship for its meaning. Tillich insists on assigning some kind of structures to a being in which every being participates, whereas pure being should never be thought of as a commonable entity at all and should have no structure to share whatsoever. There is God as Godhead in purity of being and God in existence who creates, a distinction that Meister Eckart, the thirteenth century Dominican would have made, but one which Tillich very much blurs over and appears never to make.

This book is a carefully written work; Macleod spares no effort to probe the depths of those distinctive features of Tillich's system that he has elected to examine. Although the study of reality may be considered to be philosophical one, it also lies along a borderline with theology, and whether or not one fully agrees with ontology as a profitable pursuit, it is a discipline that indisputably attempts to deal with basic issues and with a subject matter that is fundamental to any discourse about the nature of the world of which we form a part. If one's interests lie within this area of philosophy the book can be rewarding. Professor Macleod has done well with an abstruse topic which Tillich never did succeed in making completely clear.

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Mishra, K. P. : *Principle in Contemporary Moral Philosophy* :
Cuttack Students' Store, 1977, Cuttack, Orissa, India;
pp. viii + 164 : Rs. 40/-

The work, as stated in the Preface, is the 'published version' of the author's doctoral thesis of 1967. The topic it deals with is broadly the nature, role and scope of 'principle' in moral discourse as discussed by three eminent contemporary moral philosophers—R. M. Hare, K. Baier, and M. G. Singer. The sub-title of the book reads – "An Enquiry into the Concept of Principle in the Moral Philosophy of ..." these philosophers. Evidently, this topic is of utmost importance from the point of view of both normative ethics and meta-ethics. Indirectly, it is also concerned with the problem of the place of Reason and Feeling in moral life. The author discusses and criticizes 'universalizability' and 'prescriptivity' of Hare, 'moral point of view' of Baier, and 'generalization principle' and 'generalization argument' of Singer. His main thesis is negative. As he says, "My thesis mainly will be critical as I shall try to show the *insufficiency* of the principles given by these authors as justificatory principles or as descriptive criteria of morality." (p. vi) (*italics mine*).

Bringing out the difference between Emotivism and the positions of these three philosophers, the author rightly observes that "these three post-emotive moral philosophers differ from the emotivists in emphasising the necessary relationship between moral judgements and moral reasons or moral rules." (p. 12). It is true that these thinkers have tried to state and defend cognitivity or rationality of moral discourse. Naturally, 'moral reasoning' is the chief object of enquiry. The author holds that all the three—Hare, Baier and Singer—advocate the deductive model of moral reasoning. As he says, "Moral reasoning is a kind of deductive reasoning where a rule serves as the major premise, facts... as the minor premise and the conclusion, a particular moral judgement, is derived from them." (p. 13) This the author calls "the doctrine of rules in ethics."

The whole discussion in fact centres round three important questions – namely, (a) Is moral discourse rational? (b) If it is,

then what is the nature of this rationality? and (c) What is the nature and function of moral rules or principles in moral reasoning? All the three thinkers – Hare, Baier and Singer—answer (a) in the affirmative. As for (b), the author holds that all of them consider rationality of morals to consist in their universality on the one hand and in the deductive model of moral reasoning on the other. With regard to (c), Hare holds that moral principles or rules are universal – imperatives or prescriptions and function in moral reasoning as major premises. (p. 15). Baier has a wider notion of moral rules which contain both individual and social rules of reason (p. 25) and ascribes them the function of justifying moral judgements and consequent choices of actions in moral deliberation. Singer distinguishes between ‘rules’ and ‘principles’ which are more general, more fundamental and sources of ‘rules’ (p. 35). Both these function as justifications of moral judgements.

Now, as the author rightly points out, deductive model of reasoning appeals to one or more ultimate principles to justify moral rules (p. 49). In fact it involves a pyramidal structure of rules with particular actions in the base and some highest principle at the apex. Generalization principle and generalization argument, as suggested by Singer, are two such important principles. Hare’s ‘universalizability’ and Baier’s ‘moral point of view’ are broadly covered by these. The author claims to show that “universalizability as advocated by these philosophers is a combination of the logical thesis of supervenience and moral principle like equality, impartiality etc.” (p. 50) He further argues that “it is not unique in the case of moral judgements,” and as for the moral principles, “they are not common to all moral evaluation.” Supervenience means, far the author, that “if two things are alike in all respect then they are alike in value.” (p. 53)

The general observation of the author that “a moral situation is more complicated than and particular moral rule” (p. 23) is to be borne in mind while understanding the function of ‘rule’ in moral reasoning.

The author rightly points out that Singer’s generalization principle is a formal rational principle while his generalizations argument contains contingent factors like ‘desirability’ and ‘consequences’.

The author claims to show that this argument is fallacious and that it is not relevant in every moral situation as Singer claims. (p. 96)

The consideration of Singer's generalization argument naturally leads the author to the discussion of utilitarian principle as 'consequence' are basic to both of them. The net upshot of the discussion of utilitarianism is that the author on the whole, agrees "with most of the criticisms of utilitarianism made by Hare, Baier and Singer which were intended to show that the utilitarian principle could not be taken as the supreme justificatory principle." (p. 138)

So far the author's job has been negative, that of bringing out the inadequacy of 'universality' and 'utility' as justificatory principles of morality. In the last-fifth-chapter he puts forth his positive views by way of conclusions. The author rejects impossibility of normative ethics; he also rejects its non-congitivity, and accepts the importance of 'principle' or 'rule' in ethics. What, however, he is anxious to show is that 'principle', e.g., of equality is necessary, but not a sufficient condition of morality, that moral principle cannot be taken as major premise and moral reasoning can not be deductive. Further, 'Rule' does not explain the morality of 'saints' and 'heroes' (p. 141). I think he is right in this. His further contention is that no one principle is sufficient; there is plurality of principles. He accepts 'universality', 'equality', 'justice', 'impartiality' etc. (p. 140), as also 'pleasure', though "there are many other things which a rational man wants as intrinsically good besides pleasure." (p. 143) He accepts the utilitarian formula keeping it open by saying that "a man's wants - not only his wants for pleasure—should be satisfied" and calls it the principle of satisfaction which is really a collection of principles. Adding 'equality' to this, he concludes, "there are two most fundamental principles of morality the principle of equality and the principle of satisfaction." (p. 143) Later, he sums both these into one called 'universal satisfaction' (p. 148). It seems that the author unwillingly has made a circular journey from ethical 'monism' - through 'pluralism' and 'dualism' back to 'monism' again! 'Universal satisfaction' looks like an attempt to combine 'universality' and 'satisfaction' into one. But it can not change its utilitarian face.

There is a claim made by the author which seems to be unacceptable. He says that both the principles of equality and satisfaction

“spring from the very concept of rationality when applied to conduct.” (p. 148) I think, we can say this, at the most, of ‘equality’, but never of ‘satisfaction.’ As Kant has shown conclusively what we can derive from mere conception of rationality is ‘universality’ including equality and nothing else. Again, not all wants deserve to be satisfied. This means that the principle of satisfaction needs to be governed by some other principle enabling us to decide what wants may be satisfied and what may not be. The author’s answer to the problem of conflict, of these principles also seems to be somewhat unsatisfactory. He says that conflict between different fundamental principles will always remain there as no single principle can be found to synthesize them. (p. 145). If this is accepted then we are left with a plurality of basic principles without any kind of organization. This is not a happy situation and a normative ethical theory may be said to have failed in so far as it lacks in the systematic unity of its principles. Logically this brings us back to ethical monism as against pluralism.

The book is, on the whole, a welcome addition to the vast literature on moral philosophy as the topic it discusses is of great importance. The points raised by the author by way of criticisms of the views of Hare, Baire and Singer on the subject are significant. But his positive views expressed in the last chapter need much more elaboration than is accorded to them before any remarks are passed on them. They seem to be rather incomplete and raise more questions than answers. The language is loose at places—e. g. “Man desires many goals or values” (p. 138) or “some pleasures are bad for example *revenge, rage, lust*” (p. 142). There are even inconsistent statements, e. g. on page 144, speaking about fundamental principles, the author says “So if one intends to apply them on each occasion then he *can do that*. But he need not, and perhaps in practice *it is not possible to do it*.” (Italics mine.) These are of course minor points. But I feel that a detailed presentation of his positive views would have enhanced the value of the book very much.

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HEGEL AND A DOCTRINE OF GOD FOR THEISM

F. LaT. Godfrey has developed a concept of God on the basis of and moving from Hegel's *Logic*.¹ This formulation, which may be viewed as a rethinking of certain elements of an earlier "British Hegelianism," stands in notable contrast with some other recent formulations of the concept of God which self-consciously reflect moving from principles distinctly informed by Hegel and which have come to my attention. Most of these latter have reflected somewhat more prominently the influence of works more expressive of Hegel's philosophy of history, moving from the premise, it seems not too much to assume, that here lies the greatest affinity between Hegel's philosophy and the classical theological tradition.² History has perennially been a fundamental point of reference for theology and it was, after all, first in the philosophy of Hegel—at least within the modern tradition—that it became a vital concern to philosophy.

Despite a fundamental difficulty within Hegel's philosophy of religion to which the supposition of a common affinity with Christian theology with respect to history gives rise, I believe the presumption that such an affinity exists to be correct. My aim herein as to take note of this difficulty as one which Godfrey's formulation—strategically, I believe—averts, to criticize him primarily for having averted this difficulty at too high a price, and to indicate a direction in which, by a reconstruction moving from Hegel's philosophy of history, I find a more adequate solution to lie than has yet come to my attention.

The difficulty inherent in Hegel's philosophy of religion to which I refer follows from a representation of God as fully actual only in the world—more specifically, in the world as most comprehensively conceived—in history. It lies in answering the question: How does one construe the Divine Nature in this way and yet take account of the relativity of historical events constructed as manifestations of Him? By averting both the kind of appeal to history for the *conception* of God intrinsic to the Judeo-Christian

tradition and the kind of appeal to history as providing the (form and) content of the concept of God which lies at the center of Hegel's philosophy of religion, Godfrey has not found it necessary to confront this problem. By proposing to base his construction upon Hegel's Logical Idea purged of all temporal elements, which he then expounds as a transcendent Divine Creator, he has made the justification of the relation of God to the world secondary to the concept of God. This is with the result that the difficulty to which I have pointed is made extrinsic to the concept of God. A problem in the resulting formulation seems to lie in that the Logical Idea, on Hegel's account, probably cannot ultimately be derived apart from reference to history conceived as the actualization of this Idea.

His averting this problem appears strategic in that it is one which I believe has not to now been satisfactorily resolved within the Hegelian problematic. Apart from its resolution, the appropriation of Hegel's philosophy as a basis for a theistic concept of God must proceed in something like the way Godfrey proposes, that is, by drawing primarily upon the logical and ideal — in short the Platonic — elements within the system and setting aside or relegating to a secondary role the historical elements. I shall show what I see to be inherent weaknesses in — indeed the inconsistency and I should think untenability of — this approach in order to exhibit the importance of, and to set the stage for, at least going some way toward resolving the problem which it averts by a reformulation moving from Hegel but which remains generally and for the most part within the Hegelian problematic.

A notable weakness in Godfrey's position seems to lie in a failure to accord some proper philosophical significance to concrete historical events as expressive of the Divine Nature. I shall show an at least partial solution to the problem above noted, urged by this and other faults, to lie in an alternative construction moving from a specified sense in which a distinction between the form and content of dialectic is retained, that is, is not transcended in the dialectic. On the basis of this distinction 'history'³ and the historical consciousness retain their dialectical (and hence relative) character as spheres within which distinctions do not collapse into an all-embracing identity. These nonetheless are spheres which are con-

ditioned (an ever anew) by the conception of the unity comprehending and containing in their individual integrity all (contingent historically conditioned) discriminations within them.⁴ I shall enlarge and build out from these points. First, however, seeing that the problematic to which the construction to follow is a response will take shape in the critique of Godfrey's thesis, I must accord more particular consideration to this. He writes,

My thesis is that, if we read the Logic rightly, we must regard its content as the thoughts of a divine creator, who is distinct from the world but manifests his purpose in it. We will then have certain pure knowledge of the God of theism, as Absolute Personality and Providence, the Author of the world and eternally concerned with it. Hegel does, as we shall see, frequently speak of the Absolute in these terms, using the language of religion; but his strict doctrine as a philosopher is a metaphysic which finds the Absolute in a monistic pantheism, in which God is the world force or spirit immanent in the world and coming to self-consciousness only in the minds of men who are conscious of it as the Absolute.⁵ It is clear that such an Absolute cannot be identified with the God of theism, to whom we must attribute the attributes of an absolute Subject, whom we can know as not only present in the world but as the Divine Being distinct from it. I contend that this God, whom Hegel as philosopher relegates to religion, is the true and logical outcome of his Logic.⁶

Godfrey's position is based upon a flat rejection of Hegel's view of the thought content of the Logic as the self-actualizing, self-developing Absolute. He affirms, rather, that "We must look on it as the panorama of different levels of *thought* [ital. added] revealed to us in the process of the dialectic."⁷ In addition, we should not import what appears to imply temporal notions into the logical relations of the concepts of the Logic.

To suppose that we should think of this system of thought in the Logic as a self-actualizing universal seems to be a mistake and to confuse our developing view of the content with a supposed actual development of it.⁸

It may be noted that Godfrey here reflects recognition (of what may seem obvious) that a distinction must be maintained between subject (here, "our developing view of the content") and object (here, "an actual development of the content"). It is crucial to the construction to be proposed to note that Hegel *also* with some consistency retains this distinction, even where he *also* develops the concept of an over-arching and comprehending identity which conditions it and within which its polar elements are contained as moments of difference.⁹

It is also to be noted in the above citation that, in emphasizing the *Logic* as pure thought, Godfrey has been led to recommend the elimination of temporal notions from it. This, even while recognizing that this same *Logic* is the form of the world, and hence implicitly, at least, appearing to recognize with Hegel that pure thought is not something which can be arrived at merely as in itself and apart from intercourse with the world, in which, especially at the lower levels of the development of reason (prior to the level at which it gains significant increments of freedom) it is reflected.

As stated in his thesis above cited, Godfrey finds that Hegel's *Logic*, rightly understood, must lead to the God of theism as Absolute personality. His reasoning in this matter moves from his understanding of Hegel's doctrine of pure thought content as the absolute selfdetermining ground of nature and mind, which he rejects. Thus he notes of Hegel's Absolute :

. . . [T]he Absolute is impersonal, unconscious thought, the system of the categories culminating in the idea of personality or spirit, and self-actualized in individual persons who consciously identify themselves with this universal Absolute Spirit. The religious consciousness is then transcended in the mind of the philosopher, and the idea of the personal God of theism must be regarded . . . as metaphorical language, for the Absolute as personality does not exist except in individual persons who as philosophers think the system of the categories as the Absolute.¹⁰

The problem which he finds with this view is that,

If thought-content implies a subject, then thought-content of the world which is not known by us and which has an

immediate existence relatively independent of us, implies an absolute Thinker or Subject; nature, as an object of possible thought for us, must be an actual thought-content prior to our thinking it, and is therefore thought by an absolute Subject.¹¹

Again,

We must be satisfied not only that the dialectic process is valid but also that these universal thoughts are objective and have real being prior to nature and to human subjects who are latecomers into the world.¹²

If we view the continuous system of the categories as a totality, that is, as the ultimate scheme of reality, it will be seen that they involve an Absolute Subject, whose thoughts they are, and not merely a human or finite thinker, as the immanentist doctrine supposes. We may call this Subject transcendent, but it is known by us as the Thinker of the categories, and hence is not externally related to them.¹³

God

is transcendent as eternally thinking this plan as that on which nature and mind depends. If we remember that his purpose is being continually and progressively realized, we shall see that He is also immanent in the world.¹⁴

I shall note several things about the position thus summarized by way of leading into a consideration to which I shall give more detailed attention. (1) It reflects a subjective idealism and in this respect a notable departure from Hegel (and Hegel's *Logic*), who deliberately moved beyond this standpoint if not beyond idealism as such. (2) Godfrey has, it seems to me, precisely located the source of Hegel's ambiguity with respect to a (philosophical) doctrine of transcendence. Having made out that God is actual only in the world and as the mediation of the Logical Idea, Hegel has difficulty (at least in the later *Lectures* within which this arises as a problem) in determining the appropriate degree and kind of reality to be accorded to transcendence — to God before creation or the Logical Idea prior to mediation. (3) I see a problem of con-

sistency in Godfrey's beginning by adopting Hegel's system of dialectical logic as such and then supplementing this by a not only pre-Hegelian but also pre-Kantian argument for a God adequate to think this thought, by a type of reasoning which on Hegel's principles belongs to the level of the mere understanding. If he is to be self-consistent, either his acceptance of the Logic should be qualified in a way adequate to meet this objection (if that is possible) or he must abandon the kind of non-dialectical argumentation which cannot be brought into consistency with it. (4) In this connection, a crucial qualification inherent in Godfrey's appropriation of Hegel's *Logic*, to which he has not called attention, may be seen by reference to the above citation documented by note 11. The supposition is here reflected that we cannot move beyond the point of view for which the duality of thought content and its subject remain unaccompanied by an identity of these polar elements which is seen to have conditioned the initial and continuing apprehension of the duality as such. It remains unclear to me how Godfrey, if he finds it impossible to move beyond this dualism, as his entire formulation evidences, can properly represent his position as having derived as much from Hegel's Logic as he seems to claim, seeing that moving beyond this standpoint is, in one manner of speaking, what the entire work is about. If he rejects this possibility only where it pertains to the concept of God, it is not clear how this selectivity is justified. Godfrey does not distinguish his position from Hegel's in just this way, I should add, since he does not accord recognition to what follows from the fact that Hegel's Identity contains all discriminations within it.¹⁵ If his presentation of what is taken to be the essence of Hegel's philosophy is thus simplified — a simplification which may evidence an inadequate understanding of the term, "*aufgehoben*" (sublated) — this simplification will not do.

I now come to my chief problem with Godfrey's position, which has to do with adequacy rather than with consistency. This is at the point at which it seems to me that — if the problem to which I earlier pointed in Hegel's philosophy can be resolved — Hegel might have a distinct contribution to make. Godfrey's position does not draw upon concrete historical events in the characterization of the Divine Nature. On this account his formulation falls short of reflecting philosophically the best of the Judeo-Christian prophetic

tradition, according to which, I maintain, an indispensable element, at least, of the concept of God is derived by reference to historical events regarded as His acts in history. This want can be corrected, however, only if the problem which I earlier indicated Godfrey's formulation everts at too high a price (measured in terms of the loss of reference to concreteness in his conception of God), can be resolved : How is one to construe the Divine Nature from that which is actual (His acts) in the world — 'history' — and yet take account of the relativity of historical events construed as manifesting Him ?

Before turning to a formulation which is directed toward a solution to this problem, it is to be noted that, in excluding historical considerations from the concept of God, Godfrey is left to take up the relation of God (already "proven" to exist and to have certain attributes) to the world as a secondary matter. By this pre-Kantian turn the problem to which I point is not gotten rid of by this formulation, but only forstalled. Indeed it cannot be gotten rid of, since in one or another form it is intrinsic, if not to the formulation of the concept of God, at least to the philosophy of religion.

I indicated earlier that a more adequate solution to the problem above noted than is to be found in Hegel's formulation moves from the clear specification of a sense in which a distinction between the form and content of dialectic is not transcended but is retained.¹⁶ This must be even while the truth of this duality (and all others) is seen to be conditioned by the unity of the *Begriff* (here, inclusive philosophical concept) in which it is dialectically *aufgehoben*, not only as Logical Idea apprehended as a necessary condition of thought, but in actuality, i.e., as Logical Idea concretely reflected in 'history.' That it is necessary to specify such a sense is owing to the fact that the dialectic under consideration is an account of the sublation of dialectically discriminated opposites into an all-comprehending identity in the *Begriff*. Where the dialectic of history is under consideration, and not merely the dialectic of the Logical Idea, the emerging identity comprehends the most comprehensive opposites, being and thought, which identity is actuality. The specification of a sense in which the form and content of dialectic is not transcended necessarily entails the qualification of the sense in which this identity is held to be realized. What is to be

especially emphasized at this point is that it is not the dialectic of an abstract Logical Idea purified of all temporal elements (as for Godfrey), which is under consideration, but the dialectic of the mediation of this with nature, the natural world the issue of which is 'historical' actuality, i.e., nature apprehended in process, as with its own spiritual aim intrinsic to it.¹⁷

Stated in other terms, it is crucial to interpret the unity of Hegel's *actual* Begriff as having its actuality in the dialectical interplay with the plurality of moments which constitute it. The unity as such of the *Begriff* is not even conceivable except as an abstraction from this actual unity as thus constituted. Certainly some considerable basis for this construction is to be found in Hegel's works, but it does not receive uniform accent or consistent development and sometimes seems to be submerged in an emphasis upon a kind of immanent monism.

Building out from Hegel's position with respect to this matter, process forms of the sort of which he renders an account and which may be found to contribute the phenomenology of contemporary consciousness and the universe may be viewed with regard to their given *connections* as exhibiting in their organic unity their own principle of order and comprehending aim in terms of which the significance of particular members of the series is construed. If such series as are constitutive of individual experience present themselves as ever varied in character and order, nevertheless the most general of these process forms fall into types and into a serial order as well, with the result that their philosophical elucidation as a progressive series can serve to direct attention to the process whereby selfconsciousness and the world determined (in part) by it arises. Hegel correctly saw this to be the case, but failed to call attention to the typical character of members of the series or, what comes to much the same, failed to note the representative character of his account of concreteness. In addition, he over-extended the range of discriminated moments to which a specific order is held to pertain. The knowledge of Hegel's Begriff as actual, even to be consistent with this concept, must ultimately arise from the self understanding itself in interaction with the world which determines it. This self is thus only guided in the right direction by a proximate philo-

sophical account.¹⁸ This matter is rendered less than clear in Hegel's account, which in fact is some way from being fully consistent with it.

In a discussion of Hegel's dialectic of sense perception as formulated by W. H. Werkmeister, I have taken note of phases of this dialectic which it would appear are passed over by some individuals, and others which may be exhibited in a differing order in the development of the self-consciousness of different individuals.¹⁹ As an example of the former, it would appear that some individuals exhibit the dialectic of mutually interacting parts immediately following the dialectic of form and matter with the several intervening developments as reported in Hegel's account as, at most, implicit within these or as variations of them. With respect to the latter, I have noted as an example, following Werkmeister in this general disposition, that there is no evidence that the dialectic of number must follow the dialectic of quality and quantity, which, in the case of a given individual, it may procede. I have also called attention to the fundamental alternation of dialectical definitions, and hence what is determined to be the character of language, which is implied to follow from a variation in the order of discovery of dialectical discriminations.

When we turn to history, the case is similar; if an irreversible movement from bondage to freedom may be taken as the hallmark of human progression and hence of history, as Hegel held, and if the order of certain sub-moments within this struggle are indeed irreversible, it is equally apparent that the order of certain of these as well as the manner in which they are exhibited is varied from culture to culture and from community to community.²⁰ Such variations of order may be expected to be accompanied by variations of conception determined in and by their order. This becomes especially apparent when it is born in mind that the analyses and syntheses which pertain are arrived at in large part by working back from the terms themselves. This forces the abandonment of Hegel's quest for the true order of dialectic, even though a given instance of concreteness will contain within it an implicit order of moments which reflects the uniqueness of the individual and his world, and even though, in the case of some dialectical develop-

ments, the order is unalterable from one instance to another. Thus, for example, there is no circumstance under which it would seem conceivable that the dialectic of subject first encountered as a duality would precede the dialectic of form and content, seeing that the latter must condition the possibility of the former.²¹

If proximate only, a philosophical account of the type under consideration, seeing that it reflects these dialectical forms of transition which characterize the community and which on this account have a determinative influence upon the development of the self-consciousness of the individual within that same community, is by no means arbitrary. It is to be noted that, in addition to having a determinative influence upon the development of the individual, shared dialectic is in turn subject to being continually determined by the dialectic of individual self-consciousness and world.

In such a dialectic, the identity of opposites remains the conditioning ground of discriminations, but the notion of a circularity of the dialectic vanishes with the thorough-going unalterability of order. Either this, or it becomes a circularity of certain more primary moments only, such as nature, as such, and self-consciousness, as such, which along with certain of the sub-moments of each, cannot be denied as constitutive of every instance of concreteness. The very notion of circularity, even as thus restricted, seems to be undermined by the fact that dialectical forms have no actuality except as forms of processes in concretion and the fact that concretion always has novel elements within it and is hence always novel in content. Hegel recognized that dialectical forms have no actuality except as forms of processes of concretion, although it seems to me that in not according recognition in a proper way to the plurality and variety of things — sometimes even regarding them as the mere sport of Spirit — he failed to press this with consistency. Where this principle is properly observed, the affirmation of the identity of opposites in particular instances does not diminish, but enhances, by inference, the status of opposites as such not yet mediated to unity, that is, not yet exhibited in their full concreteness and thus in unity with their determining ground. The point is crucial for the affirmation of the world viewed as contingent. Thus particular concrete opposites yet unmediated are placed in a process perspective.

From Hegel's oft repeated dictum that the *Begriff* contains all discriminations within it, it follows that various discriminated concepts, each equivalent to the form of the process whereby it was realized, retain their actuality — more properly (since form apart from concretization is not actual), are very actualized anew. The practical import of this is that dialectical realizations or developments, following their initial realization, are recapitulated in the sense that they are concretized anew in new temporal instances. This pertains alike to the case of the culture or to that of the individual. Thus, for example, external authority is not done away with for a given young person who may be seen to have attained a self-concept as a (relatively) free individual through the struggle and overcoming reflected in the dialectic of Lordship and Bondage. Such a person, possessed of this self-consciousness, as in the case of De Beavoir asserting woman's rights, may later be reinforced in it by the successive confrontations of other authorities, with an ever increased courage and self-determination.²²

The present formulation is directed toward saving, through reformulation, the serial character of dialectic as a temporal phenomenon and as indispensable to the conceptualizing of temporality itself. Although not generally amenable to the methodologies of the particular sciences as they are practiced today, I wish to maintain this to be "empirically" demonstrable and to affirm anew its place within philosophical formulations. Excepting politicized Marxism as a somewhat special case,²³ this feature of Heglian thought is typically omitted in recently formulated positions moving from Hegel. In typical forms of Marxism it is preserved in a form somewhat too simplified to be adequate to an account of the conditions of experience. I wish to exhibit the serial character of dialectical accounts of history as a means for reaffirming historical concreteness as a datum of self-consciousness, even if one which such accounts can only approximate. Only the concrete language of the person who is identified with concreteness in a particular instance can be adequate to it.

An identity only loses its timeless character when something is discovered outside of it, i.e., when it is thus actualized and temporalized, or better, constitutive of temporality, which occasions

further meditation. It is thus that the serial character of dialectic is constituted.

This perspective also provides for the affirmation of the world viewed as non-contingent, or, what comes to the same thing, for the affirmation of God's action in the world, *Heilsgeschichte*. This affirmation is one which is made at the moment at which self-consciousness and the world constituted by this self-consciousness are seen as identical and in which this identity encloses within itself the dialectical actuality which in the case of the particular individual necessarily conditions it and which, practically speaking, can never be more than proximately represented in a philosophical historical account. This limitation, however, is not owing to the individual's supposed irrationality — seeing that he is the model of what we should mean by rationality — but to his unique character. What he expresses in concrete language is not grasped without loss by another.

Rationality in the spiritual individual is ever and continuingly the mediation of 'rationality' and immediacy, i.e., 'irrationality.'

The transcendence of God is also identity as the mediation of identity and non-identity, but with the notable additional feature that this identity indifferently reflects as its 'concrete content' all phases of the dialectic of 'history' in their unity and completeness. In God as transcendent, to the notion of God as immanent is added the outworking of human destiny and the Divine Plan commensurate with this Nature. From the standpoint of philosophy, this functions as a limiting concept — as a regulative but non-constitutive item. From the standpoint of religion, it is actively posited as constitutive in moments of decision and action from freedom, and in the eternal 'now' made constitutive. Philosophy has as a principal task the derivation of an account of such newly constituted unities of discriminated elements. As for Hegel, as oriented toward this task, the content of philosophy is exclusively that of religion. Hegel neglected to note, however, that the language of philosophy by which the concreteness of the 'now' is represented is not itself concrete.

The philosophical-dialectical account of 'history' interpreted as God's action in the world, *Heilsgeschichte*, may thus be seen to be

relative in the following ways — (1) It is relative in that it represents an approximation by overlapping of what the individual finds to be his own self-consciousness and historical actuality by reflecting that which he shares with a spiritual community. (2) It is relative to the period of history to which it belongs. (3) As a representation, it is temporally relative in that it presents only the past and this with only relative adequacy. (4) Within roughly specifiable limits, it is relative with respect to the degree to which dialectical forms of transition are subdivided.

With the recognition of the relativities of a philosophical account of 'historical' dialectic thus outlined, the foregoing reconstruction moving from Hegel permits the affirmation that the dialectical self-concept within the context of (dialectical) 'history' which contributes indispensibly to this self-concept is reconstituted in the moment of free decision and action. Also, God's acts in history are constituted of such moments of free decision and action. A theoretical conception of the self defined within the context of its environing world — 'history' — is in this moment of decision and action made one with the self as willing agent. Seeing that the self thus conscious of itself as a determination of 'history' — which is thus reconstituted in this moment — there is here exhibited a unity of self-consciousness and this 'history', which priorly was perceived as the world (or history) viewed as a contingent process — that is, merely in an objective and passive way. This self-concept as thus reconstituted in this moment exhibits the unity of the determinations of what is willed from freedom and of God's action in the world.

I shall take note, in turn, of each of three aspects of the identity which may be seen to constitute this moment — the ethical, the ontological and the theological — and in such a way as to exhibit this as itself dialectical in character. This is to say, it is just this — a moment — and except with respect to the themes treated, not the culmination of a dialectical process. This is to allow that dialectical form may be actualized anew on subsequent occasions. The three aspects of identity are interrelated in such a way that the consideration of one involves each of the others. Treating these as *aspects* of one dialectical moment rather than as a series of such

with cumulative import, in addition to making a simplified exposition adequate to my present purpose, renders it unnecessary to take up an issue which it would not serve my purpose to treat : in the case of the second and third of these, at least, a variation of the order of a cumulative serial development might, I think, be more adequately representative of the phenomenology of the self-consciousness of some individuals than of others, so that to introduce a determinative order would be unnecessarily to place a limitation upon the universality of the account.²⁴

The Ethical Aspect of Identity :

The phenomenon has often enough been reported in which, in moments of what appear to be crises and decisions of life and death import, memories of the series of significantly shaping events from the past, and particularly such as reflect past confrontations as have been most significantly constitutive of the self-concept, in the case of a given individual, flash before the mind in rapid succession. The philosophical significance of the shaping power of trauma and related phenomena has been so amply developed in the literature of philosophy, particularly in the decades following the Second World War, that for present purpose it will only be necessary to note its ethical dimension within the present context.

The "I" as agent — which in crises must discover itself to be what it implicitly is, willing from freedom — confronts a world (perhaps in the form of contingent history), at first as merely negatively related to it — which in crises must be discovered to be what it implicitly is — the determining ground of the "I" as willing from freedom and hence as 'history' with its own rational aim within it. In the moment of identity, viewed with respect to this aspect, each becomes explicitly what it was only implicitly : the self willing from freedom knows itself as determined by the sequence of moments of confrontation and decision which in this encounter it finds to be constitutive of its essence. The enviroing world which has posed as a threat is known to be essentially constituted as such moments of confrontation and decision as the individual has brought to the occasion. He brings these out of the di tillation and recon-

stitution of his own experience, including that shared with a community as trans-personal historical antecedents.

The ethical ought, in the manner of Kant, is thus intrinsic to the individual's decision³ in the moment of commitment, at which point, in the final analysis, no rule of prudence or utility may be introduced from sources external to his self-concept. The consequence that, for example, Arab and Israeli may equally actualize their respective ends in fatal confrontation with one another is accepted, along with the possibility that a United Nations soldier, in confronting both, might with equal zeal one day actualize another "right." That rules of prudence and utility must enter into such self-concepts is to be assumed. Two additional considerations are here to be noted.

(1) Consider the case of an individual who as a member of an "advanced" spiritual community self-consciously shares a well-developed historical tradition. This tradition reflects the dialectical character, including the rational aim, exhibited in the ethical aspect of identity. This individual identifies himself with this community. As a consequence he will undergo the radical self-negation accompanying the discovery of his freedom and response-ability more readily than one whose community, or such group life as he has, is less developed. The progress of occidental man, particularly as nurtured in the Judeo-Christian tradition, exhibited in his first engineering the scientific-technological revolution and industrial economy of modern times, may be viewed as a manifestation of this, as may also the probable success of the (as yet somewhat doubtful, at this writing) modern "State of Israel," in consideration of the "long" and homogeneous historical consciousness of the Zionist movement, to establish and consolidate itself. So proximate is the history to confrontations and decisions of individual "citizens," in the latter case, that a kind of historical consciousness is here at work which reflects the necessity and actuality of both the sacrifice and the established State before the fact. Such is the character of 'historical' events prefigured as urgent within a historical tradition by those who share it.

(2) The reconstituted 'history' which the historical conscious-

ness brings from this identity, at least in principle and potentially in fact, in turn contributes to the historical account shared by the community.²⁵ This contribution may be more than additive. It may lead to a historical account being reconstituted. Fulfillment inevitably leads to a reconstruction commensurate with the reorientation of aim which must follow.

An issue to which these considerations point is that concerning how dialectical history is written. Within the present context it can only be noted that this requires the proximate possible reconstruction of determinative events in the life of a people. It approximates these not in content only but in that its dialectical form follows that exhibited in the phenomenology of self-consciousness, in the culture and time in which it is written, conditioned by the moment of identity achieved through self and other negation. Hence a historical account is expressive of a cultural aim actualized in the self-consciousness of certain individuals, at least, which is its organizing principle. A further development of this theme would show this form to be embodied, in greater or lesser degree and with greater or lesser self-consciousness on the part of the historian, in well developed historical traditions.

From the foregoing it may be noted that this perspective does not appeal to ethical norms which are left extrinsic to human experience. Neither does it appeal to arbitrarily chosen norms within experience, which it may seem unproblematical at a given moment to presuppose apart from their ontological basis having been established, made absolute.²⁶ Consequently it will not be likely to appeal to persons who are content with philosophical formulations which are out-workings from 18th century presuppositions long disproven decisively but still defensible to (very) common sense, such as the existence of external objects which stand independent of thought and which can nonetheless by some mysterious and never explained process be known.²⁷ Rather, it calls attention to such standards as have their origin in the outworking of the problematic of the relation of mutual determination and constitution of subjectivity and objectivity, in the process form of this mutual determination and constitution.

The Ontological Aspect of Identity :

Actuality in the "logically" (not physically) most inclusive sense in which man can lay hold upon it is the universe with a past which displays its own aim as inherent within it. The concept of a universe which stands over against the subject as (merely) objectively related to it, to be passively regarded in the name of objectivity, is prior to an included within this comprehending concept.²³

Self-consciousness at first stands over against 'history' regarded as merely objective. If this self has attained to consciousness of itself — and hence to a certain degree of freedom commensurate with having experienced a series of (perhaps uniquely constituted and ordered) self — and other-negations in confrontation with actualities yet construed with respect to 'history' it is still enclosed within itself and unconscious of what it implicitly is. This individual may view 'history' in a "scientific" manner as something detached and/or he may be unconsciously disposed by in-built dispositions which have been 'historically' conditioned. Neither of these factors can more than accidentally affect the self-consciousness of the detached observer. This standpoint, moreover, can account neither for the phenomenon of the self aware of itself as essentially a freely constitutive participant in 'history' as this may be evident to others, nor for the comprehension of this self, viewed as a phenomenon.

If this self-consciousness is detached from 'history,' it is evident that 'history' is detached from it, whose actions only accidentally affect history. Particularly in the case of the "historian" who wishes to be "scientific," this mutual detachment may be held to be a virtue — and indeed it has its place within a more comprehensive methodology which takes into account other kinds of interests of the historian — but this standpoint of itself can account neither for the phenomenon 'history' nor for its comprehension, viewed as such.

If this self has attained to consciousness of itself through acting from its own self-preservation (the phenomenon of which Hegel provides a representative account under "Lordship and Bondage") and by working through other moments of self-negation in the unique form in which they constitute aspects of ethical maturing in the

relation of dependence upon other persons, but does not yet know himself as conditioned by "history" insofar as he is thus determined, this determination can at first only be represented as a blind "other," as transcendent power over him. On the side of the subject, this blind "other" presents itself as the collection of fixated and repressed archaic dispositions which effect their sway at first only by indirect means such as are routinely reported in the analysis of analytical psychology, such as the distortion of dream contents from waking life or from the repressed (individual) unconscious by the insinuation of archetypal imageries.²⁹ If these have a positive value in disposing the individual to meet threats of the past of the sort which have gone into their formation, as the dark side of the soul they are denied direct access to self-consciousness. Their content, rather, from the standpoint of (as yet unachieved) actuality, is by projection made constitutive of Divine Transcendence. This is a "bad infinity." It is thus that God as transcendent gets a bad name—that of Lucifer—who is representative of what the individual has denied admittance to, or dismissed from, consciousness. The elaboration of Him and His angels finally serves the assimilation process it forstalls. Later these archetypes may find their reflection in art and be assimilated more or less completely to consciousness.

On the side of the object, this dismissal takes the form of a failure to understand, or the suppression out of memory of, historical happenings. This is most commonly where the events or what they symbolize to the individual are most proximate to him.

This dismissal from consciousness (by anamnesis) of both types of historical determination unacknowledged as such, where accomplished, even where the "God beyond God" comes to be held as an object of radical belief—or even faith—leads to a relative hopelessness and helplessness all too familiar in the present day. This dismissal is not merely a subversion of finite aims but a robbing of energy (for Freud, *Libido*) from the *Psyche*, with the result of a relative apathy. Where not accompanied by radical faith in some form—whether supported by theological or some other symbolism, conceptuality, or mode of action—this dismissal leads to a more total anamnesis. The various "solutions" to this dilemma, including psychosis, account for several of the most notable manifestations of

what is the most central theological-philosophical problem of the present time.³⁰

Where it comes to have only the status of a sublated "moment" in self-consciousness — even a moment continually made actual — what may be regarded as the distorting effects of the bad infinity upon the presentation of Divine Transcendence are in principle overcome and in practice in the course of being diminished. The outcome of this process is ideally the practical assimilation of this which was mistakenly construed to be Divine transcendence which, as assimilated, is perceived by the self-consciousness as having in fact been the dark side of Divine Immanence. The counter-part of this process, which has its ideal outcome as the evacuation of the repressed collective unconscious, is thus a commensurate evacuation of the content of what has been perceived to be the transcendence of God. The environment of this ideal as fulfilled is the end of a primitive form of monotheism, which end (*commensurate* with the "continuing" actuality of *aufgehoben* dialectical moments) is ever with us.

In actuality, a standpoint not yet here entered upon, this double evacuation, to the degree achieved, may be seen to consist in a removal of certain distortion, a removal of the veil of Maya, as it were, whereby 'history' and self-consciousness may first come to mutual actualization, each in the other, in the moment of identity. But from the present perspective it is finite aim(s) being brought to self-consciousness. This process must go a certain way before some sense of it is grasped and the standpoint of freedom and actuality can be entered upon. This dialectic has its own series of typical or at least typical contingent moments within it, which I shall not here consider, a notion of the content of which was provided by C. G. Jung in his delineation of the archetypes of the collective unconscious.

The first negation of the self by historical determination presented as a blind "other," whether or to what degree accompanied by the delaying by-play of the anamnesis and more gradual assimilation to consciousness, yield the awareness that there are definite contents of (perhaps fixated) predispositions there to be incorporated in some manner into rational self-consciousness. What it is up

against is not just a rigid boundary, but one beyond which lie determinable contents and over which there is intercourse. The contents found to lie here pertain to a future, not merely of the individual but of the culture (including the individual as its cutting edge) to which the history pertains, and by inference to universal history. In the case of such of this content as is assimilated directly and apart from this by-play to save the "I" from being overwhelmed by the collective, this is taken to have Divine Immanence as its source. Ultimately, in the course of the process by which it is a reflection, the former point of view is corrected to correspond to the latter. The standpoint which is here referred to has not yet exhibited self-consciousness of nature made concretely actual as 'history.' On this account it has not yet entered upon a standpoint from which a faith affirmation of Divine transcendence as the ground of 'history'³¹ might be made, nor has it attained to a theological-philosophical self-consciousness of this actuality as Divine Immanence. Divine Transcendence as the ground of 'history' is no projection of the sort above considered, nor is it subject to the sort of reduction to Divine Immanence to which this was noted to be subject.

Without proposing to discriminate further stages of this development to which it seems plausible to accord universality within the phenomenology of self-consciousness and its objectivities, the results of which, in any case (following dialectical principles) are summarized in the culminating identity, I proceed to the reconsideration of this moment in respect to its ontological aspect.

Self-consciousness as thought which has attained to in-itselfness stands over against being-in-itself, the 'historical' process dimension of which, while it lies there *for* self-consciousness to apprehend in a passive way, has not yet entered into the determination of what constitutes this self-consciousness. This is to say, this relation of "being-for" has not been made internal to self-consciousness, which in this respect is not yet in-*and-for*-itself, not yet fully actual.

If this is true of thought, 'history'-in-itself from this perspective is a process but only a contingent one, incomplete in itself, its end being given in thought and not in its own element. Hence it is not yet what it implicitly is. Its being-*for* is not internalized. It is not yet in-*and-for*-itself, not yet fully actual.

In other words, if self-consciousness is (not only in but) *for* itself, as, for example, with respect to static nature, other conscious beings, or 'history' as contingent process, which have already entered into its determination, it is not *for*-itself with respect to 'history' as non-contingent process. 'History' as non-contingent process has not been made internal to it. In this relation, thought has no content commensurate with its aim and being-in-itself as 'history' has no aim commensurate with its content.

The moment of their identity is the grasping of this situation of mutual dependence and the following out of the inherent disposition of thought and actuality each to incorporate into itself that which lies at hand.

The philosophical understanding of these terms in their interrelation, for example, as logical correlatives, as a mere representation of the situation (and partial at that) is something quite different than the situation-in-itself here to be presented. Identity cannot be represented adequately, but only pointed to as something which is foundational to self-consciousness and the actuality with which it finds itself one in this moment. This pointing serves the need to conceptualize and render sharable this uniquely human dimension of experience — its dynamic center — which all too often remains private, unacknowledged, and covered over by every-day discourse.

Identity is only a recurring 'moment' and not something knowable as in-and-for-itself apart from the reactualized process of which it is a kind of culmination.

In the moment of identity each of the polar elements — thought and being — is the completion of the other, and hence an aspect of the identity, which is actuality. It is thus that, in the moment of decision and action from freedom, thought as thought about, or *Theorie*, is equally the action which it conditions. The actual is equally thought and being, where these are perspectival names for actuality — that is, where each is conceived in respect to its necessary inclusion of the other — and action.

The outworking of the aim given to 'history' in identity, in the case of a given individual, is not merely that history as previously understood by the abstract understanding is now comprehended as a

rational process. It is also the reconstitution of the series of decisive historical moments as they constitute 'history' for this particular historical self-consciousness.

The Theological Aspect of Identity :

For the purpose at hand it will principally be required to consider the concept of God which self-consciousness brings from the moment of identity, which it is a task of theology to approximately represent, forgoing further development of the truncated account of how he is brought, and what he brings, to this moment. I shall consider Divine Immanence and Divine Transcendence in turn.

'History' as the succession of moments determinative of action from freedom on the part of the individual constitutes at one and the same time for this individual non-contingent history, or actuality, and God's action in the world. This being a reconstitution of 'history' which he more or less shares with a community — which he now grasps as actual for the first time — this individual recognizes that other individuals not only participate in this 'history' but in like manner contribute to its reconstitution. In worship (as the celebration of worth) and through the medium of religious symbols, by means of which the limitations of the understanding with respect to the presentation of 'historical' actuality are in some degree given recognition and overcome,³² he shares and reifies this 'history.' In piety he anticipates its further extension in virtue of which past moments of identity are rendered relative. For this self-consciousness,

That man knows of God is in accordance with the essential community [of God and man], a community of knowing, that is, man knows God only insofar as God knows Himself in man; this knowledge is the self-consciousness of God, but just so it is His knowledge of man, and this knowledge of man by God is man's knowledge of God.³³

Faith that the world will be "reconciled," the principle of which reconciliation is given in the moment of identity, at least where this has been approached from the standpoint of a sufficiently well-developed historical tradition which exhibits the form of his own

self-consciousness, constitutes this individual's sense of Divine providence. God as adequate to this reconciliation, the instantiation of which adequacy he has found to be his own self-consciousness in moments of identity, now conceived as an eternal moment, is the Divine Subject-Object of his faith.

Just here, however, an insurmountable problem is encountered. An identity which comprehends all time and space is suggested by Hegel's Logical Idea. Could one legitimately move from the affirmation of such an Idea to regarding it as constitutive and not merely as regulative — an outside limit of abstract thought — the doctrine of Divine Transcendence set forth in the preceding paragraph could be justified by moving from the methodological basis of the present perspective. But to make this Idea constitutive exceeds the limits of post-Kantian philosophy and, perhaps even more notably, those somewhat different limits which are dominant in Hegel's own thought.³⁴ Such modifications of dialectical method as are embodied in the foregoing account, which are directed by an interest in stricter adherence to principles exhibited in phenomena than I find consistently exhibited in Hegel, moreover, in no wise remove this limitation. The problem, as in the case of Hegel's apparent attempt to provide a doctrine of transcendence in his later lectures, comes to this : If one construes God as actual only in the world and makes identity the touchstone of actuality, God as transcendent is not actual and God as actual is not transcendent.

If it should be felt that the inclusion of the statement in question can be justified without appeal to such a Logical Idea regarded as constitutive, there remains a problem in the way of its philosophical justification. This lies in that the present perspective, in common with Hegel, provides no basis for saying anything specific about a future which has not yet arrived or for construing a future in which there will be other instances of identity.

Perhaps philosophy should in any case stop here, even if by so doing, in the present case, it may be felt to render defective the solution which has been proposed to the problem with reference to Hegel, "How can one construe the Divine Nature as fully actual only in the world and yet take account of the relativity of historical events construed as manifestations of Him." I submit, nevertheless,

that the limitation above noted being acknowledged, the perspective thus set forth in truncated form resolves this problem and, in doing so, renders plausible a conception of God for theism on Hegelian lines which draws upon those aspects of his thought relating to history which have an inherent affinity to the Judeo-Christian theological tradition

The perspective outlined, moreover, renders a basis for a theistic concept of God which is not apologetic in character. Divine Transcendence as a faith affirmation is rendered unproblematical on grounds intrinsic to the formulation. A historically relevant concept of Divine immanence provides a basis for taking account both of what is shared by a religious community and what is unique to particular historical contexts and individual religious experience.

The formulation has involved a fairly thorough-going revision of Hegel.³⁵ This is despite the fact that more of his terminology has been retained than would have been had it not been my intent to render maximally evident what use was being made of his conceptuality. In the further development of what has thus been outlined, a terminology more commensurate with the perspective and with current usage will at points be introduced, thus rendering more explicit post-Hegel and perhaps post-Hegelian elements.

4, VI, 1974.

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NOTES

- 1 F. LaT. Godfrey, "Hegel's Absolute and Theism," Warren E. Steinkraus (Ed.), *New Studies in Hegel's Philosophy* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1971), pp. 167-86.
- 2 Fackenheim and Theunissen, each in his own way, stand as examples of interpreters who reflect recognition of this affinity in Hegel. Emil L. Fackenheim, *The Religious Dimensions of Hegel's Thought* (London: Indiana University Press, 1967.) Michael Theunissen, *Hegel's Lehre vom absoluten Geist als theologisch-politischer Traktat* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1970.) For my review article on the latter work, see *The Owl of Minerva*, Sept., 1973.

- 3 See footnote 28 and its context.
- 4 The neglect of the sense of this "containment" has been a primary root of grosser caricatures of Hegel, including that by Bertrand Russell. A helpful treatment of the matter, to which Hegel accorded frequent attention, is found in the remark on the expression "to sublate" in the final couple of pages of Chapter I of the *Logic*.
- 5 *Godfrey*, p. 168.
- 6 *Godfrey*, p. 169.
- 7 *Godfrey*, p. 174.
- 8 *Godfrey*, p. 175.
- 9 This point has been developed and worked out from in the following papers : "Hegel's Altar to the Known God," presented to the Hegel Jubiläumskongress sponsored by the Internationale Hegel-Vereinigung, Stuttgart, July 12-15, 1970, to appear in *Hegel-Studien*; "Hegel's Justification of Christianity : Serious or Sophistry," *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XIV, No. 4 (Winter, 1976-77) pp. 413-30.
- 10 *Godfrey*, p. 179.
- 11 *Godfrey*, p. 180.
- 12 *Godfrey*, pp. 182f.
- 13 *Godfrey*, p. 179.
- 14 *Godfrey*, p. 186.
- 15 See the latter third of "Hegel's Justification of Christianity . . ."
- 16 "Form" of dialectic in this context is intended to be equivalent to dialectical method. I have elsewhere concluded, following an analysis of this issue : " . . . while recognizing the need for a distinction between method and Notion [*Begriff*], Hegel failed to define his method in such a way as to maintain unambiguously such a distinction as would be required were a dialectical account to be falsifiable. In the Notion all distinctions are overcome and contained as discriminations, including the discrimination between method and the subjective and objective contents to which it pertains." *Hegel and the Philosophy of Religion* (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), "'Authenticity' and 'Warranted Belief' in Hegel's Dialectic of Religion," p. 224. In subsequent reflection on this matter, in part prompted by helpful criticism by Fritz Marti, I have noted that the outcome of my two-fold (formal and material) test to render historical dialectic corrigible is one which Hegel anticipated. "My insistence that dialectical method must be maintained distinct from existence . . . — a distinction blurred by Hegel himself in his effort to justify the notion of dialectical progression he proposed — is in order that the commensurability of method and existence with one another can ultimately be determined. That is, so that the very dialectical progression may be realized by which the finality of this distinction is done away with." "Das Problem

- der Verifikation historischer Dialektik," *Philosophisches Jahrbuch der Görresgesellschaft*, Vol. 84, Jahrgang 1977, 1. Holbbond, pp. 126-34.
- 17 The most common misrepresentation of Hegel follows from the assumption that he maintained that the identity of being and thought (as actuality and not merely as Idea) as achieved without qualification, and not merely concretely achieved as an outcome of the dialectical process which he found to be mutually determinative of the spiritual individual of his time, and the world construed and further determined by this individual. This leads inevitably not to the more proper conclusion that the dialectic is directed towards the exhibition of the concretely exemplified conditions of historically contingent existence, but to the heady conclusion that historical contingency has been transcended in a sense tantamount to being done away with.
 - 18 As I have elsewhere taken pains to show, accounts of this sort are at "the moment of difference" corrigible. See sources cited in Note 16.
 - 19 See Part II of "Die phänomenologische Methode Hegels und das Unbewußte," *Wiener Jahrbuch für Philosophie* 1973, pp. 178-207.
 - 20 Readers may recall several contemporary examples of the dialectic of Lordship and Bondage cited by Howard P. Kainz, in "A non-Marxian Application of the Hegelian Master-slave Dialectic to some Modern Political-social Developments," pp. 285-302.
 - 21 The dialectic of form and content may be seen to be necessary to arriving at a concept of an at first unknown sense object. See Part II of "Die Phänomenologische Methode Hegels und das Unbewußte."
 - 22 Kainz, in drawing upon De Beauvoir's struggle for woman's rights as one of several exemplifications of Hegel's account of Lordship and Bondage, has noted that this case is peculiar in that she, has already attained to self-consciousness of herself as a free individual (pp. 295f). This case exemplifies what I have referred to as recapitulation.
 - 23 This is apart from considerations of the historical rightness or historical contingency of the Marxist account of history.
 - 24 This departure from Hegel is not intended as a rejection, but as a qualification, of the notion that the respective aspects of the phenomena considered under these heads may sequentially (with their sub-moments) be exhibited in history, if the (at least practical) difficulties in the way of exhibiting such a sequence as constitutive of history, as critics of Hegel's attempts have shown, are notable. In its own way, the present perspective appeals to the serial view of dialectical "historical" moments, i.e., as constituted in individual self-consciousness in the moment of identity. The serially given contents of such moments are regarded as non-contingent "history" but with respect to a historical account they are made relative to those of other individuals, including the historian, and in this sense are made contingent. This contingency is an especially important factor in non-homogeneous

cultures. Owing to this element of contingency, temporally sequential dialectical accounts which have this serial character, it would seem, may best be left to historians.

- 25 In the case of a community of philosophers, this will be an 'historical' account.
- 26 Heintel's discussion and employment of Hegel's *spekulative Satz* as a formula for criticizing presuppositions may be found clarifying. Erich Heintel, *Die Beiden Labyrinthe der Philosophie*, Band I (Wien : Verlag R. Oldenbourg, 1968), pp. 312f and context. For Hegel's initial account, see *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, "Einleitung."
- 27 See Errol E. Harris, *Nature, Mind, and Modern Science* (New York : Macmillan, 1954), p. 181; and *The Foundations of Metaphysics in Science* (New York : Humanities Press, 1965), p. 430.
- 28 Nature as processes of space-time events is ultimately and for purposes of ontology to be included within history, although this inclusion is to be construed as having little bearing upon sciences, or aspects of sciences, in which there is no need to be concerned with concreteness in something like Hegel's sense or with the exposition of objectivity as such and the context within which this phenomenon arises.
- 29 In "Hegel's Phenomenological Analysis and Freud's Psychoanalysis" (*International Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. VIII, No. 3, Sept., 1968, pp. 356-78), I compared Hegel and Freud with respect to the following themes pertaining to alienation : anxiety, guilt, repression, dreams, transference, and the typology of mental diseases. Some indications will be found therein of sources and interpretations of which aspects of the above account are reminiscent. With respect to repression, I noted, "we do not find in Hegel's account a forcing of content into the unconscious as a result of trauma and a given anxiety threshold, as in Freud, but a holding down of an unmediated, and therefore alien content of the mind, 'the evil genius of man' . . ." (p. 369.) For "Der böse Genius der Menschen," see G. W. F. Hegel, *System der Philosophie*, dritten Teil, *Die Philosophie des Geistes* (Stuttgart : Fr. Frommanns Verlag, 1958), p. 206.

Later in the treatment of this theme, I note that C. G. Jung combined the essential elements of this aspect of Hegel's theory with Freud's theory of repression. "Some of the contents of his 'collective unconscious' are not products of repression, at least not repression that has occurred within the lifespan of the patient, but [nonetheless] built-in predispositions." (p. 371, Note 30). Insofar as Jung's collective unconscious is constituted by dispositions pertaining to natural functions, some aspects, at least, of this repression as a "holding under" with respect to built-in dispositions are expressed in Hegel's account of the soul as one with all nature. "Through this, its organic embodiment, the soul participates in the planetary life of the earth; moods are in tune with changes of climates, seasons, and hours of the day." etc.

Gustav Emil Müller, *Hegel's Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (New York : Philosophical Library, 1959), p. 200. In all of this, Hegel's account, as in the case of my own, is generally restricted to phenomena which have ontological significance, with respect to which the (meta-)psychological dimension is incidental.

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- 30 The present perspective imports an alternative to faith being made too radical by being too remotely or too narrowly related to the historical ground which conditions individual self-consciousness.
 - 31 Or, for the religious consciousness, perhaps only as the ground of history.
 - 32 as, for example, in the drama of the Mass.
 - 33 G. W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion* (Stuttgart : Fr. Prommanns Verlag, 1959), zweiter Band, p. 496.
 - 34 For a recent treatment of Hegel's method, see Eric Well, "The Hegelian Dialectic," J. J. O'Malley, Algezin, Kainz, and Rice (Editors), *The Legacy of Hegel* (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), pp. 49-64. For remarks relating to Hegel's treatment of the thing-in-itself, see pp. 52f.
 - 35 Of previous Hegel-studies published or to appear, those cited in Note 8 will contribute most directly to assisting the reader to distinguish more nearly, and with respect to the theme, what I construe to be the line between Hegel interpretation and my own reconstruction.

PREDICATES

Traditional logic analyzed a sentence into two grammatical constituents, viz. the subject and the predicate. The subject is that of which something is said and the predicate is what is said of it. The subject-predicate pattern was supposed to be the paradigm of all descriptive sentences in the indicative mood, i. e. of sentences which are capable of being either true or false. These sentences alone were philosophically interesting, with the result that all other types of sentences, like questions, imperatives, suppositions etc. received scant attention and were insufficiently analysed. Almost the whole of classical Indian thought, for example, is an explication of the variations on the subject-predicate theme.

A grammatical sentence was analysed into the two terms, viz. the subject and the predicate, connected by means of what was called the copula, which is some inflected form or other of the verb 'to be'. The thesis of reductionism, viz. that all sentences can be reduced to the subject-predicate form, puts the poor little verb 'to be' to inordinate strain. Any other verb, any kind of predication, was sought to be reduced to some sort of thing that the subject was. The sentence 'Brutus killed Caesar' thus became 'Brutus was the killer of Caesar'. Straightforward relational sentences were twisted and mangled, in order that they could be made to conform to the prescribed norm. The fact that the stratagem does not succeed is clearly brought out by the utter incompetence of traditional logic, when confronted with a relational inference. Jevons noted that even such a simple argument as "A horse is an animal; therefore, the head of a horse is the head of an animal" cannot at all be handled by the resources of the entire syllogistic machinery.

But apart from the recalcitrance of relations and relational compounds, even the verb 'to be', accepted as *the* verb of predication par excellence, contains hidden complexities which the traditional analysis fails to notice. Take the sentence 'Vaidehī is Sītā', apparently conforming to the paradigmatic pattern. But is 'Sītā' really a predicate? It is a proper name and, as such, a referring expression. Can a proper name be employed as a predicate at all? The import of the sentence is that two referring expressions have the same referent, and the sentence is therefore a statement of identity, containing no predicates, despite the grammatical nuisance of 'Sītā' occurring after the verb 'is', since the role of a proper name is to stand as the subject of a sentence. Predication takes place only when we have a referring expression and another expression of a different sort, e. g. in the sentence 'Sītā is unhappy'. The amendment 'Vaidehī is another name of Sītā' makes the situation worse, for now 'Sītā' is explicitly the subject, about whom we are saying that she has another name too. Identity sentences are predicateless.

Coming to subject-predicate sentences proper, how do we understand the nature of predication? Many philosophers, both ancient and modern, have given an account of predication which can be called the reference theory of predication. According to this account predicates too, like subjects, are referring expressions. Just as subjects refer to things, predicates refer to certain other things. The popular candidates for predicative reference have been variously called universals, ideas, properties, qualities, concepts and what not. Any theory which holds that such abstract entities exist as referents of predicates is some form of realism. Predication then resolves itself to some relation between two sorts of entities. This relation in Plato, e. g. is one of participation or imitation of a form. In more recent times Frege provides a good model of the reference theory. The subject of a sentence refers to what Frege calls an 'Object'. Similarly the referent of a predicate is a 'Concept'. If however it could be shown that subjects too might refer to concepts, then the distinction between subject and predicate would lapse. Take the sentence 'The concept of wisdom is difficult to explain'. Apparently we are referring to a concept as the subject of the sentence. Frege however has consistently to deny this, for otherwise his theory would break down. According

Predicates

to Frege, the phrase 'concept of wisdom' does not refer to the concept of wisdom, but to an object. This is very curious; if we can refer to Banaras Hindu University by the phrase 'Banaras Hindu University', why should we be debarred from referring to the concept of wisdom by the phrase 'the concept of wisdom'? That predicates are not concepts, can also be brought out in another manner. If predicates were concepts we could always substitute a concept for a predicate in a sentence in accordance with the Leibnitzian law. For example, 'Sītā is unhappy' could be rewritten as 'Sītā, the concept of unhappiness'. This paraphrase however, far from being illuminating, produces nonsense.

Coming nearer home we find the Nyāya philosopher advocating a form of the reference theory. The subject-predicate model is taken as the paradigm of all sentences, as indeed is done in every shade of Indian thought. Both the constituents of a sentence, in fact any linguistic unit at all (*pada*), are referring expressions. The world contains as many things as there are meaningful units (*padas*) to refer to them. Everything is a referent, a *padārtha*. The subject of any predication refers to the category of *dravya* or substance, while predicates refer to *guṇa* and *karma*, quality and action. According to the Nyāya way of looking at things, a *dravya* has, or possesses, a *guṇa* or a *karma*. The latter, though belonging to the *dravya*, are entities in their own right. *Dravya* is one sort of thing, *guṇa* is another. The fun begins when we ask how one thing can be predicated of another. A quality is ascribed to a substance, but how is the nature of this ascription to be made intelligible? If the two belong to different categories, how are they to be brought together? The Nyāya posits a peculiar relation of 'inness' or 'belonging' between *dravya* and *guṇa*. The quality is *in* the substance. This relation is called *samavāya* which is defined as that which generates the notion of 'inness' (*āpādayaheṭu*). The notion of course needs further refinement. Any kind of 'inness', for example, the letter being *in* my pocket, would not do. Ultimately the notion is incapable of further conceptual clarification, but can only be ostensively defined. That is to say, in order to explain the relation of *samavāya* the best one could do is to say that it is that relation which is exemplified in the situation of the substance-quality complex, and that it cannot be explicated any further. However that may be, according to

Nyāya samavāya is itself the referent of a linguistic particle and, as such, is one more padārtha, one more thing. Predication is thus not the simple affair of a conjunction of two sorts of entities, but involves three distinct padārthas, viz. dravya, guṇa, and samavāya in between them. When two things are brought together, they create a new situation which did not obtain when they were in isolation. Their togetherness is as much an aspect of the new situation as are the two terms themselves. By themselves one would not belong to the other. Nor can any one of them, taken singly, explain predication. This impasse is an echo of the hoary paradox formulated by Antisthenes, the Cynic. In the sentence 'A is B', if B is identical with A, nothing is being said about A, and the sentence is vacuous. If on the other hand B is different from A, then the sentence says that A is what it is not, and is therefore a contradiction. The Nyāya method of evading the paradox is to posit the relation of samavāya as making intelligible the nature of the 'is' in the sentence 'A is B'. It is a tertium quid, something that mediates between two different things, and is not a sign of identity at all. 'A is B' is not to be equated with 'A is the same as B'.

The acceptance of samavāya as a third term makes the situation highly complicated, and lays the Nyāya wide open to some very serious criticism. S'āṅkara has no difficulty in demolishing the house of cards built on samavāya. He points out that if a guṇa, being a new sort of entity, requires intervention of a third entity to make it relevant to its substrate, samavāya itself, being another distinct entity, stands in the same predicament. We have to bring in still something else in order to relate the relation itself to each of its relata, and this clearly leads to an infinite regress. Bradley makes substantially the same point. It seems to me that both the sides in this debate, viz. the Nyāya and his critic, are extremely confused. To take up the charge of infinite regress first. As a good Indian, I will not refer to S'āṅkara, but only to Bradley, and try to show how the infinite regress argument is misconceived, and does not affect the Nyāya position at all. The confusion is to think that a relation functions in the same way as a quality does. If they belong to different categories, as the Nyāya believes, then the attempt to confute this categorical distinction is to commit a 'category mistake'. From the fact that a quality needs being related to what it qualifies, it does not

Predicates

follow that the relation too should stand in similar need. To say that every happy child comes from a happy family is not to say that a happy family must be imbedded in another happy family, as though a happy child and a happy family belong to the same category. If A depends on B, that does not by itself entail that B should depend on something else. To take a hypothetical example : Suppose that in a philosophers' conference every participant refers to Kālidāsa. We are perplexed and seek an explanation. Then we come to know that they are imitating a particular philosopher, having great prestige, who refers to Kālidāsa. Our perplexity should end here, and we should not go on to ask whom this philosopher is imitating. He may be a great creative genius who was the first to point out the profound implications of Kālidāsa for philosophy. Even if we generalize the situation, and formulate the principle that every philosopher imitates somebody, even then no infinite regress is generated. To say that every number has a successor immediately leads to an infinite number series, but an infinite series is not an infinite regress. The latter is vicious, but an infinite sequence is innocuous. If an infinite sequence too were to be vicious then the whole body of mathematical truths would crumble. How then do we distinguish between a benign sequence and a vicious regress? The latter, I believe, arises when we say, not merely that every number has a successor, but make the much stronger statement that to know any one number we require to know its successor. The latter statement is palpably false. Each number is finite, and though it might have a successor, its knowledge does not depend on knowing the successor. Similarly every man imitates somebody' does not by itself lead to a vicious regress, unless we go on to say that to know that a person is an imitator we have to know whom he is imitating. Only in the latter case is there a vicious circle or an infinite regress. In the context of the Nyāya, the critic might well be right that a relation itself depends on other relations - the Nyāya would not concede even this - but even then a relation might still be independently understood in its functioning. Because every man has a father it does not follow that a man has to climb the paternal shoulders every time he sneezes. It seems that two different questions are involved here, viz. how a relation relates and how the relation itself is related, and the answer to one need not be the same as that to the other.

The infinite regress argument is thus not a knock-down argument. A philosopher might try to best his opponent, not with the help of any logical stick, but only with a solid, hard bamboo stick.

So far we have been considering the charge of infinite regress brought against the Nyāya. Coming back to the Naiyāyika himself, we find him no less muddled in his argument than his critic. Indeed he invites the criticism by thinking that relations are some sort of entities, on par with substance and qualities, and have an ontological status of their own. He compounds his confusion by thinking that while qualities require an explanation, relations do not. If a relation can relate, so can a quality characterize, without further complications having to be introduced. The Nyāya fails to perceive that if a quality cannot characterize a thing independently, introduction of a relation is not an improvement on the situation. If 'a quality characterizing a thing' is unintelligible, 'a quality being related to thing' is no less so. The appeal to relation, which is meant to provide an explanation of 'having a predicate', fails to fulfil that purpose. If characterization is not self-explanatory, intervention of a relation will not make it more evident. The misfortunes of the Nyāya are due to the fact that it reduces qualitative predicates to relational predicates. Being related is one mode of how things are, being characterized is another, and one cannot be supposed to be more basic than the other. If qualitative predicates cannot function in their own right, neither can the relational predicates do, the original predicament remaining unaltered. Why should the Nyāya presume that relations are somehow more privileged than qualities? It is the initial step in the argument that has been fallacious.

But we may now discern an even more basic mistake that the Nyāya makes. The real original sin it has committed is the reification of predicates. It regards a predicate itself as a referring expression, and what it refers to is then ontologized as belonging to a separate category by itself. But adjectives are not nouns. If predicates too were only names, then all that a sentence amounts to would be a mere listing of names, which can never make up a meaningful assertion. Subjects are names by virtue of their logical role in a sentence, hence predicates cannot be names, neither of qualities nor of anything else. I am not denying here the existence of qualities and other such abstract entities. The

point I want to make is that there do not have to be abstract entities, and that the argument adduced to prove their existence fails. Even if qualities did exist, that fact would not explain the essential nature of predication. The words that apparently function as names of abstract entities can be rewritten in such a way that their putative naming function is taken away without loss of meaning. A sentence like 'Honesty is the best policy' can be paraphrased as 'Honest people best succeed in their vocation', where an abstract noun takes its rightful place as an adjective. Such sentences are 'systematically misleading', but they are not false or nonsensical insofar as they could be rephrased into true or meaningful sentences. The logician is wary of such pitfalls in language. 'There is a possibility', for example, is never existentially quantified as 'There is an x such that x is a possibility.' That does not mean however that there are no real possibilities in the world, but only that its phrasing is misleading, tempting us to make bogus inferences.

If predicates are not names, what then does predication consist in? If the reference theory of predication breaks down, we have to look in another direction in order to explain its nature and function. The most promising line here is also the least exciting. All that we seem capable of saying about predication is the trivial statement that predicates are in some sense *about* the subject, in a sense in which the subject is not *about* anything else. Its triviality need not deter us, since philosophical truths, arrived at in howsoever torturous a manner, ultimately tend to be something very simple and obvious. We come to see not something profound and obscure, but what had always been clearly before us, only we did not care to see it. The obscurity lies in our asking the wrong question, viz. what sort of *entities* are the predicates? What do the predicates *refer* to? So we have to retrace our steps and go to the very roots of the mischief, and say that predicates are not entities at all. When we predicate we say something *about* the subject. This account is however vague and requires further amendment. What is it for the predicate to be *about* the subject? Take the sentence 'Rama is running.' A straightforward analysis would confirm that Rama is the subject of the sentence, about whom we are saying that he is running. But there could be another way of looking at the sentence. Suppose

that a child, not familiar with the English language, asks : " What is ' *running* ' ? I do not understand the word ". Then, instead of a lengthy verbal explanation, I might attempt an ostensive definition. I might point to Rama and say " Look ! That is what ' *running* ' is ". If this is a plausible account of one of the contexts in which the sentence could have been uttered, then the sentence is, in an important sense, not about Rama, but about ' *running* '. Here it would be natural to think that we have said something about ' *running* '. We have explained what ' *running* ' is. Is Rama then the predicate of the sentence ? This is absurd, and so we have to tighten the rules of the use of ' *about* ', in order to explicate the meaning of predication. I do not know how precisely this is to be done, but make bold to offer some tentative suggestion, in terms of set theory. A predicate P is about a subject if and only if the referent of the subject can be said to be included among the things which are P. That is to say, every predicate generates a set, which would contain the referent as one of its members. In this sense a referent does not constitute a set, and cannot therefore include the predicate as one of its members. The referent can certainly contain its parts within itself, but whole-part relationship is not to be confused with that of set-membership. My stomach is contained both in my body as also in the set of stomachs. It is only in the latter sense that we could speak of predication. The ancient dictum that a subject cannot be predicated of anything simply means that the subject is never a set, but can only be a member of a set constituted by the predicate. This shows up the essential asymmetry between the subject and the predicate. This account, I am afraid, is extremely unclear, but so is indeed any contentious issue in philosophy. Once we start seeing things clearly, philosophy would wither away.

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ANTHROPOLOGY, PHILOSOPHY AND INDIA

The German philosopher of man and culture, Michael Landmann, has told us in a book of more than 600 pages entitled *De Homine : Der Mensch im Spiegel seines Gedankens* (Man in the Mirror of his thought) that man has speculated about himself from early times to the present day. Landmann's book is concerned with philosophical thought on the subject and it extends mainly from the Greeks upto Friedrich Nietzsche. But anthropologists and students of ancient civilisations have shown us that primitive people as well as mankind at the dawn of civilisation have speculated about the origin, nature and destiny of man and have invented myths and speculative systems of thought to account for his presence on the earth and his place in all of reality.

Illustrative of primitive thought on the subject is the phenomenon of totemism which I have tried to interpret in one of my books as an aberrant manifestation of man's finitude and his nisus towards dependence and complementarity; and which the celebrated French anthropologist, Claude Levi-Strauss, views as a shining example of a primitive classificatory system based upon fundamental structures of the mind such as binary opposition. Levi-Strauss's own system of thought which is known as structuralism resembles the totemism of the primitives. He decries the historical world-view which has emerged in the civilisations of Asia and Europe as the result of the 'totemic void' in them because history is only a 'point of departure in any quest for intelligibility.'

However that may be, few will dispute the statement that the study of man is fundamental. It is fundamental because one can not fully understand the works or creations of man without trying to understand man himself. The creations of man bear the stamp

of his nature, if he can be said to have a nature. I say 'if he can be said to have a nature' because there are thinkers of recent times who question the affirmation that man has a nature. Thus the Spaniard Orlega Y. Gasset tells us that man has no nature. He has history. And the French structuralist Jacques Lacan says cryptically : 'I think where I am not, I am where I do not think.'

At any rate I should like to refer to two well-known philosophers who affirm the fundamental nature of the study of man before I go on to Charles Darwin (1809-1882) and his influence on that study. The two philosophers are David Hume (1711-1776) and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), the first an Englishman and the second a German, the German being influenced by the Englishman in a radical direction, as everybody knows. Although an absolute sceptic who doubted the existence of God, the truth of revelation and the reality of other facts, Hume regarded the study of man as fundamental. He believed that unless we are fully familiar with the 'science of man', no genuine progress can be expected or achieved in other directions. Oddly enough, the absolute sceptic speaks of the 'science of man'. Little did he realize that soon thereafter frantic efforts would be made to place the study of man on a scientific basis and yet with very little to show by way of substantial advance in resolving the enigma of man. Kant, who was awakened from his dogmatic slumber by Hume, ventured on his part to mark off the field of philosophy into the following four questions : (1) What can I know? (2) What ought I to do? (3) What may I hope? and (4) What is man? After pointing out that metaphysics attempts to answer the first question, ethics the second, religion the third and anthropology the fourth, he goes on to say : Fundamentally all this would be reckoned as anthropology, since the first three questions are related to the last.

As Marvin Harris tells us in his *The Rise of Anthropological Theory* : 'Anthropology began as the science of history.' What he means by this statement is that the students of man in the second half of the nineteenth century were dazzled by Darwin's achievements, and so they endeavoured to apply the concept of evolution to man as a physical being and to his cultures. Darwin published his *On the Origin of Species* in 1859 and followed it up with his *The Descent of Man* in 1871 and *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* in 1872. Before Darwin biology

was only a classificatory science. Thereafter it found in the concept of evolution a unifying principle based on the fundamental notions of time and change and of unfolding and becoming. Presumably biologists like T. H. Huxley, who applied their energies to tracing the descent of man along evolutionary lines, were evolutionary naturalists who tended more and more to exclude from their scientific purview any notions of an extra-scientific nature. As time went by this tendency grew stronger and is no doubt still the vogue among most biologists, the geneticist Theodosius Dobzhansky with his biology of ultimate concern being one of the rare exceptions to the general rule.

If, however, we turn to the evolutionary study of culture, the philosophy underlying these efforts has not been a straight-forward affair, and has even been called a muddle between idealism and materialism, particularly in the second half of the nineteenth century. The doctrine by which these ethnologists or cultural anthropologists of the nineteenth century were guided has been called unilinear evolutionism. A number of scholars contributed to the growth and dissemination of the doctrine. The German P. W. A. Bastian (1826-1905) was convinced of the psychic unity of mankind and believed that in philosophy, religion, language, law, art and social organisation there were a limited number of elementary ideas common to all mankind. Hence similar ideas and cultural traits rose independently in various tribes and regions. The Swiss J. J. Bahjofen (1815-1887) tried to set out the order of development in the family, and so spoke of a first stage of sexual promiscuity followed by mother-right and then by father-right. These stages were supposedly universal. The Scotsman J. F. McLennan (1827-1881) was also essentially a parallelist. He maintained that all of mankind has had the same broad development from savagery. The Englishman Herbert Spencer (1820-1905) defined evolution as a passage from 'a relatively indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a relatively definite, coherent heterogeneity.' He added that social evolution took place from the militant societies to industrial ones. He emphasized the notion of struggle for existence, and therefore supported extreme *laissez-faire* in politics and economics. Stressing the role of fear in religion, he traced its origin to ancestor-worship. The American Lewis Henry Morgan (1818-1881) who influenced Marx and Engels spoke of

three stages of development — savagery, barbarism and civilisation. He was a typical evolutionist who believed in a law of progress, in a stage of sexual communism which was followed by matriarchy and so on. The Britisher Edward B. Tylor (1832-1917) regarded primitive societies as survivals into the present of earlier stages of cultural development and also traced the evolution of religion from animism, to polytheism and then to monotheism. There were many other anthropologists and sociologists who tried to apply the concept of evolution to cultures and societies in the second half of the nineteenth century and later. The names of J. Lubbock, J. G. Frazer, R. R. Meritt and L. T. Hobhouse may be mentioned here. In fact, evolution proved to be so contagious as an idea that in 1909, as Donald G. Macrae says, anthropology, sociology and comparative religion were largely evolutionary sciences. Political science was strongly under the influence of the evolutionary concept. Eugenics was the height of fashion. And the economists were asking one another worriedly why their discipline was not evolutionary. With so much of evolutionary enthusiasm all over the place, it is not altogether surprising that T. K. Penniman says : ' With the publication of the *Origin of Species* in 1859, the Constructive Period of Anthropology as a single, though many-sided science, begins ' ; or that Sol Tax, speaking of the period from 1860 to 1890, should say that cultural anthropology had ' grown from nothing to maturity. ' Philosophically, however, the position of the unilinear cultural evolutionists was not clearcut. Marvin Harris tells us categorically that they were not materialists. Another writer, George Stocking, who has taken the trouble of examining their philosophical orientation at length informs us that idealism and materialism are not the proper philosophical categories by which to judge them. Were they, then, dualists? Perhaps. At any rate Morris Opler calls Lewis Henry Morgan, whom Marx and Engels had regarded as a materialist, a dualist.

The cultural anthropologists of the second half of the nineteenth century were arm-chair anthropologists. In other words, they relied on information collected by travellers and missionaries for their evolutionary interpretations; and so when more reliable field-data became available later, the weaknesses of the evolutionary position came to light, and unilinear cultural evolutionism received

a set-back. In recent times, however, evolutionism has been revived in some quarter in the form of general evolution and multi-linear evolution. Thus Leslie White and his students, M. D. Sahlins and E. R. Service, argue that evolutionary changes of culture are of two kinds— general unilinear evolution which is a transition of cultures from lower levels of development to higher ones, and specific evolution or the adaptation of culture to the diversity of local conditions. The latter, they add, is the concern of historians. Leslie White is a rigorous materialist, and so one can presume that his students, Sahlins and Service, follow him in this respect. Another prominent American anthropologist who has proposed a theory of multi-linear evolution is Julian Steward. He maintains that cultural developments occur differently in different culture areas, but that these different developments pass through broadly similar stages. Since Steward lends his allegiance to nomothetic causality, he is doubtlessly a materialist.

The weaknesses of the unilinear evolutionary interpretations and the belief that the anthropologists who made them were nomothetic materialists produced a reaction in the form of diffusion. This reaction was anticipated by the British historian F. W. Maitland (1850–1906) who said : ' By and by Anthropology will have the choice between becoming history or nothing. ' Diffusionism took two extreme paths, one of which was pursued in Britain and the other in the German-speaking countries. British diffusionism was represented by G. Elliot Smith (1871–1937) and his disciple W. J. Perry (1887–1949). They believed that all civilization had originated in Egypt and had spread from there all over the world. This pan-Egyptian or heliolithic theory thus sought to cut the ground beneath the concepts of independent invention, psychic unity, progress and evolution, but it was not taken seriously and so died an early death. German diffusionism was founded and elaborated by, among others, Friedrich Ratzel (1844–1904), Leo Frobenius (1873–1938), Fritz Graebner (1877–1934) and Wilhelm Schmidt (1868–1954). Under Graebner and Schmidt it came to be called the *Kulturkreislehre* or Culture Circle doctrine.

Like the unilinear evolutionists, the British and German diffusionists are rightly placed under the general label of history. But while the unilinear evolutionists hoped to attain to a science of history in the sense of unveiling universal stage of cultural development, the

British and German diffusionists believed that man was relatively uninventive, and so the rare cultural inventions, when made, tended to diffuse from their place of origin to other parts of the world. The British and German diffusionists were basically idealist in their philosophical orientation. And although the German diffusionists or historical ethnologists, as they more often called themselves, made their bow towards science, they were no doubt using the word in a wide or loose sense.

As a branch of history, historical ethnology adopts the fundamentals of historical methodology, and historical facts as systematically as possible. Historical methodology aims at ascertaining historical facts and not general concepts; and historical knowledge is knowledge of such facts and their concrete interconnections. As Feder, whom Wilhelm Schmidt quotes approvingly, puts it, 'If historical facts are separated from their particular time and place, or from the special character given them as consequences of volitional acts, or if they are separated from their individual relations, their very nature is lost.' Hence historical knowledge assumes the freedom of man.

Since, however, the historical ethnologist attempts to reconstruct the culture history of preliterate peoples, he does not have at his disposal written documents on which the historian heavily relies. How, then, does he endeavour to overcome this difficulty? Accepting with E. Bernheim and F. Graebner that there are no peoples without history, the historical ethnologist supports the view that contemporary primitive cultures embody survivals from earlier phases of development, that they are, in Schmidt's words 'living witnesses representing the oldest phases of development.' By applying the criteria of quality (characteristic similarities between cultural elements which did not originate from the nature of the object concerned or from the stuff out of which it was made indicate historical connections) and of quantity (a multiplicity of criteria of quality independent of one another confirms the criterion of quality) and a battery of other rules and techniques of procedure to the ethnographic material, he supplements historical methodology in this way when it is brought to bear on the preliterate peoples. Thus historical ethnology acquires a special character as a historical discipline, as Graebner pointed out, by developing the above criteria and rules to surmount the above-mentioned difficulty. To

Graebner goes the credit for formulating the first elaborate statement of a method bearing directly on historical ethnology influenced primarily by Graebner and secondarily by the other forerunners of historical ethnology, Schmidt endeavoured to perfect the method and to build on that basis a reconstruction of culture history in its preliterate phase. Wherever it was possible, Schmidt also used the findings of auxiliary disciplines of which prehistory was the foremost. As ethnographic and prehistoric knowledge increased, however, Schmidt's reconstructions of preliterate culture history were found wanting in various directions; but it must be noted that this great scholar did not hold his reconstructions as final achievements.

The shortcomings in Schmidt's reconstructions were sought to be corrected by J. Haekel who made many refinements, included the insights of many disciplines and avoided sweeping interpretations. But the philosophy underlying historical ethnology becomes pointed in Engelbert Stiglmayr's *Genzzeitliche Ethnologie* in which he reflects on the foundations of the discipline. In doing so he depends on the Aristotelian-Thomist philosophy which he regards as the proper perennial philosophy, as the most thoroughly thought out of all philosophical systems and as a philosophy of order and being. From this philosophy he derives the necessary and universal concepts on which he bases his own reflections on the foundations of ethnology.

In keeping with this philosophy Stiglmayr points out that every science has a double aim or object: one, to understand a particular aspect of reality, its formal object; and two, to relate it to all of reality, its material object. Since reality has many aspects, it can be considered from various standpoints. Knowledge of the formal object is attained through abstraction from the material object. Since the specific character of each science emerges from the aspect of reality which it takes for its formal object, the method of a science will depend on its formal object and not vice versa.

The object of ethnological study, says Stiglmayr, is always culture. But, then, what is culture? Culture is the epi-hyper-natural form of things, he answers. In defining culture in this somewhat extraordinary fashion, Stiglmayr wishes to convey that culture is man's attempt to improve and perfect the natural circumstances with which he is endowed and by which he is surrounded. Man can do this because he is the efficient cause of culture; culture stems

in the final analysis from man alone. Every science which is concerned with the cultural phenomenon is a cultural science. Hence there is a general science of culture and special sciences of culture. Ethnology is a special science of culture because it studies the ethnics; that is to say, the bearer of a culture is a folk. Indeed, an ethnics may be defined as a person or group which distinguishes itself from others through that which it has made its own or through its culture. In contrast with the natural sciences, ethnology is a science of mind (*Geisteswissenschaft*) and a historical one at that. Ethnology is a holistic or integral science. It studies ethnic groups as wholes. Those ethnologists who do not support the Aristotelian-Thomist philosophy would presumably take up the neo-Kantian position or some position more or less akin to the Baden branch of the neo-Kantian orientation represented by Windelband, Rickert and others who turned their attention to the study of the *Geisteswissenschaften* as the domain of values. To what extent the new realism, phenomenology and existentialism have had an effect on the historical ethnologists is not clear.

Evolutionary historicism and historical ethnology were in turn attacked from 1922 onwards by the British social anthropologists. The founding fathers of British social anthropology were A. R. Radcliffe-Brown and Bronislaw Malinowski. The former was a positivist and the latter a pragmatist. Radcliffe-Brown believed that all of reality was natural and therefore capable of being studied with the methods of the natural sciences. Following pragmatism, Malinowski tried to understand the meanings of things in terms of their practical consequences. Both of them were of the view that all attempts at reconstructing culture history without written documents was a vain endeavour. They, therefore, described such attempts by the unilinear evolutionists and diffusionists as speculative or pseudo-history.

The task of social anthropology, they said, was the analysis of existing societies in terms of the concepts of structure and function. Thus one of Radcliffe-Brown's books is entitled *Structure and Function in Primitive Society*. The British social anthropologists were strongly influenced by the French sociologist, Emile Durkheim and his followers. They, therefore, concentrated on society rather than culture in contrast with the American anthropologists who took up culture as their point of departure. They regarded social

systems as natural systems and hoped to discover the invariant relations or laws of social organisation.

The study of structure began with Radcliffe-Brown. It may be defined broadly as the framework of society considered as the ordered relation between different social units or groupings based on kinship, sex, age, common interest, locality and status, or it may be regarded as a model constructed after this relation. Radcliffe Brown developed the concept around the concept of organism in biology. But the term has been interpreted in various ways. Kroeber and Kluckhohn, for example, say that the word sometimes stresses form as when one refers to the structure of a boat, and sometimes organisation as in the term social structure. They define it as 'the mode in which the parts stand to each other. L. Warner defines it as 'a system of formal and informal groupings by which the social behaviour of individuals is regulated.' M. Fortes tells us that it is not an aspect of culture but the entire culture of a given people handled in a special frame of theory.' And, C. Lévi-Strauss tries to interpret in mathematical terms and regards it as a model built after the empirical reality but not identical with this Social reality. It is an order of orders.

The first definition of function was attempted by Malinowski in 1926. By function he meant the manner in which 'the various aspects of culture influence one another' and the measure of their contribution to the 'integral working of the cultural scheme.' Radcliffe-Brown defines it in the following way: '....the contribution a partial activity makes to the total activity of which it is a part.' Thus these two British social anthropologists, meant by the term function the interconnection between cultural and particularly the contribution that a part of a culture made to that culture in its entirety. The concept of function is very vague. It may stand for activity or for the relation of interdependence with other aspects of a culture, or again for a relation of interdependence with certain purposes such as the maintenance of a culture. G. C. Homans enumerates three types of functionalism quasimatheamatical, Durkheimian or Radcliffe-Brownian and Malinowskian functionalism. And R. K. Merton draws a distinction between latent and manifest functions.

Soon thereafter British social anthropology experienced an interesting turning-point. This happened through E. E. Evans-Pritchard.

who, although a pupil of Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski, affirmed that social systems are not natural systems but moral systems, that social anthropology is therefore, not a natural science but is like certain kinds of art and historiography and that it is not an applied science like medicine and engineering but is useful only in a general cultural sense. So likewise Edmund Leach confesses that social anthropology today is well aware of its ignorance unlike Sir James Frazer who imagined he knew a good deal for certain. Turning to John Beattie who studied under Evans-Pritchard, we learn that the social anthropologist tries to understand, whereas the natural scientist attempts to explain, a distinction which has long been familiar to the Germans. He adds further that in studying social change the social anthropologist must take on the role of a historian because changes occur in time. More recently I. M. Lewis does not hesitate to connect social anthropology with history because, according to him, it is concerned with possibilities and probabilities. Lastly, Lucy Mair, who was for several years Professor of Applied Anthropology in London University, informs us that very few British anthropologists have looked at social change as a subject of explanatory generalisations because the pursuit of one's interests through choices made by a person is something that all members of all societies can do. She says very frankly that much of the advice that anthropologists offer is just common sense.

One can, therefore, conclude that the poverty of social anthropology consists, first, in the fact that it has not been able to live up to the positivist aims and claims of its earlier phase, and second, in the fact that its methods, concepts, and self-denying ordinances do not enable it to understand and describe the first, fine flowerings of freedom and creativity and the events that followed thereafter. Social anthropology has also tended to succumb to the exaggerations of scientism and sociologism. Where social anthropology stand after more than fifty years of hectic activity? Adam Kuper in his historical survey of the subject ends by quoting Edmund Leach's remarkable question: 'What in heaven's name are we trying to find out?' And two Indian anthropologists, B. L. Abbi and Satish Saberwal, point out that social anthropology suffers from a blurred identity today.

Therefore, the central question of our time is: In what sense, if

any, is anthropology a science? We are of course mainly concerned with cultural and social anthropology and not with physical anthropology. We have seen that the unilinear evolutionary anthropologists of the second half of the nineteenth century wanted to eat their cake and have it too, that is to say, they wanted to view history from the perspective of evolution and science, but could not make up their minds in favour of materialism or idealism, and alternated between the two or endeavoured to arrive at compromise solutions. We have seen, further, how the diffusionists, both British and German, did not want to have any truck with evolutionism and viewed history, as it should be, as emerging from man as a free being capable of knowing, desiring and willing, which is its *raison-d'être*. We have also seen how the founding fathers of British social anthropology gave themselves up whole-heartedly to positivism or scientism, how with Evans-Pritchard, who incidentally became a convert to Catholicism, the pendulum swung to the opposite extreme, and how social anthropology has ramified in various directions, is uncertain of its status or its aims, and consequently has lost its identity. It remains for us to examine the view of the American cultural anthropologists and of the French anthropologists as represented by their most eminent personality, Claude Lévi-Strauss. Presumably cultural anthropologists in America can be divided into three groups, one, those who regard cultural anthropology as a natural science like physics and chemistry; two, those who regard it as one of the humanities and class it with history, art and literature and, three, those who take up an intermediate position or vacillate between the two extremes. Thus, to choose three examples by way of illustration. Abram Kardiner and Edward Prebble in their book *They Studied Man* state that the cultural history of the 19th and 20th centuries demonstrates that cultural anthropology grew into a scientific discipline from nebulous origins. They are not very clear about what they mean by a 'scientific discipline', but add later that cultural anthropology does not yet have a unified theory or method. On the other hand, E Adamson Hoebel has no doubts that man is a part of nature, that, therefore, he is a natural phenomenon and belongs within the animal kingdom and that the study of man called anthropology is a natural science when it is pursued in accordance with the principles and methods of science. But he goes on to say that it has an almost

unique quality which is that as a natural science it is at one and the same time a physical science and a social science. John J. Honigsmann, however, does not agree, if one judges from his views on the subject. He would prefer to classify cultural anthropology under history and the humanities but without abstaining from the use of the positive methods in gathering and analyzing data.

The French anthropologist, Claude Levi-Strauss, who has acquired world-renown, is largely concerned with the quest for universals or basic mental and social processes which project themselves concretely and objectively in cultural institutions. He says that anthropology should be a science of general principles and argues that such a general science can only be achieved on the basis of structural considerations which would include both unconscious and conscious processes. Inspired in the main by the linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, he affirms that linguistics offers a model of scientific method for anthropology. Referring to Karl Marx who said : 'Men make their own history, but they do not know that they are making it,' he says that this statement legitimizes both history and anthropology and that the two are inseparable. How, then shall we evaluate Levi-Strauss ? Annemarie de Waal Malefijt in her *Images of Man* points out that positivists are generally critical of structuralism and adds : 'Nevertheless, some have also realized that positivism is a scientific method using verifiability as its code, and that it is possible that other codes for understanding exist. Perhaps, then, Levi-Strauss is embarked on a scientific revolution, although at present it seems to be a faltering one. So far, he does not say much more about the human mind than that it is structured, and that its tendency is to think in binary patterns.' And Marvin Harris, who is a cultural materialist sympathetic to Karl Marx, states : 'Unlike Marx, Levi-Strauss confronted a great opportunity to which he did not respond. He found Comte, Durkheim, and Mauss standing on their heads, and he joined them.' We may, therefore, conclude that Levi-Strauss is a crypto-positivist.

Is anthropology a science or is it not ? The anthropologists, it is evident, do not give us a clear answer, as a group whose formal pursuit is the study of man. There are some who say that anthropology is a natural science; others that it is a science but not a natural science; still others that it's not a science; and several that it is both a science and history or that it is in part a science and

in part not a science.

A part of the confusion arises from the word science itself which may be used, as in the German term for it *Wissenschaft* in a wide or loose sense, or in imitation of the natural science in narrow or rigid sense. But most of the confusion arises because the concept of man has become polarised, or, as Max Scheler puts it, 'We are the first generation in which man has become fully and thoroughly problematic to himself; in which he no longer knows what he essentially is, but at the same time also knows that he does not know.' Paradoxically the quest for certainty which took its most accentuated form in the positive sciences, and which has resulted in the technologizing of human life and its environment with its attendant consequences of the pollution of the air and the waters, the unbalancing of the ecological system, the exhaustion of the earth's resources and the shrivelling of the quintessentially human, has made man uncertain of himself and his scientific powers and uneasy in his inward life. Accordingly, the reaction which has set in and which manifests itself in the restlessness of the student world in the rise and decline of the counter culture movement, in the quest for solace through eastern religions, through a bucolic existence or through the insights of the primitive peoples and the like, can only be satisfactorily supported, presuming that it is basically on the right track, first, by the acceptance of a wide definition of the term science and, second, by bringing anthropology and philosophy together in a philosophical anthropology which is in correspondence with the emerging *Zeitgeist*.

So far as a wide definition of the term science is concerned, we would do well by taking the French philosopher Jacques Maritain as our mentor. Contrasting the ancient and the modern approaches to science, Maritain points out in *The Degrees of Knowledge* that to the ancients 'the eminent dignity of metaphysics' gave shape to the word, whereas in modern time it is the experimental, positive or natural sciences or sciences of phenomena which are taken as a model. Maritain next asks how science in general can be defined in accordance with its ideal type; and he answers 'We can say that science is a form of knowledge perfect in its mode, more precisely, a form of knowledge where, constrained by evidence, the mind assigns to things their reasons of being, the mind being only satisfied when it has attained not only to a thing, to a

given datum, but when it grounds this datum in being and intelligibility.'

Such a definition would do justice to the dual nature of man which David Bidney stresses in these words : '...man is not only a part of nature but also a being who, through his selfreflective intellect and creative imagination, is able to transcend the cosmic order of nature by setting up for himself norms of conduct which do not apply to the rest of nature.' In keeping with this wide definition the imperial claims of the positivist doctrine of the unity of scientific method will have to be denied, and we will have to acknowledge the validity of other methods of acquiring knowledge and insight. What the Canadian philosopher Bernard Lonergan has to say about knowledge and insight in his great book *Insight* should be noted in this connection. At any rate, in addition to the positive method of observation, experimentation, hypothesis-formation and verification, we have the method of knowing by indwelling. Michael Polanyi, who in his profound book *Personal Knowledge* underlined the significance of tacit understanding, tells us how knowledge may be acquired by dwelling in that which we desire to know. We have a very close knowledge of our body because we dwell in it. By dwelling in the parts which constitute a whole, we come to know the whole. By dwelling in a man's actions we secure a knowledge of his mind. It is through this theory and method of knowledge, says Polanyi, that we succeed in both knowing and experiencing the higher tangible levels of life.

A Philosophical anthropology which corresponds with the emerging *Zeitgeist* and paradigm science can of hardly be said to have crystallized fully as yet. It is still in the making. But Francisco Romero's theory of man and J. F. Donceel's philosophical anthropology may be regarded as fore-shadowings.

Francisco Romero (1891-1962) was one of the most influential Latin-American philosophers. In turn he was influenced by Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler, Nicolai Hartmann, Martin Heidegger, Henri Bergson and Ortega Y Gasset. Romero's main aim was to lay down a theoretical basis for creativity, freedom and responsibility in man's cultural and social life. He opposed scientism because it looked at man's moral, aesthetic, mental and spiritual life in terms of determinism, atomism and mechanism. He also opposed fascist and communist totalitarianism. To Romero philosophical tho-

thought was a movement within cultural activity through which a critical attitude was brought to bear on the cultural activity itself. As such philosophical thought increases the development of freedom. Aiming at a humanistic philosophy which tries to maximize the realization of praiseworthy human values, he attacks positivism and reductionism because they impoverish the higher meanings and possibilities of the human spirit. To this end he adopts the phenomenological method. Experience, he believes, is dynamic and transcendental. A transcendental entity is one which radiates its action and exercises influence beyond itself. In Romero the notion of structure is basic, but he supports the proposition that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. He distinguishes four levels of reality, each of which depends on the one below it. The first level is the inorganic which is characterised by stability, regularity and gravitational force. Next comes the organic which depends on the inorganic. It is characterized by assimilation, elimination, continuing identity, growth, spontaneous movement, reproduction, and hereditary transmission. Its psychic life is pre-intentional and non-conscious. The human level which depends on the organic level becomes more and more complex acquires consciousness which, as Franz Brentano said, is always directed towards an object, that is, it is intentional. The self emerges at this level. The self or subjects becomes conscious of an object by knowing, willing and feeling it. The self, therefore, has a measure of control over its world. It creates culture and is created by it. Intentionality is a bridge to the spiritual. Since man bestrides both the natural and the spiritual worlds, he is a dual being. The actualization of man's possibilities as a person can only come about through the growth of freedom and responsibility, and through a culture which takes as its main aim the development, refinement and creative expression of his unique spiritual capacities. Spirit is order and harmony. It moulds life and intentionality to its own image. Political freedom, says Romero very relevantly for us in this country, is the foundation of other freedoms. All these freedoms are necessary so that a community or society of persons can strive towards a more adequate culture which struggles to achieve responsibility, universalism, altruism creativity in the arts and sciences and the promotion of human dignity in the economic, political and social spheres. Romero concludes with the paradox that truth can be reached, but that no version of it

should be free from doubt or accepted as a final presentation.

J. F. Donceel defines philosophical anthropology very simply as the philosophy of man and points out that it makes considerable use of philosophical, reflective and phenomenological psychology. In particular reflective psychology studies man as a subject, an ego, I, that is, as a being for whom there are objects and values and wills. It adopts a first person approach; it is a study of myself as myself. Through reflective psychology I endeavour to become conscious of and understand myself. But since I and thou are closely interrelated, since I become conscious of myself through communion with you, the study subjectivity is closely connecte dwith the study of inter-subjectivity. A man has a nature and is a person. His nature is that which is given to him as a person to utilize as he deems fit. Hence man is facticity and project. Man's nature can be studied as an object, but the study of the person as person requires the phenomenological method. In order that the pure subject can live in and absorb the world it needs roots. Its roots are its quasiobject—fingers, hair, emotions, memory, perception and the like. Therefore, anthropology is the study of being-in-the-world, and its highest form of knowing is 'the luminous self-presence and self-awareness of the subject.' There are several egos in us, the physical, the social, the personal egos; but there is a deeper ego which knows these egos and this deeper ego is the primordial or originating or pure ego, the real self. Who or what is this pure ego? In the act of knowing and willing I coincide with myself and thus coincide with being. This is the pure ego or subject and the proof of this fact is that I cannot deny that I know something without contradiction. The pure I can only be known by pointing towards it. Having thus dealt with the question—Who is man?—we can turn to the question: What is man? Man is an organism but he is different from animals in that he has the power of reflection, co-reflection and ultra-reflection, in other words, he is a person. A person is an individual with a spiritual nature, and spirit is essentially self-knowledge, self-volition, self-consciousness and self-position. But man is both a material and spiritual being; therefore he participates in individualisation through both modes, the material and the spiritual. A fundamental feature of the human spirit is the power of transcendence. Where does this power ultimately propel man?

In a loving affirmation of the Infinite. But in his actual situations man is faced by a dialectical tension between that which is always already there or facticity and that which is always already beyond it or project. Man, accordingly, incorporates in himself several paradoxes. For one, since he has a body he is subject to the laws of matter, but since he is a spirit he is above space and time. For another, the human being is at one and the same time subsistent and open. He is open both horizontally and vertically. For a third man is existent and yet to be achieved. As a person man has inalienable rights, that is to say, 'he is a sovereign being, an end in himself, never really a means; because he is a spirit, albeit in matter, because the core of his being is self-consciousness, self-possession and self-position.'

And so having briefly and rapidly examined developments in anthropology from the second half of the nineteenth century to the present-day, having considered the struggle to render it a science and the counter-struggles against that endeavour, and having concluded that the time is ripe for a philosophical anthropology in correspond with the emerging *Zeitgeist* in general and the emerging paradigm of science in particular, we can turn finally to the third term in the title of this paper, that is to say, to India. Two facts stand out prominently—one, we are dominated by a mentality of dependence; and two, we have, therefore become theoretically and philosophically sterile. The mentality of dependence has by and large arisen from the spiritual impact of a long-enduring colonialism; and the theoretical sterility is to a great extent a consequence of that impact. We have been cut off from our roots, and have not yet been able to strike fresh roots which would derive their nourishment from both tradition and modernity simultaneously. In other words, we have not yet developed an authentically synthetic culture which is a necessity today and our only hope of economic and spiritual salvation. Regrettably, our anthropologists have also followed the paths of dependence and imitation and have either resorted to descriptive ethnography and on that basis sought to trace affiliations and affinities or have taken very largely today to analytical ethnography after the manner of social anthropologists in Britain or cultural anthropologists in America. Hardly any of them have tried to reflect on the foundations of their discipline in relation to the concrete situation in which they are unavoidably participant observers, obs-

ervers, who paradoxically observe themselves. And so, as I have pointed out time and again, we have grown theoretically and philosophically sterile. Our changing situation changes for the worse because we have no theoretical or philosophical grip on it at all; and our endeavours to secure a grip on it through an imitation of western theoretical models or philosophical orientation have uncovered the weaknesses, if not the worthlessness, of the enterprise.

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PROFESSOR MALCOLM ON DREAMS

I

Malcolm's "Dreaming" is a monograph in which he consistently applies a principle of Wittgenstein to dream-experiences the principle that there cannot be any significant talk of a private object, that "an inner process stands in need of outer criteria"¹.

If dream be understood as an inner process involving thoughts, feelings, images, etc. of which the dreamer is directly aware and of which no one else can (logically) be aware, then the following difficulty arises. 'Dream' is a concept and, like any other concept of a language, must have a rule of application, so much so, that, its wrong application always remains a possibility. Now, if 'dream' means a private inner experience, there can be no criterion of its application, no way of detecting whether a particular case is a wrong application of the concept, because in the case of inner states, what an individual says is not a case of following a definition, but a case of laying down a definition. What one says about his private experience cannot be checked up, not only by others, but not even by the individual himself. The distinction between correct identification and being under the impression that the identification is correct is obliterated. Such an identification has to be incorrigible. In the case of dream, memory cannot provide a criterion, because it itself needs one. If one tries to find out whether his identification is correct by the help of memory, his position is like Wittgenstein's man who buys several copies of the morning paper to assure that what is said was true.² Thus, my identification of my dream experience may go wrong, not only sometimes, but always get rid of the idea of the private object in this way: assume that it constantly changes, but that you do not notice"³. In other words, the 'supposition of

private experience is a knob that turns nothing. ⁴ Therefore, "what went on within me" is not the point at all ⁵.

For this reason, in Chapter 14 of "Dreaming", Malcolm calls dream "a queer phenomenon", because "one tells a dream under the influence of an impression-as if one was faithfully recalling events that one witnessed" ⁶, while in fact, there was no event to recall, no dream-experience which the telling reproduces. Dream-experience is an unintelligible hypothesis because, "nothing can count for or against the truth of this hypothesis. We can say either that there were experiences during sleep or that there were not, as we like" ⁷. And, then, he approvingly quotes the last sentence of section 271 of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*: "A wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it, is not part of the mechanism". In other words, the point that Malcolm wants to make is that "telling the dream" and "having the dream-experience" are logically the same, since there is no way of knowing what dreams are a-part from descriptions. The descriptions may not be backed by anything; conversely, there might be experience without narration. But then, how to know? Thus, we can meaningfully say only that description is all that "dream" connotes. The private dream-experience is no part of the dream language-game.

In short, if the concept 'dream' we meant to refer to inner states, it would cease to be a concept, because, in that case, we can never be sure that it has as a concept must have, a definite field of application. Thus, it has to be admitted that as a concept 'dream' means, not the dream-experience, but only the description of it that one gives after waking from sleep. The description is its criterion, that is, the logical definition and not its evidence. The concept does not mean anything beyond and besides the description.

II

It is normally supposed that dream is a private inner experience, because we speak of 'remembering a dream' and 'remembering' means recapitulating a past experience. But, it is to be noted that 'remembering' in the context of telling dreams has a meaning quite distinct from the meaning it has in the context of factual memory, because it cannot be checked up. In a paper

entitled "A definition of factual memory" Malcolm holds that the knowledge that one dreamt is a case of factual memory "when one knows that one had a dream last week or last month. But if a person awakened suddenly from sleep and immediately declared that he had a dream, should we call this remembering a dream"?⁸ Malcolm answers the question in the negative, since in the ordinary sense 'remembering' always presupposes previous knowledge and there can be no question of having previous knowledge that one was dreaming.

Not that "I remember I dreamt P" has no use in language. What is to be noted is that this is a special use, so much so, that this use does not justify the fact that what I now remember was during sleep an experience, or, that 'remembering that I dreamt' is logically 'the same as 'remembering that I met X at a party'. It is this logical assimilation of the distinct uses of 'remembering' that has done mischief in the philosophy of dream and, to avoid confusion in thought, it is necessary to keep before mind the distinct uses of the term. It is to be noted that remembering a dream is not an instance of what is commonly known as factual memory. Malcolm makes this quite clear in the concluding para of his paper referred to above: "The conclusion I draw is, not that our definition of factual memory is wrong, but that this special sense of remembering that one dreamt differs sharply from the central use of factual memory locution. Our definition gives a correct account of the central use, but perhaps not of absolutely every use of this locution"⁹ This meets the charge of D. F. Pears: ".....must every type of memory claim be verified sometimes, or atleast confirmed sometimes? If so, what counts as a type?"¹⁰

In this case, Malcolm is following Wittgenstein strictly. In "Philosophical Investigations", Wittgenstein says: "The question whether the dreamer's memory deceives him when he reports the dream after waking cannot arise, unless indeed we introduce a completely new criterion for the report's 'agreeing' with the dream, a criterion which gives us a concept of 'truth' as distinct from 'truthfulness here'"¹¹.

To follow the connection between Malcolm and Wittgenstein a little farther. Wittgenstein denies that a sensation-word denotes an item in our (private) consciousness, because a private image cannot

be identified. But he does not deny that in common usage there is something like identifying mental images as when one says that the pain he now feels in the chest is the same as what he felt last month. In his review of "Philosophical Investigations" Malcolm says: "Wittgenstein who has no interest in reforming language, would not dream of calling this an incorrect use of 'identify.' But, Malcolm points out, Wittgenstein would insist on recognising the distinct meaning of the word when so used. To quote his words again: "His identification of his sensation is an expression of sensation... the identification is incorrigible." We have here a radically different use of 'identify' from that illustrated in the examples of alcohol and rabbit".¹² The philosophical problem arises because the former sense of 'identify' is taken to be the same as the latter one. Similarly, the mistaken notion of dream is due to taking 'remembering a dream' as a case of factual memory when, in fact, it is entirely different. In "Dreaming" Malcolm as a true follower of Wittgenstein, is only "assembling, reminders for a particular purpose"¹³.

III

A great stumbling-block in the way of accepting the thesis that description is all that the concept of dream implies is the fact that in the case of one's own dream, impression that one dreamt and not any description of it, is what determines that one dreamt. In other words, I know that some one has dreamt from the fact that he tells me his dream. But, surely, I do not need any telling to know that I have dreamt. I know that from my impressions of my 'dream-experience' but, then, 'I had a dream' and 'He had a dream,'—the first and third person statements have no doubt the same sense which these could not have if the criteria in the two cases were different. so, it follows that 'dream-experience' constitutes the meaning of the concept of dream, since only thus interpreted can the first and third person statements of dreaming be interpreted in the same sense—the descriptions of dreams in the case of others pointing to their 'dream-experiences' as one's impressions do in one's own case.

Against this objection to his theory of dreaming, Malcolm points out that, 'in the same sense' is determined in different cases by different moral uses, so much so, that it is fallacious to deduce any

normal use from any case of 'in the same sense'. In other words, it is fallacious to suppose that 'in the same sense' must always imply one and the same normal use in all cases, namely, the application of the same criterion of verification. 'I weigh 170 pounds' is said to be used in the same sense as 'He weighs 170 pounds', because both are verified with the same or similar method of weighing. But this does not mean that it must be so in every case of first and third person pair of statements. As a matter of fact, this is not the normal use of 'in the same sense' in the case of the pairs 'I had dreamt' and 'He had dreamt.' Here 'in the same sense' does not imply the application of the same criterion of verification. The normal use of 'in the same sense' here is only that none refers to, say, day-dream. In short, 'in the same sense' does not determine the normal use, as the objectors wrongly suppose, on the contrary, it is determined by the normal use. To quote Malcolm's own words: "What it is to use the sentence of a first person third person pair 'in the same sense' depends on what their normal use is. One cannot deduce what their normal use is from the fact that they are used in the same sense"¹⁴ Thus, though 'I had dreamt' and 'He had dreamt' are used in the same sense, it does not necessarily follow that the pair must have the same criterion of verification. In other words, it is not illegitimate to suppose that in this case 'in the same sense' has a different normal use. As a matter of fact, one knows that he had dreamt, not because of having subjective impressions, but because of finding that these impressions are not confirmed by, or tally with, waking experience. This is what makes one think that he had dreamt, even when the fact was really experienced waking up for a short while at midnight in a half-sleep half-waking state, if others who were present at that time conspire to deceive him. "As one can know one dreamt, so can one be mistaken. You wake up, for example, with the impression that a police man come into your room during the night; other people in the house say this did not occur; you conclude you dreamt it; but the event really happened and the others, conspired to deceive you".¹⁵ So the impressions by themselves, are of no account. They do not and cannot establish that one dreamt.

One of the intriguing points in Malcolm's analysis of dream is that he altogether denies the possibility of having any experience during sleep. On his analysis, 'I dreamt' does not mean 'I was

aware of anything during sleep.' Had I been aware of anything, it would not be dream but hallucination. His point is that if one can be said to have any experience in dream, it must be conceded that he is capable of making assertions in sleep of the type, for example, as cited by Aristotle, "some object approaching is a man or a horse" "the object is white or beautiful," and so forth. But, then, to concede that it is possible to make assertions in sleep is to further concede that it is possible to make the assertion "I am asleep" in sleep. But "I am asleep" is such a statement that it can be asserted only falsely. In other words, its falsity is a necessary condition of its being made. This being so, Malcolm contends, "I am asleep" can not be said to be a genuine assertion, since a genuine assertion, though may not actually be true, must at least have the logical possibility of being true.

This position of Malcolm appears to be puzzling, because if "I am asleep" is not a genuine statement, its use could not be learnt or taught. But, then, how do we know that when such a statement is made, it has got to be false? To know that whenever it is used, it is wrongly used implies that one knows that a given instance of its use is not a case of its right use. But how is that possible, unless one knows what a case of its right use is?

This difficulty may be put in another way by applying what Wittgenstein calls the principle of significant negation. Whatever proposition has a significant negation must itself be significant. Thus, it may be said that, since "I am not asleep" can be significantly said and so taught and learnt, how can its negation "I am asleep" be non-sensical and cannot be taught and learnt?

The sentences "I am asleep", "I am unconscious", "I am dead" are of the same logical type, in as much as their assertion entails their falsity. The peculiarity of these sentences is that, though it is logically impossible to assert them truthfully in the present tense, these can be, and often are, asserted truthfully in the past tense (of course, taking 'dead' to mean 'not alive'). I can meaningfully say "I was asleep", "I was unconscious", "I was not alive" (when, for example, Russell was born). But, then, these sentences in the past tense only indicate that I was not having the normal waking, conscious, living experiences. If something extremely unusual happens which it is difficult for us to integrate with our normal waking experience, we wonder if we

are awake or dreaming, that is, asleep. Similarly to say in the present tense "I am asleep", "I am unconscious", "I am dead" would only indicate that I am now devoid of normal waking, conscious, living experiences. But then, the utterance of 'I' would not be consistent with such statements, because the very utterance of 'I' would show that I am having the experiences which I deny by the use of the verb and the predicate. In other words, "I am asleep" cannot be truthfully said, because the very utterance of 'I' shows that I am not asleep. Similarly, "I am not asleep" does not make any specific statement, does not give any definite information about any particular subject matter. In other words, it does not report or describe anything but only shows that I am awake, that is, having normal waking experience which any utterance whatsoever of mine, nay, even any ejaculation or gesture of mine will show. For example, if some one referring to me remarks "He is asleep" when I am really not, I may show him that I am not asleep just by turning over, or by the movement of my limbs or by producing some relevant sounds or just by opening my eyes. Wittgenstein, in his *Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus*, makes a distinction between saying and showing. In proposition 4.1212 he says : "What can be shown cannot be said." Saying is asserting or describing that a state of affairs exists or does not exist. A proposition says or states something. Showing, on the other hand, is 'showing forth itself', 'manifesting itself', 'exhibiting itself', and so forth. "I am not asleep", Malcolm maintains, does not say or describe any state of affairs but only shows a fact which can be done without using any sentence whatsoever. Thus, "I am not asleep", being not a significant statement, it is no wonder that its negation "I am asleep" also has got to be so on the principle of significant negation. That I am awake or conscious or living can not be said, but only shown. Prof. Ayer is wrong in supposing that "I am not asleep" or "I am awake", on Malcolm's analysis, "expresses a significant statement, which has no significant negation."¹⁶ I can learn or teach the use of such sentences, because in such cases the only thing to learn or teach is how to use "a demonstrative, here functioning as a subject, so much so, that the addition of the predicate does not add anything new.

V

Malcolm considers instances of dream which may falsify his theory. For example, during sleep some one may display behaviour—utter the name of someone, smile, sigh, and the like—which may be taken to indicate that he is dreaming in the sense of having some experience in sleep. Now, suppose on waking he is not able to tell any dream. Does this prove that he did not have any dream to tell? What about dog's dreaming?

Malcolm takes this kind of dream to be uninteresting. In such case, one may have anything or nothing. It is the inexpressible and the unknowable and cannot be talked of and what cannot be talked of cannot be whistled off either. His behaviour is like that of an operated patient who utters words of agony under a nesthesia. When he comes round, he is not able to recall any experience. Did he have any experience all the same? Or was it all due to only unconscious reflex action? "And what meaning has this question?—And what interest?"¹⁷ What would settle the question? so, Malcolm says ".....our primary concept of dreaming has for its criterion, not the behaviour of the sleeping person but of his subsequent testimony.... Dreaming in this primary sense is of great interest to people and also poses philosophical problems. Dreaming that has a purely behavioural criterion is of little interest."¹⁸

Malcolm considers nightmare to be logically distinct from dream because dream occurs during sleep and when one has a nightmare he cannot be said to be fully asleep.¹⁹ The criterion of sleep, according to Malcolm, is mainly behavioural, that is, "present inertness and unresponsiveness"²⁰, so much so, that "a man who was tossing about, crying out and groaning in the throes of a nightmare "would not be" a good example of a person asleep."²¹

Narration of dreams to a psycho-analyst has importance in so far as these disclose what ideas occur to the mind of the patient, but not as revealing the patient's experience during sleep, since his waking delusions are also of importance to the psychoanalyst.

Prof. Ayer, on the contrary, contends that the fact that the patients are able to "reverse their accounts of their dreams" and "recall incidents, perhaps entire dreams, which they had not previously been able to remember" shows that there is a core of dream-experience round which the report centres. As he says, the recon-

struction of dreams under the influence of psychoanalysis "does not accord very well with the idea that there is nothing to which report of dreams can correspond".²² It is, however, clear that the fact which Prof. Ayer advances goes to prove the contrary of what he intends to prove. Which experience did the patient actually have during sleep? What is the criterion? He might have any or no experience. Anyway, his supposed experience cannot be known and, therefore, cannot be talked of.

For the same reason, Malcolm denies that dreams occur in physical time. What happens in time is an event and an event can be talked of. Conversely, what cannot be talked of cannot, without abuse of language, be termed an event.

VI

The point that Malcolm tries to establish in "Dreaming" is that one cannot be said to use a concept meaningfully if there is no uniform and objective criterion of its use. In this connection, reference may be made to Wittgenstein's denial of the possibility of private language²³. Following Wittgenstein, Malcolm means to say that, as in the case of sensation-words, so also in the case of dream-concept, it is not the inner experience, which is not only beyond all access of others, but also cannot be identified as the same at different times even by oneself, that constitutes the core of the meaning of 'dream'. 'Dream' only means the description of the impressions that one reports after waking from sleep because only these can be checked up in the light of verifiable facts.

What Malcolm means when he denies that dreams are conscious experience enjoyed during sleep is not that there is no dream-experience, but that, since there is no criterion for identifying it and thus for knowing it, no concept can be meaningfully applied to it, whatever it may be. What Malcolm insists upon is the private experience is no part of dream language game following Wittgenstein's thesis that private sensation, for example, pain, though mistakenly supposed to form the core of sensation-words, is no part of sensation language-game. There cannot be any significant talk about private dream-experience, just as there cannot be any significant talk about mystic or religious experience.

I think, it is wrong even to say that there is no dream-experience, because in that case we use a concept which cannot be significantly used. Since the theists talk non-sense, it cannot be said that the atheists talk sense. Both transcend the bounds of language and try to talk about something which cannot be talked of. What Wittgenstein said of private sensation equally applies to private dream-experience : " It is not a something, but not a nothing either : the conclusion was only that a nothing would serve just as well as a something about which nothing could be said. We have only rejected the grammar which tries to force itself on us here "24.

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NOTES

1. L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, Sec. 580
2. L. Wittgenstein, *Op. Cit*; Sec. 265.
3. L. Wittgenstein, *Op. Cit*, Part II, XI, P. 207.
4. L. Wittgenstein, *Op. Cit*; Sec. 270.
5. L. Wittgenstein, *Op. Cit*; Part II, XI, P. 222.
6. P.86.
7. *Ibid*.
8. Included in his knowledge and certainty, P. 240.
9. *Ibid*.
10. D. F. Pears, Professor Norman Malcolm : *Dreaming*, *Mind*, Vol. LXX, No. 278, April, 1961, P. 152.
11. Part II, XI, PP. 222-23.
12. Included in his Knowledge and Certainty, P.127.
13. L. Wittgenstein, *Op. Cit*; Sec. 127.
14. N. Malcolm, *Dreaming*, P. 127.
15. *Ibid*.
16. A. J. Ayer, " Professor Malcolm on Dreams ", included in his *Metaphysics and Commonsense*, P. 166.
17. L. Wittgenstein, *Op. Cit*; Part II, VII, P. 184
18. N. Malcolm, *Dreaming*, P. 63.
19. " His state was, however, so unlike the paradigms of normal sleep that it is at least problematic whether it should be said

that he was 'asleep' when those struggles were going on".
N. Malcolm, Op. Cit, PP. 62-63.

20. N. Malcolm, Op. Cit, P. 23.
21. N. Malcolm, Op. Cit, P. 28.
22. A. J. Ayer, Op. Cit, P. 161.
23. See My "Wittgenstein on Private Language." Bharati, Utkal University Journal of Humanities Vol. IV, No. 7, Dec. 70, PP. 55-62.
24. L. Wittgenstein, Op. Cit, Sec. 304.

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*THE CRITERION OF PERSONAL IDENTITY - MUST IT BE PHYSICAL ?

What is the problem about personal identity? Normally there is no problem in identifying a person to be my friend, my brother, father or uncle as the case may be. But how do I know that the person in front of me is an old friend of mine, that he is the same person with whom I used to play football during my school days. Normally again there should be no problem. He has the same physical features. I may say, and the same mental make-up too. Same or similar? Has there been absolutely no change in his physical features and even in the mental make-up? This is impossible! But then how do I know that he is the same person? For all that I know, he may be a similar person, a person whose psycho-physical make-up is quite similar to that of my old friend. Moreover, there are cases in which the physical features and mental make-up of a person are very much changed, having undergone a radical transformation in important respects, because of which it may almost be impossible to identify the person to be the same as one's old acquaintance. And yet, he is the same person, is n't he? But how do I discover it? How do I come to know that he is the same person as my old friend although his physical and mental features have undergone radical transformation in many important respects? The question is about the criterion of personal identity. Normally again there is no difficulty so long as there are photographs of my friend showing the gradual changes in his physical features and there is some body closely associated with him who has taken note of gradual changes occurring in his mental make-up. And even if my friend shows sudden signs of absolute mental derangement there is no difficulty in identifying him to be the same person so long as there is a physical continuity between his earlier and later state. A murderer who has undergone radical change both in his physical as well as mental make-up after committing the murder is identified to be the same person liable to the same charges even when a number of years might have elapsed only on this ground of bodily continuity. Bodily continuity, therefore, is the criterion of personal identity in such cases. But what if the body is destroyed?

Can we significantly talk of a person surviving the destruction of his body or appearing in another body after an interval? If so, then, without bodily identity or continuity one can be identified to be the same person as before. But the question in that case would be, what would serve as a criterion of personal identity in the absence of bodily identity or continuity? Can memory or continuity of character do the job in the absence of physical continuity? Survival of the destruction of body and reincarnation in another body can not make sense if physical identity or continuity is a necessary criterion of personal identity.

But is it a necessary criterion? That it is not necessary should be evident from the following imaginary example. Supposing that my friend, Rama, vanishes into the air without a trace before my very eyes, as if by magic, and after some time re-appears before me, shall we call him an exactly similar but not the same person only because there is lack of spatio temporal continuity and consequently of bodily identity? I think not. Will Rama himself appreciate my taking this course or even understand why I behave like this? The person who returns after the interval behaves exactly as my friend Rama used to behave, he remembers doing everything that Rama did, he knows those very facts about me that Rama knew, and his body is exactly as my friend's used to be. Are these not sufficient to let me speak of him as being identical with Rama? I felt sorry when I saw Rama vanish without a trace and this surely should be the occasion for me to rejoice at his return. It is not that I have got somebody exactly like him before me after the interval, for this is not how we are likely to assess an event like this if it occurred. Everyone, it seems, will under such circumstances be inclined to say that Rama had vanished miraculously, but has come back unharmed. Here at least is a case, imaginary of course, where we should be inclined to base our judgement of personal identity only on memory, continuity of character, etc. not on bodily identity. What if the person re-appearing is not at all like Rama in his physical appearance? Shall we be inclined to accept him as the same person if he displays a continuity of character and an ostensibly veridical memory of Rama's past? No doubt it would be much more difficult for us to get us to the idea that the person in question is Rama; we may find ourselves completely bewildered for a while; but if the person

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in question (let us call him R_1) continues to display the psychological characteristics of Rama without fail; we should be ultimately persuaded to accept him as the same person though in a different body. We may say that Rama is back in a different body. This example is significant in pointing out that bodily identity or continuity is not necessary for personal identity in as much as it is not inconceivable that we may identify persons on the basis of veridical memory and continuity of character alone.

But the above example may be made more complicated by imagining the possibility of the disappearance of Rama being followed by the simultaneous appearance of two persons. R_1 and R_2 displaying the psychological characteristics of Rama in an exactly similar manner. Rama vanishes at time t_1 , and at time t_2 both R_1 and R_2 appear and claim to remember doing everything that Rama did and display the characteristics peculiar to Rama. What shall we say under such circumstances? We cannot say that Rama has returned to us in two different bodies, nor is there any criterion available to us by means of which we may decide that one of the persons appearing before us is identical with Rama and the other is not. It is certain that we should not know at first what to say, for the phenomenon in question is unusually bewildering. But if the phenomenon persists, then we shall have to adopt some linguistic convention which may appear convenient under the circumstances. We may perhaps find it convenient to say that R_1 and R_2 are exactly similar to Rama but that neither of them is numerically identical with him. Under the present circumstances, personal identity cannot, be based on memory and continuity of character alone.

Does the above example invalidate our claim that in certain cases at least memory (and continuity of character) may be sufficient without bodily identity or continuity for the purpose of personal identity? I think not. For there are very good reasons to think that memory and continuity of character would suffice to identify a person without bodily identity or continuity in cases like the less complicated one where the disappearance of a person is followed by the appearance of a single individual claiming to remember doing the past acts of the person who has disappeared. I do not think that we can be logically coerced to admit that if we

cannot speak of numerical identity in terms of memory alone in one case, then we cannot speak of identity in terms of memory in some other case. The two imaginary cases mentioned above are different at least to the extent that whereas the disappearance of Rama is followed in one case by a reduplication of his personality, there occurs no such reduplication in the other. It is no wonder, then, that this important difference between the two cases should make our approach to them regarding personal identity quite different too. And if we can point to a single case, imaginary or otherwise, where we are likely to talk of identity in terms of memory (or continuity of character) alone in the absence of bodily continuity, then there should be no reason why we may not speak of identity in cases of reincarnation and disembodied existence after the destruction of the body. But how, it may be asked, does the construction of an imaginary case as mentioned above help us at all? May it not be contended that in ordinary circumstances we usually depend on bodily continuity as the criterion of personal identity and that in extraordinary circumstances, as stated above we just don't know what to say? And as we don't know what to say in those extraordinary circumstances, so also we don't know what to say in cases of disembodied existence and reincarnation where memory alone may serve as the possible criterion of personal identity. It is a matter of forming new rules and of making new decisions, if and when such circumstances do in fact arise. Now I am inclined to agree with the above contention on the whole, but I think that certain further points should be made in this connection. Although the above contention of the opponent may be valid, this should not be taken to have provided him with any a priori ground for claiming that personal identity just cannot make any sense without bodily identity in cases of disembodied survival and reincarnation, for what is contended by him is not that personal identity makes no sense without bodily identity but that we do not know what to say in such cases. There is a further point to be noted in this connection. We are, it is urged, to take decisions and to make new rules if and when such occasions do in fact arise. But even if this may be true, can we not possibly conceive what decisions we are likely to take if such occasions arise? If we can imagine these decisions, and if some of

the decisions imagined happen to be favourable to making memory without bodily identity the criterion of personal identity, then may we not feel justified in asserting that bodily identity or continuity is not a necessary criterion after all? The imaginary case constructed by us serves us well in being less complicated than the cases of disembodied existence and reincarnation and in making us visualize the circumstances in which we are very likely to admit personal identity on the basis of memory. Once it becomes clear to us that there may be circumstances when we are likely to base our judgment of identity on memory alone, the case for doing the same in connection with reincarnation and disembodied existence may not appear so preposterous after all. And this is why I think that the imaginary case constructed by me is not altogether pointless.

I must next consider the criteria which we may possibly adopt for the identification of the same person in cases of survival and rebirth. In the case of survival, the disembodied mind in question may be regarded as the same individual if (i) there is veridical memory of many of his past events and if there is capacity under certain circumstances to recollect those he is not actually recollecting at present, and also if (ii) the dispositions and character of the disembodied mind are continuous with those of the embodied one. The point concerning the continuity of dispositions and character is no doubt an important one, for if the disembodied life is altogether discontinuous with the embodied one, there could be a strong inclination to say that the disembodied mind in question is not the same as the embodied one. But it should be noted at the same time that if the memory claims in the disembodied state should turn out to be veridical then some degree of discontinuity may easily be allowed. The most important of all, therefore, seems to be memory, both in its dispositional as well as its occurrent sense. Let us imagine the following. In the disembodied state just after my death (i.e. the destruction of my body), I become immediately aware of a continuity of character and dispositions. This by itself should make me feel fairly certain that I have survived death. I look at my body lying there, and recognize my relatives standing beside my body although I am unable to communicate with them. Moreover, I recollect how much I used to love my body. How much I used to care for it, and

I now feel sorry, perhaps, to see that it is going to be burnt. I also recollect that I had made some provisions for my family before my death, and am glad to see that my family has benefited from it. Now these and similar experiences after death should give me the conviction that I have survived death, that I who was so and so—a teacher of philosophy, a father of four children and so on—am now experiencing such and such things after the destruction of my body. And this I am able to ascertain through the continuity of character and dispositions to an extent, but primarily through my memory. Memory may not explain or produce self identity, but it at least discovers it. Even my knowledge that my present character and dispositions are continuous with my past character and dispositions is dependent on my memory. Memory, therefore, seems to be the most important and the primary criterion for the discovery of self-identity.

But how can we conceive of an independent check of the memory claim in the disembodied state? And if we cannot conceive of any such check, how can we avoid the possibility of being misled by delusive memory? It seems that some such check is not impossible in the disembodied state. First of all, one's memory about certain things may be checked by the same person's memory about certain other things. This is not an independent check, of course, but it may not be entirely useless. If two of my memories conflict with each other, it may lead me to investigate which one of these two is veridical and which one is not. Then I may perhaps seek the help of observation; as for example I may remember that in my embodied state I kept some valuable treasure hidden at a particular place, and I may verify this memory-claim by visiting the place in question. I may engage myself in some such verification procedure in the disembodied state, and I don't think that I should be very unreasonable if I become convinced through some such verification. Moreover, if the soul in the disembodied state may not be altogether solitary but may, on the contrary, be causally related to other souls, something like a 'public' check of one's memory-claim should be possible in the disembodied state. One's memory may be checked through other's memory and observation. The public check and verification in the disembodied state would no doubt be very much different from what we usually understand

them to be. The public as we know it consists of embodied individuals whereas the public in the disembodied state would be constituted of disembodied souls only. In the embodied state, moreover, perception is dependent on and is conducted through sense organs, whereas in the disembodied state it has to be conducted without sense organs. It is possible that each and every disembodied soul may be deluded both as regards his memory as well as perception, and yet they may have an elaborate system of checking the memories against each other and against perception. If this be a fact, then it is hard to see what independent means of detecting the mass hallucination in the disembodied state may possibly be adopted. Verification of a memory-claim in the disembodied state through the memories and perceptions of other souls cannot therefore have any logical certainty. Still, it seems that a disembodied mind may have some sort of practical certainty regarding his past life and personal continuity both through his memory which has been checked by his own perception and further memories, and through the perceptions and the memories of other members of the community.

All this is, however, fraught with certain grave difficulties which have been overlooked so far. First of all, prior to the consideration of the criterion of personal identity in the disembodied state we should be able to meet the objection that it may not, after all, be significant to talk of disembodied persons. "For", as Ayer points out, "here we have to find a criterion not only for our subject's being the same person as one who is physically identified, but for his being a person at all. We have made sense of saying that some one exists without a body, before we can raise the question whether he is the same person as one who existed with a body. And for this, continuity of memory, though it may be necessary, will not be sufficient."¹ And I fail to see how one can overcome this difficulty. Soul-substance theory will not do, and a series of experience without a body cannot meaningfully be said to constitute a person. How in that case can one conceive of a person as distinguished from another in the disembodied state? By means of their mental qualities? But what in that case would distinguish two persons having the same mental qualities in the disembodied state? Assumption of soul-substance will not solve the problem;

it would rather multiply our difficulties; and there is no physical criterion to rely on. I therefore find this difficulty to be an insuperable one and fatal to any conception of disembodied existence.

There is the further objection that far from there being the possibility of a public check in the disembodied state, one would have no means of knowing, as Strawson has aptly pointed out, other disembodied persons if such persons were existing so that the disembodied existence is bound to be a solitary one. The question of verification by observation, moreover, seems not only fantastic but losing all significance when we take into consideration the fact that all such observations etc. are to be carried on not only without a body but amidst a disembodied community. We have also to make sense of saying that the disembodied person visits the place where he had hidden his treasure, and 'visiting' here is to be done without a body. How then is this visiting to be conceived? All such descriptions of the disembodied spirit visiting their home etc. are apparently significant only because of an implicit reference to body throughout such description. And that is why, because of this fact, that a reference to body cannot be omitted altogether. In Indian thought we find the assumption of *sūksma sariara* or subtle body which is conceived to be moving from one place to another after the destruction of the *sūhūla sarira* or gross body. The assumption of a *sūksma sarira* or subtle body inside the gross body is of course not without difficulties of its own. But this shows the awareness on the part of Indian thinkers that a reference to some sort of body or the other is a necessary condition for the meaningful employment of language of seeing, hearing, moving etc. in a description of the life after death. Pure spirit, therefore, according to Indian thought, cannot move, see, hear, touch, feel pain or pleasure. Geach seems to be making a salient point when he says that "the exercise of one concept is intertwined with the exercise of others, as with a spider's web. Some connections may be broken with impunity; but if you break enough the whole web collapses—the concept becomes unusable. Just such a collapse happens, I believe, when we try to think of seeing, hearing, pain, emotion etc. going on independently of a body."² The hypothesis of disembodied existence is thus

The Criterion of Personal Identity

fraught with grave difficulties, and the problem of personal identity in the disembodied state cannot therefore be solved successfully by mere reference to memory and continuity of character

The question of reincarnation, however, is a more straight forward one. When we come to the question of the determination of personal identity in the case of reincarnation, we find that here also we have to fall back upon memory both in its occurrent and dispositional sense. Here again the question of the discrimination between the veridical and delusive memory seems to be of paramount importance, and here once more the possibility of having the public check comes to our rescue. But before discussing the nature of the certainty, if any, which we may have through such checks, it may not be altogether worthless to point out that there are good reasons for believing the memory claims that are made with sincerity and conviction to be more often veridical than not. And I fail to see why this should not be true also of those few memory-claims of earlier lives that are made with sincerity and conviction. I do not, of course, mean to say that instances of sincere and confident and yet delusive memory claims actually do not occur, for such instances can easily be cited, but what I want to say is that the memory-claims, if made with sincerity and conviction, are generally true.

But in any case, I must admit, we cannot get rid of the necessity of checking the ostensible memories of past lives. No such check, however, can give us logical certainty, even if we may be practically certain that the person in question is really a reincarnation of some other person of the past. The crucial points to be noted here are the following : (i) The person concerned should be able to give us some important information about the dead person whose reincarnation he is supposed to be. (ii) He must not have obtained this information through the normal sources. (iii) He also must not have obtained them through paranormal powers like retrocognitive clairvoyance. Now it is indeed almost impossible to distinguish between veridical memory and retrocognitive clairvoyance. It is to be noted, therefore, that even if the memory claim is verified to be true in respect of the objective facts, this is no logical proof that the person in question is really identical with the person whose life history he seems to remember correctly. For

it may be that the person in question has got this information not through memory but through retrocognitive clairvoyance. Memory-claims, therefore, even if verified to be true in respect of the objective facts, cannot establish the personal identity of the person in question beyond doubt, i. e. cannot establish beyond doubt that the person in question is a reincarnation of the dead person whose life-history he seems to remember correctly. But at the same time we must take into consideration the following points. It is desirable that we should eschew the irrational tendency of trying, regardless of implausibilities, to explain all the alleged cases of memories of past lives in terms of retrocognitive clairvoyance. We must not forget that the explanation in terms of paranormal retrocognition "requires us to postulate" in certain cases "a capacity for retrocognitive clairvoyance far exceeding in scope any for the reality of which experimental evidence exists"³ Moreover, we must make it a point that any inveterate aversion that we may have against the reincarnation hypothesis, because our religion perhaps prohibits us to believe in some such theory, or because of some such sentimental reasons, should not be allowed to goad us to reject the reincarnation interpretation quite regardless of its being in some case the least implausible interpretation of all. That such irrational tendencies have gained supremacy in the interpretation of certain cases cannot be denied⁴. Not only that, even in the imaginary case constructed by us where the disappearance of Rama is followed by the appearance of R_1 claiming to remember doing what Rama alone did, we may say that R_1 has a retrocognitive clairvoyance of what Rama did. But if we go on explaining most of the ostensible memories as cases of paranormal retrocognition whenever we feel inclined to do so, no matter how far fetched the explanation may appear to be, then we shall be going too far towards irrationalism. It is no doubt true that we have no established convention regarding the veridical ostensible memory-claims of past lives, and that therefore it is matter for decision whether the person making these memory-claims should be regarded as being numerically identical with another person of the past or not. But I should think of this lack of convention as being due more to the scarcity of such phenomena (i. e. phenomena of veridical ostensible memory-

claims concerning past lives) rather than to any absurdity inherent in adopting such memory-claims as the criterion for the determination of the numerical identity of a living person with another person of the past. We may therefore adopt such memory-claims as the criterion for determining personal identity in the case of reincarnation and say that a person is numerically identical with another person of the past if the following conditions are fulfilled.

- (1) The person in question claims to remember doing what the dead person did and participating in the events that happened to the dead man.
- (2) These memory claims are veridical, i. e. they correspond to known facts.
- (3) The ostensible memories are genuine memories i. e., the person in question is known to have had no opportunity to acquire this information through some other source.

If the above conditions are fulfilled, we shall call the person in question a reincarnation of the dead person whose life-history he claims to remember as being his own.

In case of one who, on the other hand, does not actually recollect any such past life, the assertion that he is the same person as some dead individual can be based only on the supposition that under certain appropriate circumstances he is capable of actually remembering his past history which includes the history of the dead individual. Personal identity under such circumstances is based on memory in its dispositional sense alone. But here the most perplexing problem is the clarification of the meanings of 'capable' and 'appropriate circumstances.' What would the 'appropriate circumstances' be like so as to enable me to recollect my past life? What are we to mean by 'capacity to remember'? If under normal circumstances one does not seem to have such capacity, shall we or shall we not say that he is devoid of this capacity? Under what circumstances shall we be prepared to abandon our claim that every one has got the capacity to recollect their past lives? If we are not prepared to give it up under any circumstance whatsoever, then our claim, it may be urged, must be vacuous. Now I must admit that this is a serious problem. But I can only point out that

the claim concerning the capacity for remembering the life—history under appropriate circumstances need not be falsifiable, for an unfalsifiable statement is not necessarily vacuous or meaningless. I do not think that one is committed to set a limit at a point in time to the capacity of a human mind to remember its past life. The notion of personal identity in the case of those who do not actually remember their past may on this view be based on the idea that such persons could remember the incidents of their past life under certain appropriate circumstances. A person may be supposed to recollect his past sometimes through the hypnotic trance or the yogic exercises, but to fix any such limit to his capacity to remember the past by specifying a condition like yoga or hypnosis seems to me to be both arbitrary as well as unnecessary. It should, I think, be alright if one is able to specify certain possible circumstances under which a person may be supposed to actually recollect his past history, and in view of his ability to specify such conditions I do not think that his statement concerning the capacity to remember the past under appropriate circumstances should be condemned as vacuous. The actual occurrence of memory may vary from one individual to another, so that if one may be able to remember his past life through hypnotic trance another may not. In any case, the assertion that Rama is a reincarnation is intelligible on the supposition that, although he has not as yet done so, he could, in some circumstances or the other recollect as his own the history of some other past individual. And his being a reincarnation consists only in this without any further implication of transmigration of a soul or spirit from one body to the other. — Two points however, deserve to be noted here. Though not meaningless, such statement of identification of a person as a dead person of the past on the basis of memory in its dispositional sense is metaphysical and thus devoid of empirical content. It is compatible with any known fact whatsoever; no particular experience can falsify it. Secondly, memory serves here as a criterion only in an extraordinary sense and only because there is already a physical basis for identification.

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NOTES

- * Read in the International Philosophy Seminar on 'Personal Identity' held in Lucknow University during 5th-7th January, 1976.

In preparing this paper I have utilised some of the materials of my paper "Survival, Reincarnation, and the problem of personal Identity" originally published in *Journal of Philosophical Association*, 1968 and subsequently reprinted in *Philosophical Dimension of Parapsychology* (U. S. A., 1976), although it may also be pointed out that the present paper makes a significant departure from my earlier position.

1. *The Problem of knowledge* (Penguin Books, 1962) p. 195
2. P. T. Geach, *Mental Acts : Their content and their objects*.
3. C. J. Ducases : *The Belief in a Life after Death* (U. S. A. 1961), p. 243
4. Cf. *ibid.*, Chapter XXV, The case of "The Search for Bridey Murphy".

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A FEATURE OF MOORE'S STYLE OF PHILOSOPHIZING

The British philosopher G. E. Moore is not likely to be remembered by posterity for his doctrines, of which there is but little in his writings, nor for his method, which is more of historical importance than of intrinsic one. The thing that makes him a philosopher unusually interesting is, to my mind, his peculiar style of philosophizing. A characteristic feature of this style is the way he raises and clarifies questions, answers them, and then, elicits further questions from the answers given. In the present paper, I propose to throw some light on this feature of Moore's thought with reference to his long essay, entitled, "The Nature and Reality of Objects of Perception".¹ As we shall see, the afore-said characteristic of his thought is conspicuously present in this essay.

In the beginning of this essay, Moore raises a question, which centres almost the whole of his discussion. The question is, "How do we know that there exist any other people who have perceptions in some respects similar to our own?"² Moore sees that the question, as stated above, is far from being clear, for the words used are highly ambiguous; and he further points out that this ambiguity has been responsible for much confusion and error among philosophers. So, the first step that he takes to clarify this question is to distinguish it from a different psychological question viz. "How does our belief in their existence arise?". Here it may be noted that one of the ways in which Moore clarifies a question is to distinguish it from another question with which it is liable to be confused. Such discrimination contributes to making a question distinct and exact.

In the light of the given clarification Moore restates his question as follows : What reason have we for our belief in the existence of other persons? Further, he explains the word "reason" occurring in the above question. He tells us, "A Good reason for a belief is a proposition which is true, and which would not be true unless the belief were also true"³. Then, he reformulates the original question in the following words. "What proposition do we believe, which is both true itself and is also such that it would not be true, unless other people existed?"⁴ Moore points out that this formulation of the original question

shows, for one thing, more clearly its difference from the above-mentioned psychological question. He further tries to explain not only what reasons we have for believing in the existence of other people, but also in what sense we take them to be reasons. He illustrates that he is using "good reason" in a wide and popular sense. He says, "If...the Times stated that the King was dead, we should think, that was a good reason for believing that the King was dead;..."⁵. Thus, in looking for a good reason for our belief in the existence of other people, Moore is ready to accept a proposition, if it renders the conclusion positively probable, provided that it also fulfils certain other conditions, which will be mentioned presently.

Moore next clarifies the word "we" occurring in the initial question, and subsequently puts it in this way. Does each single one of us know any proposition, which is a reason for believing that others exist?⁶ Fearing that the above question might be taken to be vitiated by the fallacy of begging the question, he recasts it in another form. "There are certain kinds of belief which, as we commonly suppose, all or almost all men share. I describe this kind of belief as 'our' belief, simply as an easy way of pointing out which kind of belief I mean, but without assuming that all men do share them. And I then ask: Supposing a single man to have beliefs of this kind, which among them would be a good reason for supposing that other men existed having like beliefs?"⁷ Moore makes yet another attempt to put the question more precisely. He asks: "Which among the true prepositions, of a kind (as we commonly assume) each of us believes, and which do not themselves assert the existence of anything other than that person himself, his own perceptions, or what he directly perceives, are such that they would probably not be true unless some other person existed, who had perceptions in some respects similar to his own?"⁸

It is remarkable that Moore formulates the original question as many as six times before attempting to answer it. His answer is that "...one man would probably not have had just those perceptions which he did have unless some other man had certain particular perceptions"⁹ Moore draws a further question from the answer just given, because he finds it unsatisfactory. He asks,

What reason has each of us for believing that....he would not have certain perceptions that he does have, unless some other person had certain particular perceptions?"¹⁰ He next points out that this question may be subsumed under the general question as to what reasons we have for such generalisations as assert a connection between the existence of a certain kind of perception in one man, and that of a certain kind of perception in another man. Replying to the above question he says that if we have any reason for such generalisations that must be given by observation. He is again not satisfied with the answer given because of its inadequacy, so he elicits a new question. He asks, "What reason can be found in observation for even a single proposition of the kind....that when one man has one kind of perception, another man generally has or has had another?"¹¹ Before trying for an answer to this question Moore explains the word "observe" occurring in it. He is using it in a strict sense, in which we can be said to observe nothing but our own perceptions, thoughts and feelings. He now begins to state his question. It is really surprising that, at this place, Moore sets forth the question not less than six times. He is trying again and again to state the question as clearly and precisely as possible. I shall state only one of these six forms. Which among the things, which one single man observes, are such that they would probably not have existed, unless it were true that some of them generally stood in certain relations to observations of some other person?¹² Moore next splits this question into two other questions which are : (1) Of what nature must observations be, if they are to give a reason for any generalisation asserting that the existence of one kind of thing is generally connected with that of another?; (2) What kinds of things do we observe?¹³

Let us now sum up Moore's procedure of philosophic questioning as he has carried so far. He puts a particular question, but because of its ambiguity he reformulates the question by distinguishing it from another question. As this recast question embodies some new expressions, which are vague but important, he feels impelled to clarify them. After he has elucidated the expressions in question, he casts the original question into another fresh form. But for his incisive intellect whipped by a burning passion for clarity and exactitude Moore might have ceased to see new difficul-

ties in this recast question. The fear that some expression figuring in one of the versions of the original question might make it misleading, or, that it might be taken to be vitiated by a logical fallacy drives him to put the question in more and more fresh forms. It is significant to note that Moore offers an answer to the initial question after several clarificatory attempts. However, he finds this answer unsatisfactory, so a new question arises out of its unsatisfactoriness. This question in turn draws his attention to a general question which presupposes the former. He manages to answer this general question, but the answer given is later found by him to be inadequate. Hence he again elicits a fresh question from the inadequacy of this answer. Then, he first explains an important word occurring in this new question, and next, makes a painstaking efforts to state the question in not less than half a dozen slightly different versions. Even after so much trouble, his process of raising and clarifying questions does not stop, for he breaks the above question into two other questions.

To revert to our discussion, while answering the question : Of what nature must observations be, if they are to give a reason for any generalisation asserting that the existence of one kind of thing is generally connected with that of another ? Moore points out that there are three conditions, which are necessary to justify such generalisation. The first condition is that one must observe both some object, say A^1 which is in some respects like A, and also some object, say B^1 , which is in some respects like B. One must also observe B^1 preceding A^1 . Secondly, both the B^1 and the A^1 must exist; and B^1 must precede A^1 . The third condition is that if the observation of B^1 preceding A^1 can ever give us any reason for supposing that A is generally preceded by B, it can at most give us reason to suppose that an A is generally preceded by a B which stands to our A in the same relation in which B^1 has been observed to stand to A^1 .

Next, Moore answers the other question as to what kinds of things we observe by distinguishing three different ordinary senses of the word "observe". First, the word "observe", according to him, is sometimes used in the sense of directly perceive. Another sense of the word "observe" is that in which we can be said to observe our own perceptions, thoughts and feelings. Thirdly, we can also legitimately be said to observe external objects.

Moore then gives attention to the question of the meaning of the word "exist" occurring in the second necessary condition. The sum and substance of his discussion about it is that he is using "exists" in its ordinary sense, which consists in that to say "A exists" is not to say "A is perceived."

Moore's statement of these three necessary conditions, his discrimination between three ordinary senses of the word "observe", and his making explicit the ordinary use of the word "exist" together bring him quite close to finding an answer to the problem at issue. Moreover, the preceding brief discussion of these three points will help us in following his reasoning when he grapples with the crux of the problem.

In the long run, Moore puts his finger at the nerve of the central question. He first examines a possible answer to it, which consists in that the observation of one's own perceptions, thoughts and feelings can, by itself, give him a reason for believing that other persons have perceptions, etc. Refuting this view he rightly contends that somebody's observation of his own perceptions may, by itself, give him reason to suppose that, if another person has certain perceptions or feelings, he will also have certain others but cannot confirm the generalisation that any one of his own perceptions is just what would occur if another person had a particular perception or feeling.

After this, Moore answers the original question by asserting that other persons exist, and the argument that he produces in its favour may succinctly be set forth as follows. He holds the general principle that beliefs which lead to true predictions are generally true. He then contends that this general principle cannot be true unless some external things, over and above, what he directly perceives, exist. Thus; Moore assumes the existence of external things in order to account for the truth of the general principle in question. Further, he points out that, in his own case, he observes a general connection between his perceptions, thoughts and feelings. From all these things in conjunction with the third necessary condition; already mentioned, Moore infers that other persons exist. If we grant the assumption made by him, his argument seems to me tenable.

Moore further gives some arguments in justification of the as-

sumption in question. But I shall deal with them in brief, for this is not the purpose of this paper. My reason for considering them is that this will help bring out Moore's real form as an answer at the crucial stage of his discussion. One of his arguments is that, since 'exist' does not mean "is perceived" it is at least conceivable that things should exist, when they are not perceived. This argument may be disputed on⁹ the ground that although within the confines of ordinary language, it will not be self-contradictory to say that a thing which is not perceived, exists, and vice versa; I do not think, this logical possibility covertly being an appeal to ordinary usage can successfully defend the Moorean assumption.

Moore puts forward two more arguments by way of an examination of the Berkeleian argument that though to the same body water may appear to be simultaneously both hot and cold yet the heat and the cold cannot both really be in the same body at the same time. Disputing this argument he argues that even if we grant the assumption that the heat and the cold cannot both exist in the same place, it does not follow that neither exists there. This type of argument, he contends, only entitles us to conclude that some sensible qualities, which we perceive as being in a certain place at a certain time, do not exist in that place at that time; but we have no reason to suppose that they do not, except on the assumption that our observations give us reason to believe that other sensible qualities do exist in those positions. This argument also fails to support his assumption that external things exist, because, to my mind, it is not necessary to assume the existence of certain sensible qualities to account for the appearance of some other ones.

Moore's other argument may be outlined in the following manner. He tries to show against Berkeley that two things can really occupy the same place. His contention is based on such reasoning as given below. We sometimes believe that a given spatial area may contain parts which are invisible to us. Hence it is quite conceivable that parts of a given area may be really occupied by one colour, while the whole is really occupied by another. He further points out that we certainly believe that the area which appears to be occupied by one colour really is the same area as that which appears to be occupied by another. The

A Feature of Moore's Style of Philosophizing

above argument resting on Moore's appeal to common sense may easily be seen to be vitiated by some serious flaws. First, Moore's commonsensical assumption that space is real is questionable. Secondly, to believe that a particular appearance really occupies some real spatial area is a more precarious common-sense assumption. Lastly, to suppose that different appearances occupy the same real spatial area is to place a very uncritical trust on common sense. Besides, it should be taken into account that Moore has not done justice to Berkeley, because the latter advanced some other important arguments in refutation of external, physical objects.

It may thus safely be concluded that Moore's attempt to justify the assumption that there are external things in addition to what he directly perceives, is very unsatisfactory and inadequate. And his confession that he has not properly justified this assumption does not absolve him of the above charges. However, there seems to be some weight in Moore's contention that the general principle, noted above, cannot be true, unless the given assumption is granted, and further that as the general principle appears to be true, the existence of external things may be assumed. This being so, the argument that he has put forward in support of his final answer to the original question is not without avail despite the fact that he has failed to justify the assumption at issue on the basis of the above three separate arguments.

To conclude, we have seen with what brilliance, acuteness, and pertinacity Moore carries out the task of philosophic questioning. He raises a question, elucidates it, and then, puts it in a clearer, more precise, and improved form. This process continues. It has also been shown that the answer he gives to a particular version of the question initially asked raises a further question, which after clarification is answered to give rise to another question. This distinctive style of Moore's philosophical discussion is very important for certain reasons. First, this is very helpful in dispelling ambiguities and confusions, drawing distinctions, and thus elucidating ideas. As a consequence of an uninterrupted process of questioning and answering aided by a ~~continuous~~ clarificatory enterprise, a particular question originally raised tends to greater and greater clarity and precision. This feature of

Moore's philosophizing assumes special significance in view of the highly deceptive character of the language used by philosophers. We see that philosophers generally put ordinary word to new, and technical uses often without adequate explanation. Moore's type of questioning can render invaluable service in this field. Secondly, it should also be noted that several different formulations of the old question given by Moore differ from one another not only verbally, but they become more and more improved and pointed questions pregnant with an answer. In other words, in the process of the problem at issue being sharply defined, he is drawn close to finding an answer. Thirdly, Moore's practice of eliciting a question from an answer further helps him in his search for a final answer. Moreover, checks and counter-checks, which are characteristic of a dialogue form of discussion, may, in some measure, be seen in this type of philosophizing. For some such reasons, I think, Dr. Metz is, to some extent, right in holding that we may call Moore the greatest, acutest, and most skilful questioner of modern philosophy. "14

However, the foregoing discussion also brings to our notice Moore's weakness as an answerer. Though his questioning has been excessive and ingenious, his answering rather scanty and poor. Regarding the second point about his answering, particularly the concluding part of his essay, where he argues for the answer eventually given to the original question after a very long and hard exploratory toil, cannot escape one's notice. At this crucial place, his arguments are not only quite insufficient in number, but also except one (which might also be rejected by some) very unsatisfactory. I, therefore, think that Dr. Metz's remark that ".... he is an extremely weak and unsatisfying anywerer." "15 may, at least to some extent, be substantiated on the ground of the present essay. An investigation into the possible reasons for Moore's failure as an answerer is a separate subject. Nonetheless, it may very briefly be contended that his failure on this count is partly due to his wrong approach to the problem in question, partly to his too much concentration on some points, and, in part, to his being temperamentally rooted in common sense.

548-A, D. L. W. Varanasi

Ramesh Kumar Tripathi

NOTES

1. G. E. Moore, *Philosophical Studies*, (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London), Paperback edition 1960, pp. 31-96.
2. Ibid., p. 33
3. Ibid., p. 35
4. Ibid., p. 36
5. Ibid., p. 41
6. Ibid., p. 42
7. Ibid., pp. 42-43
8. Ibid., p. 45
9. Ibid., p. 46
10. Ibid., p. 49
11. Ibid., p. 53
12. Ibid., p. 54
13. Ibid., p. 61
14. R. Metz., *A Hundred Years of British Philosophy* (Allen & Unwin, London, 1938), p. 540
15. Ibid., 540

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REDRESSIVE THEORY OF PUNISHMENT

Democracy : Law and Justice

Law & Society

Punishment is not an isolated phenomenon. It is intimately related to the socio-political modes and aspirations of a society. Law is the key-lever which maintains and sustains the equilibrium of social relations of all sorts. The legal system is, in turn, an outcome of the human urges that determine inter-personal social relations. It is, therefore, keyed to a definite social purpose. It is institutional and instrumental. It is institutional, because it aims at maintaining the solidarity of a society. It is instrumental, because it provides for the society and its individual members to live upto their cherished desires and values. But there is nothing ultimate or intrinsic about it. Since the equilibrium of social relations is in a continuous process of change, for many reasons, so has the legal system of a society to remain in personal adjustment to respond to it properly.

Punishment is the operational mechanics of a legal system. It is its weaponry. Punishment figures at the centre in Hindu-polity also. Lord Manu has extolled it as "son of Lord".....' Punishment alone governs all created beings and keeps the world in order''¹ Kautilya upholds it as the "sceptre on which the well being and progress depends."''²

The conformists and non-conformists; centrifugal and the centripetal forces are always co-present in a society. Law attempts to maintain the balance between these rival forces without being detrimental to progress. Whenever, the disruptive forces, at individual or group level, tend to vitiate the social equilibrium, law takes cognisance of the situation and restores order by punishing the lawlessness. Thus punishment consists in inflicting suffering, in any shape or form, upon those who take liberties with the law of land. Since society is an ever-changing equilibrium of its relations, its law and modes of punishment also remain in a state of adjustment with it.

There are different systems of societies. In an authoritarian society is different from a democratic society, a theocratic

society differs from a secular society and so on. Every society has its own value system and its supporting legal-system. The tone and character of the legal-system of a society reflects the status and the role on individual as a citizen plays in that system. If the individual is free to realise himself, as in a democratic frame-work then, the laws and the modes of punishment will, and should, be different from those where an individual is just an instrument of the "social will" or the "rulers-will". It matters whether an individual constitutes part of 'a people' or of 'a subject'. Liberty is the differentia of 'a people', servitude characterise a 'subject'. Self-rule is the *sine quanon* of a democratic society and serfdom the hall-mark of an authoritarian social order.

An individual therefore, occupies different positions from society to society. Unlike an authoritarian set-up, a democratic society should never like to rob its individual citizen at least of his personality even on committing an offence to law. His individuality should remain intact. He must be treated as an end-in-himself growing and fulfilling like every other individual in society. The institution of punishment should therefore, differ from society to society.

It is very well known that no one is a born criminal nor is any one a criminal by choice. One becomes a criminal, more often than not, under compulsion. And, what one becomes is the by-product of bio-social factors. Faulty social environment, very often, produces criminal tensions in the minds of otherwise law-abiding citizens. We can not and we do not, set right the social order, but we hold the individual responsible for a crime in its entirety and punish him without going into the causes that prompted him to go that criminal way. However, the occasion of a crime is different from its cause. The cause of a crime lay deeper in the body of social milieu, work from underneath and are of lasting nature. The occasion is rather ephemeral and accidental.

What moral right does anyone have to possess more than one's needs so long as a single person in his society does not possess just enough for his need? Anyhow, law can not afford to be ~~subjective~~ in its import and application and vitalize social equities. If some people live below poverty-line and others live at wasteful luxury standard, what is basically wrong? No law can make it

right. We possess more than our need and punish anyone who takes away a portion of it for his bare needs. The socio-economic ~~must~~ should be reset so as to provide for every individual an honourable means of livelihood.

Equality preconditions social or natural justice. Socio-economic equality, relative if not absolute, prefaces political freedom and civil liberties. Justice should not be a privilege nor should law be a privilege nor should law be a weapon in the hands of the effulgent and the frugal section of a society to protect and preserve its privileged position. Disparity breeds disparity everywhere. If the application of law has to be objective then, it must take man as man and every man as one and no one more than one.

Punishment

Punishment should also have a different dimension and temper in a democratic society. An individual should not be punished as a means to any end beyond himself, but for himself only. Preventive theory of punishment subordinates individual to society. This theory is acceptable to the extent it prevents the criminal or the wrong-doer from repeating the wrong and not that others are to be prevented from going that way. This would be undemocratic. Retributive theory plays upon the hoax of the 'offended majesty of law'. Reformatory theory is a soft-spoken idiom for reform of the criminal.

Retributive theory claims punishment to be the wage of wrong. It is acceptable to that extent. But it is also asserted, at the same time, that a wrong is an offence to law, law is sovereign and that its offended majesty is to be restored. Punishment restores the offended majesty of law. This sounds more a sophist than a norm of public administration. Fundamental moral law can claim to be sovereign, that too is not free from controversy. The law of a state is just instrumental. It is neither supreme nor sovereign. It is neither universal nor ultimate nor intrinsic. So where is its majesty? Further, it is just a form. For just form should we flog the individual and be just? The individual is the content, the flesh and blood of law. Law is not to preserve itself, but to preserve the individual in a system and for a purpose. Retributive theory takes law in a dehydrated sense. There is nothing very sacred about law.

As such, what is sacred is the individual and the system in which his life and purpose seek fulfilment. Law assists the process of fulfilment. The authoritarian rulers may provide majestic awe and status to law in order to crucify the individual at the altar of their vested interests. But in a democratic social order it is neither natural justice nor social justice. In short, it is no justice at all. Law in order to do justice must promote equities in social relations.

Reformatory theory sounds otherworldly. Reform of what? Of the criminal. But crime does not originate with the individual alone. It originates from the cross-section of individual-cum-social relations. You can not weed out crime or reform the criminal without purging the society of its disparity-ridden modes of living. Disparities breed despair and generate crime. An individual is just the germ-carrier. Destroy the germ and its source, otherwise no reform of any sort is possible.

Disparity of any sort impairs fraternal order. It undermines community-spirit and generates inferiority and superiority complexes among the high and the low, the rich and the poor. It is admitted that disparities can not be totally weeded out because individual differences are nature-born and thus eventually generate differences in the society. No legislation can make men equal who are born unequal. Differences do survive. But in a fraternal social order, just as in a family, innate differences of the members do not make them superior and inferior. They remain equal in spite of differences. Privileged section of society should not become a legacy distinct and elated order. This sparks of conflict and animosity in social relations.

Crime and Justice

Justice, as it obtains today, is therefore far removed from life and its norms. It may be consistent or rational, but life is not merely rational. Life transcends reason. Consistency or rationality is not the touchstone of life and its ways.

There are three parties in an act of crime: the aggrieved, the offender, and the state. For one reason or the other, the state punishes the offender, no matter on retributory grounds or for preventive purposes, etc. It is good so far as its goes, but what

about the aggrieved? The damage done to him is not at all repaired by punishing the criminal. What is justice for him? Our entire thought on punishment has been crime or criminal-centred. No theory of punishment has taken the aggrieved into consideration. Retributive theory holds that punishment is merited by the wrong: preventive theory justifies it to check crime and the reformatory theory advocates it to reform the criminal; none of these theories carries justice to the wronged. Whether society gains or the offended majesty of law is restored or the criminal becomes a whit better, are all one-way.

Justice

Law is above all a duty of the state towards the aggrieved in a democratic set-up. It does not deal with the whole problem squarely in this way. It is not all-comprehensive. The legal system is thus incomplete and unwholesome. Justice ought to be positive in approach and consequences. It should not carry out only the spirit of revenge. Further, it is no justice and least of all social justice to send a criminal to jail and feed him at the cost of the citizens. The criminal becomes an economic burden on the society. It is imperative in a democratic social order that each one, law-abiding citizen or a criminal, should pay for one's deeds or misdeeds. It is unjust that the law abiding, peace-loving section of a society, directly or indirectly, should stand the cost of jails, etc. Why should anyone be a liability upon anybody else? In view of the principle of equality, it is in order that crime ought to pay for its licentiousness. The criminal should be made to work extra so as (i) to repair the wrong done by him to the aggrieved and (ii) also to meet the cost of his stay in jails and the staff employed there to take care of him, etc. Criminals must learn that crime cannot be an easy-go. They should know its cost. Each crime ought to be priced. But it does not mean that commit the crime and pay-off its price. Price means labour, not cash, work and not money. It has to be a suffering in all cases.

Jails

Jails become after sometime just holiday resorts enjoyable or at least cease to have penal effect for the wonted criminals. Jails.

neither reform the criminals nor do these repair the damage done to the offended.

Psychologically or sociologically, isolation in jails is also not proper kind of punishment. Isolation germinates criminal-tensions and tendencies in the mind of the vicium. It hardens the tough-guys who sport with the life, property and peace of others. It makes them an object of social contempt. It creates social-gap. Psychologically, it ruins the personality of a criminal.

Jails produce inferiority complex which makes it difficult for a criminal to live in the society peacefully even when he chooses to do so. It is imperialistic and capitalistic. Justice is made a tool of segregation and to create a section in the society for hatred and contempt because it satisfies ego. We must have some one to hate or to feel superior to.

Aggrieved and the Offender

Law should bring together the aggrieved and the offender by way of punishment which should be imparted in a way as to make the offender suffer the wrong done by him and at the same time benefiting the aggrieved. It may be admitted that certain wrongs cannot be repaired. A murdered man cannot be brought back to life by any legal system or suffering of any kind or quality. True, but what does the aggrieved family gain if the murderer is hanged? Social justice implies that the offender should be punished rather must be punished, but in a way as to repair the loss of the aggrieved to the extent possible. The offender should be made to serve the interests of the aggrieved party. Punishment should redress, redeem and reclaim. It should not aim to humiliate the person in the criminal, it should rather transform his anguish into humility. It should repair him rather than generate despair in the desperado. This is how punishment can do real good in a democratic society.

Work

Social justice must involve the criminal in work. Work at all costs and at all levels is a imperative norm of democratic spectrum of a society. Work reforms the criminal and repairs the damage

Redressive Theory of Punishment

done to the aggrieved, The fly-wheel of social justice is work-
 glowing with continuam. The offender and the offended are not a
 category apart. They are human beings. They should remain
 together and improve upon their interpersonal relations. Democracy
 is based on fraternity which does not segregate but integrates.
 Isolation and segregation in any shape or form are suicidal to a
 democracy.

Redemption can never be complete nor can it ever be earned by
 staying in jails or going to the gallows and so on. It condemns
 the criminal all the worse. Redemption can be complete only if the
 individual is reclaimed in the social order without any indignity.

This can be achieved only when the grievances of the wronged
 are redressed. The damage done to the wronged person must be
 to the extent possible, repaired by the criminal himself and by his
 sweat and toil. It is only then, that the individual can be reclai-
 med as an honourable citizen in the society. Unless the old scars
 are healed, the aggrieved can never forgive him nor can the offen-
 der even on the completion of the sentence ever feel free from
 his sense of guilt.

The criminal should far better it is if possible, remain in the
 society to suffer out the wrong done by him paying back to the
 society. He should seek redemption by earning goodwill of the
 aggrieved. This would be the real suffering of the wrong.

Suppose A steals B's goods worth Rs. 700/- This case is proved
 in the court of law. A is held guilty. Instead of sending A to
 jail, he should be made to serve the interests of the aggrieved
 worth Rs. 700/- by working under police vigilance. He should be
 acquitted on receiving a certificate of relief and goodwill from the
 aggrieved and the police. Take another case. In cases of murder
 and other such grave crimes, in which the family is rendered help-
 less, the criminal having undergone due legal process, should be
 made to serve the family, if found guilty till the family becomes
 economically and socially self-supporting. This is positive justice
 which will promote harmony and eradicate hatred from the parties.
 This will integrate the criminal in the social order once again
 benefiting all the three parties, the aggrieved, the wrong doer
 and the state.

It may be agreed that this theory does not cover all the cases but a significant social aspect of crime, punishment and justice has been brought to light. It takes punishment broad-based and democratic. It includes other theories of punishment and adds one more vital aspect of this phenomenon to make justice comprehensive, wholesome social and democratic.

New Delhi

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NOTES

1. S. Radhakrishnan & Charles Moore : A Source Book of Indian Philosophy. London 1957, p. 186.
2. Ibid, P. : 196.

A PIECE OF SENSIBLE BREAD

Berkely insisted that his philosophy was nothing more than a return to commonsense. But so did his Scottish critics when they argued, as Thomas Reid did, that we know realism to be true simply by appealing to it. In opposition to Berkeley, Reid argues that a sense percept is directly connected with the belief that its object is present in the external world and is independent of our perception of it. James Beattie, James Oswald, and Dugald Stewart followed Reid in urging the same position. But can it be that commonsense really requires an elaborate defense? Reid's purpose was to defend commonsense against apparent philosophical paradoxes like those found, he thought, in Berkeley. His usual approach was to remind us of the command that commonsense had over us.

If something is truly commonsensical then it should obviously be something which any ordinary person who has not engaged in complicated reflection can understand. Reid spoke of principles of commonsense and affirmed that there are contingent truths and necessary truths, the latter including axioms of grammar, mathematics, logic and even ethics and aesthetics. They are intuitively self-evident. But if he were correct, why would they have to be so carefully formulated by a philosopher? The same, of course, may be asked of Berkeley who truly thought he was bringing man back to commonsense after he had wandered in the mazes of Scholastic metaphysics and Locke's doctrine of unknown substances. Even some contemporary appeals, like G. E. Moore's famous 1925 article "A Defence of Commonsense", are aimed at bringing people back to the views of the ordinary man and his ordinary language.

The desire to return men to commonsense implies that they have somehow been lured away from it by abstract theorizing; that they have been diverted from what is obviously and commonsensically true by the machinations of philosophers who deliberately take people away from commonsense for reasons known only to themselves. Interestingly enough the celebration of commonsense for its own sake is not found among scientists. Nor do scientists have any wish whatever to bring people back to

it. Indeed, it is commonsense with its naivete and superstitions about molecular biology or nuclear physics. Nor is technology an ally of commonsense. For the sake of mankind, it goes against it.

Why then have philosophers felt compelled to claim that they were bringing people back to commonsense? Does any ordinary untutored person really care about the abstruse reflections of epistemologists and metaphysicians? Have philosophical principles in the realm of ontology ever made any difference to any ordinary person so that he would somehow be elated to find out that what he had been believing all along was now found out to be true by those who had spent years in complicated reflections? S. A. Grave acutely observes: "It may be asked whether commonsense had beliefs until philosophers engaged in its defence ascribed to them." When American Pragmatism was originally formulated, some thinkers were overjoyed to realize that they had at last been able to state something which the man in the street could understand. But is this a boon to philosophical activity? Is the criterion of philosophical wisdom to be found in some putative commonsense view which any ordinary person can readily understand without special effort?

It seems apparent that the constant appeal to commonsense or even ordinary language is wrongheaded. Commonsense is ambiguous, a position with strange provenance. It does, however have a journalistic appeal. Newspaper men are pleased when they can find a view which somehow speaks to the "average reader". Thus even scientific findings, for the journalist, have to be made translatable into commonsense language and palatable to ordinary language before they can be reported. The unlearned, average person is catered to. He does not have to put out any special effort to intellect to understand anything because great truths are presented to him in a commonsense way. But this appeal is misguided. If anything, commonsense must be judged and corrected and brought into line with what is factually correct and logically coherent. Indeed, the reason philosophy and its offspring, science, arose in the first place was because of the problems raised by commonsense. The fictional "man in the street" is no expert in thinking or in anything. It is his views which need to be evaluated and criticized. Commonsense can never be a test. It me-

rely provides data for study. G.R.G. Mure once said : " In a philosophical court the place for commonsense is in the dock, or on occasion the witness box, never the bench. "2

There must then be some other reason why philosophers, especially since the eighteenth century, have thought the appeal to commonsense was necessary. We can take a statement from the early part of Berkley's *Third Dialogue Between Hylas and Philonous* as an opener. In responding to attacks from the materialist Hylas, Berkley in the person of Philonous at one point replies, " A piece of sensible bread, for instance, would stay my stomach better than ten thousand times as much of that insensible, unintelligible, real bread you speak of. "3 And just before this he says :

I am of a vulgar cast, simple enough to believe my senses and leave things as I find them. To be plain, it is my opinion, that the real things are those very things I see and feel and perceive by my senses. These I know, and finding they answer all the necessities and purposes of life, have no reason to be solicitous about any other unknown beings.

Now, as is well known, Berkeley was an opponent of the Aristotelians and their successors the Scholastics, whom he called Schoolmen. The view that the world of physical objects consisted in substances which had qualities attached to them was repugnant to him because he could neither define nor experience any substance. He similarly opposed Locke's view. Substance for him was a word that did not solve any problems but created them, for it was an unknown somewhat presumably operating behind the scenes of daily experience making the world of sights, smells and sound evident to our senses but never itself coming into a perceptual focus. Accordingly, Berkeley's philosophy of Immaterialism is primarily directed against any metaphysic which posits material substance but has no empirical evidence for said substance. He honestly thought that such systems raised so much dust that trained philosophers as well as ordinary persons could not see elementary truths. And the result was confusion and even ~~disbelief~~ in ordinary daily affairs. Furthermore, practical religion suffered, for people did not know what to believe. In addition to

what he regarded as faulty metaphysics, the activities of those he called "free-thinkers" in his *Alciphron* had abetted the disruption of the social order and common morality. In their clever and publicized talk they had made their positions so attractive that bright young minds searching for truth were made to feel ridiculous if they actually trusted in moral ideals or believed in any form of traditional religion. It is difficult for an earnest mind to feel any confidence in his views if those who dominate the sophisticated world and inhabit elite intellectual circles promote skepticism of traditional values and ridicule even sincerity. Of course, ordinary persons without any intellectual interest at all, pay no attention to dilettantes and sophisticates anyway and probably don't even know that they exist. But Berkeley was interested in the thoughtful, inquiring persons who were seeking solutions to what were taken to be the basic issues of life and death, God and freedom and the soul. That is one reason he admittedly wrote his *Principles of Human Knowledge* and the *Three Dialogues*, to say nothing of the *Alciphron*.

Accordingly, in Berkeley's case, "commonsense" means a good bit more than a mere return to the views of the unthinking, unlearned country bumpkin who really cares not a whit for philosophy, science or truth, and is content to follow conventional ways of doing things with all the accompanying follies and superstitions. Berkeley's motive was to bring earnest inquirers to a philosophical position which was not only based on evidence and reason but which was understandable, persuasive, and which lent support to the best the human mind could think.

When he argues that a piece of sensible bread is better than a piece of ontological bread, he is doing just that. He is appealing to thoughtful reasoning minds not to mere commonsensical ones. He is challenging them to recognize that the world of sense is more real than any postulated ontological world. It is indeed reasonable to believe that one can trust his senses when it comes to the question of what to eat. The "sensible bread" is the only *real* bread for Berkeley; there is no other kind. It is not a finite mode of the ~~attribute Substance~~, as Spinoza would say. Nor is it the product of aimless atoms that have somehow come together to cause the qualities we see, touch and taste, as Lucretius would have to say.

A Piece of Sensible Bread

Neither is it a real "substance" which mysteriously exists even though it cannot be perceived or experienced in any way. The bread is to be taken as real in itself. In calling people back to the world of sense instead of fostering a belief in mysterious "matter", Berkeley thought he was calling them back to a commonsensical philosophy which not only had the support of reason but which gave meaning and value to the practical life. F. W. McConnell comments :

As to the plain man finding Berkeley's mentalism objectionable, is not Berkeley's metaphysics the logical conclusion of commonsense? When digging around the roots of the 'common' man's thinking do we not perceive that the real object is regarded as that which is socially verified and consistently and coherently thought about? Neither of these involve an extra-men^{al} existence.⁴

But Berkeley is no mere phenomenalist. He did not say that all that existed in the world was sensible things. He is often interpreted as one who really denied the existence of physical things. But this single quotation about "sensible bread" given the lie to that facile and glib misrepresentation Berkeley does not deny the world of things, the world of bread and cheese and trees; he defines it. It exists as sensed. He charges the materialist with not trusting his senses. "In short, you do not trust your senses, I do."⁵ Then he adds that these sense objects have their rootage and basis in a God who presents them to us in a regular and coherent way, in such a way that they testify to his goodness. He does not "drag in" the idea of God, as is sometimes wrongly said, but rather from the orderly and dependable phenomena of the sense world, one infers the presence of a Mind as their source. Thus matter or unknown substances are not logically required to account for a piece of bread. God is the ultimate sponsor and source of the "sensible bread". All that exists in the sense world can be viewed as "manifest tokens of divinity."⁶

This is really not a commonsense view at all. But what is there any view which can rightly claim to be commonsensical? It would be better for philosophers to stop the quest for that

which caters to and satisfies the ordinary man and to seek first for that which is true according to reason and evidence. There are no "canons" of commonsense. When philosophers appeal to it, they most often seem to mean the "commo. sensê" which prevails in their own circle of sophisticated acquaintances. They cannot and do not mean the common sense of a Mongolian or an Amazonian or an American. They have a special but unstated idea in mind. I think we have shown what Berkeley meant by it.

But there is point we can make in favour of a general commonsense. There are some metaphysicians, many in India, who are wont to say that the world of sense is an unreal world, possibly *maya*, a product of cosmic ignorance, or may be an illusion, a shadow of what is truly real. In the West there is a particular religious view, Christian Science, which announces that the world of matter and sensible things, as well as all illness, is quite unreal and is the result of our ignorance and our failure to comprehend fully the mind of God. I am not here denying the possible validity of such alternative immaterialistic views. But we must affirm again that Berkeley's piece of sensible bread will satisfy the hunger pangs of one's "unreal" stomach more than a metaphysical theory will. No matter how the world of sense is "explained" metaphysically, one behaves in that world in the way described by Berkeley. If a piece of bread is unreal, so is the butter and knife which spreads it and the hand which grasps it and the teeth which chew it and the saliva which helps digest it. To say this is really not to tell us anything that makes any difference to the daily life, and that is the appeal of Berkeley. It may be that a cut across my wrist is unreal ontologically, and the blood which spurts out from it equally unreal, but I had better tie an unreal bandage on it, and perhaps an unreal tourniquet and apply some unreal antiseptic if I am ever again to spend time thinking about the nature of the real. A piece of sensible unreal bandage will do more for my unreal bleeding wrist than any unknown substance or the illusory being of some metaphysical doctrine.

To deny the world of sense may be a possible metaphysical conclusion but one cannot long live without using that world and

without eating "sensible bread". No matter how we interpret it, the world of sense is with us and places its demands upon us. Happily, the sensible world satisfies our "unreal" thirst too. It cannot be denied without being assumed and used. Berkeley reminds us that we must begin our philosophizing by acknowledging it before we theorize it out of existence. It is difficult to see where he is wrong in this.

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NOTES

1. S. A. Grave, "Commonsense" in P. Edwards (ed.) *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 156
2. G. R. G. Mure, *Retreat from Truth*, p. 153.
3. *Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous*, Vol. II of *Works* (Luce and Jessop, eds.) p. 229.
4. F. W. McConnell, "Berkeley and Skepticism" in my *New Studies in Berkley's Philosophy*, p. 49.
5. *Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous*.
6. *Principles of Human Knowledge*, Section 148.

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ON META-MORALISM

The very subject matter, methods and rationale of ethical theory is a persistent source of controversy and dissatisfaction. Moral philosophy, we have been told, rests on a mistake, 'belief in ethics' has been said to be an illusion, and some philosophers have been written of "The Refutation of Morals".¹ John Wheatley, albeit modestly, enters these lists and provides us with a distinctive characterization of what he take to be an underlying mistake of traditional ethics.² I share his misgivings about much of moral philosophy. I too am deeply troubled about what we are to do when we do moral philosophy and indeed about the very point of the whole enterprize, though I am less confident than Wheatley that I see the light at the end of the tunnel. What we know how to do reasonably well is perhaps for the most part trivial and what at least some of us want very much to do and what appears at least to be needed, is something that we do not seem to know how to do at all. (I shall return to this very general question at the end of my remarks.)

Wheatley raises many issues and I shall not try to sort out all my agreements and disagreements with him. Rather I shall first indicate where we agree and then turn to argument concerning those parts of his account at which I would demur.

I

First, summarily for my accord with Wheatley. (I do not, of course, state these as dogmas to be accepted or rejected. Philosophy shouldn't go like that; indeed by definition good philosophy cannot go like that, but I state them simply to narrow the range of dispute between us.)

1. In many situations (perhaps even most) what one does when one speaks (what one does by speaking) is more important than the exact words used in doing it, "because what one does using one form of words can usually be done, using another form of words." (However, one should not take this to the extreme as Wheatley does, when he claims "we must forget about investigating the uses of words and inspect instead the sorts of things we

do when we talk about conduct." There is not the slightest need to make a choice here; one can and should do both and which activity is central will depend on the particular perplexity about morality. What we must do in investigating the uses of words is to see that we keep a vivid sense of relevant context and to do this we will have to do the sorts of things Wheatley would have us do.)

2. Many moral philosophers have led us down the garden path by focussing too narrowly and too exclusively on 'good', 'right', 'ought' and 'obligation'. They have for the most part neglected examining the uses of other key words such as 'remorse', 'shame', 'guilt', 'contrition', 'atonement', 'bestiality', 'insensitivity', 'inauthenticity', etc., etc. Even more importantly, in sticking with their one-sided diet in just the limited ways they have, they have failed to attend adequately to those very complex and varied things we do when we appraise conduct.

3. Universalizability may be common to all employments of 'good' but it is not a distinctive feature of 'good' or even of all evaluative terms. Any descriptive term is universalizable. Moreover, even assuming some tolerably clear distinction between descriptive and evaluative uses of terms and even assuming that being universalizable is a distinctive feature of the evaluative employments, stressing that value judgements or evaluations must be universalizable is of little value in setting out the limits of moral argument or showing how moral disputes can be rationally resolved.

4. Like Toulmin and Baier, Wheatley rightly stresses that what moral philosophy should take as its central task is the attempt to gain a clear understanding of what conduct is justifiable and why. We want to find out what are adequate reasons for doing one thing rather than another. We can give paradigms of justifiable conduct or of good reasons in ethics but we need a perspicuous representation here of what it is that makes conduct morally justifiable.

II

So much for my agreement with Wheatley, let me now turn to where we disagree. I shall organize my critical remarks first

(and briefly) around what I take to be a serious historical 'distortion' in Wheatley's account and secondly around what I take to be errors in his argumentation.

The historical point first. In trying to show that there is a non-trivial sense in which his subject matter does not exist, his target is "ethics as traditionally conceived", though it is clear from what he says at the end of his essay that he is actually limiting the field to analytical ethics. But even so circumscribing 'ethics as traditionally conceived', Wheatley has in effect treated 'ethics as traditionally conceived' as if only the type of work characteristic of R. M. Hare, P. H. Nowell-Smith and Charles Stevenson counted as 'ethics as traditionally conceived'. But his characterization hardly fits the very important and influential work of Stephen Toulmin, Kurt Baier, W. D. Falk, Peter Winch, G. R. Grice, David Lyons, D. H. Hodgson, J. N. Findlay or Stuart Hampshire. John Rawls' influential work, going back two decades, does not at all fit Wheatley's characterization of traditional moral philosophy, yet it has at least as much call to be called 'traditional moral philosophy' as has anything Wheatley discusses under this rubric. And Rawls' monumental *A Theory of Justice* surely is a living and crucial counter-example to Wheatley's claims, as are three other recent and important books solidly in the analytical tradition: G. J. Warnock's *The Object of Morality*, Richard Norman's *Reason For Actions* and David Gauthier's *A Theory of Reasons For Action*. Moreover, and finally on this score, it is not only recent analytical ethical theory that badly fits Wheatley's characterization but so do the more classical sources of analytical moral philosophy: to wit Moore, Prichard, Hagerstrom, Ross, Broad and Stocks. Some of their work fits his characterization, but not the bulk of it.

It is surely a mistake to take one reasonably characteristic strand of moral philosophy and simply designate that as 'traditional moral philosophy'. It is simply not the case that philosophers have turned aside the question of justification and made moral philosophy into a small and unimportant branch of the philosophy of language.

III

However, let us now, for the sake of continuing the discus-

sion, put these historical considerations aside. It has been the case that Hare's work, as well as Stevenson's and Nowell-Smith's, has been influential and much of it does reasonably well fit Wheatley's description.

Wheatley claims that in discussing conduct, rational justification and moral justification come to the same thing. That is to say, if I am rationally justified in doing X, then I must also be morally justified in doing X; and if I am morally justified in doing Y, then I must also be rationally justified in doing Y. However, it is not evident that either of these claims is true and Wheatley does not give us adequate grounds for believing they are true.

In trying to defend his claim, Wheatley argues that it is a piece of mythology to believe that in moral argument we can give moral reasons for acting in one way rather than another. Moral reasons, he tells us, are just rational reasons and nothing else. Surely all reasons are putatively rational and indeed if something is a reason for doing something, it is pleonastic to say that it is rational, though everything considered it still might not be the most rational consideration on which to act. But if it is a reason, it is a rational consideration. The crucial thing to ascertain is whether 'moral' ever properly qualifies 'reasons'.

Wheatley concedes that it sometimes does in ordinary usage but he believes that ordinary usage is not a good guide here. And I, for one, do not wish to contest this point. The Stalinist phase of ordinary language philosophy is long since past. What I want to investigate is whether it is really the case; as Wheatley claims; that where we do something and have adequate reasons for doing it "ethical considerations don't enter into the matter at all." In querying this claim, we need to remind ourselves that there is a kind of principled behaviour which is simply required of a moral agent, the following of which may not always be the best - the most rational - policy for a rational egoist who is only contingently committed to trying to act in accordance with the moral dictates. That is to say, he may in certain contexts have very good reasons not to follow what he recognizes to be the morally appropriate course. And if he is a consistent and purely rational egoist, he will indeed not follow that course when it is not in his interests to do so. There are rational reasons for his following an egoistic

policy and if he acts in accordance with them, he has not acted irrationally or even unintelligently but he has overridden crucial moral considerations. i. e. moral reasons. Moreover, there are no good grounds for believing that to be such a rational egoist is to be irrational.

A case will make this evident. Suppose I am in effect competing with five of my colleagues for a sabbatical. Suppose we all have good reasons for believing that only two of us will get sabbaticals. A conversation takes place at a departmental meeting concerning when submissions for sabbaticals must be made and suppose meeting that deadline is important. The department chairman says 'November 1st' but I know that it is October 1st and I remain silent. I have behaved in an unprincipled way, but, if I am a tolerably thick-skinned fellow, there are circumstances in which it is in my rational interest to so behave. As Sidgwick forced on our attention, there are circumstances where what is reasonable from a moral point of view conflicts with what is in an individual's rational self-interest. On the moral side, in such a circumstance, the reasons give or at least the operative reasons are moral reasons. There is reason for me to speak up here, for doing so is the decent thing to do. Indeed it is the thing morally required of me. But failing to speak up, at least in some circumstances of the above sort, would be neither unintelligent nor irrational. Yet it would be morally wrong. Similar things can be said about being fair in a situation where one can, with no harm to oneself or social disutility, shrink from doing one's share of some commonly burdensome task.

Anyone who understands moral discourse, knows that if he is to behave as a moral being, there is no question of his not attempting to be fair and to be principled. He can no more question that than a baseball player can question whether he is struck out after he has had three strikes.³ If a moral dispute gets pushed in a certain direction, moral reasons are given for actions, e.g., 'That's unprincipled' or 'That's unfair'. But an unprincipled and unfair man, Plato and Wheatley to the contrary notwithstanding, need not be an unintelligent or irrational man; and, in acting unfairly or being unprincipled, he need not be 'flying in the face of reason'.

'Moral' then does properly qualify 'reasons'. There are distinctively moral reasons for acting which are not just rational reasons. For a rational individual egoist—I did not say an 'ethical egoist'—it may be the case that with his interests he is rationally justified in doing something and still not morally justified in doing it. Or rather, more accurately, as Sidgwick puts it, reason does not always speak with one voice.

IV

I think that this is sufficient to undermine Wheatley's control claim that "the notion of justifying conduct is a rational category not an ethical category" and "that as a consequence, ethics, in one important sense, does not exist." But Wheatley might respond that had I taken to heart what he said about moral principles, I would realize that such a response was really not open to me. But even if he is right in what he says about moral principles, it is not evident to me either how or that this would be so. Yet even granting him that, for the sake of the discussion, it does seem to be the case that his account of ethical principles is not without important flaws.

It does not follow that if ethical principles are not justifiable on the basis of reasons, that these ethical principles must either be "arbitrary or a matter of personal choice or personal commitment". As we should have learned from Wittgenstein, if not from Aristotle, not everything that it is reasonable to do is done for a reason and justification must have an end or it wouldn't be justification. Fundamental moral principles such as 'One must be principled' may be so rock-bottom in moral thinking that they do not admit of justification; indeed they may not even require justification; but it does not follow that they are therefore arbitrary or simply a matter of personal choice or commitment. There are several other alternatives, perhaps the most promising of which is that they are principles which are constitutive of what it is to take a moral point of view. Given what moral concepts are, there is simply no moral option to them. This claim may be too strong. But it has been extensively and carefully argued for in the literature.⁴ Until Wheatley gives us some good grounds for rejecting such a view we have no need to accept either of his

alternatives. Moreover, there are other alternatives as well. Even if, in Philippa Foot's apt phrase, there are no such "starting-points fixed by the concept of morality", it still could be the case that human beings (anywhere, anywhen), are such that their needs and wants limit the very principles they in fact can accept. If this were so, then accepting these principles would not be a matter of individual choice or anything like an arbitrary coin-tossing. And there are, no doubt, other alternatives as well. But this is enough to make it evident that we are not impaled on Wheatley's fork.

V

Wheatley might still resist and (neglecting my very last point) argue that to so talk about starting points fixed by the concept of morality, is in effect to make the error of reasoning from the fact that the language is used in a certain way to the quite distinct claim that it is appropriate that it be used that way. It is a mistake to argue from 'good' means such and such and covers so and so to detailed views about how we ought to live or to what we should commit ourselves to. But with concepts such as morality and rationality, we have a whole interrelated network of notions which govern in certain domains how people see and respond to the world. It is not obvious that we have a clear sense of what it would be like either to step back from these concepts and envision alternatives to them or to jettison the whole lot and reason with radically different concepts. Human conflict, given our pervasive class divisions, is sharper now than it needs to be and perhaps will be in the future. But even in a more rationally ordered world, there would be some conflicts of interest and a need to resolve them as people decide what to do and how to relate to each other. There will remain a human need for such concepts.

In sum, Wheatley contends that "there is no way to justify one's conduct which is not simply to justify it rationally; if ethical justifiability is distinguished from rational justifiability then there is no such thing as ethical justifiability." I have tried to show that his first claim is false and that he has not at all made out his second claim.

VI

I now return to the considerations raised at the very beginning of my essay. I share Wheatley's misgivings about moral philosophy and my impression is that these misgivings are reasonably widespread. The sources, I suspect, are various, but it seems to me that at least two very crucial sources of discontent are in areas other than those which Wheatley explores and that what we need to do is to probe them.

First, bearing in mind that the supreme goal of traditional ethics is to articulate in some tolerably systematic form a conception of the moral order of things which will be authoritative and survive the critical scrutiny of reflective men, we must face up to the very real possibility, as Philippa Foot has recently powerfully argued, that this goal may be illusory.⁵ That this is so, remains a genuine possibility, even if there are starting points fixed by the very concept of morality which give definitional criteria of moral good and evil such that we can quite objectively claim that *some* moral judgments are objective and *some* moral arguments are sound. That these criteria allow us to say quite objectively that Hitler's treatment of the Jews morally intolerable, does not settle the question of whether all or even most really crucial moral disputes are even in principle, let alone in fact, so objectively resolvable. It is quite probably the case, as Foot puts it, "that the concept of morality while it fixes a great deal also leaves quite a lot open."⁶ 'Hitler was a moral monster and murdered innocent human beings' is so fixed but not 'A human embryo is a human being with the rights of a human being'. Many of us may agree, that is, that while we can determine from the very concept of morality that murder is morally objectionable, we cannot determine completely in such a manner what will count as murder. In moral arguments we seem sometimes to get pushed into saying that something is just wrong—say the judicial murder of an innocent human being—no matter what the context or for what reasons it is done. At certain points, though between individuals and societies at variable points, many (perhaps even all) moral agents dig in their heels and assert that so and so is right or so and so is just wrong and that no reasoning could gainsay it. But over what these things are, we do not have general agreement

either intra-culturally or across-cultures. And sometimes these disagreements appear at least not to be based on some complex disagreement as to the facts, but result from our having different contingent moral principles which are used by their respective moral agents in forming moral judgments. Many people are content to give a relativistic account of the truth or falsity of such claims as 'Rancid yak's butter is good in tea', 'Princess Margaret dresses smartly' or 'Even when speed and expense is not at issue, it is better to travel by plane than by ship', but resist accepting such an account for moral judgments, even when they are contestable ones such as 'Killing malformed infants is always wrong' or 'Sacrificing people for future generations is never justified'. Nevertheless, these principles are contingent but not generally accepted moral principles which certain but not all moral agents use in forming moral judgments.

In morality there is what is indeed a humanly understandable conviction that there must be a more objective view than the view we would take about the goodness of Rancid yak's butter in tea, but this conviction, when read into a belief, may be but a fiction rooted in an inability definitively to shake oneself free from the hold of a conception of moral authority which at best would make sense only against a certain quite unacceptable religious background. Consciously such a conception of authority is rejected but a hankering after it remains.

Foot and some others think something very like this is the case. If it is, the goal of traditional ethics certainly is unattainable. There could be no giving of sound moral arguments which could be organized in a systematic and rational way into a moral overview which would form a comprehensive guide for human living such that it would be a definitive action-guide in the major areas of human stress—a guide which could show a man, independently of what his attitudes are or what his stance toward the world happens to be, that he has reason to act in accordance with that moral overview.

Traditional moral philosophers—moral sceptics apart—have either sought to articulate such a conception of the moral order of things or at least have tried to show that such a conception is possible. We have reason to be sceptical that they have succeeded

or even can in the future succeed in such an undertaking. What we need to probe is whether this scepticism is on balance justified.

The second consideration to which I want to draw attention would be a truism if the above sceptical point is well taken, but even if it is not, it lives a life of its own and is another source of dissatisfaction with traditional moral philosophy. The point is this: the living general moral problems that most deeply and persistently worry us—the ones that hassle us in our daily lives—are such that moral philosophy gives us precious little if any insight into how (if at all) we can resolve them. Even if it is granted, as it usually is now, that moral philosophers can legitimately do normative ethics as well as meta-ethics, we still seem to have nothing at all from moral philosophy concerning such deeply felt moral questions as to whether we should strive to bring into existence a socialist society that would cast off the pervasive capitalist and individualist orientation of our society or whether the present institutions of marriage and the position of women should be replaced by social arrangements of a more communal, less tradition-oriented type. Is the capitalist order an abomination and should marriage as we have it be phased out?⁷ Moral philosophy seems at least to be no help here at all. And indeed many moral philosophers are utterly complacent about that. That this state of affairs obtains should be a matter of deep disquietude to moral philosophers.

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NOTES

1. J. L. Mackie, "A Refutation of Morals", *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 1948 and reprinted in Paul Edwards and Arthur Pap (eds.) *A modern Introduction to Philosophy*. See also J. L. Mackie, *Contemporary Linguistic Philosophy—Its Strength and Its Weakness*, (Otago, New Zealand: The University of Otago Press).

- 1956) and Jonathan Harrison, "Ethical Skepticism," *Aristotelian Society Proceedings*, supplementary vol. LLI (1967).
2. Jon Wheatley, "Ethics Does Not Exist," *Sixteenth Congress of the Canadian Philosophical Association*, Montreal, June 7, 1972.
 3. John Rawls, "Two concepts of Rules," *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. LXIV (January, 1955) and Kai Nielsen, "Appraising Doing The Thing Done," *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. LVII, No. 24 (November, 1960).
 4. Peter Winch, "Moral Integrity," (Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell's, 1968) and "Nature and Convention," *Aristotelian Society Proceedings*, (1959-60), D. Z. Phillips and H. O. Mounce, *Moral Practices*, (London, England: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969) and R. W. Beardsmore, *Moral Reasoning*, (London, England: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968).
 5. Philippa Foot, "Morality and Art," *The Proceedings of the British Academy*, Vol. LVI (1970), pp. 3-16. See also her "In Defence of the Hypothetical Imperative," *Philosophic Exchange*, Vol. 1, No. 2, (Summer 1971).
 6. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
 7. What I am saying here is that philosophers have not come to grips with such genuine moral questions as are discussed in books such as C. B. Macpherson's, *The real world of Democracy*, (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1967), Richard C Edwards' (*et. al.* (eds.)), *The Capitalist System*, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1972), Tom Christoffel's (*et. al.* (eds.)), *Up against the American myth*, (New York, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970) Robin Morgans (ed.), *Sisterhood is Powerful*, (New York, New York: Pandom House, 1970) or in "A Woman Is a sometime Thing" and "The Myth of Motherhood," both in Bryan Finnigan's and Cy Gonick's (eds.), *Making It: The Canadian Dream*, (Toronto,

Canada: Mc Clelland & Stewart Ltd., 1972). Here we find a plethora of moral questions which are very real to us. It is disquieting to say the least that moral philosophy has so little to say about them or that we, as moral philosophers using our own expertise, can, as moral philosophers, offer so little to the rational discussion of these questions.

2.24

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SOCIAL MILIEU IN INDIA AND DEVELOPMENT

Part II

2.24 The Paradox of change and no-change in Hindu Society

The gist of the argument so far is that the basic social ethos, structure and behaviour in Hindu society has not changed in essentials during centuries and even during British rule. Sociologically this would be considered an impossibility. "An open system in a changing environment either changes or perishes. In such a case the only avenue of survival is change. The capacity to persist through a change of structure and behaviour has been called "ultrastability." ¹⁵ How has it been possible for Hindu society to persist and survive without changing its structure in a changing environment? First, in the context of this sociological doctrine it might be doubted whether the Hindu system is a closed or an open one. In so far as it is a closed system-as I think it is-the doctrine obviously does not apply. But this is a debatable issue and we may for this discussion take the view that it is an open system. In that case how does the mechanism of change operate in this society?

The defence mechanism of the Hindu system to change in a changing environment and yet not to change in essentials or structurally is the behaviour principle at the heart of the system, complete freedom of thought and ritual and no freedom of action, the code for which is laid down by the total social system. This enables the social fabric to absorb social change in a manner in which the change is effectively twisted to its own purposes. It seems to give way and yet does not in essentials. It is like a pool of water. One can strike it hard with a stick and the water seems to break. A moment later, however, it returns to its original place and the break disappears without any trace.

* The 1st part of this article was published in the Indian Philosophical Quarterly April 1978.

This hints at the possible explanation of the frequently met phenomena in the history of Hindu society that social change is not cumulative. A change appears to take place and soon enough it is so well twisted and absorbed that when the next one comes along the situation is at it was before the first change. As a result social change never reaches even the first base. Every time it is always a fresh beginning.

It is interesting to see how this happens. Any religious or social movement going against the basic tenets of the Hindu social and ethos and organization is accommodated and reconciled to the overall social structure by the process of isolating its followers into a separate caste. Once this happens, as it inevitably does in a caste society, its momentum is contained within itself. It becomes as it were quarantined by all other castes and allowed, as it were to stew in its own juice. The other castes remain unaffected and the movement never spreads to the society as a whole to become generalised. The new caste is provided its niche in the total structure without any change in the structure itself. The history of the Lingayat movement and community is a good example of this phenomenon. Buddhism was almost eliminated from India and Buddhists merely became a small neglected caste in the total social arrangements. Brahmos is a more modern example. Within the new caste that comes into being in this way, the new thoughts and behaviour patterns going against the basic tenets of Hindu social organization are allowed to continue formamilly, now of course robbed of their gneral radical potential to bring about any sginificant change in the overall social structure. It is a slightly different cog, but nevertheless a cog that fits well to the old wheel. A new force by being allowed a larger play in the swings is prevnted from affecting the roundabout. This social mechanism of allowing greater play to the swings is the essence of the tolerance that characterises Hindu society. This tolerance is a price that caste society pays for keeping itself intact and essentially unchanged. It is the kiss of death for any structural social change arising in that society. The success of this mechanism has been amazing throughout the life of Hindu society.

Its success, as a matter of fact, extends even beyond the Hindu society. Under the impact of Islam and Christianity thousands of Hindus were converted to the new religions. But that did not mean

for them an emancipation from caste society because the converts carried their castes with them intact and these new religious dispensations had to accommodate them within their own struture, thus essentially becoming cast societies themselves. The Pope was made to issue a bull allowing the continuation of castes in the new converts to Christianity in South India ¹⁶. There was possibly no such formal recognition of caste in Islamic society but in fact the Islamic society in India developed into a caste society.

It is interesting to see how the mechanism of tolerance in Hindu society works to smother radical social reform even in independent India. The fact that the Indian Constitution defines the state in India as a secular state has been flaunted as a symbol of its modernity and progressiveness. The claim is hollow because by "secular" Indian laws mean something much more traditionally Hindu than anything that is understood in the modern idiom of the West as secular. Secularism as understood in the West is a competing system of ultimate convictions to religion. Secularism cannot be neutral among religions when it undertkes to confine them to their proper sphere. According to the secularist doctrine religious activities are free to the same extent as indential behaviour proceeding from non-religious motives. Religious activities enjoy no special dispensation from general regulation, even where this impinges heavily on certain religious activities. This has been stoutly rejected by the Indian Supreme Court. The secularist notion that matters protected by Government apply primarily to the matters of faith, belief and worship, leaving matters of practice subject to state legislation is denied by the Indian Supreme Court. Their position is that the guarantees of religious freedom extend to whatever conduct is essential or integral to a particular religion. "What constitutes the essential part of a religion is primarily to be ascertained with reference to the doctrine of that religion itself" according of the Supreme Court. No wonder there is no common civil code that applies to all the citizens of India irrespective of caste and religion. In another guise it is the same doctrine of tolerance in the Hindu system, an effective drag on far reaching social reform as ever before.

This discussion of change and yet no change in Hindu society cannot be complete or fruitful without a discussion of the response of Hindu society to forces of modernism or modernity that flow-

ed into India from the West through British rule and other channels. That was also the main orientation of the analyses of Hindu and other religions that Weber undertook. It is also in consonance with the main purpose of this analysis of the social dimension of Indian development.

To set the stage for discussion, however, it is necessary to begin by sketching the content of Weber's analysis of the Protestant ethic as the prime mover of the development of capitalism as it has emerged out of the subsequent criticisms, analyses and modifications. The debate has been ably synthesized and summarised by Eisenstadt and we mainly follow him here. According to Eisenstadt the crux of the re-examination of Weber's argument lies in shifting the course of argument from an examination of the allegedly direct, causal relation between Protestantism and capitalism to that of the transformative capacities of Protestantism. The crucial impact of Protestantism in the direction of modernity came after the failure of its initial totalistic socio-religious orientations. The three questions that stand out in this connexion and the answers to them are as follows :

(1) What is it within any given religion (or ideology) that creates or may account for the existence of such transformative capacities? This potential or capacity does not seem to be connected with any single tenet of Protestant faith but rather in social aspects of its basic religious and value orientations. The most important of these are its strong combination of "this worldliness" and transcendentalism. Second, is the strong emphasis on individual activism and responsibility. Third, is the unmediated direct relation of the individual to the sacred and to the sacred tradition.

These religious orientations were not confined to the sacred but closely related to two social orientations: their social status images and orientations. First, was their 'openness' towards the wider social structure, rooted in their 'this-worldly' orientation. Second, they were characterised by a certain autonomy and self-sufficiency. They evinced little dependence for the crystallization of their own status symbols and identity on the existing political and religious centres.

(2) In what directions such transformative capacities may develop? By the very nature of the totalistic reformatory impulses of the Protestants the central political symbols, identities and institut-

ions constituted natural foci for their orientations and activities. On both the levels of forging new symbols of national identity and legitimization of the new patterns of authority, these developed, through the initial religious impact of the major Protestant groups and especially through their transformation, the possibilities of the reformation of the relation between rulers and ruled, of patterns of political participation and of the scope and nature of the political community.

These orientations also contained possibilities of the structuralization of the central legal-institutional institutions and of their basic premises centred round the idea of the covenant and contract and around the reformulation of many concepts of natural law which led to a much more differentiated view of the legal state and autonomy of voluntary and business co-operations, freeing them from the more restricted view inherent in traditional natural law. In Catholic countries, in contrast, the same diversifying orientations were stifled in their development among other things by the maintenance of the older Catholic symbols of legitimization and the traditional relation between Church and State.

The transformative effects spread to other aspects of the institutional structure of modern societies, and especially to the development of new types of roles, role structure and role sets and to motivations to undertake and perform such roles. The latter happened in three ways: (a) In the definition of specific new roles with new type of goals defined in autonomous terms and not tied to existing frameworks. (b) The development of broader institutional organizational and legal normative setting which could both legitimise such roles and provide them with the necessary resources and frameworks to facilitate their continuous working. (c) The development of new types of motivation, of motivations for the understanding of such roles and for the identity of them.

(3) What are the conditions that develop in the society within such religious or ideological groups, which facilitate or impede the institutionalization of such transformative capacities or orientations? In broad terms it seems that the possibility of such institutionalization is greater the stronger the seeds of autonomy of the social, cultural and political orders are within any society. The specific transformation potentials of Protestantism can be seen in

the fact that it took the seeds of autonomy and pluralism in the European Christian Culture and helped in recrystallizing them on a higher plane of differentiation than in the Catholic countries. The transformative capacities of the Protestant groups were smallest in those cases where they attained full powers—when their more totalistic restrictive orientations could become dominant—or in situations where they were down-trodden minorities.¹⁷

The debate on the Weberian thesis emphasises that Protestantism was a catalyst that furthered the development of earlier seeds of autonomy and pluralism in European culture and that too where it succeeded just enough,¹⁸ not too much, not too little. In essence what it achieved was the orientation to 'this-worldliness, and the separation of religious from the social and the economic, what is today often described as secularization. What secularization amounts to has been discussed before when we examined the Indian conception of a secular state. The Protestant reformation achieved it because it did not succeed totally as a religious movement. No religious movement can be expected to practically reduce the role of religion to a private voluntary association. Two lessons emerge from this for a general consideration of social change (a) no religious movement can be relied upon to bring about secularization (b) secularization develops from seeds of autonomy and pluralism in the cultural tradition, if any, and not out of the blue.

In studying the impact of modernism or modernity—which is also described as Westernization or secularization many times though each term has its own nuances—in the light of Eisenstadt's formulation of the Weberian thesis, we must begin by noting with Srinivas that the totality of change involved is "inclusive, complex and many-layered". The range is wide from technology at one end to the experimental method of modern science and modern historiography at the other. It is complex because different aspects of the totality are seen to combine to strengthen certain processes, sometimes work at cross purposes and are sometimes discrete. Customary dietetic restrictions have been considerably loosened in urban areas and among the elite which strengthens the process of secularization of life styles. On the other hand, the introduction of printing and education led to developments in political and cultural fields that have given rise not only to nationalism but also to revivalism, communalism, casteism, heightened linguistic

consciousness, and regionalism, an instance where the forces released have worked at crosspurposes. An instance of discrete development is the commonly observed fact that the manipulation of Western technology does not mean that the manipulators have accepted a rationalistic and scientific world view.¹⁹

In studying this total complexity we have fortunately an analysis of India's response to modernity by Eisenstadt²⁰ himself. In analysing India's response to modernity he divides the Indian entity into two, the centre and the periphery. The centre represented the political entity or the British government ultimately replaced by the Government of independent India. The periphery consisted of the old traditional society of villagers' communities and village networks, of the traditional urban centres interwoven into the various local-political and religious—centres and into 'caste society'. Modernity impinged on Indian society through the centre as also through other ways not connected with the centre and independent of it through 18th, 19th and 20th centuries. The two forces of modernity developed in separate and independent ways and evoked dispersed and different types of responses from the Indian society. The whole range of responses from the erosion of traditional culture resulting in disorganization and anomy through total resistance and strengthening of traditional structure and adaptive response to transformative response are all to be found in India both at the centre and at the periphery. But on the whole the traditional Indian periphery evinced a high degree of adaptability which is characterised by a great readiness by the members of the traditional setting to undertake new tasks outside their groups, by development of a much higher degree of internal-differentiation and diversification of roles and tasks, and by increasing incorporation of these new roles within them (P. 282).

The diversified response to modernity was in tune with the historical response of Indian society to all change and the source of this diversity lay in the great heterogeneity of India which went beyond merely local variability by affecting the central core of Indian tradition—the caste system—in its ideological and structural aspects alike. But paradoxically this core had shown much greater resilience or continuity than other great traditions in Asia. This paradox is explained by the important fact that Indian cultural entity was not tied to any political framework as also the fact

that the Brahmanic value system and structure of the caste system had not an organized homogeneous, unified, centre. The political centres were usually partial and relatively weak in terms of the major orientations of the cultural system. The continuous "cross-cutting" between the different structural and ideological tendencies could go with more structural "innovative" ones stressing both the permissiveness of Indian culture and its great propensity to segregated cultural innovation. (p. 295).

The response to the impingement of modernity in India was strongest in dispersed institution-building or development of new organizations in various institutional systems—whether agricultural, industrial, administrative or cultural. "But in a sense all these developments were limited, each developing in its own sphere, through its own momentum and partial motivation; they were not fully connected with the overall motivational orientations focussed as they were on the cultural religious spheres." (p. 305).

Whether the impact of modernity will ultimately evoke a transformative response from the Indian society cannot be decisively answered one way or the other. "Throughout the various spheres of Indian socio-political cultural order there exists the problem of the extent to which it will be able to generate not only permissiveness, which could facilitate the setting up of new institutional frameworks under external influence or the continuous recrystallization and adaptation of traditional groups to such new frameworks, but also how it could develop new innovative forces, new common integrative frameworks to support continuous institution-building. In the periphery this problem lies principally in the extent to which the recrystallization of caste and other traditional groups will indeed facilitate developments of new more flexible frameworks and crosscutting of different hierarchies of status within which new values, orientations, and activities may develop, or, conversely the extent to which they will reinforce the crystallization of neotraditional divisive symbols or groupings." (p. 304).

Eisenstadt's assessment of the response of Indian society to modernity is comprehensive and insightful but curiously incomplete and ambivalent in its conclusions. It can be faulted in one or two respects but its most important shortcoming is its seeming anxiety to keep its options open and shy away from conclusions that would logically follow. If this is avoided it becomes quite clear that

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India's response to modernity was not and cannot be of the transformative kind which is crucial for the process of modernization.

I believe that Eisenstadt's characterisation of the replacement of the British centre by a centre manned by Indians themselves on the attainment of political independence as "the basic ultimate breakthrough to modernity in the political and cultural spheres" (p. 298) as partly wrong and partly misconceived. He seems to have been prone to the same misconception of regarding that the character of the centre remained the same as of old when it came to be manned or managed by the Indians themselves and that this was the culmination of a process of political modernization. But he fails to see that as a result of this transfer the centre underwent a subtle qualitative change. The centre as it came to be managed by the Indians became increasingly subject to the pressures from the periphery and no longer remained a centre independent of and largely impervious to the influences from the periphery as the British centre was. With the establishment of parliamentary democracy and the passing away of the old leaders who could afford to ignore the periphery in some matters though not in all; the centre has come more and more under the pressures emanating from the periphery. The emergence of the "soft state" is a manifestation of this process. Consequently the ability of the centre to lead in the onward march of modernization has progressively dwindled. This is a serious setback to the process of modernization since independence and in years to come.

This would not have mattered much if the periphery were undergoing modernization and was ready to support and push it at the centre. But this was not so and Eisenstadt recognizes this. He also fails to penetrate the real character of the 'adaptability' that Indian society has displayed and displays today to the impulses of modernity. He notes that this has been the traditional way in which Indian society has responded to any change in the past. It is also the way in which Indian society has kept its ultra-static cultural mould through ages. As has been pointed out before this adaptability is the kiss of death that Indian society gives to all changes and moulds them to its own purpose of keeping itself intact in essentials. Eisenstadt insightfully notes that institution-building in response to the impingement of modernity on Indian society is dispersed and is not connected with overall motivational orienta-

tions. It may be recalled that Weber made a similar point in regard to the development of cultural rationalisation in Indian society. While there was development of special technologies appropriate to the *dharma* of each profession "from construction technique to logic as the technology of proof and disproof to the technology of eroticism", there could not develop levels of generalization above the technological because of the fragmentation involved in the notion of occupational *dharma*. The same tendency or the deep-rooted complex of the Indian society is at work in respect of the institution-building activity. This is the classical method of the Indian society to scatter the changes and adaptations it has to make widely, and to contain or quarantine them in separate groups so that they never really come together or cumulate. They always remain scattered, single and unrelated. That is the most efficient mechanism of the Indian social arrangements for smothering change.

The points that Eisenstadt makes regarding the absence of a developing general motivational or value structure favourable to modernization in Indian Society has often been made in a slightly different way. It has been said that under British tutelage Indian society did adopt many untraditional institutional structures and has continued with them even after the end of British rule. But these structures are managed and run not in the spirit in which their originals were conceived and run in the West but in the Indian way. Democracy, bureaucracy, modern business units, schools, newspapers, clubs, organizations, etc. have all the outward appearance of their compeers in the West but the essential internal spirit behind their working is totally different (or Indian). Citations on each of these from the critical writings of scholars, Indian and foreign, can be quoted in abundance to substantiate this observation. It is not necessary to do so because it is not likely to be seriously challenged or denied. But this perhaps draws attention to another facet of the response of Indian society to modernity. Indian society responds in a way in which such modern institutions when adopted always remain formal organizations and do not become properly internalized social institutions. "Like an institution, an organization has stable and recurring patterns of behaviour. The added dimension of an institution is that these patterns and behaviour are *valued*." ²¹

It is the speciality of the Indian social milieu that inhibits the growth of value structures around anything that is untraditional, that is, not within the framework of the family, caste and village. The non-traditional institutions adopted are like the dummies in shop-windows that give the Indian Society a false appearance of modernization.

A critical examination of Eisenstadt's appraisal and the logical development of some of his important observations lead to the conclusion that Indian society's response to modernity is largely devoid of the transformative aspect and the other kinds of response are far too dissipated by the functioning of the Indian society, to serve as the basis of development of a real modernization-favouring social milieu.

That the mechanism and functioning of the Hindu social system produces a kind of human material and institution-building that is detrimental to the evolution and functioning of a modern society is a fact of far-reaching importance that has not received much attention. This has significance not only for the building up and functioning of a capitalist ethic and society—the context in which it was examined by Max Weber — but also for that of a socialist or communist society in India. All these, — capitalist, socialist or communist — are modern societies and a certain kind of value system, a certain type of human beings and a certain kind of institutions and their functioning is necessary and usually assumed for their successful building up and functioning. This is what is lacking in the Indian social system.

Can this be changed by a radical change in the present economic structure? That is the belief and conviction of intellectuals of the Marxist persuasion. In the Marxian analysis all social values and institutions belong to the social superstructure erected on the economic structure of society embodied in the ownership of the means of production and the class relations that they engender. Once the basic structure is changed the old superstructure cannot persist and a new one would take its place. Ethics, values, etc. therefore cannot be changed until the basic economic structure is changed. Once that is done, these will automatically follow.

This is stated in the broadest of terms and without the qualifications that Marxists say they usually make. But the message is clear. The main task is the change in the basic economic

structure. It seems, however, that the Chinese are experiencing something different. "The Communist Manifesto talks of the revolution as 'the most radical rupture with the traditional property relations' adding that it was 'no wonder that its development involves radical rupture with traditional ideas.' This could mean that the rupture with 'traditional property relations' brings about in a good measure the other rupture as well. It could also mean that the concept of 'radical rupture with traditional property relations' is a larger concept including in it 'the radical rupture with the traditional ideas'. The Chinese are facing the situation in which, since there has been no radical rupture with traditional ideas, the radical rupture with traditional property relations has not proved as effective as one would have liked it to be. The Red Flag wrote in 1971 : "We deeply realise that bringing about the 'first rupture' is a needed and important step, while bringing about the second rupture is also an important and indispensable step. Bringing about the first 'rupture' is only the first step in a 10,000 li-long march towards the fulfilment of the historical task of proletarian dictatorship".....Chau En lai warns that "our leading comrades must pay close attention to the socialist revolution in the realm of the superstructure".²² The rupture of property relations thus comes out to be not a sufficient condition for the dismantling of the superstructure. Whether it is a necessary condition is not as definite as one would like to believe.

2.3 The Hindu Social Milieu A Summary Statement

As the argument so far has covered a lot of ground, it would be useful to have a summary statement to put it in proper perspective. The bald and unpalatable thesis is that the cultural values, personality motivations and social structure inherent in the ethos and structure of Hindu society and religion are adverse to its economic and social progress in modern times and modern ways. The ethos and structure of Hindu society reinforce one another and are two sides of the same coin, more than in any other traditional society in the world. There is no escape by way of stressing the gap between ideological formulations at the philosophical level and the structural reality of life as it is ordinarily lived by the common people. All of them share the same system of values, though rituals and religious practices are free to vary from caste

to caste. The Hindu system evinces a great tolerance for thought but allows no freedom for action. Herein lies its secret of transforming tolerance into an effective instrument of smothering any far-going structural social change. It gives way but does not change in essentials. Any change is isolated and dissipated by the working of the caste system in a manner in which the change is twisted and adapted to maintain the existing structure. The mechanism of change and yet no change in essentials operates throughout the tolerance of the Hindu society.

There is no room for the individual in this hierarchical society whose birth in any caste gives him his place in society and his duties are prescribed by the caste of his birth (dharma). Sanctions against not doing his duty are divine (karma). Escape is only through salvation. Consequently the individual develops an "other-worldly" attitude towards his work, his calling, his duty, etc. It is passive, noncommitted and almost indifferent. Self-love is quite common and general in such a society and the common type of personality to be found in Hindu society is that of the narcissistic type. Such a type of personality operates too much on, what Freud termed, the pleasure principle in which wish is equal to deed, letting things happen (passivity) favoured over attempts to master. It copes with helplessness by immersion in ideals, dreams and wishes as a replacement of what is. Narcissists have shallow loyalties beyond their immediate family and caste and have little or no sense of social obligations or duties to the society as a whole. Nationalism cannot grow vigorously in such a set up. Patriotism is weak and nationalism thin and largely negative. A society consisting predominantly of narcissists is not, however, an individulistic society but one of narrowly selfish persons who usually do not see beyond themselves.²³ Naturally polities containing such populations are weak and an easy prey to foreign conquest.

A society which ensures the production of such human material is incapable of working or building institutions and organizations beyond the traditional ones of the caste and the family. All such institutions and organizations, which are the core of all modern societies, are formally adopted but adapted in their functioning to the maintenance of traditional values and goals. Such societies are unable to live and lead an institutional life beyond the tradit-

ional.²⁴ This is also why the response of Hindu society to modernity has not been or likely to be full of transformative possibilities. And that accounts for the fact that the basic social ethos, behaviour and structure of the Hindu society has not changed in essentials during or after British rule. It is a society that is wedded to poverty. Poverty is its product and also an essential condition of its survival.

3.1 Why the Japanese analogy is inappropriate

A question can be and has been raised whether all this matters in the case of a nation's modernization? Cannot modernization succeed inspite of this? Has this not happened in Japan? A respected sociologist like Srinivas has recently endorsed such a position. He quotes with approval the following from Chie Nakane: "In the course of modernization Japan imported many Western cultural elements, but these were and are always partial and segmentary and are never in the form of an operating system." It is a language with its basic indigenous structure or grammar which has accumulated a heavy overlay of borrowed vocabulary; while the outlook of Japanese society has suffered drastic changes over the past hundred years, the basic social grammar has hardly been affected. Here is an example of industrialization and the importation of western culture not effecting basic changes in the cultural structure." ²⁵

There is no reason to disagree with Nakane's contention with regard to Japanese development. And he puts his finger exactly on the point which make the Japanese analogy inapplicable and inappropriate to the Indian case. In the foregoing pages I have been trying to bring out the basic social grammar of the Hindu system, to use Nakane's telling phrase, and it can be shown that it is the very opposite of that of the Japanese society. I am arguing that the Japanese could bring about modernization in the economic sphere successfully, even spectacularly, without any structural cultural change because the latter shortcoming could be compensated by other strong points in its basic social grammar. The basic grammar of the Hindu society has not only not such virtues but has its own weaknesses to boot. To substantiate the argument I must begin by an attempt to briefly sketch the outline of the basic social grammar of the Japanese society.²⁶

Japanese society throughout known history has been a closely controlled society both formally and informally. The minute legal regulations regarding the type of houses (including their length and breadth) and the number and kind of gifts that should be given at the time of marriage by farmers having different size holdings of land in the Tokugawa period are an example of the formal detailed controls. The Japanese have been conditioned to a world where the smallest details of conduct are mapped and status assigned. Informal controls equally meticulous consisted of the cultural indoctrination of the principles of social conduct like, *on* (a category of incurred obligations), *gin* (a category of Japanese obligation), *chu* (fealty to the Emperor), *ko* (filial piety), etc. There is a firmly established tradition of placing greater importance on the "family". The offsprings are trained not to make themselves ridiculous and not to put the family to shame. Inertia and deference to authority characterise the Japanese attitude to life and play a greater part in determining the conduct of the Japanese people than do conscience and rational judgement. They are trained to live in peaceful submission. Theirs is not an individualistic society.

So far as religion is concerned the Japanese are extremely uncomplicated. Transmigration of soul and nirvana are not in the Japanese pattern of thought. Japanese are uninterested in the fantasies of a world hereafter. Their mythology tells of gods but not of the life of the dead.

Even the idea of differential rewards and punishment after death is rejected for any man becomes a Buddha after he dies. A man who is "enlightened" (*satori*) is already in nirvana, which is here and now in the midst of time. Just as alien in Japan is the doctrine that flesh and spirit are irreconcilable. Yoga as a technique to eliminate desire which has its seat in the flesh is rejected by the Japanese. It is more understood as self-training whose rewards are here and now.

Japanese national character has been much debated and controversies have raged round it. Without entering into this we can note some features that stand out. Japanese children are foundly brought up and the father is not a super ego figure. The child gets its norms of conduct from the society. He will not be approved by his own group, unless he is approved by other groups. Japanese personality is not of the punitive western type. It may be slightly

narcissistic but not all the way. The great Western sanction for good behaviour is guilt that for the Japanese is shame (*haji*). For the Japanese aggression causes a guilt feeling because it is traduccing the good love of those against whom it is made. It is apologetic. This gives rise to a dual personality type which exhibits extremes of obedience and revolt.

The spectacular Japanese economic performance comes from a large and hardworking labour force backed by devotion to work, ingenuity in methods, and clever management. There is a built-in collectivism in the Japanese people. Like so many other things in Japan, work is ceremony. The Japanese workers are dedicated to their work and taken collectively, are perhaps the hardest workers in the world. That is why though Japanese workers are neither very efficient nor particularly energetic, as compared to their Western compeers, they are capable of generating extraordinary amount of energy and vitality. ²⁷

The ruling class which took charge at the time of the Meiji Restoration (1868) concentrated on national prosperity through armaments in order to catch up with the more advanced nations, while at the same time challenging the "art" of the West with the "virtue" of the East. The formal and informal control system was utilized to promote above all else loyalty to the throne and filial piety. The devotion to the throne was nurtured by keeping people engrossed in good manners and customs and free from the danger of degenerating into masses over-conscious of themselves as citizenry.

The lesson from Japan is therefore exactly the opposite of what is usually and superficially drawn. The Japanese society was and is a closely controllable and controlled society in contrast with the Indian. Though both societies are not of the individualistic type the Japanese individual, in contrast with the Indian, is not other-worldly in outlook, is not preoccupied with individual salvation, is intensely nationalistic with a high sense of social obligation and duty, is hardworking and committed to his work. With such a cultural ethics or social grammar, the Japanese society is capable of making a success of whatever objective it sets for itself. There is of course the danger that it may work for wrong objectives. ²⁸ But that is irrelevant for the immediate point at issue here. The fact is that the cultural ethics or the social grammar of Indian

society is the very opposite of the Japanese and though for argument's sake one may say that Japanese case illustrates that some societies can possibly achieve social and economic progress without any significant changes in the cultural ethics or social grammar, Indian society is not such a society.

Remedies and prospects : The argument developed so far attempts, a little iteratively perhaps, to identify and describe the social and cultural parameters of economic development and social change in India. These are : the social structure of the Indian society with its traditional and other institutions and organizations together with the prevalent personality pattern in the society on the one hand and, on the other, the cultural ethos that animates and conditions the interactions between them which manifest themselves in their functioning and behaviour. This complex as a whole effectively smothered all impulses toward significant social change from arising from within the society and successfully subverts any exogenous impulses of the same kind to its own purpose of maintaining the *status quo*. These parameters are age old, closely woven into the social fabric and of historically-proved durability.

That they will not remove themselves or wither away because of political liberation or establishment and functioning of formal democratic institutions or planned efforts at economic development may be taken as well established by the experience and developments in India during the 30 years that have elapsed since independence. In all these years these social parameters have been either ignored or treated as easily manageable and removable in the calculations of Indian leaders. A great deal of the failure of the planning effort and the democratic processes in India are directly traceable to this cavalier attitude or negligence. It is necessary that in the future they should be specifically recognized as constraints on progress, should be thoroughly understood and energetically tackled with persistence and ingenuity. I believe that they are capable of being tackled over the long term.

The obvious next question is what needs to be done in this regard, who should do it, where should it be done and in what way ? Though I have no cut and dried answers to laudle out on all these questions, I believe I can indicate the broadline along which answers to these questions would lie.

It is perhaps necessary to realise the peculiarly difficult nature

of the problem involved and its tackling. The core dilemma can be put in a nutshell : " we are inescapably committed to the mediation of human structures which are at once indispensable to our goals and at the same time stand between them and ourselves ". It is a conflict between ends and means, the split between ' the motion and the act '. Plans and programmes reflect the freedom of technical or ideal choice, but organized action cannot escape involvement, a commitment to personnel or institutions or procedures which effectively qualifies the initial plan. In acting on these problems it is necessary to act not only on the ends but also simultaneously on the means and to see that the ' logic ' of action does not impel one to go from one undesirable position to another. In other words, an unceasing effort has to be made to master the instruments generated in the course of action. Though therefore the broad lines along which the answers to the questions posed above are sketched below in the usual format of objectives, instruments, etc. that should not be mistaken for their true or actual form. At best it is an overly simplified outline along the usual familiar lines to help initial understanding. But its true complications underlined above should never be lost sight of.

Let us begin with the agent of this change. The almost unanimous answer to this would be the Government of India manned by a devoted and dedicated leadership which will not only preach but practise. Such a leadership will have to be a moral leadership as well, a leadership derived from the people but not of them in the sense that will not hesitate to move against the popular beliefs and prejudices if they are harmful to progress at the cost of risking its own popularity.

It will have to be a strong leadership, though one hopes, not an authoritative one, which can make its decisions stick. We shall ignore the questions such as whether such a leadership can arise in the present social milieu, whether, when and if it arises, it will be able to get into the seats of power through the democratic process and whether it will be able to stay there for a sufficiently long period ? Admittedly these are relevant but difficult questions and I do not want to get sidetracked in answering them. I note them and pass on to other ones immediately more relevant to the theme under discussion.

The objectives of change can be spelled out in the light of the

preceding discussin. (a) To change the present social structure based on the caste and property heirarchy (b) To improve and modify the functioning of institutions and organizations by making them more secular (c) To change and secularise the present values and attitudes of the people to make them more efficient and active, economically and socially, and, in the long run, to change the common personality pattern to one more conducive to progress and activity.

All these objectives have to be tackled simultaneously and separately. According to some extreme Marxist formulations, (a) is the basic structure on which (b) and (c) stand in the nature of superstructures and that, provided (a) is tackled successfully the remaining will automatically change in the right direction. Such a simplistic view is not held by a majority of Marxist thinkers. The Chinese view in this regard, referred to earlier, testifies to the difficulties in the way of accepting such a simplistic view, even from the operational point of view. In a way the Chinese experience suggests not only that (b) and (c) have to be individually tackled even after tackling (a) successfully but that tackling them is far more difficult than the tackling of (a). Due note must be taken of this important experience.

There is also a view similar but of a much milder variety, which holds that economic development through planned effort can solve these problems in its stride. This view is also unrealistic and a-historical. Apart from the fact that these very factors prevent the pace of economic development from quickening in such societies the historical evidence regarding countries in the non-communist world which have experienced considerable spurts of economic development, does not lend much support to this view. The cases of Taiwan, S. Korea, Brazil, Venezuela come immediately to mind not to mention the oil producing countries of the Middle East. The older case of Japan emphasizes the same point. Economic development can possibly help the kind of social change required but it cannot by itself bring it about. It cannot be considered a necessary or a sufficient condition for such social change.

The changing of the social and economic structure is difficult enough but as compared to (b) and (c) which involves the changing of "man" in the broadest sense is far more difficult. This, however, is not something that is exotic or out of the blue. The

necessity of changing and building up of the human being as a separate task of development is recognized even by the communists. At the Twenty-First Congress of the CPSU, Khrushchev announced that "To reach communism we must rear the man of the future right now." ³⁰ In stating therefore that a new man has to be reared in India to fit the prosperous and poverty free India of the future, nothing exotic or out of this world is being suggested.

The agenda set forth above is perhaps the tallest, one which is easier to state than to achieve. But who can solve his problems by ignoring or underestimating the difficulties of attaining a solution? I do not want to minimise the difficulties but all I want to say is that the problem is not insoluble if we have the will. Where there is the will there is always a way.

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NOTES

15. M. L. Chandawaller, in *Social Change Readings*.
16. G. S. Ghurye, *Cast and Class in India*, Bombay, Popular Book Depot, 1950.
17. S. N. Eisenstadt, 'The Protestant Ethic Thesis, in analytical and comparative context', *Diogenes*, No. 59 (1967). Also in: *Sociology of Religion*, Penguin Modern Sociology Readings, (Ed.) R. Roburson, 1969.
18. In the evolution of Hindu society, according to some sociologists like Dr. Ketkar, we have an exact parallel, though of the opposite sort. Dr. Ketkar argued that the Brahmins created the caste system as an instrument of the expansion of Hindu society in ancient times. Such a system could rapidly absorb into the Hindu fold innumerable tribes and communities, without disturbing their gods, rituals, etc. The society was bound together by the Brahmins acting as priests to all castes and the political power determining from time to time the hierarchy of different castes. In due course, it could be surmised, that the occupations would come to be chosen freely

rather than by birth and in a sense all castes would have merged into the single caste, Brahmin. But this never happened. The caste system, once it came into being, proved too enduring and the social experiment remained unfinished. Hindu society is an unfinished experiment that has stagnated perhaps beyond repair. Cf. *Maharashtriya Dnyankosh*.

19. M. N. Srinivas, *Social Change in Modern India*, Allied, Bombay, 1966, pp. 55-56
20. "India's Response to Modernity" in *Tradition, Change and Modernity*, S. N. Eisenstadt, John Wiley, New York, 1973, pp. 280-306.
21. Edward Feit, "Pen Sword and People : Military Regimes in the Formation of Political Institution", *World Politics*, January 1973, p. 251.
22. G. P. Deshpande, "Importance of the Superstructure," *Economic Weekly*, March 1, 1975.
23. It may perhaps avoid unnecessary misunderstanding by directing attention to the fact that though a selfish person may be defined as one who is motivated strictly by self-interest, "Self-interest" is a complex motivation and cannot be considered to have the same content in all climes and times. The content of self-interest is determined by the social institutions of a given society. See *Social Factors in Economic Development - A Trend Report and Bibliography*, International Sociological Association, Vol. VII, No. 3, 1957.
24. The noted historian of the Marathas, V. Khare, laid his finger exactly on this weakness in Maratha society and polity as leading to their defeat in their struggle against the English. He did not go deeper into the causes of this but his historian's insight was keen enough to grasp this crucial fact.
मराठ व इंग्रज, न. चि. केळकर, १९१८ या पुस्तकाची प्रस्तावना.
25. C. Nakane, *Japanese Society*, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1970, quoted by M. N. Srinivas, "Social Environment and Management's Responsibilities", *Economic Weekly*, March 15, 1975, p. 488.
26. For the following account I am drawing among others on Ruth Benedict, *Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, 1946.
Tadoshi Fukutake *Man and Society in Japan*,

- I. Kawasaki, *Japan Unmasked*, 1969. D. G. Haring, " a .
 nese National Character, Cultural Anthropology, Psychoana-
 lysis and History ", in *Japanese Character and Culture*, (ed.)
 B. S. Silberman, University of Arizona Press, 1962.
27. Ichiro Kawasaki, *Japan Unmasked*, Charles E. Tuttle
 Company, Rutland, Vermont, and Tokyo, 1969, pp. 36-40.
28. As has been observed " Where modernization means only an
 increased effectiveness in goal attainment, with no increase
 in the rationalization of goal-setting process, very serious
 pathologies can result ". Bellah, *Religion and Progress in
 Modern Asia*, Epilogue, 1965, New York, Free Press, p. 195.
29. P. Selznic, " Foundations of the Theory of Organizations ",
American Sociological Review, Vol. 15 (1948), 25-35.
30. Quoted by Konenkov, in " Communism and Culture ",
Kommunist No. 7, 1959. English translation in *Soviet
 Highlights*, No. 3, 1959.

A NON-DUALISTIC REPLY TO MOORE'S REFUTATION OF IDEALISM

If philosophical Idealism may be characterized as in some sense placing mind at the center of reality, then a system of thought which identifies consciousness and reality may qualify as a candidate for philosophic Idealism. Such is the approach taken by the non-dualistic system of Advaita Vedanta according to which consciousness is reality.¹ I propose to examine the refutation of idealism offered by G. E. Moore from the standpoint of non-dualistic Idealism according to which neither subject nor object possess real existence.² The claim I hope to substantiate is that from the standpoint of non-dualistic Idealism, G. E. Moore's refutation of Idealism can be seen not as an argument offered against Idealism, but rather as an argument offered on its behalf.³

G. E. Moore begins his now classical essay with the statement that Modern Idealism asserts that the universe is spiritual. One of the meanings he ascribes to this statement is :

Chairs and tables and mountains *seem* to be very different from us; but when the whole universe is declared to be spiritual, it is certainly meant to assert that they are far more like us than we think.⁴

Here, Moore takes for granted the existence of the subject and assumes that the Idealist argues that the object is in reality like the subject. Moore does not consider the possibility of an idealistic perspective according to which neither subject nor object may lay claim to real existence. But if neither subject nor object are ultimately real, neither one exists so as to be either like or unlike the other.

Again, Moore holds that for Idealism, the universe, "...has what we recognize in ourselves as the *higher* forms of consciousness."⁵ However accurate Moore's description may be of other Idealisms, it does not touch upon the position of the non-dualist. For, if by the universe Moore means the world which is made up of objects, then for the non-dualist, such a world has no existence in reality.⁶ That which does not exist in reality cannot possess forms of consciousness, whether higher or lower.

G. E. Moore, however, as he later notes, is only interested in idealistic arguments and he concentrates on the one argument which he believes that all Idealists must rely upon in order to establish the conclusion that 'Reality is spiritual'.⁷ The proposition upon which G. E. Moore claims that all Idealism rests is the proposition *esse is percipi*.⁸ Moore states his philosophical translation of Bishop Berkeley's celebrated formula :

If *esse* is *percipi*, this is at once equivalent to saying that whatever is, is experienced; and this, again, is equivalent, in a sense, to saying that whatever is, is something mental.⁹

This formulation, however, does not capture the position of non-dualism since it requires a distinction between experiencer and experienced, a distinction, which, as we have seen above, is not proper to the non-dualistic Idealist. If we were to adopt a paraphrase appropriate to articulating the essence of the ontological commitment of non-dualism, we might say, 'Whatever is, is experience'. It is crucial to see that Moore's argument against Idealism rests at every stage upon the acceptance of the subject-object duality, the very supposition that the non-dualist calls into question.

G. E. Moore's argument rests upon another equally important assumption as well, namely, that reality is a whole, part of which is not experienced.¹⁰ Nowhere does Moore *prove* that perception is only a part of a whole which is reality. Why does Moore think that there is something more in reality than there is in experience? He thinks this because otherwise he thinks that the proposition, *esse is percipi*, will be an absolute tautology.¹¹ But the proposition, 'Whatever is, is experience',¹² is only empty if we assume that experience is the experience of objects, and if we then take he objects away, experience is empty. But if there are no objects, we are not taking anything away. We assert only what is.

But let us inquire into why G. E. Moore says what he does. He holds that if there is not a reality in addition to experience, to assert that *esse is percipi* will amount to making a "perfectly barren analytic proposition".¹³ But the proposition, 'Whatever is, is experience', is not an analytic truth in the same sense in which the proposition, 'All bachelors are unmarried males', is an

analytic truth. The latter proposition is true because of the rules of language. The former proposition is analytically true because it is analytic of experience; i. e., it is analytic of what is found in experience. That a truth of experience is analytic for experience follows from its being a truth of experience. If we assert that which is necessarily true of experience that does not make our assertion an empty truth.

Let us proceed with the argument of G. E. Moore. G. E. Moore states :

We have then in every sensation two distinct terms (1) 'consciousness', in respect of which all sensations are alike; and (2) something else, in respect of which one sensation differs from another. It will be convenient if I may be allowed to call this second term the 'object' of a sensation We have then in every sensation two distinct elements, one which I call consciousness, and another which I call the object of consciousness.¹⁴

This analysis of Moore's states the problem in a nutshell. The question at issue is, are there two distinct elements in sensation, namely consciousness and the object of consciousness? But we cannot appeal to introspection to settle the case as according to some, introspection reveals that there are two elements in consciousness while to others introspection reveals no duality within consciousness.¹⁵ On the basis of introspection, at least, it appears to be a moot point as to whether or not there is a duality within sensation.

At this point it may be useful for us to inquire into the way in which G. E. Moore has arrived at his conclusion that there are two distinct elements in sensation. Consciousness, for Moore, is a name given to all cases of sensation on the ground that while individual sensations differ from each other, they all nonetheless share in common the characteristic of being sensations. If individual sensations differ from each other, and yet, are all equally consciousnesses then it follows for Moore that each sensation differs from each other sensation *qua* content. This, however, is not the only conclusion that we might draw. It is also possible that each sensation might differ from each other sensation *qua*

a mode or kind of consciousness without there being, in any individual case, a distinction between a consciousness and an object of consciousness.

For Moore, since individual sensations differ from one another, and all are equally consciousnesses, it follows that consciousness is something distinct from its contents since these are different while it remains the same. However, from the fact that consciousness, as a name, is given equally to all of its cases, it does not follow that in any one application of the name that there is a difference between consciousness and its object. Consciousness, as a concept, is formed by Moore, by abstraction from individual cases of what all individual cases share in common. It does not follow that in any one case of sensation that there is a distinction between consciousness and an object of consciousness. Because consciousness, *qua* abstract concept, is alike in all cases, it does not follow that because one sensation differs from another that consciousness and sensation are different. It only follows that what is true of the abstract order of existence (concepts) may not be true of the concrete order of existence (sensations). All cases of consciousness may be identical *qua* being consciousnesses and each may differ from each other in the way each has of being a consciousness without it being true that consciousness and its object are distinct.¹⁶

Let us now turn to what G. E. Moore terms the true analysis of sensation :

The true analysis of a sensation or idea is as follows. The element that is common to them all, and which I have called 'consciousness' really *is* consciousness. A sensation is, in reality, a case of 'knowing' or 'being aware of' or 'experiencing' something.¹⁷

From this analysis it would appear that sensation is a case of subject knower "knowing" an object. Sensation, in this analysis, is not the object known, but the knowing of it.

Later on, however, Moore gives this analysis of sensation :

....I am aware of blue, and by this I mean, that my awareness has to blue a quite different and distinct relation. It is possible, I admit, that my awareness is blue *as well* as being of blue; but what

I am quite sure of this that it is *of* blue; that it has to blue the simple and unique relation the existence of which alone justifies us in distinguishing knowledge of a thing from the thing known, indeed in distinguishing mind from matter.¹⁸

Here, Moore admits the possibility that awareness can be blue as well as being of blue. But I will argue that if awareness is blue then it makes no sense to say that it can be of blue as well. For, if awareness is blue then we do not need to become aware of it. If there is already a blue awareness we would not need to become aware of it or else why should we have said that it was a *blue awareness* in the first instance. The only possible alternative is that it is not a blue awareness of which we are becoming aware, but it is a blue *simpliciter* of which we are becoming aware. But if it is blue *simpliciter* of which we are becoming aware, it seems then that we must first have the blue before knowing it. But this, even on Moore's own account, is impossible. On the one hand, if there is already a blue awareness there would seem to be no need to become aware of it, or else why do we refer to it as a blue *awareness*. On the other hand, if it is a blue *simpliciter*, we could have a sensation without knowing. But this Moore himself does not allow.¹⁹

What Moore actually discovers in introspection is, I think, blue awareness and not blue *simpliciter*. Why else would he allow for the possible existence of blue awareness? And yet, if what he actually discovers is blue awareness, it would not seem that he would need a further entity, consciousness, to become aware of this.²⁰

Moore's 'Refutation of Idealism' follows quite simply from his last description of sensation :

There is, therefore, no question of how we are to "get outside the circle of our own ideas and sensations." Merely to have a sensation is already to be outside that circle.²¹

What Moore intends in this analysis is simply this. If sensation is comprised of two distinct elements, consciousness and the object of consciousness, then to have a sensation is already to be

aware of something which is other than consciousness. But Moore's analysis depends upon his having access to that to which he has no access, namely a blue in itself. If the blue Moore speaks about is a blue awareness then he would not have to become aware of it, in which case there are not two items, consciousness and its object. If the blue Moore speaks about is that of which he must become aware before he can know it as blue then it must be that he can have a blue before he knows it as blue. But this is impossible. For how could you "have a blue" without knowing it was blue? It must be that "having a blue" is discovering a blue awareness, or, in a word, that blue and consciousness are not two distinct elements, but one.²² It seems that Moore's argument for the 'Refutation of Idealism' is not actually an argument for the 'Refutation of Idealism'. It seems rather to be an argument on its behalf.

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NOTES

1. "Vedānta, like Hegel, says that Reality is thought..."
Nikhilananda, Preface to *The Māndūkyopaniṣad with Gaudapāda's Kārikā and Śaṅkara's Commentary*, p. xxxII.
"Being is identical with thought..." (in Advaita),
Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, p. 458.
"Existence and consciousness are one." (in Advaita)
Chandradhar Sharma, *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy*, p. 284.
2. "This perceived world of duality, characterized by the subject-object relationship, is verily an act of the mind."
Śaṅkara, *Māndūkyopaniṣad*, IV, 72. Cf., the author's
Five Dialogues on Knowledge and Reality, Library of Congress Number A-412079. *First Dialogue*, pp. 17-23;
Second Dialogue, pp. 33-38; p. 42; *Fourth Dialogue* p. 99
Fifth Dialogue, pp. 120-122; *Epilogue*, pp. 146-147.
3. Although the later Moore does not subscribe *in toto* to this argument against Idealism (*Vide.*, the preface to

Philosophical Studies in which Moore says of his early paper : " This paper now appears to me to be very confused, as well as to embody a good many down-right mistakes. ") this refutation retains a classic historical and philosophical significance of its own. Because of this, it deserves consideration in its own right, independently of Moore's later position.

4. G .E. Moore, ' The Refutation of Idealism ', *Philosophical Studies*, p. 1 (emphasis his).
5. *Ibid.*, p. 1 (emphasis his).
6. " Man has mere persistent belief in the reality of the unreal (which is duality). There is no duality (corresponding to such belief). " Sankara, *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad* IV, 75. Cf., Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, pp. 456-458 et *passim*.
7. *Op. cit.*, p. 3.
8. *Op. cit.*, p. 5.
9. *Op. cit.*, p. 6.
10. *Op. cit.*, p. 9.
11. *Op. cit.*, p. 11.
12. For the sake of a harmony of reference we will change only the past tense of the verb for ' experienced ' to the noun form ' experience ' and leave the word order of the paraphrase intact. However, we must keep the above arguments in mind.
13. *Op. cit.*, p. 10.
14. *Op. cit.*, p. 17.
15. Professor Errol E. Harris states that he can find no such distinction in sensation : " I am myself unable to distinguish in my own experience of sensation between anything describable as an act of consciousness and the immediate object of consciousness. " *Vide* ' The Mind-Dependence of Objects ', *The Philosophical Quarterly*, April, 1955, p. 224. Professor Harris states that Bertrand Russell is also unable to find such a distinction in sensation : *Vide*, Russell, *Analysis of Mind*, pp. 17, 141 f.

- and *Our Knowledge of the External World*, p. 83. On the other side there is Moore himself, Brentano, Husserl, and others. Professor Ducasse states : " Professor Moore asserts that in any case of awareness of blue it is possible (even if not easy) to distinguish by careful introspective observation the awareness from the blue. This I readily grant..." Cf., Moore's : " The Refutation of Idealism ", *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore*, p. 239.
16. The confusing of what is true of the abstract order of existence with what is true of the concrete order of existence, we may call the fallacy of confusing existential orders.
 17. G. E. Moore, ' The Refutation of Idealism ', *Philosophical Studies*, p. 24 (emphasis his).
 18. *Ibid.*, p. 26 (emphasis his).
 19. *Vide*, above f. 17.
 20. *Five Dialogues on Knowledge and Reality. Second Dialogue*, pp. 47-49; *Fifth Dialogue*, pp. 118-123. The question addressed here is, what is knowledge? While Moore calls it a simple and unique relation he does not analyze what *is* the relation.
 21. *Op. cit.*, p. 27 (emphasis his).
 22. Cf., C. J. Ducasse, Moore's " The Refutation of Idealism ", *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore*, pp. 232-233; 236-237; 239; 242; *et passim*. In Professor Ducasse's very cogent analysis he argues that blue is a kind of experience as waltzing is a kind of dance. The discovery of blue awareness would be the discovery of a kind of awareness. In Professor Ducasse's terms, blue is not an object of experience, but a species of experience.

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THE VITALITY AND ROLE OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY TODAY

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Some Axioms

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Over a decade ago the "Indian Philosophical Congress" asked for papers and organized a symposium on Does Indian Philosophy Need Reorientation? The papers are published in the Proceedings. The problem has been haunting Indian intellectuals and is of particular interest to Comparative Philosophy, for, undoubtedly, what provides the horizon of the question is the challenge of Modernity in general and of Western Christianity in particular. Even if some of my suggestions descend to the area of concrete proposals, I think that they may be of more than particular interest, for - independently of their merit - they give expression to the necessary incarnation of philosophical activity into praxis.

Although this paper was originally delivered at the Symposium, it has since been given its final form. I am glad to express my gratitude to the conveners and my colleagues, and my agreement with most of the proposals made during the course of our meetings. I have tried not to repeat them here, assuming that silence will not be interpreted as disagreement.

During an entire week the last month of October a dozen of Indian philosophers met in order to discuss 'What is living and what is dead in Indian philosophy.' The convener was the University Grants Commission and the host the Department of Philosophy

of the Andhra University at Waltair. Some position papers were circulated in advance and the initial discussions were centered around those papers, although the colloquium became more alive and pertinent when the exchange of views took the turn of personal philosophical confessions.

Besides the written contributions sent by K. K. Banerjee, D. P. Chattopadhyaya, D. Malvania, R. C. Pandeya, and K. Ranga Rao and T. N. Murthy, the participants presenting and defending their papers were : N. K. Devaraja (Varanasi), M. N. Gangopadhyay (Shantiniketan), T. M. P. Mahadevan (Madras), K. J. Shah (Dharwar) and Jaganath Upadhyaya (Varanasi). The three professors from Waltair, B. V. Kishan, K. S. Murthy and K. R. Rao took active part in the discussion. Daya Krishna (Jaipur) and myself were the other members of the group besides the junior teaching staff of the Department of Philosophy.

The purpose of the Symposium may be better served if, instead of expounding my personal opinions at length, I put forward only those ideas which may enjoy a wider consensus, and adopt a sutra-like style.

Our common concern being philosophical, requires a philosophical approach. Some of the sutras will therefore transcend the pragmatic issue at stake in this Symposium. This should not be misconstrued as a diversion but as an attempt to penetrate more deeply into the problem itself. Indian Philosophy cannot divorce itself from Philosophy.

I - Methodological Remarks

I, 1 - The results depend on the method.

The answer to any problem is a function of the problematic we see. What we see is conditioned by our perspective, i. e., by the method we adopt.

I, 2 - The method one adopts depends on the philosophy one follows.

There is a *vital circle* enveloping our methods and the overall existential situation of our philosophizing. This is a fact which determines the limits of all our speculation : the method depends on the philosophy one holds and the philosophy holds cond-

itions the method one adopts. Only from a logical point of view, however, is this circle vicious, because life is not reducible to mere logic, nor do we start our speculations from point zero. What we need is a critical reflection on the criteria we use in philosophical analysis.

- I, 3** – The criteria we apply in deciding what is alive and what is dead in Indian Philosophy depends on previously-held philosophical views.

For some, truth is alive no matter how dead it may be sociologically. For others, something which does not have the power to transform human existence cannot be said to be living – to put only the extreme cases. We must find some points of agreement if we are to proceed in a collegial way.

- I, 4** – In a pluralistic philosophical situation there can be a certain consensus only in mythical meta-criteria or in non-philosophical, pragmatic concessions.

The first alternative represents an inherent limitation of philosophy, and depends on what take for granted and thus agree upon either consciously or unconsciously. The horizon of such a consensus is provided by the myth in which we live. There is, for instance, a certain agreement today that philosophy – in whatever sense we may understand it – has to be relevant for people in general; that it cannot be reduced to an uncritical repetition of the past, etc.

The second alternative represents the death of philosophy as a free and ultimate enquiry, for it would have to assume that a non-philosophical power, say the State or the Church, has the right to dictate what philosophy has to defend.

We, have, thus, three possibilities: to be commanded by a non-philosophical agency (thereby being placed at the service of some other will), to use the criteria of our particular philosophical systems (to use any other), to agree upon some meta-criteria (becoming open to dialogue and inter-action).

- I, 5** – The meta-criteria are necessary but not sufficient.

The meta-criteria are formed by the basis on which rest the different and divergent criteria (of the concerning philosophies). They allow a free interplay among the different criteria emanating

from the diverse philosophical views. They provide the horizon which makes dialogue, interaction and even disagreement possible. But they are not, properly speaking, criteria to be applied, because they provide only the arena where the discussion can meaningfully take place. The meta-criteria may be of help in finding acceptable criteria to people of different philosophical persuasions. Some meta-criteria are, for instance, that philosophy should be relevant, that it should open us to a clearer vision of truth, but they do not tell us how we detect relevance or find truth.

I, 6 - Phenomenology may offer us an acceptable starting point.

The proof of the cake is in the eating. It is a question of trying it.

II - Phenomenological Analysis

II, 1 - The Phenomena we detect correspond to the presentday socio-historical situation.

We should beware of universalizing our conclusions. Nobody can claim meaningfully to cover the universal range of the human experience. The temporal factor should not be overlooked, for it plays an important and limiting role. We can only speak for our time and place, although these two categories can embrace much more than our day and our village.

II, 2 - Indian Philosophy here means the classical systems, the āstikas or orthodox as well as the nāstikas or heterodox.

This seems advisable to reduce the field of our inquiry and focus our discussion. Considerations regarding the nature of philosophy and its distinction from theology and religion, viz. the relation between dharma, darsana, brahmavidya, atmajnana, etc, should be overlooked in this particular context. Philosophical systems coming from Islam, Christianity, aboriginal wisdom, etc. - important as they may be - have also to be disregarded here.

II, 3 - What is living means that which is sufficiently present so as to be effective either on the visible, conscious and sociological level (a), or on the invisible, unconscious and anthropological level (b), or on both. Effective here means affecting life in some non-negligible degree.

Something can be present among a sociologically powerful group and yet have hardly any roots in the Indian soil, and vice-versa. The discrepancy between the two levels creates the complexity of the problem. Here the question of alienation becomes relevant.

The term living should be free of axiological overtones. To be living does not mean to be good and true; it could be equally harmful and wrong. Yet there is an intimate relationship between life and values which is in itself a peculiar philosophical problem.

II, 4 - What is dying means that which is sufficiently absent so as to be ineffective on one or both of the above-mentioned levels.

The term 'dying' seems more apposite than the term 'dead', not only to balance 'living', but also because human existence, on every plane, is an 'in-between life and death'. The whole of existence ek-sists in a two-way transit between life and death; and it is the tension between the two that constitutes our factual situation.

II, 5 - What is dying in Indian Philosophy is : (1) on level (a) practically every idea tied up with obsolete cosmologies : (2) on both levels most of the systems as they were once taught; and (3) mainly on level (a) many of the religious institutions and practical implications of the systems.

(1) The greatest impact of modern science is to be seen not in the technical gadgets that science has made possible, but in the change of world-view which it has brought about. Today anything which contradicts the 'scientific' world-view has very little chance of survival. Miracles and apsaras may be still considered real, but they have to pass through the screen of 'Science' - whether this be valid or not. This point is less applicable in the case of the Indian peasant, but even here watching television, or at least the 'belief' that such a thing is possible and real, has fundamentally changed the cosmological background over against which his conceptions of reality rest - to illustrate a long process with a single example. There is no philosophy without a cosmological ground, declared or undeclared. We face today in India a phenomenon similar to the collapse of the medieval world-view in Europe. The

purāṇas may still be very much alive, but currently they are being 'situated' in a different framework, which alone permits them to live.

(2) Some schools of Vedānta could be said to be an exception to this and yet there seems to be general agreement that even they are on the decline and that they are, in any case, simply expurgated and oversimplified versions of the traditional sampradāyas.

(3) Traditional institutions are on the wane; they exercise less and less influence on the ordinary life of the people. The caste system, for example, may still be strong in certain milieus, but its maintenance is primarily due to inertia, and it seems to have been stripped of whatever rationale that once made it at least meaningful. Furthermore, traditional Indian Philosophy shaped a social order and created an anthropological situation which are hardly alive today. Many aspects of the old order survive, but the wind of change seems irresistible and has already blown unto the four corners of the country. Not only are gurukulas, vedic practices and mimāṃsā categories declining, but also the practice of shaping one's life according to the views of the traditional systems is disappearing, notwithstanding the many noble efforts at renewal. Indeed the very existence of reform movements is evidence that the 'unreformed' systems are dying.

II, 6 - What is living in Indian Philosophy is its Spirit, which can be detected in (1) mumuksutva or the unquenched desire for liberation and (2) yukti or the wholistic approach to reality, especially to the ultimate questions.

An all-pervading conviction seems to be very much alive throughout India. Philosophers have given it the most variegated names such as mokṣa, nirvāṇa, bhoga, jñāna, apavarga, ānanda, brahman, tattvajñāna, etc. These names may represent a human invariant, yet they present a peculiarly Indian slant. The vast majority of the people of India still react positively to the idea of liberation and emancipation, even if these are interpreted in socio-economic or political terms. There is in mukti, freedom, an aura of 'plus' which seems to indicate that this goal of human existence, in whatever it may consist, is worth pursuing.

(2) There is a synthetic feature which some will say belongs to the Indian mind, and which undoubtedly belongs to the spirit of

Indian Philosophy : it consists in an all-embracing or integrated ideal of truth and perfection. Jñāna or knowledge does not mean only technical know-how or specialized cognition. A sage in India has to be holy as well as knowledgeable, while an unethical man is not considered capable of purely intellectual achievements; religion and ethics, the sacred and the profane, theory and praxis, etc. all go together. Except for a tiny little minority among the British 'educated', hardly anybody in India considers Philosophy as just another science or as an analytical endeavour. On the contrary, it is seen as an all-embracing wisdom having constitutive links with religion and holiness. The salvation man longs for is an integral state including sarvam, all - from which the very word salvation derives.

III - Theoretical Considerations

- II, 1 - It is the task of Philosophers in India, not only passively to analyze the status quo, but to intervene actively in the fluxus quo by taking a stand in determining what should live and what should die in Indian Philosophy.

Thus we need both a critical analysis of the situation, and practical proposals based on such an evaluation of the nature and function of philosophy itself. There is no need to recall that classical Indian Philosophy was part and parcel of the life of the people.

- III, 2 - The main factors with which Indian Philosophy has to deal, are : (a) the technological civilization, (b) the pan-economic system and (c) the western way of life.

Philosophy cannot be cultivated *in vitro*. Its ground is the living soil of the people philosophizing. It is for his fellow-beings that the philosophers proper philosophize. The three factors of rupture modify not only the results and the methods of Indian philosophizing today, but philosophical activity itself in its very roots. Today, Philosophy in India—as elsewhere—has to address itself not only to the rethinking of solutions, but to the awareness of the problems themselves and ultimately, of reality. Indian Philosophy cannot live in an enclave.

- III, 3 - The main element of continuity in Indian Philosophy today is the inborn urge of the peoples for mokṣa or liberation,

this latter understood according to the divergent interpretations of the different philosophies, ancient or modern.

A permanent factor common both to the traditional philosophical systems and the present day mentality seems to be the human longing for emancipation. This dynamism confers unity and purpose to the philosophical enterprise. If the desire to know Being could be said to be the central thrust of western philosophy, the desire for liberation characterizes Indian Philosophy. To the satyajijnāsā of the West, we could present the mumukṣutva of India as the main concern of Philosophy. This mukti, however, does not need to be interpreted in one particular way. The study of what makes the human being free could be said to constitute the central philosophical question for our times.

It is this element of continuity that is largely responsible for the tremendous appeal of Indian wisdom throughout the world today. This gives Indian Philosophy a relevance far beyond its traditional boundaries, not only geographically and historically but also philosophically, as we shall suggest when affirming that Philosophy today must be cross-cultural (IV, 3).

III, 4 - The concept of philosophical relevance cannot be dictated from outside philosophy but must spring from the nature of the philosophical enquiry itself.

Here we should recall what has been said concerning the criteria governing philosophical enquiry. For some philosophers, certain types of problems are considered more important than others. We repeat: the fact that we have not mentioned something here does not mean we under-rate its importance. The Philosophy of Mathematics and Aesthetics, for instance, should not be neglected. The specific problem under examination, however, is not the nature of all Philosophy, but the situation of Indian Philosophy today.

III, 5 - The main philosophically relevant areas are: (a) Social Philosophy, (b) Philosophical Anthropology and (c) Philosophy of religion.

To persist in looking for relevance in any of the classical disciplines such as metaphysics, epistemology or logic, etc. would only

increase the gap between past and present, and reinforce the divisions between the philosophical disciplines. We need precisely to overcome such watertight compartments. Furthermore, these three areas of enquiry require the collaboration of all philosophical disciplines. To concentrate on clarifying traditional notions such as *ātman*, *brahman*, *cit*, *ānanda*, etc. may set *a priori* limits to what should be a free philosophical enterprise. It may further divert us from an analysis of our contemporary understanding of reality and impose on our thought categories from the past, relevant as they may prove to be. Moreover, all these problems will re-emerge in their proper setting in the process of tackling the three proposed areas.

In sum, these three areas of concern do not exclude traditional disciplines or Indian categories, but reorient them to serve living issues.

- III, 6** – It is imperative for Philosophy in India today to scrutinize sociological problems, e. g. : (a) the possible juxtaposition, superimposition, interaction or symbiosis between currently emerging institutions and traditional patterns; (b) the meaning of current slogans and myths such as 'democracy', 'secularism', 'socialism', 'humanism', 'scientific progress', etc. and (c) the problem of justice.

It goes without saying that here social philosophy does not mean purely descriptive and quantitative sociological behaviorism. Especially in India sociology cannot be divorced from its ontological foundation and religious implications,

(a) If the subject-matter of philosophy is reality, a social philosophical study cannot fail to see two Indias painfully 'coexisting' in our times. Tradition and modernity have not yet married. The philosopher here has a priestly function. The world of work, family life, political involvement on all levels, etc. are urgent philosophical issues which need theoretical clarification as much as practical orientation.

(b) It has always been the task of a living philosophy to take a stand regarding existentially burning issues and to clarify the powerful ideational forces which drive individuals and peoples, in order to help emancipate Man, so often caught either in mere slogans or else hopelessly exploited. To rescue Man from fear of

the higher powers and anxiety about the underworld has ever been a driving impulse behind any authentic philosophy. The corrective and critical function of philosophy should be applied here.

(c) Nothing is more deleterious than living on borrowed ideas and ideals. Almost every great philosophy has elaborated the intellectual foundation on which the idea of justice rests. The very fact that many Indian systems have neglected this point calls for a more thorough study today.

III 7, - Philosophical Anthropology is relevant today in as much as a technological civilization and a scientific era are both based on a conception of Man which needs fundamental research.

Philosophy of Science and Technology have all too often taken for granted an image of Man which has been furnished by a mainly western intellectual history, without considering that Indian anthropological assumptions, for instance, may be different. It is the task of the philosopher, as well as the man of politics, to tackle this problem which generally escapes the technician and scientist, for it requires a radical questioning of the very foundations of 'homo faber et technicus.'

III, 8 - Philosophy of Religion has a special relevance, for religions show an intriguing ambivalence, being at once the best but also perhaps the worst feature of Indian culture.

Throwing away the baby with the bathwater is neither philosophical nor efficient. Indian Philosophy has been intrinsically connected with the religious urge of Man; in fact, it has been the intellectual side of religion as it were. Traditional religions may not satisfy us any longer, but an uncritical dismissal of religiousness will not do justice to truth or to Man. Here the inflation is not cured by philosophical poverty.

IV - Philosophical Orthopraxis

IV, 1 - Philosophy is not mere ideology. Philosophy is as much a theoretical activity as it is pregnant with action. The function of Philosophy consists not in justifying any given state of affairs, but in enhancing Man's awareness and by this act improving reality itself.

Radical criticism is a feature of any authentic philosophy. Philosophy questions itself and is ready to make a total self-sacrifice for the sake of the philosophical activity. The critical self-reflection of Indian Philosophy should be free from a priori attitudes of defense or attack. Indian philosophers are willy-nilly caught up in the crossing of philosophical currents which conditions their own philosophizing.

IV, 2 - Indian Philosophy will be relevant if Indian philosophers are authentic philosophers : i. e., (a) if we feel the excruciating problems of our times on an ultimate level; (b) if we suffer the human condition of our people; (c) if we think through the problems in order to clarify them; and (d) if we struggle to find ways of solving them.

Philosophy is more than a non-committal brooding on safe issues and also much more than an uncritical plunge into action. It is more than just teaching and also more than simple involvement. In a word, Indian Philosophy will be relevant if it is truly philosophy - and not just a regurgitation of past 'glories'.

The main task of philosophers is not to 'teach' a discipline called 'philosophy', but to live it, to spread it just as the ~~ris~~ spread the sacrifice. Philosophers should not constitute a sort of closed and self-perpetuating body which is maintained in existence solely for the sake of its own preservation.

IV, 3 - Philosophy today-and Indian philosophy is no exception-has to be cross-cultural.

The very ground of philosophical speculation today is cross-cultural. Indian philosophy has to meet this challenge not by hiding behind an impregnable bulwark, but by allowing itself to be thrown as a seed into the soil of the contemporary world.

Cross-cultural Philosophy does not mean comparative philosophy if by the latter term one understands the comparison of Philosophies. Philosophy does not deal with 'philosophy' or 'Philosophies' but with reality, and with all the means that Man has at his disposal on the ultimate level of understanding.

Cross-cultural Philosophy implies the awareness that both the ground or starting point of philosophical speculation and its results,

answers or clarifications spring from and are addressed to a cross-cultural man situation. Our human predicament is today, generally speaking, a more or less confused mingling of cultures and the interaction of many world-views and life-styles. It belongs precisely to Philosophical awareness to create certain order in the present-day mingled state of affairs. Cross-cultural Philosophy is thus both an exigency and an aim.

Cross-cultural Philosophy assumes that there is no neutral platform from which one can casually philosophize. The cross-cultural approach studies philosophical problems in the light of more than one philosophical tradition, trying to integrate the immense variety and riches of the human experience. A new kind of hermeneutics is required here : morphological and diadronical hermeneutics are not sufficient. Diatopical hermeneutics is needed, not as a substitute for the other two, but to complement them.

IV, 4 - Indian philosophers today could be exceptionally well equipped to play leading role in India and in the world. They can have a first hand experience of (a) classical Indian culture, (b) western civilization (and non-western cultures), and (c) modernity.

This exceptional socio-historical possibility entails the exceptional danger of schizophrenia of defensive caste-isolationism. Syntheses are as barren and pernicious as attitudes deemed self-sufficient, which lead to arrogant withdrawals. Philosophy today cannot be fruitfully cultivated in isolation, nor-obviously-in superficial relations.

(a) Classical Indian Philosophy may have to undergo a painful and fundamental transformation, but it has not yet spoken its last word. On the contrary, all the evidence leads one to suspect that its role will become increasingly crucial if it remains loyal to its genius. Indian Philosophy is not a racist concept; rather, philosophers steeped in the still-living Indian tradition are exceptionally fit to imbibe a spirit which implies more than general ideas or abstract principles.

(b) The many centuries of more or less happy symbiosis between India and the West also account for the fact that what goes under the vague heading of 'western philosophy' is in no way foreign to the cultural climate of India - although one might

wish that Spanish, Dutch, Portuguese and French elements could have had a greater philosophical impact in order to complement the more predominant Anglo-Saxon influence. Goa and Pondicherry could have become philosophical symbols if only they had not been polarized into exclusively political issues.

(c) Modernity today can no longer be equated with one particular culture, despite its notably 'western' connotations. The philosopher in modern India, like anyone else, bears the excruciating burden of finding his way in the present day situation. We are certainly all at a crossroads.

IV, 5 – The revitalization of Philosophy, and thus of Indian Philosophy as well, depends to a great extent on the dialogical dialogue to provide the proper mode of philosophizing. The dialectical dialogue is not sufficient.

The clarification of existentially decisive issues cannot be entrusted to a merely dialectical interplay, which assumes that the epistemic principle of non-contradiction also has a supreme ontological value and thus is the only possible basis for deciding the validity of a philosophical intuition.

Dialectics are a fundamental philosophical method, and something which contravenes the principle of non-contradiction cannot seriously claim philosophical validity. But dialectics are not enough for the present philosophical situation.

The dialogical dialogue does not substitute for but complements dialectics. It is based not on a common confidence in the neutral field of logical dialectics, but on a genuine mutual trust in the other, i. e. on the fact that the other is a source of understanding and of original perspective, just as I am, and that in consequence he/she not only merits human respect, but philosophical attention as well, even if I do not exactly understand his/her opinions. The dialogical dialogue is a real 'going through the logos' (*dia ton logon*) so as to overcome—not deny—the logos by piercing through it and reaching that other sphere of human experience which only confidence in the other, qua other, can make possible. In the dialogical dialogue, I open myself to the other so that my partner may discover my myths, my underlying assumptions and criticize the very foundations of my convictions; and vice-versa, of course. The dialogical dialogue

does not stop when we reach a logical impasse or when I convince the partner of contradiction; at this point the dialogue looks for another way to proceed further and deeper, and does not cease until we have reached a common myth on which we may both rest, because neither questions it. The common ground here is not the logical arena, but the total human reality. The dialogical dialogue implies, obviously, the belief that I am not selfsufficient in constructing a complete picture of reality and that the other can offer a fundamental contribution (and not only a minor correction to my, by then frozen, convictions). This is why the dialogical dialogue opens us up for radically new vistas. The real dialogue is neither what I say or what my partner adds, but what happens in the dialogue itself; something about which neither I nor the other party has any previous knowledge.

This is why the dialogical dialogue is risky. It cannot be pre-planned, nor can we determine its results. I may be convinced or change my opinions or a new awareness may emerge. In any case the rules of the dialogue are not presupposed a priori or dictated by one of the parties. Today Indian Philosophy can have a creative encounter with the other philosophical world-views, which are alive even in the very soil of India, only by means of such an authentic dialogical dialogue.

V-Practical Suggestions

V, 1 - Everything depends on the conviction that philosophical activity is of the utmost importance and that the time, attention and money given to it are not superfluous luxuries.

Philosophies often have an inferiority complex, which creates a pernicious feed-back feeding a vicious circle: the bigger the complex, the greater the actual sociological inferiority of philosophy. Philosophy considers itself of little importance in the actual situation of India and this very belief is at least partly, the cause of its meagre importance and minor impact.

V, 2 - The nature of our problem is fundamental and so calls for radical measures. Minor adjustment may prove to be counter-effective and merely prolong a status quo which needs to change fundamentally.

Radical change does not mean hurried and improvised reforms; but the experience of the last 25 years of Indian University life should be a warning and a challenge. We cannot perpetuate a system which corresponds neither to the vital needs of the people nor to the very nature of Philosophy. The implementation should be progressive and prudent, and the plan thorough and far-reaching. Philosophical thinking is always bold and radical; courage and imagination are also philosophical virtues. It is not a question of giving lustre to a once glorious philosophical past but of making Philosophy in India what it should and could be: a school, a place of real wisdom which serves to emancipate the human being from the bondage of ignorance which besets Man - to use a particular traditional language, although not necessarily in its traditional sense.

V, 3 - The post renaissance western notion of 'Philosophy' as a discipline among other disciplines should be superseded. Authentic Philosophy permeates all spheres of academic as well as of human life in an ontonomic way.

This is such a radical suggestion that we may not be prepared to implement it, but it could at least, be studied. The first step would be to create chairs or prescribe 'papers' of Philosophy in all faculties and institutions of learning. One could begin with the 'higher learning' and then proceed to other more 'elementary' schools. This would also have the effect of creating more 'jobs' for philosophers, thus hopefully enhancing both the number and the quality of the students attracted to professional cultivation of philosophy. Schools of Engineering, Medicine, Law, Technology, etc. should all teach Philosophy in an adequate manner. The traditional 'Studium generale' of the classical Universities and the requirements on 'General Knowledge' could provide a model which, however, should be improved.

Instead of the *autonomic* reaction of the particular sciences against the *heteronomic* dominance of Philosophy and Theology, which was the pattern in the past, a more balanced and harmonious *ontonomic* relationship is required.

Most of the modern disciplines and sciences are off-shoots of western philosophy; they are not children of the traditional Indian darshans. This fact both facilitates and makes more difficult the integrating task of Indian Philosophy. It facilitates the task, because

of the absence of historical resentments and cultural misunderstandings. It makes the task more difficult because the synthesis, which should remain open, has to be freshly created.

To provide an open, but coherent and comprehensive world-picture, to offer a universal frame of reference, still remains one of the most important tasks of Philosophy. This task cannot be left to a few specialists and much less to sociology. The dialogical dialogue mentioned above is not restricted to 'philosophers' or 'philosophies' alone, but involves all branches of human activity.

V, 4 - Besides Chairs of Philosophy in all Faculties, special Chairs in the Philosophy of each Faculty should be created.

The students of the different faculties should have a general knowledge of Philosophy, as proposed in 5 V, 3- This need could be met by instituting Chairs of Philosophy in the different Faculties. As an intermediary step one could institute compulsory papers on Philosophy for the students of all Faculties under the responsibility of the Department of Philosophy.

Besides this, special emphasis should be laid on the intellectual unity of a particular Faculty and its integration into the general pattern not only of knowledge, but also of life. Medicos, lawyers, historians and engineers, to give just a few examples, should have not only a general knowledge of the philosophical problems of our times, but also be conversant with the anthropological and philosophical foundations of their respective disciplines. A general theory of medical sciences, which by definition can only be philosophical, is as necessary as mastering particular medical technique. Philosophy is not only cross-cultural, it is also essentially interdisciplinary.

Not only is accurate preparation of the curricula and syllabi needed; the personnel and problems themselves must be prepared, for we are entering here an extremely important new area. For once Philosophy in India could take the lead!

V, 5 - The title of Ph. D. should be upgraded so that it becomes an exceptional qualification.

A new degree could be created if the 'old' Ph. D. were still to be required. One cause of the low esteem in which Philosophy in India today is held, is the generally poor quality of University students and consequently of staff (brilliant exceptions notwith-

standing). This can only be remedied by revalorizing the title and then the philosophical course of study of Philosophy.

V, 6 - The creation of an All-India Institute or Academy of Philosophy.

The example of other countries may be stimulating and enlightening. India has first class national institutions for Arts and Sciences, Law and Medicine, but in spite of the Indian philosophical tradition she does not have a corresponding Indian Academy of Philosophy, which could enjoy a consultative status to different bodies of the Country, including the State. Parenthetically one might add that some genuinely philosophical thinking would do no harm to the studies and disquisitions of the Supreme Court and other Higher Courts of Law. Is India not running too much in the wake of classical foreign models, despite the fact that elsewhere these very institutions are now being considered in need of radical reforms?

For far too long, and after the sciences have already overcome this stage, philosophers continue to believe that philosophical speculation is a highly individualistic affair. This does not need to be the case. To be sure, the genius is always an exception and cannot be foreseen or produced, and certainly thinking requires solitude and concentration (as in the sciences as well), but this does not exclude the communitarian and collaborating character of Philosophy. The many traditional schools of the past witness that a proper climate, a tradition, and a two way communication are required.

The function of such an Academy could be to encourage 'team work' and common reflection on fundamental issues as well as to coordinate philosophical activities at the highest level. It should not become a 'think-tank' in the service of vested interests or political power, but should embody the philosophical awareness of the people and should contribute to enhancing the quality of the spiritual and intellectual life of the community.

V: 7 - Emphasis should be given to the areas of special relevance and to cross-cultural studies, also providing more or less institutionalized opportunities for fruitful philosophical dialogues and interactions.

Without encroaching upon philosophical freedom, ways of fostering these above-mentioned goals could be found : Prizes, Seminars, Summer-schools, guidelines for Ph. D. theses, etc. These activities go beyond the competence of Departments of Philosophy which in any case should not have a monopoly on the cultivation of Philosophy.

V. 8 - Indian philosophers could take the lead in promoting the publication of a History of Philosophy on a human scale which would overcome national and cultural, as well as religious boundaries.

The " History of Philosophy, East and West " edited by S. Radhakrishnan could serve as an example here. This project should not be a mere juxtaposition of essays, nor follow historical and geographical divisions but cut across times and places, and present the main philosophical problems as they have been seen, suffered and solved by the human race across all boundaries. Being in itself a difficult philosophical task this very activity could help create the organ to realize it. Needless to say, the project, although directed from somewhere, should be truly universal and not only Indian, in collaboration perhaps with UNESCO.

V. 9 - A Handbook of Fundamental Terms of Indian Tradition could help to give consciousness, identity and perspective to the bewildering variety and richness of the philosophies of India.

For two years the present writer has conducted a feasibility study on this matter, which has since been shelved until a proper agency would take the financial and administrative burden, and would be glad to provide further details on this point.

V. 10 - Today many responsible thinkers of the world are searching for an alternative to modern culture. Indian Philosophy should enter this quest and see whether it can contribute to the discovery of a viable alternative. A common project could be set up.

The present writer has presented a draft to UNESCO calling for a symposium involving the different philosophies of the world in order to agree on the diagnosis before proceeding to the therapy.

and would be honored to give details of his proposal.

VI - Some Axioms

- VI, 1 - The vitality of Indian Philosophy today depends on the vitality of today's Indian philosophers.
- VI, 2 - The vitality of Indian philosophers today depends on their taking seriously their role as thinkers in a global context.
- VI, 3 - The effectiveness of their thinking will depend on such factors as : (a) how deeply they are rooted in the Indian tradition; (b) how well they are at home in western culture; (c) how sincerely they are engaged in the modern struggle for a humane world.

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CONTEMPORARY REACTION TO ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY: SOME REFLECTIONS

I

The main purpose of the present paper is descriptive rather than critical. The description is incomplete, as it has to be; but it is, I hope, representative. In sum, the finding is that especially during the recent years there has been a counteraction to what is roughly known as analytic philosophy: there has been a rather powerful drift towards synthesis without, of course, denying the importance of analysis; and yet the envisaged synthetic philosophy (or synoptic metaphysics) cannot be said to have *fully* demonstrated its plausibility or illuminative value.

The subject, however, cannot even begin to be discussed until the meanings of the crucial words in its title are sufficiently specified. Let us, then, begin with the word 'analytic.' What is analytic philosophy? Which philosophers are analytic philosophers? Was Russell, for example, an analytic philosopher? But he gave us a kind of metaphysics as well: his neutral monism is almost notorious. Again, notice that J. O. Urmson, in his well-known book, *Philosophical Analysis*,¹ concludes with a reference to what he calls "a decisive break" — i.e., a break between Russell's mode of analysis and the later developments after the end of 1930's. What all these suggest is that analytic philosophy, as so called, does not embody a single, unambiguous kind of philosophizing. Since its inception, mainly with Russell and Moore, it has assumed various forms, not even applying precisely one, single method, i.e., the method of *analysis*. Let us, therefore, take a brief glance at its geography and recent history.

Philosophy has always been partly analytic. Plato analyzed — so did Aristotle and numerous others. Still, by analytic philosophy is generally understood (as will be understood here) a kind of philosophy which has developed, roughly, since the beginning of the third decade of the pre-

sent century, having its hey-day during 1930's with the advent of logical positivism. With Russell and his logical atomism, it aimed at *reducing* complex and less ultimate facts to simple and more ultimate ones — at discovering the logically ultimate simples that constitute the real world. But his method of reductive analysis was later criticised and abandoned by those who have come to be called "ordinary language philosophers," such as Ryle, Wisdom, Wittgenstein and J. L. Austin. With them and their more recent followers, philosophy has come to be a matter of *elucidation*, rather than analysis. Only, the old epithet "analytic" has continued to be applied to these later and relatively recent developments, although the analytic procedure, as previously conceived, has become very essentially transformed.

The result is that the term "analytic philosophy" can no longer be used without a distinction between its wide and narrow senses. In its narrow sense, analytic philosophy aims merely at unpacking conceptual or linguistic complexes, or reducing such complexes into their ultimate, simple components. It presupposes the existence of relatively unclear "complexes," and its objective is to *analyze out* relatively concealed meanings. In the wider sense, analytic philosophy is this and something else besides (but nothing more): it wants to *elucidate* the use of a linguistic expression by *whatever* adequate procedure, and the aim is not to discover structures of complex facts, but to dissolve conceptual puzzles and guard people from being misled by language.

Analytic philosophy is being taken here in this sense, and by 'contemporary' is being meant roughly the period after 1950, which was harbingered by the publication of Prof. H. H. Price's paper, "Clarity is not Enough," in 1945.³ Analytic philosophy (i.e. twentieth century analytic philosophy) has never been without challengers — rather mighty challengers such as Stace, Blanshard and Ewing. But Prof. Price's article perhaps gives the most typical ex-

pression to this challenge and, therefore, it seems legitimate to treat it as the first clear signal to the reverse current.

There is, of course, a still wider sense in which the term 'analytic philosophy' may be taken. In this wider sense these challengers as well are analytic philosophers. Any philosopher, in this wider sense, is an analytic philosopher, provided he is interested in analysis (taken in *its* wider sense) and applies the analytic techniques. Russell and Moore are, of course, analytic philosophers in this broad sense. But in the moderately wide sense (the second of the senses explained above) in which the term is being taken here, even these two giants of analysis cannot be called by that name. What, then, makes all the difference?

In the moderately wide sense, an analytic philosopher believes in the following four theses:

- (1) Analysis or elucidation is a theoretically useful and essential activity.
- (2) Analysis or elucidation (either linguistic or non-linguistic) is the *sole* function of philosophy.
- (3) Metaphysics (either immanent or transcendent) is futile or simply meaningless.
- (4) Philosophy has no concern with the so-called problems of life and is not to make normative pronouncements. (A philosopher need not be a "wise man.")

Now, a philosopher like Russell accepts only the first of these four theses, rejecting all the rest, either in principle or in practice. He is, therefore, not an analytic philosopher in this moderately wide sense. The same or much the same is true of H. H. Price, C. D. Broad and numerous others. In other words, they all accept the first thesis, but rejects some or all of the remaining theses. Let us then consider their reaction to these different theses in some details.

II

Critics of analytic philosophy have sometimes given a frank and clear expression to their deep appreciation of the

merits of analysis. Thus, H. H. Price, in his paper referred to above, develop a rather elaborate defence against what he considers to be inelegant attacks on 'analytic philosophy'. He considers analysis to be an absolutely necessary part of the philosopher's occupation, stamps its long history as honourable, and remarks that its history is worthy of being studied for its own sake as one of the monuments of human genius.

Again, Blanshard observes that, in spite of its grave short-comings, the analytic movement has led to "genuine gains." It has lifted philosophy to an unforeseen level of definitiveness, clarity, carefulness and precision; it has made philosophical writing more simple and lucid, and brought philosophy and science together, to the advantage of the former. And, finally, he remarks:

"The new movement has stung him [Englishman], bewildered him, flouted him, angered him, made him thrash out at it in desperate, frustrated indignation. But it has also chastened him. He will find, I hope and expect, that all this whetting of knives has been in his service. It has at least given him a weapon of very sharp edge which, if he knows how to use it, will win him even more honourable trophies than those that are now on his walls."⁴

This, as it appears, has been well said. The merits of analysis or clarification should be obvious to any serious-minded thinker, whatever other affiliations he may or may not have. The first thesis of analytic philosophers is, therefore, beyond question.

But is analysis the *sole* function of philosophy? This brings us to the second thesis, and to all the strictures that have fallen even from such sympathetic critics as already quoted. Thus, Prof. Price, who has had so much to say in defence of analysis and clarification, observes:

"I think that clarification is a part of the philosopher's task; an indispensable part moreover, and one which he must be allowed to fulfil by whatever methods. . . . But I do

not think that it is the whole of his task. And certainly clarification is not all that the educated public demands of him."⁵

In the same vein C. D. Broad observes that "I do not think the analysis of propositions of various important kinds is the *whole* business of philosophy."⁶ Referring to what is called the therapeutic view of philosophy, he trenchantly remarks:

"It is not for me to judge whether it is altogether *prudent* for professional philosophers thus publicly to proclaim that their business is to take in and wash each other's dirty linen. Nor will I speculate on how long an impoverished community, such as contemporary England, will continue to pay salaries to individuals whose only function, on their own showing, is to cure a disease which they catch from each other and impart to their pupils."⁷

Quotations of this kind could be multiplied, but they need not be. It should be enough to notice that, among contemporary philosophers, it is far from being a general position that analysis or elucidation is the sole function of philosophers. With the onward march of analytic philosophy there has always been, in Passmore's language, "recalcitrant metaphysicians" such as Whitehead, Collingwood, Ewing, Cassirer, W. M. Urban, and even Russell and Moore themselves. Long ago, in his Morley College lectures during 1910-11, Moore stated that the first problem of philosophy, as generally practised, is the problem of giving a general description of the universe as a whole; and it appears that, in spite of his intense analytic occupation, he has never disowned this as a philosopher's task.

Again, in *My Philosophical Development*, one of his latest works, Russell, while defending analysis (i.e., reductive analysis) against its critics like J. O. Urmson, rather violently reacts to the model of philosophizing based on the later Wittgenstein. One would feel tempted to quote some of his strictures:

"I do not for one moment believe that the doctrine [i.e., Wittgenstein's doctrine concerning the function of philosophy] which has these lazy consequences is true. I realize, however, that I have an overpoweringly strong bias against it, for, if it were true, philosophy is, at best, a slight help to lexicographers, and at worst, an idle tea-table amusement."⁸

He observes that his most serious objection to the new philosophy (i.e., analytic philosophy) is that it has abandoned the grave and important task of *understanding* the world. He then remarks:

"I cannot feel that the new philosophy is carrying on this tradition. It seems to concern itself, not with the world and our relation to it, but only with the different ways in which silly people can say silly things. If this is all that philosophy has to offer, I cannot think that it is a worthy subject of study."⁹

As further symptoms of a rather wide-spread dissatisfaction, in the west, with clarificatory restrictions on the scope of philosophy, one could also mention the publication of certain key-books or series of books on metaphysics and, more generally (in the words of A. C. Ewing), on "non-linguistic philosophy." The Prentice-Hall series, for example, which is by no means restricted to linguistic philosophy, includes a volume entitled "Metaphysics," whose author contends that metaphysical problems are fundamental, so that the other branches of philosophy, directly or indirectly, bear upon them. "This suggests," he remarks, "contrary to what is widely assumed, that metaphysics is a foundation of philosophy, not its capstone." W. H. Walsh's book,¹⁰ bearing the same title, puts forward an elaborate defence of what he calls immanent metaphysics, in spite of its recognition of the great merits of analysis.

To take one more interesting example, Prof. J. J. C. Smart of the University of Adelaide, Australia, intends his book, *Philosophy and Scientific Realism*, "as an essay in synthetic philosophy, as the adumbration of a coherent and

scientifically plausible world-view."¹¹ In opposition to what he calls "the prevailing conception of philosophy,"¹² he believes that, as philosophers, we can and ought to think not only *clearly* but also *comprehensively*, and suggests that part of the philosopher's task is the attempt to acquire a synoptic view of the world."¹³ Candidly he remarks:

"That philosophy is at least the elimination of nonsense and the clarification of thought is something of which I have not the least doubt. However, I should also wish to argue that philosophy is more than this, and that it is the business of the philosopher to decide between various synoptic hypotheses on grounds of plausibility."¹⁴

Again, in another of his works, he not only develops theories in what might be called scientific metaphysics, but tries to make out a case for the plausibility of this kind of philosophy, adding that "to see the world not as a physicist or chemist or biologist or psychologist but as a complete whole is surely something which is worth doing for its own sake."¹⁵ As against W. H. Watson's (Wittgensteinian) criticisms of synthetic philosophy, he contends that it is not only not-too-sensible but even partially wrong to say that such a philosophy "decides nothing," and also that a philosophical synopsis of scientific facts is not nonsense just because it is above the barely scientific level.

This, however, virtually covers up even the *third* of the analytic philosopher's common theses. In other words, this shows that there has always been some opposition, more or less strong, against the analytic philosopher's opposition to metaphysics and, more generally, to non-linguistic philosophy. As late as 1956 Friedrich Waismann, once a member of the Vienna Circle, remarked: "To say that metaphysics is nonsense is nonsense."¹⁶ With the wide-spread rejection of the verifiability theory of meaning, this trend seems to have become palpably strong during the current years. In a recent work on the philosophy of language,¹⁷ it has been argued that 'meaningful' is a vague term and should not be restricted within empirical verifiability; which suggests that

the verification principle is not necessarily a fatal threat to metaphysics.

We may now come to the last thesis of analytic philosophers. Since Wittgenstein bade good-bye to ethics in his *Tractatus*, normative ethics largely fell out of fashion. Normative ethics, it was supposed, is essentially a matter of preaching, and as Schlick put it, for a philosopher "there is no greater danger than to change from a philosopher into a moralist, from an investigator into a preacher."¹⁸ Ayer divided "ethical contents" into four different kinds, and remarked that ethical philosophy comprises only the first of them, i.e., propositions which express definitions of ethical terms, or judgments about the legitimacy or possibility of certain definitions." "A strictly philosophical treatise on ethics should therefore make no ethical pronouncements."¹⁹ The changed situation can well be understood from a study of the books and articles recently published on ethical problems, as well as the courses offered particularly in Great Britain and America. Ethical writers, in general, have inculcated the kind of detachment in favour of which C. L. Stevenson spoke in the opening page of his well-known book, *Ethics and Language*.²⁰ It is a detachment from all normative and evaluative questions and, through that, from all questions which constitute what is called the philosophy of life.

But this attitude has also not gone unchallenged, even in the land of its origin. Thus, in the Introduction to *Value and Obligation* (edited by him) R. B. Brandt divides ethical problems into *normative* and *metaethical*, and very candidly observes: "A study of the problems of ethical theory naturally must include the problems both of normative ethical theory and of metaethics."²¹ And his anthology shows that he meant business. To take another slab of evidence, the Macmillan series on the Sources in Philosophy includes a volume, published in 1965, which assimilates materials from such traditional figures as Plato and Rousseau. In the Introduction, the editor rather insists that the task of ethics is, inter

alia, to show the grounds of reasonable choice in relation to happiness and to decide what ought to be done.

This challenge is perhaps best articulated by Prof. Henry Veatch who, referring to the detachment which Stevenson advocates, rather passionately questions the propriety of that detachment:

"Still one wonders whether, when the house is burning or the ship sinking, detachment is quite the proper attitude. ... As a professor, one may relish controversy with other professors; as a teacher, one may needle and cajole one's students; but as a human being one feels a responsibility to engage in frank and open discussion with other human beings about those moral and ethical questions that have plagued the thoughtful men of all ages."²²

He warns that the theory that he is going to present in his book may involve "a plea for some special code of ethics" (his quotation marks), but, so he thinks, a special plea is not necessarily special pleading, and, therefore, his book rightly professes to be "through and through a book of philosophy."²³

In fine, a curious reference may also be made to some of the standard introductory works on philosophy, currently published, which have consciously taken liberties with all but the first thesis of analytic philosophers. Apart from such works as *A Modern Introduction to Metaphysics* edited by D. A. Drennen²⁴ and *Introduction to Philosophy* edited by Arthur Smullyan and others,²⁵ I would specially mention two: John Hospers's *An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis* (Rev. ed., 1967),²⁶ and *A Modern Introduction to Philosophy* edited by Paul Edwards and Arthur Pap.²⁷ Among these writers, who are known more for their original contributions than their text-books, Prof. Hospers does not hesitate very much in including discussions on metaphysics and normative ethics, while the other two, in preparing a "modern" introduction to philosophy, have not chosen to accommodate analytic philosophers alone, their only consideration in selecting contemporary material being

"clarity and intelligibility of the writer's language, the importance of his ideas" etc. They (these two) indeed do not believe that any definition of philosophy can be wholly unbiased, and yet proceed to define philosophy in as unbiased terms as possible, so that extra-analytic problems also can be comprised within its scope. Of course, the reference to such introductory works derives its significance not so much from what views these philosophers explicitly hold regarding the scope of philosophy as from how they have actually planned their works.

III

This, however, is all about the west.²⁸ What is the situation in the east? As it seems, the picture here is comparatively simple. The philosophical tradition in the east is generally marked by speculation, spiritualism and a concern with salvation. These metaphysical and practical moorings, generally speaking, are still almost as forceful in eastern philosophy as in earlier times. Chinese philosophy, with its great Confucianism, Taoism and Neo-Confucianism, has ended up with Marxism, and Japanese philosophy, in spite of its late contact with western thought, has substantially remained the same as it was many generations ago.

More than two decades back Prof. D. T. Suzuki, renowned Buddhologist of Japan, wrote:

"We can thus state that the *kannagara*²⁹ summarizes Japanese thought. The Japanese mind ever since its awakening to reflection has been under the influence of foreign culture, Confucian, Taoist, and Buddhist, and recently the Western mode of thinking has found its way here, the scholars are now endeavouring to unfold what is essentially Japanese by adopting Western methodology. At the same time most young men these days are so taken up by Western thought, and those who read recent Japanese humanistic literature will find there every possible shadow of the West. But in spite of all these foreign accretions, what flows deeply underneath is this Japanese thought and feeling of the *kannagara*, which will always

assert itself in one way or another whatever its superficial coatings may be."³⁰

I think that, in spite of a greater impact of western thought, especially of Marxism and analytic philosophy, on Japan since that time, this summarization of Japanese thought is still, in substance, correct. By virtue of her general non-intellectualistic temperament Tokyo is, presumably, still very unlike Vienna.

As for the Indo-Pak-Bangladesh subcontinent, one could surmise the situation as something most typically and also most powerfully representing the general philosophical heritage in the east. In respect of epistemic attitude and regard for tradition, it resembles continental Europe much more than Great Britain and North America. As we all know, people here are relatively conservative, and naturally lag behind. As it appears, philosophers here are only beginning to feel the impact of the western analytic movement, and the story may be summarized by saying that they, in general, do not accept any of the four theses mentioned earlier with apparently some partial reservation for the first. Metaphysics of the transcendent variety has been and still is rampant in this area, and philosophy is still, almost as before, conceived and professed as something tightly wedded to life, particularly to the problem of good life and salvation.

Quite long ago the late Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, the best-known contemporary Indian philosopher, expressed his dissatisfaction with what he termed "the pious sophistries or the sacrosanct hair-splittings"³¹ of professional philosophers, and later remarked in another of his well-known works: "Philosophy is understanding, contemplation, insight, and a philosopher can find no rest until he gains a view or vision of the world of things and persons which will enable him to interpret the manifold experiences as expressive, in some sort, of a purpose."³² Nay, the same spirit is re-expressed in the fact that the *History of Philosophy Eastern and Western* published under his editorial chairmanship was intended as something "that may serve as a release

at a time when philosophy is becoming restricted in scope and limited to logical and linguistic analysis."³³

As late as 1957 a scholar of Indian philosophy observed: "In the Orient, philosophic wisdom does not come under the head of general information. It is a specialized learning directed to the attainment of a higher state of being."³⁴ This is as much true of Bangladesh as of India, and numerous utterances of the philosophers of both countries could be quoted to substantiate it. To take only one example from Bangladesh, the late Dr. G. C. Dev, former Chairman of the Department of Philosophy, Dacca University, and a dedicated exponent of idealism, once candidly remarked: "From my life-long endeavour to connect myself intimately with philosophy I have come to the realization of this truth that any fruitful philosophy is philosophy of life. Philosophy, therefore, is only a synonym of the philosophy of life."³⁵ He reiterated the same or much the same thing in many other places of his works,³⁶ and he seems to have been followed by so many that the identification of philosophy and philosophy of life, accompanied by a sort of distaste or even contempt for logical rigour and analytic circumspection, may be said to have become something of a fashion in this area.

Back in 1936, when logical positivism was already playing havoc with traditional speculative philosophy in Europe, *Contemporary Indian Philosophy* appeared with the philosophical views of twenty-four leading thinkers of this sub-continent. These views, in many of which something had been said about the nature and value of philosophy, clearly indicate an anti-analytic trend. This, however, had its most systematic expression in the words of D. M. Datta who pointed out what he called "three undesirable tendencies" in modern western philosophy, viz., its anti-metaphysical tendency, its questioning the rationality of a comprehensive view of the universe as a whole, and its divorce from practical life. He no doubt admitted the great usefulness of analysis because without analysing facts and ideas and particularly the meanings of words "we cannot arrive at any precise and accurate conclusion." "But," he then remarked,

"it is going too far to suggest that analysis is the only or the main business of philosophy." It may be observed, in a nutshell, without producing further specific evidence, that this position is still typical of the *general* currents in Indian thought.

IV

This brief survey of the situation in contemporary philosophy, however, suggests that, insofar as the merits of analysis are concerned, hardly any comments are called for. Both parties join hands on this front. But could we say, following Wisdom, that to philosophize is always to analyze? Clarity, indeed, is what philosophy primarily aims at (except in the philosophy of life, in the broad sense of the term); but, as Prof. Price demands, clarity may be either synoptic or analytic, and both may be essential to a complete intellectual satisfaction. We shall demand analytic clarity in the case of individual concepts or individual verbal expressions; but it *seems* true that any area of experience will remain ultimately unclear unless the *whole* is put together and a synoptic insight into the whole is attempted. This seems even truer in the case of the totality (i.e., the largest possible totality) of experiences. We want not merely to analyse the world but to *understand* it. But sciences give us only partial pictures, and it is traditionally the business of philosophers to build up an integrated, comprehensive view out of these rudiments. If this is metaphysics, something of this sort seems to be a basic demand of our intellectual frame.

Price tacitly distinguishes between two types of speculative metaphysics: (a) the undesirable type which aims "to establish conclusions about matters of fact by means of purely *a priori* premises";³⁸ (b) the desirable type which wants "to produce a conceptual scheme under which all the known types of empirical facts may be systematically arranged."³⁹ He compares the latter to a kind of map, and contends that its function is not to furnish *key-information* about matters of fact, but only to device a conceptual scheme

which brings out certain systematic relationships between them.⁴⁰ It seems that interest in metaphysics of this kind, and perhaps only of this kind, is both natural and reasonable, and at least one thing that the analytic movement has achieved is that there will probably be no going back (or, at least no *unhesitant* going back) to the too imaginative speculations about the transcendent, the supersensible or the so-called unknowable.

It is palpably in the air that the days of logical positivism are long past. But even if it be a fact that the verifiability principle does not succeed in demonstrating the meaninglessness of metaphysics, that itself does not show that transcendent metaphysics is meaningful. Logical positivism seems to have a deep-seated point, but it gets lost in positivism's peculiar approach to the issue. It seems that the problem of meaning should be approached, not by asking which statements are verifiable, but by asking how meanings are actually assigned to particular symbols. It seems correct to say that *basic* symbols are assigned (or spontaneously acquire) meanings through instantiation of their respective uses; but, if so, a sentence turns out to be meaningless if it contains any symbol or part of a symbol whose meaning cannot, in principle, be assigned through instantiation of use.

It is also to be noted that the metaphysical concept of transcendence does not, by itself, take us very far, because bare transcendence or absolute "otherness" is conceptually empty. Like existence and non-existence, such concepts as knowability, verifiability, acquaintanceability, and their negatives are not predicates. Nothing can, therefore, be *defined* into them, because the function of a definition (i.e. unostensive definition) is to mention predicates. The so-called reality cannot, therefore, be defined simply in terms of transcendence; we must mention some genuine predicate if we want to say what it is. And once a predicate is mentioned, it would be necessary to *explain* why an entity bearing the predicate should transcend all knowledge. But can any such explanation be given, *in principle*? It might be

argued that it is unknowable or unacquaintanceable precisely because we do not have, and will never have, the appropriate faculty by which it could be known or be acquainted with. But to say this is only another form of saying that it is unknowable or unacquaintanceable, and hence it would not count as the explanation in question.⁴¹

But, however undesirable Price's undesirable metaphysics may be, his desirable metaphysics too is not quite above all suspicion. Price observes that this map-like metaphysics may legitimately assume more than one form, and these different forms are not either true or false, but only either *good* or *bad*, or less good or better.⁴² But if the sentences in synoptic metaphysics are to state *facts*, they have to be either true or false; and if they need not state *facts*, will they really satisfy the "consumers" (the educated public) Price has in mind? Will not such sentences really be a kind of normative utterances? But, if so, will not synoptic metaphysics be unable to *say* anything about the world as it is, and also be faced with the danger of becoming a matter of individual, conceptual choice?

Furthermore, it is also to be considered whether the conceptual scheme, under which all the known types of empirical facts are to be arranged, will be anything like an empirical, scientific hypothesis. If it is, such metaphysics will be something like a super-science. But it is odd to believe that a super-science is not liable to be either true or false. If, on the contrary, it is nothing like a science, it is hard to see how empirical facts can be systematized within it.⁴³

I am not necessarily suggesting that these difficulties cannot be overcome, but only insisting that unless these difficulties are adequately dealt with, this scheme of synoptic metaphysics will not cut much ice. It seems that, keeping in view philosophy's distinction from science, the most fundamental issue in both analytic and non-analytic philosophy is the relationship between philosophy and fact.

There is, however, another front at which non-analytic philosophy will have to fight out its course. This front

is the whole area of normative philosophy — social, political and moral. If philosophy here is to remain distinct not merely from science but also from mere preaching, it must make clear the kind of logic it is applying and the kind of relationship it has with its analytic and synoptic counterparts. In the moral sphere, for example, normative philosophy is supposed to suggest the best code of life. But who or what is the real arbiter in pinning down the *best* code? Is it general happiness, or the Socrates of J. S. Mill as opposed to the pig? Are we here applying discursive logic or only personal intuition? How can a philosopher, in such a situation, preserve his love of "truth" or respect for evidence as apart from individual or universal (human) bias? How, again, is such a code of life to be connected with the metaphysical map-making? Need it be connected at all, in case any attempt at such a connection is likely to result in the best code getting lost in abstruse conceptual wilderness?

These are some of the fundamental matters to be considered, if the contemporary reaction to analytic philosophy is ultimately to maintain its stand and to be really fruitful as philosophy and not as either fancy or sheer sermon.

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NOTES

1. Oxford University Press, 1956.
2. Recall here the distinction between elucidation and analysis in the strict sense.
3. First published in the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Vol. XIX, and later reprinted in *Clarity Is Not Enough*, edited by H. D. Lewis (George Allen, 1963).
4. H. D. Lewis, ed., *Clarity Is Not Enough*, p. 109.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 58.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
8. Russell, *My Philosophical Development*, p. 217.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 230.

10. Hutchinson University Library, London, 1963.
11. *Philosophy and Scientific Realism* (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), p. 1.
12. *Loc. cit.*
13. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
15. *Between Science and Philosophy* (Random House, 1968), p. 13.
16. "How I See Philosophy," *Contemporary British Philosophy* (1956), edited by H. D. Lewis; reprinted in *Logical Positivism* edited by A. J. Ayer, p. 380.
17. W. P. Alston, *The Philosophy of Language* (Prentice-Hall, 1964).
18. Ayer, ed., *Logical Positivism*, p. 247.
19. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic*, p. 103.
20. Yale University Press: New Haven, 1944.
22. Veatch, *Rational Man*, (Indiana University Press), pp. 14, 15.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
24. The Free Press of Glencoe, New York, 1964.
25. Prentice-Hall, New Delhi, 1962.
26. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., USA.
27. The Free Press, New York, 1957, 1965.
28. Affixing Australia, of course.
29. "... the way natural to the gods, or the way of the gods as they are by themselves without being affected by human intellectuality." Radhakrishnan and others, eds., *History of Philosophy Eastern and Western* (George Allen, 1952), p. 605.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 606.
31. *Indian Philosophy* (1926), p. 781.
32. *An Idealist View of Life* (George Allen, 1932), p. 10.
33. *History of Philosophy Eastern and Western*, p. 6.
34. Heinrich Zimmer, *Philosophies of India* (1957), p. 56.
35. G. C. Dev, *Amar Jivan Darshan* (My Philosophy of Life; Dacca, 1961), p. 6-7. My translation.
36. E.g., his *Idealism: A New Defence and a New Application*, pp. 16-17, and *Aspirations of the Common Man*, p. 146.

37. *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, pp. 290-91.
38. *Clarity Is Not Enough*, p. 39.
39. *Loc. cit.*
40. Cf. W. H. Walsh, *Metaphysics*, pp. 177, 181.
41. Probably an epistemic predicament of the Kantian type could alone be successfully put forward in support of the belief in a transcendent reality. The Kantian predicament arises because it necessarily limits human thought to a fixed number of immutable categories which are inescapable and yet ultimately vitiated by contradictions. But one could wonder why at all we would need categories of this very specific variety. This, however, is a point which will not be entered into at the moment.
42. Cf. "And if metaphysical assertions cannot of their nature be set down as strictly true or false, we may all the same want to characterize a set of them as illuminating or the reverse, or to describe them as authentic or spurious." Walsh, *Metaphysics*, p. 183.
43. Notice also Warnock's thought-provoking remarks concerning the feasibility or "attractiveness" of such a conceptual scheme in pp. 144-45 in his little but very useful book *British Philosophy Since 1900* (Oxford University Press, 1958).

ON PERCEPTION

A Brief Philosophical Re-examination of a Modern Interpretation of some Concepts in early Buddhist thought.

Introduction

The *Mahā-hatthipadopama-sutta* in early Buddhist thought attempts an exposition of 'perception' phenomenologically, though in a very primitive sense. Some other suttas follow suit. The central notions in the *Mahā-hatthipadopama-sutta*, in particular gives emphasis to visual perception as against auditory perception, olfactory perception, etc. Concerning 'perception' four necessary and sufficient conditions are noted in this sutta. They are as follows: (i) the internal visual sense organ (the eye) intact; (ii) the external physical object coming into the percipient's range of vision; (iii) sensory impingement and (iv) an appropriate act of awareness on the part of the percipient (this can be referred to as successful perception-occurrence).¹ The condition (ii) above can be made explicit to mean "the coming of the external physical object (which exists independently of the perception of the percipient) within the range of his vision." Without its ontological existence, a perception-occurrence is logically impossible.

The above assertion, we contend, favours a kind of causal theory of perception in a somewhat primitive sense. All causal theories of perception, in whatever forms they appear, take as their central notions the existence of the physical object and the effects it produces. These notions, remotely of course, suggest a causal theory of perception. What is emphasised by the statement "the internal visual sense organ (the eye) intact" is that the eye, which is one of the central sense organs in the human body, plays a central role in producing an effect, viz., veridical or non-veridical perception-occurrence. If one accepts the necessity of a sense organ for effecting 'perception', then the theory which such an acceptance would imply is a causal theory of

perception. We hope to make explicit this point in what follows.

D. J. Kalupahana,² a renowned Buddhist scholar has expressed the view to the effect that a kind of phenomenalism is entailed in early Buddhist thought and seeks to clinch his argument by bringing such modern notions as 'sense-datum,' which came to be introduced in the West recently owing to theoretical speculations in Science and Mathematics. We wish to argue against Kalupahana's contention, impressive though it may be.

Causal theory of perception

A comprehensive version of a causal theory of perception must include the notions of veridical perception and non-veridical perception. As regards veridical perception, the rôles of the sense organs and of causal ancestry and the material object are necessary and sufficient. In non-veridical perception, the role of the physical object (the material object) is inoperative, while those of the sense organs and causal ancestry remain.

With reference to veridical perception, the argument in the suttas in early Buddhist thought can be formulated in this way: Let the percipient be X and the physical object, Y. If it is true that X perceives Y, then by necessity, the following is the case:

- i. there is sensory impingement which is an effect;
- ii. there is an appropriate act of awareness on the part of the percipient; and
- iii. the elements which are causally responsible for this effect are
 - a. the physical object Y and
 - b. the bio-chemical system of X, the percipient.

It is clear now that sensory impingement, an appropriate act of awareness on the part of the percipient and the physical object are equally significant for veridical perception. However, conceptually speaking, "sensory impingement," "awareness," "physical object" and "perception" are the

central concepts that form the conceptual family. If epistemological justification is demanded, the suttas in early Buddhistic thought must provide relevant data to justify the claim that to perceive a physical object Y involves sensory impingement which is causally accounted for by the existence of the physical object Y on the one hand and X the percipient on the other.

Perception and conditions

We shall first attempt an examination of perceptual elements phenomenologically. In the first instance, the point I made about the bio-chemical system of X, the percipient, may be controversial. But, then, the suttas are emphatic about the necessity of "the existence of an internal sense organ intact" as a precondition for perception. The significance of the bio-chemical system of man or X, the percipient, therefore follows. It is this point that introduce new support for our view, namely, that the perceptual reflections in early Buddhism makes explicit a kind of causal theory of perception in a somewhat primitive sense. The following passage in the *Madhupñdikāsutta* strengthens the above contention: "Visual consciousness arises because of (the) eye and (because of) material shapes, (and) the meeting of the three (that is to say, visual consciousness, the eye and material shapes) in sensory impingement (on each other); what one feels one perceives, what one perceives one reasons about*" In this passage, the words *eye* and *one* (one-self or one's bio-chemical system) are noted, and, if "an appropriate act of awareness on the part of the percipient" is emphasized with regard to perception, then, phenomenologically, some form of a causal theory of perception is strongly suggested, the reason being that the necessity for sensory impingement on the one hand and the bio-chemical system of man on the other is accorded recognition. The contribution by the bio-chemical system and the material object towards effecting perception-occurrence is enough to enrich a causal connection.

* The items in brackets are introduced into the English translation in order to make the sense of the original absolutely clear.

Veridical perception as noted in these suttas, if it is broken down, may be seen to involve the following: (i) From a phenomenological point of view, sensory impingement, awareness and perception; and (ii) from an ontological point of view, the bio-chemical system with its sense organs and the physical object. A set of significant differences are made explicit here between "sensory impingement," and "awareness" on the one hand and "awareness" and "perception" on the other. This dual difference is a cardinal feature of any *causal theory of perception*. For, "sensory impingement," "awareness" and "perception" are but *caused*. To put it still more explicitly, "perception" ("veridical perception") is an effect which should be understood causally in relation to "sensory impingement" and "awareness." Alternatively, "perception" cannot be understood by reference to sensory impingement and sense data in the sense understood in contemporary sense-data philosophy, which advocates a kind of phenomenalism, the reason being the central emphasis given to *causation* in early Buddhism. We have already seen how it brings forward sensory impingement and perception phenomenologically. It primitively suggests a causal theory of perception as against any kind of phenomenalism.

This point is strengthened a very great deal by the emphasis on the ontological phenomenon, "material shape." For instance, the *Mahā-hatthipadopama-sutta* says, "Visual consciousness arises because of (the) eye and (because of) material shapes." D. J. Kalupahana, however, expresses a basically different view. He says, "The so-called primary existents represented by earth (*paṭhavi*), etc. are nothing but sense data. Hence, earth, for example, is defined as grossness (*kakkhālātā*). On the other hand, there are specific statements that knowledge of the external world is based on experience (*vedanā*), and that this experience is dependent on contact with sense data (*phassa*). Hence, any theory about the nature of the external world has to be based on the sense data (*phassa*), and speculation that goes beyond sense data would be metaphysical and futile." The above

is a complex statement which covers several phenomenological data unclearly put together. Kalupahana's suggestion is that the perceptual statements in the suttas imply a kind of phenomenalism. Let us analyse Kalupahana's contention confining ourselves to the central contents just mentioned. Our claim is that the perceptual elements found in the suttas and therefore in the Buddhistic Nikāyas suggest a primitive causal theory of perception. We shall begin our justification of this claim with a consideration of the statement: "Visual consciousness arises because of (the) eye and (because of) material shapes..." These words refer to a significant notion, namely, "material shape," which is not the one to be emphasized centrally in any sense-data theory either in a primitive sense or in a more modern sense. It is noteworthy, therefore, at this juncture, to try to explicate Kalupahana's alternative notion "visible form," which replaces "material shape" in I. B. Horner's translation. Is the notion "visible form" equivalent to that of "colour" or "shape" or "patch" or "sound" as expounded by G. E. Moore, Bertrand Russell, A. J. Ayer, etc.? According to modern sense-data thinkers, "colour," "shape," "patch," "sound," are but sense-data which are basically different from physical objects.⁷ It appears that Kalupahana is assuming that "visible form" is equivalent to a "sense datum" in the modern sense. However, he does not argue his case convincingly. This is clear from his attempt to read some kind of phenomenalism into certain perceptual claims in the suttas in the Buddhistic Nikāyas. In order to develop his view, he represents *phassa* as sense data. However, the notion of a sense-datum remains inappropriate or seems to have brought in conflicting contexts which work at cross-purposes. The concept of *phassa paccaya vedanā*² (meaning: "depending on contact is feeling"), surely need not implicitly contain a controversial sub-concept such as "sense-datum." The introduction of a notion of a sense-datum by Kalupahana at the outset itself poses a significant problem, namely, that relating to precisely the logical status he gives to sense-data. And the status he gives it is some kind of a factual status. This is strongly evident from his assertion

to the effect that "...there are specific statements that knowledge of the external world is based on experience (*vedanā*), and that this experience is dependent on contact with sense-data (*phāssa*), and speculation that goes beyond sense data would be metaphysical and futile."⁹

But, then, firstly, if experience is dependent on contact with sense-data, is it not the case that

(i) "experience" and

(ii) "contact with sense-data"

are two different categories, such that the former is subjective and the latter characterised some sort of objectivity. Ontologically, sense-data must be *there* to effect "contact with sense-data." Unless Kalupahana gives a very different meaning to the phrase "contact with sense-data", it empirically implies just the meaning we have just noted. If sense data are *there* for one to *contact*, it follows that they are neither mental creations nor physical objects but *verifiable data* according to Kalupahana. However, the premise as well as the conclusion of his argument are dubious, for the logical status of sense-data stands underlined on the one hand and cloudy on the other. They are given, primitively, a status that may be said to be similar to that of physical objects; yet the relation between sense-data and physical objects is not dealt with. He may try to get out of this predicament by arguing that the theory implicitly embodied in the suttas which emphasise 'perception' represents "a form of phenomenalism," so that the notion of a physical object would not be necessary. But we contend that such an argument would be unconvincing for there is an acceptance of the notion of a physical object. In support of this contention, we shall quote the following significant passage which we believe will confirm our exposition. The passage is as follows: "...just as a space that is enclosed by stakes and creepers and grass and clay is known as a dwelling, so a space that is enclosed by bones and sinews and flesh and skin is known as a material shape."¹⁰ Accordingly, the notion of a physical object (a material object) plays a central role. From this we conclude that the notion of a sense-datum does

not occupy a central place in these primitive perceptual reflections.

And secondly, to make explicit 'phenomenalism,' Kalupahana heavily depends on J. H. Baldwin's exposition of 'phenomenon' in the Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology. This introduction is good but at the same time effort should have been made to reveal the limitations on the subject matter at hand. Buddhism, the religion which is preached by the Buddha,¹¹ conceptually embodies a very ancient cultural environment (pastoral) in the Indian civilization. But Baldwin's notion of 'phenomenon' is coloured by Contemporary epistemology which sprang out of theoretical speculations in modern science (technological environment) in the Western world. This in turn is embedded in Graeco-Roman civilization. Philosophically speaking, what emerges into explicitness are conflicting contexts, viz., religion (the religious context) and science (the scientific context) which work at cross-purposes. Culture-wise as well as context-wise, Buddhism and Modern science are basically different. To put the point differently, their natures are poles apart and goal-wise, they can be distinguished from each other. It is unwise on the part of Kalupahana to ignore these significant differences.

Phenomenalism, very broadly speaking, maintains that physical object statements entail some statements about sense data, but not vice versa. This theory poses a central problem, that is to justify the move from these to a world independent of ourselves. If phenomenalism deals with only sense data as Kalupahana maintains, then one would be confined to one's own experiences in complete solitude. If so, the theory is unverifiable in principle. But, however, we need not end up in solipsism as happened in Kalupahana's exposition, for the Nikāyas do admit the existence of physical objects (material objects). For instance, in Mahā-hatthipadopama-sutta, ontologywise, a "cause" is operative with regard to "painful feeling."¹² The same is the case with the Madhupindika sutta in which "the eye" and "the material shape" are clearly emphasised as causes.¹³

Phenomenalism or Causal theory of perception

If what Kalupahana says is the case, namely, that all that we sense are sense data, what would be the nature of the external world? With reference to this problem, there is little that Kalupahana has to offer. It is wrong to say that the emphasis "is on sense data as the content of our empirical knowledge, with denial of any real substratum behind phenomena."^{13a} But, then, "a denial of any real substratum behind phenomena" (=X) is one thing, and, "the acceptance of sense-data as the content of our empirical knowledge" (=Y) is another thing. To put it differently, Y does not follow by necessity from X. Our contention is that X can be entertained without entertaining Y and vice versa. Alternatively, there has been no attempt to explain or analyse away physicality factually by sense data. Nor does it explain or analyse away physicality conceptually, by a notion of a sensedatum; for it affirms both sensory impingement and the physicality in such a way that neither is reducible to the other nor is physicality explained away by sense data. This is evident from the acceptance in the *Mahā-hatthipadopama-sutta* of a view to the effect that visual consciousness arises because of the eye and of *material shapes* (the word in Kalupahana's translation is 'visible form'). To put the matter still more explicitly, while the eye and material shapes are considered to be causes of certain effects, there is no effort here to analyse away physicality, factually or conceptually, by sense data. It is incorrect, therefore, to characterise such a theory as a type of phenomenalism. For Kalupahana's contention, as already noted above, is that the content of our empirical knowledge is sense data so that ontologywise, an acceptance of a physical object is not satisfactory. However, the *Madhupindika sutta* and the *Mahā-hatthipadopama-sutta* centrally entertain the notion of a physical object of a very special kind whose characteristic is substratumlessness. Alternatively speaking, this contention, by necessity, does not lead us to an acceptance of a type of phenomenalism which springs out of a notion of a sense datum. The concept of a physical object, when laid bare, may lead to a substratumless object; yet it can be called a physical object

without getting involved in self-contradiction or in a fallacy. The reflections in the suttas already noted, primitively speaking, permit such a view; but, then, it is problematic whether such reflections can lead us to the type of phenomenalism that Kalupahana reads into them. Though his contention is that "the emphasis on sense data as the content of our empirical knowledge," yet it remains unsubstantiated. As a logical point, the emphasis in them seems to be on (i) sensory impingement, (ii) causal production and (iii) the material shapes (physical objects = material objects), and from these, it is doubtful that what Kalupahana entertains follows at all.

This point would further be made explicit if (ii) and (iii) above are analysed more fully. This we shall attempt now. Human physiology has it that the nervous system receives rapidly moving chains of impulses. This is a well known fact. It is appropriate to look at this fact not in order to make it better known but simply to explicate its meaning in the context of our main argument — that the perceptual reflections in the suttas entertain the view that there are physical objects which are also the causes of our veridical perceptions. The sense organs and physical objects (material shapes) play significant roles in producing veridical perceptions. If the physical object is non-present, a perception can still be produced, but it remains basically a non-veridical perception, for instance, an illusory perception or an hallucinatory one. The primitive perceptual model in primitive Buddhism as embodied in the *Nikāyas* is thus apparent, and it is clear that the notion of a physical object is centrally vital. To put it differently, the notion of a physical object plays a centrally significant rôle in producing a veridical perception or a true perception. And, therefore, reading a notion of a sense-datum into the account, as is done by Kalupahana, is unnecessary.

Owing to set Western conceptual (hence philosophical) orientations, the use of perceptual concepts are, very often, neatly arranged in conceptual families or conceptual schemes as noted by later Wittgenstein, Hamlyn, Ryle and others.

But such perceptual concepts become increasingly cloudy when considered against the perceptual reflections in primitive Buddhistic thinking in particular. The reason relates to the limitations of the subject matter at hand within which we are compelled to operate. Accordingly, the perceptual reflections in the suttas do not attempt to account for a notion of a sense datum by the existence of the physical object (the material shape), Y. Alternatively, they do not record a notion of a sense datum to be explained by the existence of a physical object (the material shape), Y.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the perceptual reflections implicit in the suttas of the Buddhistic *Nikāyas* simply attempt, in a very primitive sense, to characterise the central notions concerning a veridical perceptual situation. As we pointed out earlier too, from these perceptual reflections, a primitive causal theory of perception can be elicited. What we mean here by the word 'primitive' is that the theory is not on a par with modern causal theories of perception which successfully account for both veridical and non-veridical perceptions.

Once the central perceptual concepts in these suttas are made explicit, very briefly of course, in this way, certain other claims Kalupahana makes may be seen to be unwarranted. One such claim is that "speculation that goes beyond sense data would be metaphysical and futile." If this statement is true, any claim which asserts the existence of a physical object is both metaphysical and futile as it involves much more than mere sense data. Do the texts of the suttas which emphasize perceptual reflections substantiate this claim of Kalupahana? Not at all. What the texts make explicit is that the external objects impinge on our sense organs in the form of stimuli; and as and when the mind is attentive to these stimuli, sense-impressions or sense data are produced. The *Nidāna* Book testifies to this conclusion thus: "On account of the organ of sight and visual objects there arise visual consciousness. And the meeting of these three, i.e. the organ of sight, visual objects and visual con-

consciousness, jointly contribute to generate a visual sense-datum:" ("cakkhum ca paṭicca rupam ca paṭicca uppajjati cakkhuvinnānam tinnaṃ gāgati phasso").¹⁴ Accordingly we see that the perceptual assertions in these suttas do accept the notions of "physicality," "sense organic body-sensitivity" and "mechanism of the mind." And they clearly point to something much more than mere sense-data (impressions). What emerges into explicitness is the impossibility of "phenomenalism" which is read into perceptual assertions in the suttas of the Buddhist *Nikāyas*, by Kalupahana.

Conceptually speaking, it looks impressive to judge statements that endorse the existence of physical objects as metaphysical. However, this argument needs to be established, and Kalupahana does not even attempt to provide an argument in this connection. Therefore, the kind of phenomenalism he reads into perceptual reflections in the suttas remains both vulnerable and problematic. Is it valid to see a kind of phenomenalism in the perceptual reflections just mentioned? We contend it is invalid. And we argue for our case as follows: The *Mahā-hatthipadopama-sutta* deals with a valid perception-occurrence in this way: "But when your reverences, the eye that is internal intact and external material shapes come within its range and there is the appropriate impact, then there is thus an appearance of the appropriate section of consciousness."¹⁵ A notion of a sense-datum is not contained either in a primitive sense or in a modern sense in this passage, which can be considered as centrally important for reflections on perception.

In any event, Kalupahana's judgment, namely that "...speculation that goes beyond sense data would be metaphysical and futile," is nebulous. What, for instance, does his statement mean? Very lucidly speaking, its scope

* For ease of comprehension, a literal rendering of the original will follow here, for a rendering that reads more easily: "But when, your Reverences, external material shapes (physical objects) come within the range of the eye that is intact internally and the appropriate impact is made, then, in this manner, does the appropriate aspect of consciousness appear."

is so limitedly drawn that the only notion that is incorporated within non-metaphysics is that of a sense-datum. And, therefore, conceptual models, mathematical symbols, scientific entities, physical objects and physical existents are pushed into *metaphysics*, which is characterized as futile. But is not this conclusion too harsh on the one hand unwarranted on the other in the context of the major conceptual tenets in the suttas? We contend that the suttas clearly accept the notion of a physical object, and that they also accept the notion of a cause. According to Kalupahana's position, we are now in the territory of *metaphysics*. But surely this position remains unestablished, for the suttas in the Buddhist *Nikāyas* clearly accept the notions such as "sensory impingement," "percipient," "physical object" and "cause". If so, according to Kalupahana's premise the conclusion must be that the perceptual reflections in them are also metaphysical. But however this conclusion does not follow from the central notions in the suttas. To put the point yet more explicitly, the suttas accept the notions of "sensory impingement," "percipient," "physical object" and "cause;" and, therefore, they suggest neither phenomenalism nor metaphysics as conceived by Kalupahana but a causal theory of perception, in a primitive sense.

Therefore, the notion of the external world, as conceived in the Buddhistic suttas is not something which has got to do with sense-data. For notions of a percipient and of the physical object are centrally accepted here as playing significant rôles in connection with perception-occurrence phenomenologically. Accordingly, ontologywise, that is to say, in relation to what exists and in what way, the suttas note physical objects and percepts on the one hand and causal conditioning on the other. The point is highlighted thus: "This painful feeling that has arisen in me is born of sensory impingement on the ear, it has a cause, not no cause."¹⁶ The notions in the suttas once they are made explicit in this manner, work together to bring about a kind of causal theory of perception and not a kind of phenomenalism. What is implicative, therefore, is the physical nature of the external world as against the phenomenal nature

Kalupahana superimposes on the external world, and from this a *primitive* causal theory of perception emerges into explicitness.

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NOTES

1. *Majjhimā Nikāya*, Vol. I, ed. V. Trenckner and R. Chalmers, London, PTS: Tr. I. B. Horner, Middle Length Sayings, Vol. I, London, PTS., 1954-9, 190.
2. *Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, D. J. Kalupahana, The University Press of Hawaii, Honolulu, 1975, p. 70.
3. *Majjhimā Nikāya*, Vol. I, Middle Length Sayings (*op. cit.*,) 111.
4. *Ibid.*, 190.
5. *Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* (*op. cit.*,) p. 70.
6. "rūpa" — *Majjhimā Nikāya*, Vol. I, (*op. cit.*,) 190.
7. Research Papers: Philosophy, A. D. P. Kalansuriya, Lake House Printers and Publishers Ltd., Colombo, 1972, Paper I, pp. 1-14.
8. *Majjhimā Nikāya*, Vol. I, (*op. cit.*,) pp. 111-2.
9. *Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, (*op. cit.*,) p. 70.
10. *Majjhimā Nikāya*, Vol. I, Middle Length Sayings, Vol. I, (*op. cit.*,) 190.
11. *Majjhimā Nikāya*, Vol. II, Middle Length Sayings, Vol. II, Tr. I. B. Horner, London, PTS., 1954-9, 211.
12. *Majjhimā Nikāya*, Vol. I, Middle Length Sayings, Vol. I, (*op. cit.*,) p. 232.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 145.
- 13A. *Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* (*op. cit.*,) p. 87.

14. *Samyutta Nikāya*, Vol. II, Ed. L. Feer, London, PTS., Tr. C.A.F. Rhys Davids and F. L. Woodward, The Book of the Kindred Sayings, Vol. II, London, PTS., 1917-30, 72.
15. *Majjhima Nikāya*, Vol. I, Middle Length Sayings, Vol. I, (*op. cit.*,) p. 236.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 232.

REVIEWS :

Dr. Mahesh Chandra Bharatiya: Causation In Indian Philosophy (with special reference to Nyāya-vaiśeṣika) Vimal Prakashan, Raṇ Nagar, Ghaziabad (U.P.) 1973, pp. 297; Price Rs. 45/-.

The work under review is originally a Ph.D. thesis submitted to Meerut University. It presents a study of the theories of causation as viewed and advocated by different important systems of Indian Philosophy. It is divided in three parts. The first part deals with the problem of causation, both in East and West. A brief survey of the western treatment of causation has also been attempted so that an insight may be attained into the problems of causation and the Indian treatment of the problem may be examined and evaluated in the modern perspective. It has been maintained by the author of the present work that while western thinkers are occupied by the considerations of the relation of the efficient cause with its effect, the basic problem discussed by the Indian thinkers is that of the relation of the material cause with its effect. A classification of Indian theories of causation has been furnished on this ground. The second part of the work is concerned with the theories of causation in schools other than Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika comprising Cārvāka, Sāṃkhya-Yoga, Vedānta, Buddhist, Jains and Mīmāṃsa. The Cārvāka views on causation-its denial of causation, its SVABHĀVA-VĀDA and YDRCCHĀ-VĀDA have been explained and critically examined. The Sāṃkhya theory of causation-the Satkārya-Vāda, the Parīṇāma-Vāda or Vikāra-Vāda has been explained and examined. The yoga treatment of the theory has been discussed with its various aspects: the doctrine of dharmās and dharmin, nimitta Kāraṇa, Parīṇāma, Krama-niyama and Upbandha. Theory of causation in Upaniṣads and various schools of vedānta, Advaita-Vāda, viśiṣṭ-advaita vāda, Dvaita vāda, Dvaita-advaita-vāda and śuddhādvaita-vāda has been discussed. The theory of causation in Advaita-vāda has been traced historically taking the important Advaita writers

chronologically. The Ajāti-vāda of Gauḍapāda has been explained, Śaṅkara's theory of causation has been discussed in detail and it has been maintained that Śaṅkara is both a pariṇāma-vādin on the phenomenal plane and a Vivārta-vādin on the absolute plane. Buddhist theory of causation—the pratītya-samutpāda-vāda has been discussed. The various interpretations of pratītya samutpāda in different schools of Buddhist philosophy, the Hīnyāna schools — Theravāda and Vaibhāṣika and Mahāyāna schools, Mādhyamika and yogacāra, have been discussed. The Jaina view of causation which is a synthesis of satkārya-vāda and asatkārya-vāda, has been also stated and examined. The Jaina classification of cause has also been furnished. The Mīmāṃsā view of causation has been discussed and it has been maintained by the author of the present work that much of Mīmāṃsā view is the same as that in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika with, however, some minor differences, e.g. in the case of Kumārila, who does not accept the category of inherence and hence, for him the classification of inherent and non-inherent causes becomes meaningless. It has been shown that the main difference of Mīmāṃsā with Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is that the former accepts some sort of causal power (śakti) in causes. The arguments given by Mīmāṃsā to propound this causal power have also been examined.

The author does not claim much originality in this part of his work. But he claims to have based his treatment of the problem, as far as possible, on the original sanskrit works and at times, he also claims to have touched the points so far unexplored.

The third part is the main part of the work where he claims to have devoted much of his labour and time to make an humble contribution to the advancement of knowledge in the field. Herein various aspects of Nāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation i.e. definitions of cause and effect, unnecessary antecedents (anyathāsidhas) kinds of causes, plurality of causes and the doctrine of avayavin, have been discussed in detail in separate chapters. A separate chapter has been devoted to the causation of qualities and actions

(See Chapter-VIII, part II I). It has been maintained that there is a separate set of causes for the qualities and actions and because the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers have made a clear distinction between substance (Dharmin) and qualities (Dharmas). General causation of qualities and the problems faced therein have been examined and various incongruities and absurdities have been pointed out in the conception (See pp. 223 ff.). The Nyāya-vaiśeṣika theory of causation has been compared to the theories of other schools of Indian philosophy and several similarities and distinctions have been shown (See Chapter X of the part III).

The author of the present work claims to have removed several misconceptions regarding the theory of causation. Dr. D. N. Shastri, who has also been teacher and supervisor of the present research work of the author, in his work 'Critique of Indian Realism' has maintained that the conception of Samavāyikāraṇa and Asamavāyikāraṇa was absent in the early works in Nāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy and it is a later development. But the author of the present work has clearly shown that the conception of both Samavāyikāraṇa and asamavāyikāraṇa was found to be present even in the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras of Kaṇāda, which is the earliest work on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy. Dr. D. N. Shastri in his aforementioned work has maintained, according to the author of the present work, that there exist two types of theories of causation in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Philosophy. One earlier to be found in the Nyāya-sūtras of Gotama and the other later, to be found in the later works from Udyotkara and Vacaspati onward. The author of the present work has devoted a separate chapter to discuss this view of his teacher, Dr. Shastri and has shown that this view is based on mis-interpretation. According to the present author, there exists only one theory of causation according to which when the arrangement of the parts of a substance is disturbed and a fresh arrangement is made, the previous āvayavin residing in the parts is destroyed and a fresh āvayavin is produced in the parts which

reside there, side by side with the parts, through Samavāya-relation. This theory is found from the earliest works of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, i.e. — Vaiśeṣika-sūtraś and Nyāya-sūtras to the later works like that of Vacaspati-misra, Viśvaṇāth etc. (See pp. 186, 189 and 191.).

Several other misconceptions of Dr. Shastri have been pointed out and removed by the author of the present work. So the author of the present work, though a disciple of Dr. D. N. Shastri, is not his unthinking gramophone. He appears to be fairly independent and critical.

Many wrong interpretations of Sanskrit texts by scholars like Ganganāth Jha, J. N. Sinha, J. R. Ballantyne, Radhakrishnan and Umesh Mishra have also been pointed out and correct interpretations have been suggested (see pp. 40, 44, 137, 178, 227 and 243).

The author of the present work also distinguishes very clearly the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception of Samavāyi-Kāraṇa from Sāṃkhya conception of Upādāna-Kāraṇa and maintains that it is wrong to translate Samavāyi-Kāraṇa, for material cause, as has been done by scholars like Radhakrishnan, S. N. Dasgupta and J. N. Sinha, (See pp. 158-59 and 263). It has been clearly shown by the author of the present work that the Sāṃkhya does not make a distinction between dharmas (properties) and Dharmin (Substance) and as such the conception of Samavāyi-Kāraṇa and asamavāyi-Kāraṇa there is fused into one, that of Upādāna-Kāraṇa. But in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika a distinction is made between the Dharmas and Dharmin and as such the arrangement of the parts, which is a Dharma (quality), introduce a difference in the previous substance and the new substance. The literal meaning of Upādāna-Kāraṇa is the cause which is taken up (upādiyate) to get at the effect and as such it can be accepted in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy also. A seed thus can be known as an Upādāna-Kāraṇa for a sprout in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika also, though the inherent causes of sprout are only the parts of the seed and not the seed itself. If, however, we take up only parts to get at the

effect without an avayavin residing in the parts, the parts themselves can be called *Upādāna-Kāraṇa*.

The work under review fails not so much because it has left any stone unturned in gathering the requisite data on the subject but in putting the data in the development model he proposes to put. What one mostly gathers from the present work is who has said a particular thing and in what work. But beyond this on the developmental score the readers do not appear to gain much. One rather gathers the tabulation of the data. But just tabulation of the data is not developmental account of the problem — logical or chronological. He should have given a philosophical reconstruction of the problem under discussion.

But the author being a scholar of both Sanskrit and Philosophy has been able to base his study on the original Sanskrit texts and give it a modern orientation. The work carries a valuable bibliography, index of names and subjects and also a scheme of transliteration. The printing is good. In spite of the aforementioned shortcomings the author of the present work has collected invaluable data and industriously accommodated them in the work. The work can be recommended both to students and researchers of logic and metaphysics in general and Indian Logic and Philosophy in particular.

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Ram Lal Singh

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Oxford University Press

Bombay Delhi Calcutta Madras

J. FEYS, *The Life of a Yogi*, Calcutta: Firma KLM, 1976, 54 pages, cms. 14 × 21, Rs. 12.

Dr. J. Feys is establishing himself as an independent expert on Śri Aurobindo. His first book, *The Philosophy of Evolution in Śri Aurobindo and Teilhard de Chardin* (reviewed in IPQ, I/3, 267-9), has been highly spoken of by critics in India and abroad. A study of their spirituality is in the press. And here we have an exegetical study of Śri Aurobindo's autobiographic documents concerning his spiritual experiences contained in the collection, *On Himself* (Pondicherry, 1972).

The importance of these documents for a proper understanding of his doctrinal writings was already underlined in Vol. 30 of his "Birth Centenary Library" (*ibid.*, 1975), pp. ii-iii: "Śri Aurobindo's consciousness underwent great development between 1892, when he was a student of twenty writing the *Harmony of Virtue*, and 1950, when as a master of Yoga he put the finishing touches to *Savitri*. It is necessary to take this development into consideration when evaluating Śri Aurobindo's writings of different periods."

Feys distinguishes four major spiritual experiences linked as follows with the five phases of Śri Aurobindo's development:

Phase I : Pre-Yogic Experiences, 1892-1903.

Phase II : Beginning of Yoga practice, 1904-1907.

Phase III : Two complementary experiences, namely, First major experience (of the Silent Brahman), at Baroda, early 1908;

Second major experience (of the Cosmic Brahman), at Alipore Jail, 1908-1909.

Phase IV : Period of maturing and groping, 1910-1920.

Third major experience (synthesizing the first two, viz., of the Silent or Static and of the Dynamic Brahman).

Phase V : Exploring the Future, 1920-1950.

Fourth major experience (of the higher planes of consciousness from Overmind to Supermind).

Phase I is marked by initial, still inarticulate, pre-yogic experiences: one, unclear, in London (1892); a second, an experience of vast calm which remained with him for long months afterwards, when he stepped first on Indian soil at the Apollo Bunder in Bombay, (1893) back from England; a third, a vision of the Godhead surging up from within, when he had a near carriage accident in Baroda (1893); a fourth, an aesthetic realisation of the vacant Infinite, on the ridge of the Takhat-i-Suleman in Kashmir (1903); a fifth, a feeling of the living presence of Kālī in a shrine on the bank of the Narmada (undated but prior to 1904). That the list is not exhaustive, is suggested by the 'etc.' of the document. These are all spontaneous experiences which he had "before he knew anything about Yoga or even what Yoga was." But they herald the next Yogic experiences.

Phase II is devoted to Yoga practice. "I did not start Yoga till about 1904." He "started Yoga by himself without a Guru." A friend explained to him the control of breath and he earnestly engaged into this (still external) practice of *prāṇāyāma* for four years but without appreciable spiritual growth. He was at the same time engaged in febrile political activity following the Partition of Bengal in 1905. Nevertheless, "there was no conflict or wavering between Yoga and politics," unlike the time (in 1910) he would leave politics, he says, "because I did not want anything to interfere with my Yoga."

Phase III is marked by two intense experiences. "The first he gained while meditating with the Maharashtrian Yogi Vishnu Bhaskar Lele at Baroda in January 1908." "He had had no helper or Guru in Yoga till he met Lele and that was only for a short time." This happened at a time, he says, when "after four years of *prāṇāyāma* and other practices on my own, I had a complete arrest and was at a

loss. At this juncture I was induced to meet a man without fame whom I did not know, a Bhakta with a limited mind but with some experience and evocative power." Thus the experience itself was not the fruit of *sādhana*. It was nonetheless induced systematically by the method of 'rejection of thought' taught by Lele. " 'Sit down,' I was told, 'look and you will see that your thoughts come into you from outside. Before they enter, fling them back.' I sat down and looked and saw to my astonishment that it was so; I saw and felt concretely the thought approaching as if to enter through or above the head and was able to push it back concretely before it came inside. In three days — really in one — my mind became full of an eternal silence — it is still there." Śri Aurobindo viewed this experience as 'Advaitic,' 'Vedāntic,' which explains the *bhakta* Lele's disavowal of his disciple. "The first result was a series of tremendously powerful experiences and radical changes of consciousness which he [Lele] had never intended — for they were Advaitic and Vedāntic and he was against Advaita Vedānta — and which were quite contrary to my own ideas, for they made me see with a stupendous intensity the world as a cinematographic play of vacant forms in the impersonal universality of the Absolute Brahman." Let us note that "the realisation of the silent, spaceless and timeless Brahman [was] gained *after* a complete and abiding stillness of the whole consciousness." The latter preceded and induced the former. It was a negative "feeling and perception of the total unreality of the world" followed by a positive realisation of "some undefinable Reality... perceived as true... beyond space and time and unconnected with any cosmic activity, but yet... met wherever one turned." He considered both as unconnected with his previous yoga, unexpected and gratuitous. Yet we may wonder how much immediate interpretation in the light of Aurobindo's pre-yogic experiences entered his viewing of the pure experienced datum of this series of experiences; this is, indeed, a vexing question which imposes itself on the critic of any mystic experience: was it self-interpretative or did the mystic interpret it in the light of his previous views or

inclinations? As to the element of givenness, Sri Aurobindo emphasized it and thought that these experiences had been given to him "by the grace either of a temporary Guru (but it was not that, for he was himself bewildered by it) or by the grace of the eternal Brahman and afterwards by the grace of Mahakali and Krishna." Here the intrusion of interpretation is clearer. As to Lele, "he was alarmed, tried to undo what he had done and told me that it was not the Divine but the devil that had got hold of me." However, "the final upshot was that he [Lele] was made by a Voice within him to hand me to the Divine within me enjoining an absolute surrender to its will — a principle or rather a seed-force to which I kept unswervingly and increasingly..."

For several months Sri Aurobindo's condition remained unimpaired even though "the sense of unreality disappeared and there was a return to participation in the world-consciousness" which, however, did not cancel his inner peace and freedom. He now experienced a de-possession of self in his very involvement in worldly concerns: "something else than himself took up his dynamic activity and spoke and acted through him but without any personal thought or initiative." But "what this was remained unknown" for he had not yet realised the dynamic side of the Brahman.

The second experience of Phase III happened in the Alipore jail. Antithetic to the first, it made him realise "the cosmic consciousness" and "the Divine as all beings" or, as he expressed it also in theistic terms, "God within us all." First, he felt directed by God to the Gītā-sādhana: "He placed the Gita in my hands. His strength entered into me and I was able to do the Sadhana of the Gita." Divine directions came to him in the form of auditory phenomena. On the third day of his arrest (May 4, 1908) "a voice came to me from within, 'Wait and see'." Jailed on the 5th and placed in solitary confinement, "I waited day and night for the voice of God within me, to know what He had to say to me, to learn what I had to do." He was not long disappointed: "It seemed to me that he spoke to me again and said, 'The bonds you had not the strength to break, I have broken for

you'." Just as God, with the face of Sri Krishna, spoke to him, so also Aurobindo had taken to praying to him: "I should have Thy protection;" "If Thou art, then, Thou knowest my heart;" "Give me Thy *Adesh* (command):" He was also undergoing visionary phenomena, seeing Krishna surrounding him in the form of the jail high walls or of the tree in front of his cell. Hearing God tell him; 'Look now at the Prosecuting Counsel,' he looked and it was not the Counsel he saw: "it was Sri Krishna who sat there, it was my Lover and Friend who sat there and smiled." This recurring vision of Krishna as indwelling all things and men, enhanced his sense of fellowship: "I looked at the prisoners in the jail, the thieves, the murderers, the swindlers, and as I looked at them I saw Vasudeva, it was Narayana whom I found in these darkened souls and misused bodies. Amongst these thieves and dacoits there were many who put me to shame by their sympathy, their kindness, the humanity triumphant over such adverse circumstances." Thus the vision made him more humane and more humble.

How did he express the essence of these various mystical realisations? "He made me realise the central truth of the Hindu religion," the truth of God's personal presence in all. "I am in all men and I overrule their actions and their words." It revealed that the events of his arrest, imprisonment and trial were providentially guided. This insight determined his unreserved surrender and made him leave the whole issue of his case to his Counsel Srijut Chittaranjan Das. And he realised that God's operative presence extended not only to his case but to the whole course of history. "I have shown you that I am everywhere and in all men...not only in those who are striving for the country but...also in those who oppose them."

Finally he is told, "I give you the *Adesh* to go forth and do my work" and "Behold the people among whom I have sent you to do a little of my work." These people are represented by the jailed criminals. But is this work the socio-political activity which his arrest had interrupted? He is told, "I have brought you here to teach you what you

could not learn for yourself and to train you for my work." As emerges from the conclusion of the Uttarpara speech uttered by Śrī Aurobindo on his release and in which he explained his experiences, the divine work meant would be that of a nationalism with a religious inspiration; it would be the emancipation of the country for the world-wide spread of the Hindu religion. Yet, he was still uncertain. The balance between service of the nation and religious pursuit was still ambiguous. Actually his social and political involvement was to come to an abrupt end on his withdrawal to Pondicherry. His bhakti-fervour too would corrode, as we shall see presently. For this withdrawal also he received a command: "I suddenly received a command from above, in a Voice well known to me, in three words, 'Go to Chandernagore'... Afterwards, under the same 'sailing orders' I left Chandernagore and reached Pondicherry on April 4th, 1910."

Phase IV is less well documented. The ten years between 1910 and 1920 were a period of groping and maturing: "It took me ten more years of intense Yoga under a supreme inner guidance to trace it [the real way] out and that was because I had my past and the world's past to assimilate and overpass before I could find and found the future." His third experience is only succinctly referred to as "that of the supreme Reality with the static and dynamic Brahman as its two aspects." It is the synthesis of the Baroda and the Alipore experiences which had been somehow antithetic.

Phase V (1920-1950) corresponds to the fourth major experience, "that of the higher planes of consciousness leading to the Supermind." In the light of *The Life Divine*, Book II, ch. 26, we may identify these as Higher Mind, Illumined Mind, Intuition and Overmind. This period is highlighted by the descent of the Overmind in 1926. It was the supreme achievement of his unrelenting sādhanā. "The only real difficulty which took decades of spiritual effort to work out towards completeness was to apply the spiritual knowledge utterly to the world and to the surface psycho-

logical and outer life and to effect its transformation both on the higher planes of Nature [corresponding to the above higher planes of consciousness] and on the ordinary mental, vital and physical levels down to the subconscious and the basic Inconscience and up to the supreme Truth-Consciousness or Supermind in which alone the dynamic transformation could be entirely integral and absolute." This retrospective view belongs to a document dated 1946. The experiences of this fifth period are also reflected in the later chapters of the second redaction of *The Life Divine*.

Dr. Feys, finally, relates Śri Aurobindo's chief works to those five phases since they cannot be rightly interpreted except against the background of the experiences which ground their systematisation. *Essays on the Gītā* corresponds in its structure of Kshara Brahman, Akshara Brahman and Purushottama to the first three major experiences of the static/dynamic Brahman and the synthesis of both. *The Life Divine*, 2d redaction, corresponds to the fifth phase and the fourth experience. *The Synthesis of Yoga* complements the *Essays*; its first part, of later redaction, may reflect experiences of the fifth period. *Savitri* appears to be the complete flower of all the various phases and experiences.

In reviewing this book I have thought it useful to the reader to be provided with a summary of the results of Dr. Feys's ordering of the series of spiritual events which constituted the inner life of the great Yogi Śri Aurobindo. All my quotations are from the latter's autobiographic documents; their exact references will be found in the book itself. There also the reader will be exposed to Dr. Feys's perceptiveness, interpretative acumen, clarity of exposition, sustaining sympathy with his subject and utter reliability.

Dnyānadeepa Vidyāpeeth,
Pune 14.

R. V. DeSmet

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THE NEW HUMANISM, By Max Hamburg, Ph.D. Philosophical Library, New York, 1975, pp. 195, No index, \$ 9.75.

The title of this small volume recalls the emergence of the Humanist Movement in the spiritual wasteland of 1930's when John Dewey and associates proclaimed a then famous "Humanist Manifesto." Dewey's picture would indeed be more fitting on the cover jacket than Whitehead whose analytical thinking was planes above the shifting negations and materialism of Humanism sugarcoated as Naturalism. Humanism was not a fixed creed and according to this author it is even less now. He fails to connect it with the development of Western thought since Descartes (1596-1650). He writes:

The New Humanism is not a program; it is a mood that emerged from a deep-felt revulsion against man's inhumanity to man."

This is a too simple dismissal. Humanism is a revolt against theological dogmatism, a plea for the secular consciousness, a movement to set up the empirical method of science as the true organon of knowledge. It rejects Theism and dualism without adequate critical understanding of Philosophy. Hence the importance of a book like Hooking's COMING WORLD CIVILIZATION which explains so well the meaning of the Cartesian revolution in science for Modernity. But Prof. Hamburg ignores all this. His list of 12 "profound" books shed little light on the real intellectual crisis of Modernity. Reisman, W. Whyte, Galbraith and Chas. Reich are enormously interesting but meagre philosophical fare, giving little insight into basic principles.

Reich's clever GREENING OF AMERICA is a must for the informed reader but the last book to recommend to immature students' educational guidance and a key to ethical norms. A better choice would be Dewey's A COMMON FAITH, which reminds us that so much which is most enduring in society is "not of ourselves" but the heritage of pathfinders before us. Hamburg quotes Reich as saying:

"Consciousness III rejects the whole concept of excellence and comparative merit...."

As if civilization did not begin with some one's striving for excellence, a tentative (at least) standard of merit. To reject all discrimination, all standards of merit is to betray the intellectual life.

Socrates saw the point in his debates with the Sophists. Philosophical progress makes a return to Protagoras untenable. In a sense he was the first Humanist. Man and his welfare was ever his concern.

The chapter on "Roots of Science" is most interesting part of this challenging book. For it is also a burning denunciation of militarism and the cult of war. Here the author reveals his vast human sympathy, his empathy for all who suffered in the Vietnam Madness. He concludes with ringing, convincing plea for no more such madness. And for this he wins our lasting respect.

California

Bernhard Mollenhauer

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OUR CONTRIBUTOR, TO VOL. V

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ANNOUNCEMENT

Due to certain unforeseen difficulties in the Press the following Articles could not be included in the July 1978 issue of the Indian Philosophical Quarterly.

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| 2. Communication as Inessential to Art | : R. K. Ghosh |
| 3. Who is the real Hume in the Dialogues? | : D. K. Basu |
| 4. Truth and Language: A Wittgensteinian Analysis | : R. C. Pradhan |
| 5. How Not To Be | : Vidyut Aklujkar |
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| 8. The Concept of Adhyasa and the Vedanta of Samkara | : S. K. Chattopadhyaya |
| 9. A Conceptual layout of Gauda-
da's Kārikās | : S. S. Deshpande |

These articles will now be published in October 1978 issue of the Indian Philosophical Quarterly. The editors regret the delay in publishing these articles.

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BOOKS RECEIVED

1. Jitendrakumar : Bharatwarsha Namakaran (Itihas
Dada Bhoiraj Ani Sanskriti): Jivaji Grantha-
mala, Solapur. (pp. 4 + 480).

2. Dimal Krishna Matilal : The Logical Illumination of Indian Mysticism: Oxford University Press. (pp. 36).
3. Dr. N. Subbu Reddiar : Religion and Philosophy of Nalayiram with Special Reference to Nammalvar: Sri Venkateswar University, Tirupati: 1977. (pp: xvi + 915).
4. J. R. Joshi : Minor Vedic Deities: University of Poona, 1978. (pp. viii + 220).
5. V. K. Bharadwaja : Naturalistic ethical theory: Delhi University Press: 1978. (pp.6 + 191).
6. K. P. Bahadur : The Wisdom of Nyaaya: Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi. (pp. 28 + 246).
7. Wazir Singh : Humanism of Guru Nanak. Ess Ess Publications, New Delhi, 1977. (pp. xv + 191).
8. R. R. Pandey : Man and the Universe in the Orthodox Systems of Indian Philosophy. GDK Publications Delhi, 1978. (pp. ix + 201).
9. B. Kuppaswami : Dharma & Society: A Study in Social Values. The MacMillan Co. of India Ltd., 1977. (pp. ix + 211).

ANNOUNCEMENT

The Indian Philosophical Quarterly is proposing to bring out a Special Number on "Democracy, Discipline and Freedom" by about January 1979. Depending upon the circumstances we hope to bring out this number either as a Supplementary Issue or dedicate the concerned issue in the regular series to the theme. We invite articles on any aspects of the above theme for consideration in this Special Number.

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Contributors are requested to submit *Two Typed Copies* of their articles / reviews (preferably not more than 10 pages double-space typing) and also to provide relevant notes and references at the end of their contributions.

EDITORS

Indian Philosophical Quarterly welcomes papers in all areas of Philosophy, History of Philosophy and Philosophy of Indian Origin. It is interested in persistent, resolute inquiries into basic questions regardless of writers' affiliations.

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the articles

